# Userspace mesh routing ```text local OS → TUN → IP plugin (encrypt) → router → transport peer link transport peer link → router → transport peer link (transit) transport peer link → router → IP plugin (decrypt) → TUN → local OS ``` The TUN is the boundary of the local host. The kernel sees one overlay route; it never forwards transit traffic. WireGuard encryption remains end to end. The core router sees only an opaque payload and routing metadata. iroh is the current transport adapter, with fragmentation below the routing envelope so the default 1280-byte interface MTU also works on small QUIC paths. ## Graph and lifecycle Each authenticated control session advertises that peer's own direct data links. There is one table for each network, whatever protocols run over it: a link is a way to reach a neighbour, while the single internal protocol is an end-to-end tunnel to a peer. The envelope names the protocol, so the two are independent. A neighbour reached over several kinds of transport (UDP, TCP, QUIC datagrams) is sent to over the best open one, in the order the protocols were configured, and over the next if that one fails or cannot carry the frame. Every authenticated member enters the graph; a member in the middle needs no protocol in common with either end, only a link to each. A snapshot refreshes on the maintenance interval, expires after 90 seconds, and is withdrawn when the session ends. Link arrival, closure and changed announcements rebuild routes immediately. Unchanged announcements refresh their age without republishing the forwarding snapshot. Every pair uses one internal WireGuard channel, matched by its fixed opaque capability and independent of the selected external protocols. The tunnel is created when a member and its key are known; its logical link survives temporary loss of all physical paths. Carrier selection changes, automatic fallback and shorter routes keep the same keys, interface and counters. The lower endpoint id still chooses the mutually enabled external carrier in its preference order. A relayed AWG first hop can lead to a QUIC next hop: the user's choice governs this device's adjacent links, while the inner ciphertext stays unchanged. An existing TCP connection continues after transient loss if its own timeout has not expired; a sufficiently long outage can still terminate it. Breadth-first search computes the shortest directed paths and every equal-cost first hop in sorted order. An actual direct link always wins. The first row is always supplied by local transport state, never by a remote claim. Routes stop at 16 links. A packet also carries a decreasing hop limit, bounding temporary loops if different nodes have not yet received the same topology update. The existing control plane still forms authenticated pairwise sessions. Routing provides multihop **data** paths among these members; it does not add control-plane flooding or carry control sessions through the data plane, so a member that has no control session with another has no data path to it either. Announcements are volatile, not durable membership or availability guarantees. ## What "online" means One definition, computed by the agent and reported identically by `tsng status` and the tray: a member is online when this agent can reach it by any path — a live authenticated control session (QUIC keep-alive every 5 seconds, so a vanished peer is noticed within about 15), or a data path to it through other members. It is never inferred from ping, which a firewall may block, or from a tunnel's last handshake, which says only when traffic last flowed. How it is reached is reported separately: `direct` over a named transport, `relayed` through a named member over N hops, or no data path yet while one is being set up. Being relayed is not being degraded in any way but distance, and is shown so it is not a surprise. ## Packet path The control loop binds next hops to transport handles in an immutable table and publishes it through `ArcSwap`. Readers do not acquire the topology mutex. The transit routine validates the fixed 82-byte envelope, looks up the source and destination, selects a cached next hop, decrements one byte, and calls the transport's synchronous datagram send. It never searches the graph, formats an endpoint string, validates an Ed25519 key, decrypts, or touches TUN. An exclusively owned receive buffer is reused when decrementing the hop limit. Shared buffers require a copy through the safe `bytes` API. There is no added transit queue or timer; every raw transport has its own reader. Readers yield after 64 ready packets to avoid starving other runtime tasks. Local delivery uses a bounded 256-datagram inbox and drops a new packet when full. Transport queues and fragment reassembly retain their own limits. `PacketLink::send_flow` accepts an opaque 64-bit flow identifier. IP plugins derive it before encryption from source/destination addresses, protocol and TCP/UDP ports. WireGuard keeps tags alongside its bounded pending queue, so the first application packets retain their flow identity after a handshake. Transit preserves the tag; it never hashes changing ciphertext. Handshake and keepalive frames use flow zero. Fragmented IP traffic uses a coarse address/ protocol hash because later fragments lack ports; fragmented flows between the same addresses coalesce. A transition between fragmented and unfragmented traffic can change its path. The default overlay MTU avoids needing IP fragmentation for ordinary host TCP traffic. ECMP is deterministic for a source and flow while the table is unchanged. Closed next hops are skipped until the control loop replaces the table. A topology change can move a flow; datagrams remain unreliable and unordered, and there is no promise to preserve order across a physical path failure. Logical peer links and end-to-end encryption state survive these changes. ## Carrier health and switching Carrier setup failures and persistent encrypted delivery loss advance the initiator's ordered fallback cycle. Logical end-to-end links survive while physical links are retired explicitly. The AWG carrier negotiates a fresh private pair profile on every reentry, without changing topology's durable state. See [amnezia.md](amnezia.md) for thresholds and bounds. ## Verification and measurement The default offline suite exercises four real agents, iroh transports and WireGuard tunnels with memory TUNs, plus graph/forwarder unit tests. It needs neither administrative rights nor public relays/DHT. Run the forwarding microbenchmark explicitly: ```sh cargo test --release -p tsunagi-core --lib forwarding_benchmark -- --ignored --nocapture ``` It processes one million 64-byte frames and one million 1280-byte frames with two equal next hops. Frame construction is outside the timed section; the actual ingress routine, header validation, snapshot lookup, ECMP, TTL update, buffer release and mock transport submission are inside. The mock transport counts sends without storing frames. Results are CPU forwarding cost, **not** end-to-end network latency or VPN throughput; encryption, fragmentation, sockets, congestion and scheduling contribute separately. Wire compatibility: control ALPN `tsunagi/ctrl/8`, data ALPN `tsunagi/data/6`. Upgrade every participant together; saved identities and network state persist.