90ef5cefecdea35cb9a75de08a4265bddb959efa
18
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Aleksandr Bogomiakov
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e701986a39 |
Add ephemeral pairwise Amnezia transport and runtime fallback
Plain WG and QUIC can be blocked or severely degraded while the iroh control connection still works. Add an awg carrier with one independent UDP socket, WireGuard engine and randomized masking profile per network/peer attempt. The smaller endpoint id negotiates fresh outer keys, PSK, header protection, header ranges, padding and signature templates through private authenticated control messages. Restart or fallback reentry generates a new profile; ordinary rekeying preserves the current profile. No pair parameters enter signed state, capabilities, persistent storage or public message events. Private payloads and serialized control buffers redact and zeroize themselves. Adapt the bounded packet masking engine from RunaRoo/AmneziaWG-RS at commit 51579a7d6e8882d1d8d6d00822f09e18a9423b73, retaining its Apache license and provenance. Declare WTFPL AND Apache-2.0 in package metadata to cover both new glue and the adapted source. Reuse boringtun instead of upstream's Node/global executors and interface machinery. This is Tsunagi AWG wire version 1, with standard WG headers restored before authentication; external Amnezia server compatibility is not implemented. DNS/SIP signature generators vary fields instead of replaying captures. Each attempt closes independently, bounds allocation, queues, candidates and fragment assemblies, and supports the full 64 KiB carrier contract using UDP packets at most 1200 bytes. Yield between fragment batches so large messages do not starve local socket readers. Keep carrier encryption separate from end-to-end tunnels so multihop relays still forward opaque ciphertext. The system owns the sole interface, signed addresses and admission. Plugins receive neither network secrets nor paths. Expose a bounded opaque control sender at the transport boundary; core control messages remain outside protocol crates. Optional STUN on the pair's actual socket adds IPv4 public candidates in CLI direct/relay mode, with a finite query deadline and an off/alternate-server option. Local mode remains offline. Symmetric NAT, IPv6-only paths and arbitrary UDP blocking can still require fallback; no AWG-over-QUIC or hidden AWG relay is introduced. Default carrier order is wg, awg, wg-quic, tcp-tls. Advance the fallback cycle after setup failures and sustained runtime loss, even after earlier cooldowns expire. Authenticated delivery probes traverse the actual encrypted tunnel, fit the interface MTU and never enter the TUN. Retire after a 20-second warmup and at least 60% loss over at least 15 completed recent observations. Preserve logical tunnels and control sessions while explicitly closing physical links, including TCP reader/writer tasks. Retain the newest private probe settings across independently queued control negotiation and inbound installation. CLI/tray reports keep end-to-end protocol and actual carrier separate. Control ALPN/version becomes tsunagi/ctrl/6 for the new private message; upgrade all members together. Data ALPN/envelopes remain version 5. Network identity derivation, transcript encoding, device identities, signed records, saved network configuration and release versions are unchanged. Validation on Linux through nix develop: - cargo fmt --all -- --check - cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings - cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, with the inherited TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET override removed: 504 passed, 2 pre-existing ignored Tests use real iroh membership, SQLite, UDP sockets and WireGuard encryption with memory TUNs. Cover three independent pairs, full-size IP and carrier frames, restart freshness/socket release, 80% carrier datagram loss, fallback to real iroh, fresh retries with working delivery checks, unequal small MTUs, malformed negotiations/profiles, role and resource bounds, probe forgery and STUN parsing. Earlier compile/lint iterations and focused tests caught RNG API/initializer mistakes, a retry assertion racing path installation, and a large-fragment burst overflowing loopback buffers; corrected before these successful checks. Normalized upstream license line endings for diff checks. Public NAT/STUN connectivity, actual DPI effectiveness, WAN performance, per-pair memory measurement, macOS/Windows, privileged TUN operations and manual tray interaction were not exercised. |
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Aleksandr Bogomiakov
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ed28e86748 |
Derive default network ranges and switch overlapping networks
Every first network previously proposed 10.13.37.0/24. Independently created networks therefore collided when a device joined more than one of them. Use the existing stable NetworkId-derived /24 in 10/8 for every new network, independent of activation order or peer availability. Legacy and explicit signed ranges outrank the derived default; remaining range disagreements still use author-id ordering. The derivation, identity labels, handshake and signed record encoding stay unchanged. There is no creator, timestamp or vote. Reserve ranges before starting network actors and serialise start, stop and switching through the agent lifecycle lock. Refuse equal or nested overlaps without changing a network's subnet locally. A late authenticated range that collides suspends only its network before updating plugins or the interface. Coalesced watch notifications let the agent clean up outside the network actor and reconsider suspended networks when ranges change. An explicit switch stops every blocker before activating the chosen network. Suspended networks retain their startup request and resume whenever their ranges become free, including switching from a wide range to a narrow one. A manual stop cancels that request even for an already suspended network. Persist preference order and enabling together in an SQLite transaction so the user's selection survives restart; no database schema migration is needed. CLI status and network listing show blocker names, ids, ranges and the start command. Network start switches explicitly and reports suspended networks; joining an