The tun crate runs configure() by default (ensure_root_privileges is true),
which is harmless today because it only acts on fields that were set, and
the attach path sets none. Saying so explicitly documents the intent and
keeps it true if the crate changes.
Also records why packet information stays off: `ip tuntap add ... mode tun`
defaults to no packet information too, so the TUNSETIFF flags match when
attaching and reads and writes stay raw IP packets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Creating a network interface needs CAP_NET_ADMIN, but that is a one-time
setup step rather than something the agent must hold for its whole life.
SystemTunFactory now attaches to an interface that already exists and only
creates one when it does not. A persistent interface created by root and
owned by the user therefore lets the agent run with no privileges and no
capabilities at all. When attaching, nothing is reconfigured, since doing so
would need exactly the privileges we are avoiding.
New `tsunagi tun-setup` prints the three commands to run once as root,
resolving the derived interface name and overlay address for the network.
This also fixes a real gap: the overlay address was passed to the factory
and thrown away, so an interface the agent created had no address and could
never have received anything. The `tun` crate sets addresses through an
IPv4-only ioctl and cannot assign an IPv6 one at all, so the agent now
verifies the address is present via /proc/net/if_inet6 and refuses with the
exact command to run instead of coming up broken. Doing it in-process would
mean speaking netlink, which is not implemented and is recorded as such.
Not verified on this machine: no sudo is available here, so the privileged
setup and the attach path were not executed end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Corrects the architecture on two points raised in review, while the project
is still small enough to change cheaply.
1. Control and data are separated *logically*, not physically.
The old reading — "nothing but control may ride on iroh" — threw away iroh's
whole value and would have forced the data plane to reimplement STUN, ICE and
a relay. Now both planes ride on iroh with different ALPNs and different
connections, so the data plane inherits hole punching and relay fallback,
while proto/ still knows nothing about packets and dataplane/ knows nothing
about the control protocol.
New boundary: PacketTransport / PacketLink, an authenticated unreliable
datagram channel per (network, peer, protocol). tsunagi/data/1 runs the same
membership handshake, then DataOpen/DataOpenAck, then QUIC datagrams. Only
the smaller endpoint id dials, so exactly one link exists per pair.
A plugin is handed links and never learns reachability, so the WireGuard
announcement shrank to a public key: there is no address left to lie about.
2. WireGuard now runs in userspace, on boringtun's protocol state machine.
No kernel module, no wg tool, no ip shell-out, no loopback proxy: the wgtool,
backend and bridge modules are gone. Only creating a TUN device needs
privileges, and that sits behind TunFactory, so the entire data plane —
handshake, encryption, routing, address ownership — is tested with none.
Address ownership is enforced rather than believed: outbound packets go to
the owner of the destination address, inbound packets are dropped unless
their source is the address derived for the peer that sent them.
3. A `tsunagi` binary: secret, doctor, id, up. It owns the runtime, the
logging subscriber and Ctrl-C, which the library still refuses to.
Also fixes a reference cycle where IrohTransport held Arc<Inner>, which kept
the databases open and the directory lock held after shutdown; two storage
tests caught it once the cycle existed.
81 tests pass offline with no privileges, including real IPv6 packets
crossing a real WireGuard tunnel over real iroh connections. Verified by
hand: two CLI processes forming a mesh both on loopback and via n0 discovery
using only an endpoint id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>