Added DHT peer resolver, fixed MTU
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ A working library with **real iroh connections** and integration tests:
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- several independent networks at once in one agent;
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- deterministic network identity derived from name + secret;
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- candidates supplied by a replaceable discovery component;
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- automatic first contact through the public Mainline DHT (BEP44);
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- real iroh connections plus an explicit mutual proof of network membership;
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- a small versioned control protocol: handshake, hostname/capability
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announcement, ping/pong;
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@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ A working library with **real iroh connections** and integration tests:
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### What it deliberately does **not** do
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Not implemented, and not pretended to be: Mainline DHT, DNS, routing through
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Not implemented, and not pretended to be: DNS, routing through
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intermediate participants, a full CRDT, dynamically loaded plugins, a system
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service, a complete CLI, or a local control socket. Snapshot synchronisation
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and signed revocations are designed for but not implemented — see
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@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ system's and the user's responsibility, not this library's.
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- Rust 1.91 or newer (iroh 1.2 requires it), edition 2024. Pinned dependencies
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in `Cargo.lock`.
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- No internet, no DHT, no public relay, no administrator rights and no changes
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- No internet, no public DHT, no public relay, no administrator rights and no changes
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to OS network settings are needed to build or test.
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- WireGuard runs in userspace (boringtun): **no kernel module and no `wg`
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tool**. Only creating a real network interface needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, and
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@@ -87,20 +88,26 @@ what it belongs to, at any time, while it runs.
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./target/release/tsunagi join --network lab
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```
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On the second machine, start its agent with the first machine's endpoint id
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and join the same network with the secret that was printed:
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On the second machine, start its agent and join the same network with the
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secret that was printed:
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```bash
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./target/release/tsunagi up --peer <endpoint-id-from-the-first-machine>
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./target/release/tsunagi up
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./target/release/tsunagi join --network lab --secret tsn1...
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```
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**`--peer` is how the first meeting happens, and only the first.** Two
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agents that have never met have nothing to go on: this project publishes
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nothing about who is in which network, by design. One of them has to be
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told the other's endpoint id — after that each remembers the other and
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finds it again by itself. Give several for redundancy; any one of them
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getting through is enough.
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**Name and secret are enough for the first meeting.** Mainline DHT discovery
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is enabled by default. Each active network publishes this device's endpoint
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and searches until the first authenticated connection. While connected it
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only republishes; after 60 seconds without any authenticated connection it
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searches again. Publication is approximately every five minutes, and records
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older than 15 minutes are ignored. DHT storage nodes may retain them longer.
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Use `--no-dht` to disable DHT, or `--peer <endpoint-id>` for optional manual
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bootstrap. `--reach local` disables public DHT regardless of the DHT flag.
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Endpoint records are public, signed, and contain no network secret. Discovery
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is not authentication: every connection must still prove network membership.
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Details and failure behavior are in [docs/mainline-dht.md](docs/mainline-dht.md).
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**One introduction is enough for the whole network.** Members tell each
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other about the members they know, and every author of a signed record is
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@@ -458,13 +465,12 @@ its whole life has carrier for its whole life.
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### The MTU is 1280
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That is the minimum IPv6 requires (RFC 8200), and Linux enforces it by
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disabling IPv6 outright on an interface below it — the per-device
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`/proc/sys/net/ipv6` entries vanish and adding an address fails with
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`Invalid argument`. A smaller MTU cannot work at all, so the agent refuses one
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rather than letting it fail later. See
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[docs/wireguard.md](docs/wireguard.md#mtu) for the ceiling that pushes back
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from the other side.
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The default interface MTU stays at 1280 on direct paths, relays and paths
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inside another VPN. Large encrypted packets are split into smaller QUIC
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datagrams and reassembled before reaching WireGuard. SSH and full-size TCP
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segments therefore do not require a manual MTU override or MSS adjustment.
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The original IP packet, including its DF bit, is preserved. See
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[docs/wireguard.md](docs/wireguard.md#mtu) for limits and compatibility.
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### Summary
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@@ -584,13 +590,14 @@ service run by Number 0 — "n0", the company behind iroh — at `dns.iroh.link`
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over pkarr and DNS, and resolves other endpoints the same way. That is why `--peer <endpoint-id>` works with no address attached:
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iroh looks it up. None of that code is ours.
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**2. Finding who is in a network — ours, and it is still manual.**
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`NetworkDiscovery` maps a secret-derived `DiscoveryKey` to a set of *candidate*
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members. Two backends exist: `StaticBootstrap` (what `--peer` feeds) and an
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in-memory one for tests. The planned Mainline DHT backend, which would let
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members find each other from the network secret alone, is **not implemented**.
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So today you bootstrap by passing one peer's id; after that the mesh is
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whatever those agents reach.
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**2. Finding who is in a network — Mainline DHT by default.**
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`NetworkDiscovery` supplies unverified candidates. The Mainline backend uses
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a signing key derived from the network name and secret to publish signed
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BEP44 records containing each writer's endpoint ID and addresses. Its 16
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slots provide starting candidates, not a complete membership list or a limit
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on network size. After the first authenticated connection, introductions and
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signed state reveal the other members. `StaticBootstrap` (`--peer`) remains
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available, and tests use either a local Mainline Testnet or in-memory discovery.
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What this means in practice:
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@@ -598,6 +605,8 @@ What this means in practice:
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to a public third-party service** (Number 0's, unless you change it). They are not secret, and the network secret is
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never published, but an observer of that service learns that your endpoint
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exists and where it is. `--reach local` publishes nothing.
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- With DHT enabled, endpoint records are also published to the public Mainline
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DHT. They are signed, not encrypted; membership still requires the secret.
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- A relay, when one is needed, sees the volume and timing of your traffic — not
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its contents. The default relays are Number 0's, in the US, EU and
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Asia-Pacific.
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