Files
tsunagi/crates/tsunagi-core/src/overlay/router.rs
T
Aleksandr Bogomiakov e701986a39 Add ephemeral pairwise Amnezia transport and runtime fallback
Plain WG and QUIC can be blocked or severely degraded while the iroh control
connection still works. Add an awg carrier with one independent UDP socket,
WireGuard engine and randomized masking profile per network/peer attempt.
The smaller endpoint id negotiates fresh outer keys, PSK, header protection,
header ranges, padding and signature templates through private authenticated
control messages. Restart or fallback reentry generates a new profile;
ordinary rekeying preserves the current profile. No pair parameters enter
signed state, capabilities, persistent storage or public message events.
Private payloads and serialized control buffers redact and zeroize themselves.

Adapt the bounded packet masking engine from RunaRoo/AmneziaWG-RS at commit
51579a7d6e8882d1d8d6d00822f09e18a9423b73, retaining its Apache license and
provenance. Declare WTFPL AND Apache-2.0 in package metadata to cover both
new glue and the adapted source. Reuse boringtun instead of upstream's Node/global executors and
interface machinery. This is Tsunagi AWG wire version 1, with standard WG
headers restored before authentication; external Amnezia server compatibility
is not implemented. DNS/SIP signature generators vary fields instead of
replaying captures. Each attempt closes independently, bounds allocation,
queues, candidates and fragment assemblies, and supports the full 64 KiB
carrier contract using UDP packets at most 1200 bytes. Yield between fragment
batches so large messages do not starve local socket readers.

Keep carrier encryption separate from end-to-end tunnels so multihop relays
still forward opaque ciphertext. The system owns the sole interface, signed
addresses and admission. Plugins receive neither network secrets nor paths.
Expose a bounded opaque control sender at the transport boundary; core control
messages remain outside protocol crates. Optional STUN on the pair's actual
socket adds IPv4 public candidates in CLI direct/relay mode, with a finite
query deadline and an off/alternate-server option. Local mode remains offline.
Symmetric NAT, IPv6-only paths and arbitrary UDP blocking can still require
fallback; no AWG-over-QUIC or hidden AWG relay is introduced.

Default carrier order is wg, awg, wg-quic, tcp-tls. Advance the fallback cycle
after setup failures and sustained runtime loss, even after earlier cooldowns
expire. Authenticated delivery probes traverse the actual encrypted tunnel,
fit the interface MTU and never enter the TUN. Retire after a 20-second warmup
and at least 60% loss over at least 15 completed recent observations. Preserve
logical tunnels and control sessions while explicitly closing physical links,
including TCP reader/writer tasks. Retain the newest private probe settings
across independently queued control negotiation and inbound installation.
CLI/tray reports keep end-to-end protocol and actual carrier separate.

Control ALPN/version becomes tsunagi/ctrl/6 for the new private message;
upgrade all members together. Data ALPN/envelopes remain version 5. Network
identity derivation, transcript encoding, device identities, signed records,
saved network configuration and release versions are unchanged.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, with the inherited
  TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET override removed: 504 passed, 2 pre-existing ignored

Tests use real iroh membership, SQLite, UDP sockets and WireGuard encryption
with memory TUNs. Cover three independent pairs, full-size IP and carrier
frames, restart freshness/socket release, 80% carrier datagram loss, fallback
to real iroh, fresh retries with working delivery checks, unequal small MTUs,
malformed negotiations/profiles, role and resource bounds, probe forgery and
STUN parsing. Earlier compile/lint iterations and focused tests caught RNG
API/initializer mistakes, a retry assertion racing path installation, and a
large-fragment burst overflowing loopback buffers; corrected before these
successful checks. Normalized upstream license line endings for diff checks.
Public NAT/STUN connectivity, actual DPI effectiveness, WAN performance,
per-pair memory measurement, macOS/Windows, privileged TUN operations and
manual tray interaction were not exercised.
2026-10-11 13:52:10 +01:00

975 lines
34 KiB
Rust

//! Which peer a packet is for, and whether a peer may have sent it.
//!
//! One agent has one interface, so a packet coming off it could belong to any
//! network the agent is in and to any protocol currently carrying traffic.
//! Deciding which is this table's job, and it is the reason the interface
//! belongs to the system level: the answer comes from signed state, which no
//! protocol owns.
//!
