63 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML
63 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML
 
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# Meguri instance configuration. The process refuses to start without it (MEGURI_CONFIG_FILE).
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# This file is the only place that defines workspaces and which identity-provider groups give
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# which role; there is no UI or API for either. The OIDC client secret is NOT stored here: set
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# MEGURI_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET in the deployment secret store.
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#
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# Applied by the migrate Job (or a single process without MEGURI_SKIP_MIGRATIONS) at every release.
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# Unknown fields and invalid values are rejected at startup.
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auth:
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# Lets ordinary password accounts (created by an instance administrator) sign in.
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# Keep false in production where everyone signs in through SSO.
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password_login: false
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# Break-glass instance administrators. Omit this whole block in production; add it only to get
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# back in when SSO is broken, then remove it again. While present, the generated password is
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# written to the log of the process that synchronized the configuration (the migrate Job), and
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# anyone who can read that log can sign in as an instance administrator. The password is derived
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# from a database-held secret, the username and the current UTC hour; it rotates every hour.
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# bootstrap_admin:
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# usernames: [rescue]
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# OpenID Connect provider. Confidential client, authorization-code flow with PKCE.
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# Redirect URI to register: {MEGURI_PUBLIC_URL}/api/oidc/callback
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oidc:
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issuer: https://sso.example.internal/realms/corp # HTTPS; discovery is read from <issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration
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client_id: meguri
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scopes: [openid, profile, email] # default; must include openid; email links people planned by email
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# Where the groups are. A dotted path into the token claims (for example realm_access.roles).
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# Keycloak: add a "Group Membership" mapper with this claim name, "Add to ID token" and
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# "Add to userinfo" on. Matching below is by exact string, so "Full group path" decides
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# whether values look like /payments/leads or leads.
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groups_claim: groups
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groups_sources: [id_token, userinfo] # searched in this order
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# Groups whose members are instance administrators: they see and may act in every enabled
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# workspace, manage password users and delete disabled workspaces. Not tied to any workspace.
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instance_admin_groups:
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- /meguri/admins
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# Workspaces. `key` is the permanent identifier (3-64 characters: a-z, 0-9, hyphen); never reuse
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# it for something else. `name` is unique and is what people see; changing it renames the
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# workspace. A workspace that exists without a key and has exactly this name is adopted.
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# Removing an entry here DISABLES the workspace (nobody can open it, nothing is published, data is
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# kept); listing it again re-enables it. Deleting it for good is a manual action on the
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# instance administrator's page.
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workspaces:
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- key: payments
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name: Payments
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# Workspace administrators (team leads): every permission in this workspace only. At least one group.
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admin_groups:
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- /payments/leads
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# Employees: the workspace's employee permission set, by default calendar, schedule editing
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# and replacement requests. Administrators change that set in the workspace settings.
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member_groups:
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- /payments/team
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- key: customer-support
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name: Customer Support
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admin_groups:
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- /support/leads
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member_groups:
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- /support/team
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- /support/contractors
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