Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Aleksandr Bogomiakov fac3bd7bb9 Add tcp-tls transport and tunnel protocol disguised as HTTPS
Implement the `tcp-tls` protocol crate and generic tunnel codec abstractions
alongside `wg-quic` to circumvent deep packet inspection (DPI/TSPU), UDP
blocking, and QUIC throttling. Traffic uses standard TCP on port 443 with
TLS 1.3 framing, looking identical to regular HTTPS traffic to network
observers.

Architectural highlights:
- TunnelCodec & GenericTunnelPlugin: Provide an extensible plugin abstraction
  in `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/tunnel.rs` that encapsulates background task
  lifecycles, per-peer channels, and sink dispatch, so new transport plugins
  only define cryptographic transformations and handshake payloads.
- MultiPacketTransport & Protocol Priority Selection: Support multiple
  simultaneous transports in `AgentConfig` and dynamically dispatch `open()`
  calls by protocol identifier. In `ensure_links`, choose the highest-priority
  mutually supported protocol per peer to avoid duplicate links.
- TLS 1.3 & Certificate Pinning: Generate self-signed Ed25519 X.509 certificates
  derived from the persistent `DeviceIdentity` secret. Clients pin peer
  certificates using `PinnedEndpointVerifier` against `iroh::EndpointId`.
- End-to-end Encryption: `PeerCipher` uses X25519 static-static ECDH, HKDF-SHA256,
  and ChaCha20-Poly1305 with incrementing 64-bit nonces. Relayed traffic across
  intermediate nodes remains confidential and tamper-proof.
- Privilege handling: Default to TCP port 443 with fallback to 8443 on
  `PermissionDenied`, providing an actionable message recommending:
  `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p <path>`.

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed (all workspace unit,
  integration, CLI, and new `tsunagi-tcp-tls` tests passed).
2026-09-30 16:41:51 +01:00
ab b4f3e57c8d Implement fast userspace multihop mesh routing
Replace the one-intermediate-peer relay with protocol-scoped connectivity
graphs and precomputed shortest-path/ECMP forwarding snapshots. Independent
transport readers forward opaque transit frames without a plugin or TUN
round trip. Carry source, destination, a bounded hop limit and stable flow
tags; preserve end-to-end WireGuard links across topology changes.

Classify IP flows before encryption and preserve their tags through the
WireGuard pending queue. Add offline four-agent path-change coverage, loop
and isolation tests, and an opt-in release forwarding microbenchmark. Bump
control/data ALPNs while preserving persistent network identities and state.

Also include the pending Windows Mainline idle-timeout fix and its regression
test, using a reproducible vendored dependency patch.

Validation: fmt, workspace Clippy with warnings denied, and 307 release tests
passed. Two pre-existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were excluded; public
DHT and the manual benchmark remain ignored by default. The forwarding
microbenchmark measured 103 ns (64 B) and 202 ns (1280 B) per transit packet,
excluding encryption and socket I/O.
2026-09-22 18:08:26 +03:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 3581feb9b9 Reach a peer through one that can reach both
Two members of a mesh could both reach a third and not each other, and
that pair was simply lost to one another: a packet for a peer with no data
link was counted undeliverable and dropped. Now it goes through a member
that has both.

What travels is not routes. Each agent says only which peers *it* has a
live link with — first-hand, over the control plane, one hop, never a
claim about somebody else's reachability — and everybody computes their
own way through from that. The choice is local and deterministic (the
lowest endpoint id among the peers that have a link to the destination),
so there is nothing to agree, nothing to elect, and two agents may well
route each direction differently. It is soft state: repeated while it
holds, expired when it stops, so a relay that disappears stops being
chosen without anybody revoking anything.

The one in the middle carries bytes it cannot read. A datagram is wrapped
with the peer it is for, and unwrapped on the other side into the link for
the peer it came *from* — which matters, because a packet attributed to
the carrier would be dropped as coming from an address the carrier does
not hold. The tunnel stays end to end, and the relayed datagram goes link
in, link out: it never reaches the middle's interface, so no routing,
forwarding or firewall setting of that host is involved. One hop, so a
loop cannot form without counting anything.

A protocol is handed one link per peer that now outlives the paths under
it. A direct link that dies, a hop that changes, a direct link that comes
back: none of it tears down a tunnel any more, and the size a protocol may
use does not change with the path. Where there was never a direct link at
all, the link exists anyway as long as a hop does, so a peer reachable
only through somebody still gets a tunnel.