//! Two questions, and they are not the same one:
//!
//! * **Outbound**: this destination address — whose is it? A packet for
//! nobody is dropped rather than broadcast.
//! * **Inbound**: this peer decrypted a packet with this source address —
//! is that address actually its? A peer may not speak for anybody else,
//! and the check consults the signed claim rather than anything the peer
//! said.
//!
//! Nothing here is derived from a protocol's key. An address is allocated at
//! the system level and signed by the member that holds it, so every protocol
//! carries traffic for the same addresses and the table is the same whichever
//! one is in use.
use super::broadcast::{BroadcastPolicy, BroadcastTable};
use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use iroh::EndpointId;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
/// Where an outbound packet is going.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Route {
/// The network the destination belongs to.
pub network: NetworkId,
/// The member that holds the destination address.
pub peer: EndpointId,
}
/// A network's exit-node settings, as far as packets are concerned.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ExitPolicy {
/// This agent offers itself as an exit node here: packets from members
/// for addresses outside every overlay range are handed to the host.
pub offer: bool,
/// The member all other traffic is sent to, if this device uses one.
pub via: Option<EndpointId>,
}
/// What one network contributes to the table.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NetworkRoutes {
/// Exit-node settings of this network.
pub exit: ExitPolicy,
/// Local broadcast policy and authenticated willing recipients.
pub broadcast: BroadcastPolicy,
/// The range this network allocates from, once it has agreed one.
pub range: Option<Ipv4Range>,
/// This agent's own address in the network.
pub local: Option<Ipv4Addr>,
/// Every other member's address, as the signed state has it.
pub peers: Vec<(Ipv4Addr, EndpointId)>,
}
/// Why a network cannot be added to the table.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RouteError {
/// Two networks would answer for the same addresses.
#[error(
"network {network} uses {range}, which overlaps {other_range} already in use by \
{other}. One agent has one interface, so an address can belong to only one of \
them: stop the other network before starting this one."
)]
Overlap {
/// The network being added.
network: NetworkId,
/// The range it wants.
range: Ipv4Range,
/// The network already using an overlapping range.
other: NetworkId,
/// That network's range.
other_range: Ipv4Range,
},
}
/// Address ownership across every network this agent is in.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct RoutingTable {
broadcast: ArcSwap<BroadcastTable>,
networks: RwLock<HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>>,
}
impl RoutingTable {
/// An empty table.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
fn read(&self) -> std::sync::RwLockReadGuard<'_, HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>> {
match self.networks.read() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
fn write(&self) -> std::sync::RwLockWriteGuard<'_, HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>> {
match self.networks.write() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
/// Replaces what one network contributes.
///
/// Rejected when its range overlaps another network's. With one
/// interface an address can belong to only one network, and guessing
/// which would send somebody's traffic to a stranger.
pub fn set_network(&self, network: NetworkId, routes: NetworkRoutes) -> Result<(), RouteError> {
let mut networks = self.write();
if let Some(range) = routes.range {
for (other, existing) in networks.iter() {
if *other == network {
continue;
}
let Some(other_range) = existing.range else {
continue;
};
if ranges_overlap(range, other_range) {
return Err(RouteError::Overlap {
network,
range,
other: *other,
other_range,
});
}
}
}
networks.insert(network, routes);
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
Ok(())
}
/// Forgets a network.
pub fn remove_network(&self, network: NetworkId) {
let mut networks = self.write();
networks.remove(&network);
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
}
/// Replaces only a network's broadcast participation, without changing addresses.
pub fn set_broadcast(&self, network: NetworkId, policy: BroadcastPolicy) {
let mut networks = self.write();
if let Some(routes) = networks.get_mut(&network) {
if routes.broadcast == policy {
return;
}
routes.broadcast = policy;
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
}
}
/// Replaces only a network's exit-node settings, without changing addresses.
///
/// A network that has no entry yet (its range is not agreed) takes them
/// from [`NetworkRoutes::exit`] when it is added.
pub fn set_exit(&self, network: NetworkId, policy: ExitPolicy) {
if let Some(routes) = self.write().get_mut(&network) {
routes.exit = policy;
}
}
/// Recognizes limited and configured subnet broadcasts before unicast lookup.
pub fn is_broadcast(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.broadcast.load().is_destination(destination)
}
/// A precomputed domain-scoped recipient list; no per-packet graph search.
pub fn broadcast_recipients(
&self,
source: Ipv4Addr,
destination: Ipv4Addr,
) -> Option<Arc<[Route]>> {
self.broadcast.load().outgoing(source, destination)
}
/// Local admission after the plugin authenticated and decrypted the sender.
pub fn accepts_broadcast(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
destination: Ipv4Addr,
) -> bool {
self.broadcast.load().accepts(network, peer, destination)
}
/// The peer that holds a destination address, if anybody does.