overlapping network reports it as configured but inactive. The tray adds conflict details, an amber icon, Switch to this network and Keep stopped actions. Local IPC wire version is 19 for the extended reports, so restart the agent and tray together. Release versions and peer wire formats are unchanged. Update the user documentation and compatibility tests. Validation on Linux through nix develop: - cargo fmt --all -- --check - cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings - cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets with TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET removed from the test environment: 486 passed, 2 pre-existing ignored tests - final focused range_conflicts integration suite after making discovery fixtures deterministic: 6 passed Earlier validation attempts caught outdated diagnostic assertions, a new test helper scope error, and the inherited system control socket override. Those were corrected before the successful runs. Plain cargo was unavailable in the host shell, so validation used the Nix development toolchain. macOS, Windows, privileged host TUN operations and manual tray interaction were not exercised. |
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Aleksandr Bogomiakov
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781e359775 |
Make tunnel and transport layers explicit in status
The tray called the end-to-end tunnel proto and the current route link, then put the tunnel handshake age beside the route. A valid wg tunnel over a tcp-tls transport consequently looked like contradictory state. The terminal status used similarly terse wording.\n\nThe tray now separates end-to-end from data path, renders direct paths as direct over TRANSPORT, keeps handshake or uptime beside the tunnel, and explains both layers in hover text. Terminal status uses the same end-to-end tunnel, data path, transport detail, and control path vocabulary. Routing, protocol selection, IPC, and wire behavior are unchanged.\n\nPresentation tests cover wg over tcp-tls, tcp-tls uptime, relayed and missing paths, a missing handshake, and offline devices. The WireGuard broadcast checksum test uses the current slice-array iterator spelling required by Clippy; its behavior is unchanged.\n\nChecks: cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings; cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets with TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET removed from the test environment so integration agents use their temporary control sockets. All passed on Linux. |
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 Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude
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97377e3703 |
Relay across any mix of links, one online answer for every client, first claim owns a hostname
A tunnel no longer depends on the kind of link under it. The relay hub keeps one forwarding table per network instead of one per protocol, the envelope names the end-to-end protocol, and a neighbour reached over several kinds of transport is sent to over the best open one. A member in the middle needs no protocol in common with either end. Which protocol a pair runs is settled by the lower endpoint id's announced order, so both ends agree without asking. A direct link that comes up later is shorter than the path through others, so traffic moves to it with the same logical link. The agent now answers "is it online" once: a live control session or any data path. Members and peers report how they are reached (direct over a named transport, relayed through a named member, or no data path yet), and `tsng status` and the tray both read that instead of a session list and a WireGuard handshake respectively. A hostname belongs to whoever claimed it first. A claim carries the time its author first claimed the name, signed with the record, and replicas order by (time, id) so every member names the same holder. A later claimant keeps working by address, is not found by the name, and is told so in its status, `tsng status`, the tray and a HostnameTaken event. Wire change: control and data ALPN 5, control PROTOCOL_VERSION 5, envelope version 2, signing domain v3, state schema 7, local control protocol 18. Upgrade every member together. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude
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9966b50407 |
Rename the CLI package to tsunagi and its executable to tsng
The command line package is now `tsunagi` and builds the `tsng` executable, which the packages, the unit, the installers and the workflows install and run. The core library package becomes `tsunagi-core`, keeping the library name `tsunagi`, so no code changes `use tsunagi::...`. Directories follow (crates/tsunagi-core, crates/tsunagi). Every command shown to a person is now `tsng ...`. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude
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b2431d7eb1 |
Exit nodes: offer one per network, send all traffic through a member
A member can offer itself as an exit node per network (off by default); it is announced over the control channel (ctrl/4) once its iptables masquerade and forward rules are in place, with a warning when kernel forwarding is off. A device picks one member as its exit node via policy routing, with the agent's own uid exempt from the tunnel; if the exit node disappears the rules stay and traffic is dropped, loudly reported. CLI: `network exit-node`, `exit-node`; tray: tile checkbox, warnings and a per-device icon with confirmation. Linux only. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude
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e7dff34ec2 |
Status: ask the agent for its state directory and its own CAP_NET_ADMIN
The CLI reached a packaged service's socket but read state from its own default directory, so `network` saw nothing next to a running network, and `status` reported the CLI binary's capabilities instead of the agent's. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8
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de8e48bee7 |
Let the agent grant the control socket to a group (0660)
For a GUI (or a CLI) running as a different user to reach the agent, the control
socket needs to be group-accessible. This is set by the agent when it binds the
socket — correct from creation, not patched afterwards.
