Every member now also derives an IPv4 address, from the same inputs as its
IPv6 one, into 100.64.0.0/10 by default. The range is configurable and IPv4
can be turned off with --no-ipv4.
IPv4 is honestly weaker than IPv6 here and the code says so. A 64 bit
interface identifier makes an IPv6 collision impossible in practice; IPv4
has nothing like that room, and in a /10 with 50 members two will derive the
same address about 0.03% of the time. A mesh with no coordinator cannot
allocate around that, so a collision is detected and resolved instead: the
member whose public key sorts lower keeps the address, a rule every member
computes identically and therefore agrees on. The other keeps IPv6 and is
flagged in the status. IPv6 always works; IPv4 almost always works and
degrades predictably.
Routing and address-ownership enforcement now cover both families: a packet
goes to the peer that owns its destination, and a decrypted packet is
dropped unless its source is an address derived for the peer that sent it,
IPv4 included.
Six new tests, among them a real IPv4 packet crossing a tunnel next to an
IPv6 one, a spoofed IPv4 source being dropped, and an IPv6-only overlay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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