///
/// This agent's own address returns `None`: a packet for ourselves does
/// not go over a tunnel, and answering with a peer would send it to one.
///
/// An address nobody holds, outside every overlay range and an ordinary
/// unicast destination, goes to this device's exit node when it has one:
/// that is what sending *all* traffic through a member means.
pub fn route(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> Option<Route> {
let networks = self.read();
for (network, routes) in networks.iter() {
if routes.local == Some(destination) {
return None;
}
if let Some((_, peer)) = routes
.peers
.iter()
.find(|(address, _)| *address == destination)
{
return Some(Route {
network: *network,
peer: *peer,
});
}
}
// Inside an overlay range, an unowned address is nobody's, not the
// internet's.
if !is_internet_destination(destination) || in_any_range(&networks, destination) {
return None;
}
exit_via(&networks).map(|(network, peer)| Route { network, peer })
}
/// Whether a peer may send from a source address.
///
/// A peer speaks only for the address the network agreed it holds. The
/// one exception is this device's exit node: what comes back from the
/// internet carries the internet's addresses, so from *that* peer any
/// source outside the overlay ranges is accepted.
pub fn may_send_from(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, source: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
let networks = self.read();
let Some(routes) = networks.get(&network) else {
return false;
};
if routes
.peers
.iter()
.any(|(address, holder)| *address == source && *holder == peer)
{
return true;
}
routes.exit.via == Some(peer)
&& is_internet_destination(source)
&& !in_any_range(&networks, source)
}
/// Whether this agent, as an exit node of `network`, takes a member's
/// packet for `destination` to the host.
///
/// Only an ordinary unicast address outside every overlay range, so a
/// packet for another member, for this agent or for the local network
/// segment never leaves by this door. The sender's own source address is
/// checked separately, by [`Self::may_send_from`].
pub fn accepts_exit_traffic(&self, network: NetworkId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
let networks = self.read();
networks
.get(&network)
.is_some_and(|routes| routes.exit.offer)
&& is_internet_destination(destination)
&& !in_any_range(&networks, destination)
}
/// The network and member this device sends its internet traffic through.
///
/// One default route, so one answer; if several networks claim one (they
/// should not) the lowest network id decides, so two runs agree.
pub fn exit_via(&self) -> Option<(NetworkId, EndpointId)> {
exit_via(&self.read())
}
/// Networks that offer this agent as an exit node, with the range each
/// agreed. A network that has not agreed one yet has nothing to
/// masquerade and is left out.
pub fn exit_offers(&self) -> Vec<(NetworkId, Ipv4Range)> {
let mut offers: Vec<(NetworkId, Ipv4Range)> = self
.read()
.iter()
.filter(|(_, routes)| routes.exit.offer)
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.range?)))
.collect();
offers.sort_by_key(|(network, _)| *network);
offers
}
/// The range of every network in the table that has agreed one, sorted.
pub fn overlay_ranges(&self) -> Vec<Ipv4Range> {
let mut ranges: Vec<Ipv4Range> = self
.read()
.values()
.filter_map(|routes| routes.range)
.collect();
ranges.sort_by_key(|range| (range.base, range.prefix_len));
ranges.dedup();
ranges
}
/// One network's exit-node settings and its range, if it is in the table.
pub fn exit_settings(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Option<(ExitPolicy, Option<Ipv4Range>)> {
self.read()
.get(&network)
.map(|routes| (routes.exit, routes.range))
}
/// Whether an ordinary packet terminates on this host in this network.
/// Exported LAN subnets must extend this admission policy explicitly later.
pub fn is_local_destination(&self, network: NetworkId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.read()
.get(&network)
.is_some_and(|routes| routes.local == Some(destination))
}
/// Every address this agent should answer to, with its prefix length.
pub fn local_addresses(&self) -> Vec<(Ipv4Addr, u8)> {
let mut addresses: Vec<(Ipv4Addr, u8)> = self
.read()
.values()
.filter_map(|routes| Some((routes.local?, routes.range?.prefix_len)))
.collect();
addresses.sort();
addresses
}
/// The one network whose address the limited broadcast route is bound to.