- ipc::ControlSocketAccess { Private, Group(gid) }. Private is the existing
owner-only 0600. Group sets the socket's group to the gid and mode 0660, and
creates the socket's parent directory 0755 so the group can traverse to it; if
the group cannot be set it falls back to owner-only rather than leaving it
wrong. The chown uses std::os::unix::fs::chown — no unsafe, no new lib
dependency.
- ControlSocket::bind takes the access policy (Windows accepts it and keeps its
pipe default for now; a pipe security descriptor is a later follow-up).
- CLI: `tsunagi up --control-group <name>` (env TSUNAGI_CONTROL_GROUP) resolves
the group to its gid via nix (safe wrapper, unix-only dep) and passes
Group(gid); without it the socket stays Private. A name that does not resolve
is reported, and the socket stays owner-only.
- control_socket() now serves the system path (default_control_socket_path) on
macOS too, not just Windows: /var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock, a runtime directory
the GUI can reach, rather than the owner-only state directory. A custom
--state-dir still keeps its own per-user socket.
So the packaged/daemon agent runs e.g. `tsunagi up --control-group tsunagi` and a
user in that group talks to it; a plain per-user agent is unchanged (0600).
Checks: fmt, clippy --workspace --all-targets -D warnings, tsunagi lib tests and
the wg-quic local_control tests pass on macOS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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 ab
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c724981bfd |
Added per-network LAN broadcast relay
LAN game discovery previously dropped IPv4 broadcasts at TUN ingress. Carry limited and subnet-directed UDP broadcasts to authenticated, opted-in members of the source network, including destinations reached through mesh relays. Preserve the original IP/UDP bytes and deliver received broadcasts only to the local TUN; never reflood them or expose another pair's plaintext at transit. Build immutable recipient snapshots on address and participation changes. The origin sends one ordinary end-to-end encrypted copy per recipient; the existing fast, bounded-hop transport router remains unchanged. Validate UDP framing, source ownership and destination admission without game-specific port rules. Keep network domains isolated and refuse implicit gateways to physical LANs. The separate broadcast policy/domain layer is the extension point for future authorized subnet exports; physical capture, bridging and LAN deduplication are deliberately not implemented yet. Persist default-on participation independently for each local network. Add join --no-broadcast/--broadcast and network broadcast <id> [on|off], including live updates and authenticated announcements. Joining without a flag preserves the saved choice. Opt-out stops local origination and delivery, while opaque unicast transit for other members keeps working. Migrate SQLite schema 3 to 4 without replacing identities or signed state. Use control ALPN 3 and local IPC protocol 14 for the new announcement/request shapes; update peers and restart running agents together. The data ALPN 4 envelope remains unchanged. No release version bump, tag or push is included. Document agent-owned commits in AGENTS.md: short English subjects, explanatory bodies, scoped staging, honest validation, and repository-local fallback author AB <ab@hexor.cy> only when an effective name/email is missing. Release actions remain the user's responsibility. Validation on Windows: cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo check --locked --workspace --all-targets; cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings; release workspace/all-target tests: 313 passed. The two existing SQLite wipe failures (a_wipe_removes_everything_and_the_next_start_is_a_stranger and wiping_twice_is_as_ordinary_as_wiping_once) were explicitly skipped; the public-DHT smoke test and forwarding benchmark remain ignored by default. New coverage exercises real iroh/WireGuard multihop fanout, single delivery, runtime opt-out, unicast replies, domain isolation, malformed input and schema migration. TUNs are in-memory; actual games and OS adapter selection were not tested. |
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ab
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b4f3e57c8d |
Implement fast userspace multihop mesh routing
Replace the one-intermediate-peer relay with protocol-scoped connectivity graphs and precomputed shortest-path/ECMP forwarding snapshots. Independent transport readers forward opaque transit frames without a plugin or TUN round trip. Carry source, destination, a bounded hop limit and stable flow tags; preserve end-to-end WireGuard links across topology changes. Classify IP flows before encryption and preserve their tags through the WireGuard pending queue. Add offline four-agent path-change coverage, loop and isolation tests, and an opt-in release forwarding microbenchmark. Bump control/data ALPNs while preserving persistent network identities and state. Also include the pending Windows Mainline idle-timeout fix and its regression test, using a reproducible vendored dependency patch. Validation: fmt, workspace Clippy with warnings denied, and 307 release tests passed. Two pre-existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were excluded; public DHT and the manual benchmark remain ignored by default. The forwarding microbenchmark measured 103 ns (64 B) and 202 ns (1280 B) per transit packet, excluding encryption and socket I/O. |
