Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 776eedc669 Report members, not symptoms
A peer going away showed up as three unrelated yellow rows: no peers
authenticated, N dial failures, one packet to an address nobody owns.
Each was true and none of them said the actual thing, which is that a
member we know about is offline. Worse, they are cumulative, so after
the peer came back the report still looked broken.

Two changes behind that.

Members are now a list, joined from the three sources that each know
part of the answer: signed state says who belongs and keeps saying it
while they are away, the session list says who is here, the overlay says
whose tunnel is up. Online first, then away, this agent left out because
the device section already covers it. An absent member is stated rather
than flagged — in a mesh of laptops being away is the ordinary condition
— and its failed dials are attributed to it instead of floating free as
a network-wide number.

Counters are history and no longer grade anything. Grading them is what
kept the report red long after the cause had gone. The one exception is
context-sensitive rather than cumulative: handshake failures with nobody
connected is the signature of a mismatched secret, so that is called
out.

NetworkStatus grows a member roster from the signed records, and the
overlay report carries the endpoint id so a tunnel can be matched to its
session. Note what the roster cannot do: a member is in signed state
only once it has claimed something, which today means an IPv4 address,
so an IPv6-only network still has no durable roster. Hostnames are not
persisted either, so an absent member is named by its id.

The control socket gained a version word. Adding these fields changed
how postcard parses the bytes, and without it a client one build ahead
of its agent reported "Found an Option discriminant that wasn't 0 or 1".
The check names a mismatch for whichever side is newer; an older agent
reading a newer request just drops the connection, so the CLI offers
that as a possibility rather than asserting it. It also now separates an
agent that is absent, which is an ordinary answer, from one that is
there and will not answer, which is a fault.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:26:16 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 21be7e9b44 Separate control and data logically, move WireGuard into userspace, add a CLI
Corrects the architecture on two points raised in review, while the project
is still small enough to change cheaply.

1. Control and data are separated *logically*, not physically.

The old reading — "nothing but control may ride on iroh" — threw away iroh's
whole value and would have forced the data plane to reimplement STUN, ICE and
a relay. Now both planes ride on iroh with different ALPNs and different
connections, so the data plane inherits hole punching and relay fallback,
while proto/ still knows nothing about packets and dataplane/ knows nothing
about the control protocol.

New boundary: PacketTransport / PacketLink, an authenticated unreliable
datagram channel per (network, peer, protocol). tsunagi/data/1 runs the same
membership handshake, then DataOpen/DataOpenAck, then QUIC datagrams. Only
the smaller endpoint id dials, so exactly one link exists per pair.

A plugin is handed links and never learns reachability, so the WireGuard
announcement shrank to a public key: there is no address left to lie about.

2. WireGuard now runs in userspace, on boringtun's protocol state machine.

No kernel module, no wg tool, no ip shell-out, no loopback proxy: the wgtool,
backend and bridge modules are gone. Only creating a TUN device needs
privileges, and that sits behind TunFactory, so the entire data plane —
handshake, encryption, routing, address ownership — is tested with none.

Address ownership is enforced rather than believed: outbound packets go to
the owner of the destination address, inbound packets are dropped unless
their source is the address derived for the peer that sent them.

3. A `tsunagi` binary: secret, doctor, id, up. It owns the runtime, the
logging subscriber and Ctrl-C, which the library still refuses to.

Also fixes a reference cycle where IrohTransport held Arc<Inner>, which kept
the databases open and the directory lock held after shutdown; two storage
tests caught it once the cycle existed.

81 tests pass offline with no privileges, including real IPv6 packets
crossing a real WireGuard tunnel over real iroh connections. Verified by
hand: two CLI processes forming a mesh both on loopback and via n0 discovery
using only an endpoint id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 11:55:20 +01:00
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 7cea9afa37 Proof-of-concept mesh agent library over iroh
Working library with real iroh connections, not an interface sketch:

- persistent device identity in state.sqlite, stable across restarts
- deterministic network space derived from name + secret via HKDF-SHA256,
  with frozen labels and unambiguous length-prefixed encoding
- replaceable discovery returning unverified candidates only; static
  bootstrap, in-memory test backend and a composite
- real iroh connections plus an explicit mutual membership proof:
  HMAC-SHA256 over a role-separated transcript bound to the TLS exporter,
  the network id and both endpoint identities
- small versioned control protocol: handshake, announcement, ping/pong
- multiple networks per agent with enforced isolation
- automatic reconnect with bounded backoff and jitter
- mandatory state vs disposable cache, with a real directory ownership lock
- status snapshots, event stream and honest diagnostics

47 integration and unit tests cover the required scenarios offline on
loopback. Snapshots, revocations and WireGuard are designed for and
documented, not implemented.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 00:10:07 +01:00