///
/// The host has a single `255.255.255.255` route per interface, and one
/// interface carries every network, so only one overlay address can be its
/// source. The choice is the lowest [`NetworkId`] among networks that have
/// broadcast enabled, a range and a local address: deterministic, so two
/// runs with the same networks pick the same one.
pub fn broadcast_host_target(&self) -> Option<(Ipv4Addr, Ipv4Range)> {
let networks = self.read();
networks
.iter()
.filter(|(_, routes)| routes.broadcast.enabled)
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.local?, routes.range?)))
.min_by_key(|(network, _, _)| *network)
.map(|(_, local, range)| (local, range))
}
/// Whether a range would collide with one another network already uses.
///
/// Asked before proposing a range rather than after: with one interface
/// an agent that claimed an address it could not route would also be
/// telling everybody else to use that range, and "the range of the
/// lowest author wins" would spread the collision instead of containing
/// it.
pub fn would_overlap(&self, network: NetworkId, range: Ipv4Range) -> Option<Ipv4Range> {
self.read().iter().find_map(|(other, existing)| {
if *other == network {
return None;
}
let other_range = existing.range?;
ranges_overlap(range, other_range).then_some(other_range)
})
}
/// All active networks whose reserved ranges intersect this range.
pub fn overlapping_networks(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
range: Ipv4Range,
) -> Vec<(NetworkId, Ipv4Range)> {
let mut conflicts: Vec<_> = self
.read()
.iter()
.filter_map(|(other, routes)| {
let other_range = routes.range?;
(*other != network && ranges_overlap(range, other_range))
.then_some((*other, other_range))
})
.collect();
conflicts.sort_by_key(|(id, _)| *id);
conflicts
}
/// Current signed allocations used for encrypted data delivery checks.
pub(crate) fn probe_addresses(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
) -> Option<(Ipv4Addr, Ipv4Addr)> {
let table = self.read();
let routes = table.get(&network)?;
Some((
routes.local?,
routes
.peers
.iter()
.find(|(_, holder)| *holder == peer)
.map(|(address, _)| *address)?,
))
}
/// How many networks the table covers.
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.read().len()
}
/// Whether it covers none.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.read().is_empty()
}
}
/// Whether an address is an ordinary unicast one: not this host, not a
/// multicast or broadcast group, not link-local, not unspecified.
fn is_internet_destination(address: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
!(address.is_unspecified()
|| address.is_loopback()
|| address.is_multicast()
|| address.is_broadcast()
|| address.is_link_local())
}
/// Whether an address lies in any network's range.
fn in_any_range(networks: &HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>, address: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
networks
.values()
.any(|routes| routes.range.is_some_and(|range| range.contains(address)))
}
/// The exit node in use, if any, from the lowest network that names one.
fn exit_via(networks: &HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>) -> Option<(NetworkId, EndpointId)> {
networks
.iter()
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.exit.via?)))
.min_by_key(|(network, _)| *network)
}
/// Whether two ranges share any address.
fn ranges_overlap(one: Ipv4Range, other: Ipv4Range) -> bool {
// A range contains the other's base, or the other way round. With
// prefix-aligned ranges that is the whole of it: two blocks either nest
// or are disjoint.
