Remove tun-setup and the attach path it served

The managed interface supersedes both. They go together because apart
they are useless: attaching needs an interface somebody prepared, and
tun-setup existed only to say how to prepare one.

This also corrects what the last commit's README claimed. It said the
manual route was needed on macOS and Windows; it was not, and could not
be. The recipe printed Linux `ip` commands, and a persistent TUN that a
second process can attach to is a Linux concept — macOS creates a utun
by opening a control socket and there is nothing to hand over. So those
platforms were never served by this path, and their honest state is that
a real interface waits on a provisioner, with --no-tun meanwhile.

Gone with it: the interface-existence check, the /proc/net/if_inet6
address inspection and its DAD flag decoding, and the --interface flag,
which had one mode left.

Kept: the check that the allocated IPv4 address is really on a local
interface. The agent now assigns that address itself, so the check is no
longer telling a user what to run — it verifies the outcome instead of
trusting it, which is worth keeping precisely because the assumptions
around Linux address behaviour have been wrong here more than once. Its
message says which interface should have had the address rather than a
command to run.

Boxing Up(UpArgs) is fallout: TunSetupArgs had been masking how much
larger that variant is than its siblings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tsunagi
2026-09-21 14:46:39 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent b23e832a73
commit 4759e47e31
10 changed files with 106 additions and 669 deletions
+17 -15
View File
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ system can hand us IP packets, and even that is behind a trait
| | needs privileges | what it proves |
|---|---|---|
| `MemoryTunFactory` | no | handshake, encryption, routing, address ownership |
| `SystemTunFactory`, attaching | none, if the interface was prepared | traffic actually reaches the OS |
| `SystemTunFactory`, creating | `CAP_NET_ADMIN` | the same, at the cost of a capability |
| `MockProvisioner` | no | the above, plus what would have been done to the host |
| `ManagedTunFactory` | `CAP_NET_ADMIN` | traffic actually reaches the OS |
`SystemTunFactory` attaches to an interface that already exists and only
creates one when it does not. A persistent interface created by root and owned
by the user lets the agent run with no privileges at all; see *Running
unprivileged* in [../README.md](../README.md#running-unprivileged).
`ManagedTunFactory` creates the interface and configures it; see
*Provisioning the interface* below and *Privileges* in
[../README.md](../README.md#privileges). With no capability the agent runs
with `--no-tun`: everything but the last hop into the kernel still works.
[boringtun]: https://docs.rs/boringtun
[`TunFactory`]: https://docs.rs/tsunagi
@@ -126,14 +126,16 @@ wins, and the agent adopts it. So the flag matters for whoever starts the
network and is harmless afterwards. Pass `--ipv4-range none` for an IPv6-only
overlay.
Putting the address on the interface still needs privileges, and the agent
cannot do it. Since the address is only known once the agent has agreed with
its peers, `tsunagi tun-setup` cannot print it up front either. So the agent
checks whether the address is assigned anywhere on the host — by binding a UDP
socket to it, which needs no privileges — and reports the exact command until
it is. This matters: with the wrong address on the interface, packets leave
with the wrong source and every peer drops them as not belonging to us, which
looks like a broken network rather than a missing command.
The agent puts the address on the interface itself, as soon as the network has
agreed on it — no restart, and the interface is not recreated, which would
drop every tunnel riding on it.
It then checks that it is really there, by binding a UDP socket to it, which
needs no privileges. That check is deliberately independent of the code that
did the assigning: the failure it guards against is a silent one. With the
wrong address on the interface, packets leave with the wrong source and every
peer drops them as not belonging to us, which looks like a broken network
rather than a broken assumption.
A release tombstone exists in the record type and merges correctly, but
nothing emits one yet, so an address stays claimed until the network is
@@ -224,7 +226,7 @@ use tsunagi::{Agent, Result};
async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let paths = StoragePaths::user_default()?;
// MemoryTunFactory needs no privileges; swap in SystemTunFactory for a
// MemoryTunFactory needs no privileges; swap in ManagedTunFactory for a
// real interface.
let plugin = WireguardPlugin::open(
WireguardConfig::new(paths.state_dir.join("wireguard")),