Describe the layers the way they now are
The module documentation still said addresses were derived from a WireGuard key and that the plugin owned the interface. Both are now wrong, and rustdoc caught it as broken links to modules that had moved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -18,13 +18,15 @@
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//! ourselves, and we do:
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//! ourselves, and we do:
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//!
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//!
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//! * outbound, a packet is routed to the peer that **owns** its destination
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//! * outbound, a packet is routed to the peer that **owns** its destination
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//! address, where ownership is the derivation in [`super::overlay`];
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//! address, where ownership is the signed claim the system level agreed;
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//! * inbound, a decrypted packet is dropped unless its **source** is exactly
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//! * inbound, a decrypted packet is dropped unless its **source** is exactly
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//! the address derived for the peer whose tunnel decrypted it.
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//! the address that peer holds.
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//!
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//!
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//! So a participant cannot receive traffic addressed to someone else, and
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//! So a participant cannot receive traffic addressed to someone else, and
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//! cannot forge traffic that appears to come from someone else, no matter
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//! cannot forge traffic that appears to come from someone else. Neither
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//! what it announced.
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//! check consults anything the peer said here: an address is claimed at the
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//! system level and signed by its holder, and that is what is compared
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//! against.
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
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use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
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@@ -1,43 +1,37 @@
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//! The WireGuard data plane plugin.
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//! The WireGuard protocol plugin.
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//!
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//!
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//! WireGuard is the first IP plugin. It creates real IP connectivity between
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//! The first of them. It carries IP packets between participants; deciding
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//! participants, while the control plane keeps doing what it does: agreeing on
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//! who is in the network, what addresses they hold and which interface those
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//! who is in the network and carrying each participant's opaque announcement.
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//! sit on belongs to the system level, which configures this and then leaves
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//! it to get on with it.
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//!
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//!
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//! The two planes stay separate:
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//! Where the line falls:
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//!
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//!
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//! * **The plugin knows nothing about reachability.** It is handed a
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//! * **The plugin knows nothing about reachability.** It is handed a
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//! [`PacketLink`](crate::dataplane::transport::PacketLink) per peer and
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//! [`PacketLink`](crate::dataplane::transport::PacketLink) per peer and
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//! bridges the kernel WireGuard device onto it. Hole punching and relaying
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//! moves datagrams over it. Hole punching and relaying belong to the
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//! belong to the transport.
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//! transport.
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//! * **The announcement says who, not where.** It carries a public key, so
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//! * **The plugin knows nothing about addresses either.** They are allocated
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//! there is no address for a peer to lie about.
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//! and signed at the system level, the same ones whichever protocol is
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//! * **The core never parses these announcements.** It moves a bounded opaque
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//! moving the packets. Nothing here derives one.
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//! blob; only [`announcement`] interprets it.
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//! * **The announcement says who, not where.** A public key and the network
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//! * **Keys are separate.** The plugin has its own key per network, in its own
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//! it is for, so there is nothing about reachability for a peer to lie
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//! store, unrelated to the iroh device key and to the network secret.
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//! about.
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//! * **WireGuard's own crypto is untouched.** The bridge is a pipe; the
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//! * **The core never parses these announcements.** It moves a bounded
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//! handshake and encryption run end to end between the two kernels.
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//! opaque blob; only [`announcement`] interprets it.
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//! * **Keys are separate.** One key per network, in its own store, unrelated
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//! to the iroh device key and to the network secret.
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//! * **WireGuard's own crypto is untouched.** The handshake and encryption
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//! run end to end between the two ends of a tunnel.
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//!
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//!
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//! # How a mesh forms
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//! WireGuard itself is [`boringtun`]'s protocol state machine, running in
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//! this process: no kernel module, no `wg` tool, the same code on every
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//! platform. [`device::WireguardDevice`] drives one tunnel per peer.
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//!
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//!
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//! Every participant derives its own overlay address from the network id and
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//! The interface underneath comes from [`crate::overlay`], and with its
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//! its own WireGuard public key ([`overlay`]), so no coordinator hands out
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//! in-memory implementation the whole data plane — handshake, encryption,
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//! addresses. Because that derivation is public, each agent computes every
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//! routing, address ownership — runs and is tested with no privileges at
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//! peer's `AllowedIPs` itself instead of believing what the peer claims — a
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//! all.
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//! member cannot route another member's traffic to itself.
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//!
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//! WireGuard itself is [`boringtun`]'s protocol state machine, running in this
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//! process: no kernel module, no `wg` tool, the same code on every platform.
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//! [`device::WireguardDevice`] drives one tunnel per peer and routes packets
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//! between them and a [`tun::TunDevice`].
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//!
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//! The only part that needs privileges is the packet interface. With
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//! [`tun::MemoryTunFactory`] the whole data plane — handshake, encryption,
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//! routing, address ownership — runs and is tested with no privileges at all.
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//! For real traffic there is [`provision::ManagedTunFactory`], where the
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//! agent creates and configures the interface itself over netlink and
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//! removes it again on exit.
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//!
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//!
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//! See `docs/wireguard.md` for the full picture.
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//! See `docs/wireguard.md` for the full picture.
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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//! The boundary to the operating system's packet interface.
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//! The boundary to the operating system's packet interface.
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//!
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//!
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//! The WireGuard implementation in [`super::device`] is pure userspace and
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//! One agent has one of these, and it belongs to the agent rather than to
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//! needs no kernel WireGuard module and no `wg` tool. It does still need a way
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//! any protocol: a packet arriving here is routed to whichever peer owns its
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//! to hand IP packets to the operating system, which is what this trait is.
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//! destination, over whichever protocol has a link to that peer.
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//!
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//!
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//! Two implementations:
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//! Two implementations:
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//!
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//!
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