one.contains(other.base) || other.contains(one.base)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
fn network(name: &str) -> NetworkId {
NetworkKeys::derive(
&NetworkName::new(name).unwrap(),
&NetworkSecret::from_bytes(vec![4u8; 32]).unwrap(),
)
.network_id()
}
fn peer(seed: u8) -> EndpointId {
iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).public()
}
fn addr(last: u8) -> Ipv4Addr {
Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, last)
}
fn routes() -> NetworkRoutes {
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(1)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2)), (addr(3), peer(3))],
}
}
#[test]
fn a_packet_goes_to_the_member_that_holds_its_destination() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("routing");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.route(addr(2)),
Some(Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(2)
})
);
assert_eq!(
table.route(addr(3)),
Some(Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(3)
})
);
}
#[test]
fn a_packet_for_nobody_has_nowhere_to_go() {
// Dropped rather than sent to everybody: a tunnel is not a broadcast
// domain, and flooding would hand one member another's traffic.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("routing"), routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(200)), None);
assert_eq!(table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 0, 2, 1)), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_packet_for_ourselves_is_not_sent_to_a_peer() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("routing"), routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(1)), None, "that address is ours");
}
#[test]
fn a_peer_may_only_send_from_the_address_it_holds() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("ownership");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
assert!(table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(2)));
// Somebody else's address, and its own network's.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(3)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(1)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(99)));
// A peer that holds nothing here.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(9), addr(2)));
// And the question is per network, not global.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(network("elsewhere"), peer(2), addr(2)));
}
#[test]
fn two_networks_with_overlapping_ranges_are_refused() {
// One interface means an address belongs to one network. Accepting
// both and guessing would send somebody's traffic to a stranger.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let first = network("first");
let second = network("second");
table.set_network(first, routes()).unwrap();
let err = table.set_network(second, routes()).unwrap_err();
let RouteError::Overlap { other, .. } = err;
assert_eq!(other, first);
assert!(err.to_string().contains("stop the other network"), "{err}");
assert_eq!(table.len(), 1, "the overlapping network is not added");
// A range of its own is fine.
table
.set_network(
second,
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
peers: vec![(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 2), peer(4))],
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(
table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 2)),
Some(Route {
network: second,
peer: peer(4)
})
);
// And the first network still answers for its own.
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)).map(|route| route.network), Some(first));
}
#[test]
fn the_host_broadcast_target_is_the_lowest_enabled_network_with_an_address() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
assert_eq!(table.broadcast_host_target(), None);
let (low, high) = {
let (a, b) = (network("first"), network("second"));
if a < b { (a, b) } else { (b, a) }
};
let mk = |enabled: bool, base: [u8; 4], local: Option<Ipv4Addr>| NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled,
..Default::default()
},
range: Some(
format!("{}.{}.{}.0/24", base[0], base[1], base[2])
.parse()
.unwrap(),
),
local,
peers: Vec::new(),
};
let a = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 1, 0, 1);
let b = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 2, 0, 1);
// The lower id has broadcast off, so the higher one is chosen.
table
.set_network(low, mk(false, [10, 1, 0, 0], Some(a)))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(high, mk(true, [10, 2, 0, 0], Some(b)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((b, "10.2.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
// Both enabled: the lowest id wins, whatever the insertion order.
table
.set_network(low, mk(true, [10, 1, 0, 0], Some(a)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((a, "10.1.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
// No local address yet: it cannot be the route's source.
table
.set_network(low, mk(true, [10, 1, 0, 0], None))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((b, "10.2.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
table.remove_network(high);
assert_eq!(table.broadcast_host_target(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_range_can_be_asked_about_before_it_is_proposed() {
// The point of asking first: an agent that claims an address it
// cannot route also tells everybody else to use that range.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let first = network("first");
let second = network("second");
table.set_network(first, routes()).unwrap();
let mine: Ipv4Range = "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.would_overlap(second, mine), Some(mine));
// Its own range is not a collision with itself.
assert_eq!(table.would_overlap(first, mine), None);
assert_eq!(
table.would_overlap(second, "10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn a_nested_range_counts_as_overlapping() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table
.set_network(
network("wide"),
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.0.0.0/8".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
// Inside the /8, in either direction.
assert!(
table
.set_network(
network("narrow"),
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
}
)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn replacing_a_network_does_not_count_as_overlapping_itself() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("refresh");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
let mut updated = routes();
updated.peers.push((addr(4), peer(4)));
table.set_network(id, updated).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.len(), 1);
assert!(table.route(addr(4)).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn forgetting_a_network_takes_its_addresses_with_it() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("leaving");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
table.remove_network(id);
assert!(table.is_empty());
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)), None);
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(2)));
}
#[test]
fn the_local_addresses_are_what_the_interface_should_carry() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("one"), routes()).unwrap();
table
.set_network(
network("two"),
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
peers: Vec::new(),
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.local_addresses(),
vec![(addr(1), 24), (Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1), 16)]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_network_with_no_address_yet_contributes_nothing() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("waiting");
table.set_network(id, NetworkRoutes::default()).unwrap();
assert!(table.local_addresses().is_empty());
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)), None);
assert_eq!(table.len(), 1, "the network is known, it just has nothing");
}
fn with_exit(offer: bool, via: Option<EndpointId>) -> NetworkRoutes {
NetworkRoutes {
exit: ExitPolicy { offer, via },
..routes()
}
}
const INTERNET: Ipv4Addr = Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34);
#[test]
fn without_an_exit_node_the_internet_has_nowhere_to_go() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("plain"), routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(INTERNET), None);
assert_eq!(table.exit_via(), None);
}
#[test]
fn with_an_exit_node_every_ordinary_destination_goes_to_it() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("client");
table
.set_network(id, with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
let exit = Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(2),
};
assert_eq!(table.route(INTERNET), Some(exit));
assert_eq!(table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 10)), Some(exit));
assert_eq!(table.exit_via(), Some((id, peer(2))));
// A member's own address still goes to that member.
