Corrects the architecture on two points raised in review, while the project is still small enough to change cheaply. 1. Control and data are separated *logically*, not physically. The old reading — "nothing but control may ride on iroh" — threw away iroh's whole value and would have forced the data plane to reimplement STUN, ICE and a relay. Now both planes ride on iroh with different ALPNs and different connections, so the data plane inherits hole punching and relay fallback, while proto/ still knows nothing about packets and dataplane/ knows nothing about the control protocol. New boundary: PacketTransport / PacketLink, an authenticated unreliable datagram channel per (network, peer, protocol). tsunagi/data/1 runs the same membership handshake, then DataOpen/DataOpenAck, then QUIC datagrams. Only the smaller endpoint id dials, so exactly one link exists per pair. A plugin is handed links and never learns reachability, so the WireGuard announcement shrank to a public key: there is no address left to lie about. 2. WireGuard now runs in userspace, on boringtun's protocol state machine. No kernel module, no wg tool, no ip shell-out, no loopback proxy: the wgtool, backend and bridge modules are gone. Only creating a TUN device needs privileges, and that sits behind TunFactory, so the entire data plane — handshake, encryption, routing, address ownership — is tested with none. Address ownership is enforced rather than believed: outbound packets go to the owner of the destination address, inbound packets are dropped unless their source is the address derived for the peer that sent them. 3. A `tsunagi` binary: secret, doctor, id, up. It owns the runtime, the logging subscriber and Ctrl-C, which the library still refuses to. Also fixes a reference cycle where IrohTransport held Arc<Inner>, which kept the databases open and the directory lock held after shutdown; two storage tests caught it once the cycle existed. 81 tests pass offline with no privileges, including real IPv6 packets crossing a real WireGuard tunnel over real iroh connections. Verified by hand: two CLI processes forming a mesh both on loopback and via n0 discovery using only an endpoint id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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AGENTS.md
Rules for anyone — human or automated — changing this repository. Read this before touching the code. Do not restate the full design here; follow the links.
What this project is
A proof-of-concept agent library for small private mesh networks. A user supplies a network name and one shared secret; agents derive the same network space independently, find each other, prove membership and exchange control messages. Scope and non-scope are in README.md.
There is no central server, no owner, no registration and no majority vote. Design accordingly: a majority is not a root of trust.
Architectural boundaries
Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
- Control plane vs data plane. The separation is logical, not physical.
The control protocol in
src/proto/knows nothing about packets, andsrc/dataplane/knows nothing about the control protocol; either can be replaced on its own. Both may ride on iroh — refusing to would throw away iroh's NAT traversal and force the data plane to reimplement it. They use different ALPNs and different connections, so a busy or broken data plane cannot disturb control traffic. - Plugins never learn reachability. An
IpPluginis handed aPacketLinkper peer and moves datagrams over it. Addresses, hole punching and relays belong tosrc/dataplane/transport/. A plugin announcement says who, never where. - The core never parses a plugin payload. See
src/dataplane/mod.rs. Onlysrc/dataplane/wireguard/announcement.rsinterprets WireGuard payloads, and only after bounding every field. A data plane failure must never stop the control plane. - Derived, not claimed. A peer's overlay address is derived from its public key. Outbound packets are routed to the owner of the destination address; inbound packets are dropped unless their source is the address derived for the peer that sent them. Never trust an address a peer announces.
- Plugins own their system objects. A plugin creates and removes its own interface and nothing else. Never touch routing, DNS or firewall settings.
- Device identity vs network identity. The iroh endpoint id is the device's
public key.
NetworkIdis derived from name + secret only. Never conflate them, and never let one change the other. - Discovery vs authentication. Discovery returns unverified candidates. It never authenticates, never carries control messages and never mutates agent state. Membership is decided only by the handshake.
- Mandatory state vs disposable cache.
state.sqliteis never silently reset: damage is a hard error.cache.sqlitemay be deleted at any time and is recreated. A stale cache must never bypass identity or network authentication. - Candidate vs observed address vs verified path. Report these as three
different things. A missing value is
None, never invented.
Rules that are not negotiable
- Tests come first. Every substantial change ships with tests for the normal path and the important failures. See docs/testing.md. Do not add tests for getters or to move a coverage number.
- Never change
IDENTITY_SCHEME, the derivation labels, or the transcript encoding insrc/identity/network.rsandsrc/proto/handshake.rswithout treating it as an incompatible protocol change. Bumping the crate version or the control protocol version must not change an existingNetworkId. - Secrets never leak. Not into logs, not into
Debug, not into status output, not into anything exported to the network.NetworkSecretand derived keys redact themselves and zeroize; keep it that way. - No panics on untrusted input. No
unwrap,expectorpanicon anything that came off the network. Clippy enforces this at warn level in the library; tests opt out explicitly at the top of each file. - Bounds before allocation. Frame lengths are checked against
Limits::max_frame_lenbefore a buffer is allocated. Every string, list and queue has a limit insrc/config.rs. - Failure is contained. A bad signature, wrong secret, malformed packet or unknown version rejects one message or one session. It never stops another network and never stops the agent. There is no irreversible global error flag. A data plane failure must never stop the control plane.
- The library owns no globals. No global tokio runtime, no global tracing
subscriber, no signal handlers, no
fork, noprocess::exit, no global mutable state. Several agents must run in one test process. - SQLite never blocks the executor. All database work goes through
spawn_blocking. Never hold a transaction or a database lock across a networkawait. When signed records land, writing the record and bumping the author's own counter must be one transaction, committed before publishing to the network. - Shutdown is bounded. A peer that stops reading must not be able to hold up shutdown. Wind tasks down with a grace period and then abort.
- Nothing from a remote announcement becomes a shell command, a filesystem path or an OS setting. The agent never touches interfaces or OS settings it did not create.
Where things live
| path | responsibility |
|---|---|
src/identity/ |
device identity; deterministic network space identity and derived keys |
src/storage/ |
state.sqlite, cache.sqlite, directory ownership lock |
src/discovery.rs |
candidate sources; test and static backends |
src/proto/ |
framing, message formats, membership handshake |
src/net.rs |
iroh endpoint adapter and observability snapshots |
src/agent/ |
agent lifecycle, per-network runtimes, sessions, events, status |
src/dataplane/ |
the plugin contract, the packet transport, and the WireGuard plugin |
src/bin/tsunagi.rs |
the command line agent; the only place that owns a runtime, a logger and signals |
tests/ |
integration tests; tests/common/ is the shared harness |
Add abstractions only at real substitution or testing boundaries. Do not add a trait per struct. Prefer one crate with clear modules over many small crates.
Testing rules
- Use real iroh endpoints on loopback, real handshakes, real SQLite in temporary directories, and independent agent instances.
- Discovery may be substituted. iroh, authentication, message passing and persistent storage may not be.
- No arbitrary multi-second
sleepas the primary synchronisation. Wait for a specific event or condition under one overall deadline (wait_event,wait_until).settle()exists only for asserting that something did not happen. - The default suite must pass with no internet, no DHT, no public relay, no administrator rights and no changes to OS network settings. Anything needing the internet or root stays out of the default set.
- The WireGuard packet interface may be substituted (
MemoryTunFactory). Its key handling, announcements, derived addressing, the WireGuard protocol itself and address-ownership enforcement may not — the default suite runs real handshakes and real encryption. - Running several library instances in one process is not a test of several system processes; do not describe it as one.
Before you open a change
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets
CI runs these on Linux, macOS and Windows. A CI config existing is not evidence that tests ran on every OS — say what you actually ran.
Check the real API of the iroh version in Cargo.lock before using it. Do not
invent methods from memory.