The data ALPN is `tsunagi/data/2`: every datagram now carries a tag saying
whether it is direct, for somebody else, or from somebody else. The local
control protocol is 13, for the relay counters — what this device carried
for others is their traffic on its uplink, and that should not be
invisible. `status` says `via <peer>` on a path through somebody.

Fairness between the peers a relay carries for is deliberately not here
yet: the queues are bounded and the counters are what a limit would be
built on.

Tested with fake links for the mechanics, and end to end with three real
agents — two that cannot reach each other directly, a real WireGuard
packet crossing through the middle. The one arrangement a single host
cannot produce by itself is a pair that cannot see each other, so that is
a `testing`-only switch on the agent config and exists in no release
build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 01:32:43 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 41604225ba Let a device leave a network, and start over
Joining was one command and leaving was nothing at all: a network went into
`state.sqlite` on the first `up` and stayed there, so a mistyped secret
left a second network beside the working one with no way to remove it but
editing the database by hand.

`tsunagi network` lists what this device belongs to. `tsunagi network leave
<id>` publishes a signed release first — while the agent is running and its
sessions are up — and only then deactivates the network and removes it. The
order is the whole point: signed state has no expiry, so the tombstone is
the only thing that ever frees the address and the name for the others, and
after the network is gone there is nothing left here to sign one with.
Peers pass it on, so a member that was away hears it from them rather than
from an agent that has already left.

With no agent running nothing can sign or send, and the command says so
instead of quietly succeeding: `--offline` drops the network locally and
says plainly that the others keep the old claim. The outcome always
distinguishes "published to nobody" from "not published at all", because
they leave the network in different states.

A network is named by its id, and a unique prefix will do. The name is
refused on purpose: two networks can share one — that is exactly the
situation this command exists for — and picking between them for the user
is how the wrong one gets left.

The author's version counter deliberately survives. Rejoining the same
network with the same key must continue above the release, or every replica
that holds the release would treat the new claim as stale and the returning
member would be invisible for good. The protocol key does not survive:
rejoining is joining, not resuming, and coming back with a key the network
was told to let go claims an identity nobody holds any more. Plugins learn
about it through a new `on_network_forgotten`, which is about what outlives
a session rather than what a deactivation tears down.

A released member also drops out of the roster `status` prints. The
tombstone stays in the record set — a replica that never heard of it would
otherwise reinstate the old claim — but listing an author that gave
everything up as a member made leaving look like a peer that had broken.

`tsunagi wipe` is the other half: it empties both directories, so the
device identity, every network, every signed record and everything a
protocol kept beside them go at once and the next start is a stranger. It
refuses while an agent holds the directory, and refuses a directory with no
`state.sqlite` in it, so a mistyped `--state-dir` cannot take somebody's
documents with it. Without `--yes` it only prints what it would remove and
what membership would be lost. It is not a goodbye and says so: leaving the
networks first is what frees their addresses.

The local control protocol is 8 — the socket carries a `Leave` request now,
since only the running agent can publish the release.

Exercised end to end against real agents: leaving by prefix released the
address to a connected peer, leaving by name was refused, `--offline` was
refused until asked for explicitly, wipe was refused while the agent ran,
and the directory afterwards had no identity in it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 21:54:05 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 142fdf995c Make the protocol a crate of its own
tsunagi-wg-quic. The line between a protocol and the system level is now
drawn by the compiler: nothing in it can reach into tsunagi beyond what
tsunagi makes public, and it carries its own version — which is not the
version peers compare.

Two things the compiler found the moment the boundary was real. The key
store was reaching into the core's `pub(crate)` file-permission helpers;
those are a legitimate service of the system level, because a protocol
keeping keys on disk has the same obligation the agent does, so they are
public now with that said. And the test harness was about to be copied
into a second crate, which is how two copies start to drift; it is a
`testing` feature of the core instead, which is also what anybody writing
a protocol would need.

The bridges put up while things were moving are gone: the error
conversion between the two levels, and the re-exports of the system
level's types from the protocol crate. Imports now say which level they
come from, which is the point.