assert_eq!(
table.route(addr(3)),
Some(Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(3)
})
);
}
#[test]
fn the_exit_node_is_never_the_answer_for_what_is_not_the_internet() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table
.set_network(network("client"), with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
// Ourselves, a free address inside the overlay range, and everything
// that is not an ordinary unicast destination.
for destination in [
addr(1),
addr(200),
Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1),
Ipv4Addr::new(224, 0, 0, 251),
Ipv4Addr::new(239, 255, 255, 250),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 1, 1),
] {
assert_eq!(table.route(destination), None, "{destination}");
}
}
#[test]
fn another_networks_range_is_not_the_internet_either() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table
.set_network(network("client"), with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(
network("other"),
NetworkRoutes {
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 7, 7)), None);
}
#[test]
fn two_exit_choices_resolve_to_the_lowest_network_id() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let (a, b) = (network("one"), network("two"));
table
.set_network(a, with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(
b,
NetworkRoutes {
exit: ExitPolicy {
offer: false,
via: Some(peer(9)),
},
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
let (chosen, _) = table.exit_via().unwrap();
assert_eq!(chosen, a.min(b));
assert_eq!(table.route(INTERNET).unwrap().network, a.min(b));
}
#[test]
fn the_exit_peer_may_send_from_any_internet_address_but_nobody_else_may() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("client");
table
.set_network(id, with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
// What comes back from the internet carries the internet's addresses.
assert!(table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), INTERNET));
// Another member still speaks only for its own address.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(3), INTERNET));
assert!(table.may_send_from(id, peer(3), addr(3)));
// The exit peer cannot pass itself off as somebody else in the
// overlay, nor as this agent, nor as something that is not a source.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(3)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(1)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(200)));
for source in [
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
Ipv4Addr::new(224, 0, 0, 1),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
] {
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), source), "{source}");
}
// Without choosing an exit node nobody gets the exception.
let plain = RoutingTable::new();
plain.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
assert!(!plain.may_send_from(id, peer(2), INTERNET));
}
#[test]
fn an_exit_node_takes_a_members_internet_packets_only_while_it_offers() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("server");
table.set_network(id, with_exit(false, None)).unwrap();
assert!(!table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, INTERNET));
table.set_exit(
id,
ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None,
},
);
assert!(table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, INTERNET));
assert!(table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 10)));
// Never for another member, for this agent, a free overlay address,
// or anything that is not an ordinary unicast destination.
for destination in [
addr(1),
addr(2),
addr(200),
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST,
Ipv4Addr::new(224, 0, 0, 251),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
] {
assert!(
!table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, destination),
"{destination}"
);
}
// An unknown network offers nothing.
assert!(!table.accepts_exit_traffic(network("elsewhere"), INTERNET));
table.set_exit(id, ExitPolicy::default());
assert!(!table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, INTERNET));
}
#[test]
fn offers_are_listed_by_network_with_the_range_each_agreed() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let (a, b) = (network("a"), network("b"));
table.set_network(a, with_exit(true, None)).unwrap();
table
.set_network(
b,
NetworkRoutes {
exit: ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None,
},
// No range agreed yet: nothing to masquerade.
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.exit_offers(),
vec![(a, "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap())]
);
assert_eq!(
table.exit_settings(a),
Some((
ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None
},
Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap())
))
);
assert_eq!(table.exit_settings(network("none")), None);
}
#[test]
fn setting_exit_for_a_network_with_no_entry_is_remembered_by_the_caller() {
// The runtime keeps the policy and passes it with the network when
// its range is agreed; a setter for a network the table does not know
// yet changes nothing.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_exit(
network("later"),
ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None,
},
);
assert!(table.is_empty());
}
}