One deliberate deviation, stated rather than hidden. The authenticated
transport stayed in the core. Moving it would have meant handing a
protocol the network's keys so it could prove membership itself, and a
plugin that can authenticate on the control plane is a worse trade than
a module boundary is worth. So the core proves who is at the other end
and the protocol owns what is said over it — the same separation, without
the secret crossing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 19:55:30 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 7c1be332e3 Agree a protocol by name and wire version
A peer's announcement already carried a protocol and a version; only the
name was being checked. Now both are, and a peer offering a protocol at a
version this build does not speak simply has no data plane — the control
plane keeps working, messages and signed state still flow, and the
difference is reported once rather than on every announcement.

The version compared is the *wire* version, not the software version, and
the trait says so: a plugin crate has its own version and it is nobody
else's business. Two peers on different releases work together for as
long as the bytes between them have not changed, and nothing in the
negotiation may be derived from anything that moves with a release. A
test pins that agreement turns on the name and version alone, with a
peer whose announcement carries a payload this build has never seen.

`PeerStatus` gained the protocols agreed with each peer, so an empty list
is visible as what it is: a session that is up, carrying control traffic,
with no protocol in common.

The forging test plugin was announcing version 1 while claiming to speak
the current one, so its payload was being set aside for the wrong reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 19:34:38 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 9415866193 Take the interface off the protocol and give it to the agent
One agent, one interface. The plugin no longer creates one, no longer
holds a TUN factory, no longer keeps a routing table and no longer
decides who owns an address. What is left of it is the protocol: a
WireGuard key per network, a tunnel per peer, encryption on the way out
and decryption on the way in.

The packet path is now explicit about where each decision lives. Out: the
agent's interface reads a packet, the routing table says whose
destination it is, and each protocol is asked in turn whether it can
carry it there. In: the protocol decrypts and hands the packet up with
the peer it came from attached, and the agent checks that peer is
entitled to the source address before writing it out. A protocol proves
who; only the system level knows what they may say.

Two things found by making it work.

`carry` sent the packet unencrypted at first. The encryption had lived in
the interface loop that moved to the core, so taking that out quietly
removed it — the receiving end rejected plaintext as a bad WireGuard
datagram and the counters said nothing at all. Encryption belongs with
the protocol and is now there, with packets dropped for having no session
yet counted apart, because a handful while a tunnel comes up is normal
and a number that keeps climbing is not.

An agent could impose a range it could not itself route. With one
interface two networks need different ranges, and "the lowest author's
range wins" would have carried one agent's colliding default to
everybody. The configured range is now reserved when a network is
activated — on the serialised path, so the answer does not depend on
which task ran first — and an agent that cannot have it proposes nothing
and adopts whatever the network settles on.

Leaving a network takes its address off the interface and leaves the
interface; the interface goes when the agent does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 19:20:30 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 5bee148497 Move the overlay interface to the system level
One agent, one interface, owned by the agent rather than by a protocol.
That is what makes several protocols able to be live at once: a packet
leaving the interface is routed to whichever peer owns its destination,
over whichever protocol has a link to that peer, and neither protocol
has to hold the address because the agent holds it.

This commit moves the pieces without changing behaviour: provisioning,
the TUN itself, IP header parsing and interface naming are now
crates/tsunagi/src/overlay, and the WireGuard module re-exports them
while its callers are moved over. They were never WireGuard-specific —
netlink, capabilities and `ip tuntap` have nothing to do with the
protocol running on top.

They also get their own error type. An interface that cannot be created
is not a plugin failing, and now that the two belong to different levels
they should not share a word for it.

Routing, addressing and the reduced plugin contract come next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 18:09:57 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 60e6b263d1 Split the system level and the command line into a workspace
First step of separating the layers. The library and the binary are now
crates/tsunagi and crates/tsunagi-cli, which means the plugin crate to
come can be told apart from the core by the compiler rather than by
discipline.

Falls out of it immediately: the CLI's dependencies stop being features
of the library. clap, anstream and tracing-subscriber were optional
dependencies behind a `cli` feature that every library user had to
remember to turn off; now they belong to the crate that uses them, and
the library defaults to no features at all.

The one test that drives the binary moved beside it — a library cannot
depend on a binary built from a crate that depends on the library — and
was rewritten against the public API instead of the test harness.

AGENTS.md said to prefer one crate. It now says the system level and its
plugins are separate crates, for the reason above, and that everything
else stays one crate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 18:05:42 +01:00