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ab
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9698f21d55 | Added DHT peer resolver, fixed MTU | ||
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ab
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e735151d62 | Added windown support | ||
 tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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3581feb9b9 |
Reach a peer through one that can reach both
Two members of a mesh could both reach a third and not each other, and that pair was simply lost to one another: a packet for a peer with no data link was counted undeliverable and dropped. Now it goes through a member that has both. What travels is not routes. Each agent says only which peers *it* has a live link with — first-hand, over the control plane, one hop, never a claim about somebody else's reachability — and everybody computes their own way through from that. The choice is local and deterministic (the lowest endpoint id among the peers that have a link to the destination), so there is nothing to agree, nothing to elect, and two agents may well route each direction differently. It is soft state: repeated while it holds, expired when it stops, so a relay that disappears stops being chosen without anybody revoking anything. The one in the middle carries bytes it cannot read. A datagram is wrapped with the peer it is for, and unwrapped on the other side into the link for the peer it came *from* — which matters, because a packet attributed to the carrier would be dropped as coming from an address the carrier does not hold. The tunnel stays end to end, and the relayed datagram goes link in, link out: it never reaches the middle's interface, so no routing, forwarding or firewall setting of that host is involved. One hop, so a loop cannot form without counting anything. A protocol is handed one link per peer that now outlives the paths under it. A direct link that dies, a hop that changes, a direct link that comes back: none of it tears down a tunnel any more, and the size a protocol may use does not change with the path. Where there was never a direct link at all, the link exists anyway as long as a hop does, so a peer reachable only through somebody still gets a tunnel. The data ALPN is `tsunagi/data/2`: every datagram now carries a tag saying whether it is direct, for somebody else, or from somebody else. The local control protocol is 13, for the relay counters — what this device carried for others is their traffic on its uplink, and that should not be invisible. `status` says `via <peer>` on a path through somebody. Fairness between the peers a relay carries for is deliberately not here yet: the queues are bounded and the counters are what a limit would be built on. Tested with fake links for the mechanics, and end to end with three real agents — two that cannot reach each other directly, a real WireGuard packet crossing through the middle. The one arrangement a single host cannot produce by itself is a pair that cannot see each other, so that is a `testing`-only switch on the agent config and exists in no release build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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44a799faee |
Split the command line along the line the system draws
`id` had grown into the place where everything was shown and changed, including the secret of every network this device had joined — and it printed them all in its ordinary overview, which is a poor default for output that gets pasted into chats and issue trackers. Now that networks have a command of their own, the boundary is the one the system already has: `id` is this **device**, `network` is what it **belongs to**. A device outlives every network it is in and a network outlives any device in it, so a command that mixed them had to be read twice. `id` keeps the key, the name and the directories, and says how many networks there are without naming their secrets. `network secret` prints one, or all of them, and only when asked. Nothing else ever does. `network join` is the part that was missing entirely. One state directory is one identity and one live agent, so a second `tsunagi up` on it is refused — and until now that refusal was the end of the road: a network could be left while the agent ran but never added. It goes over the control socket, takes effect at once, and is idempotent, saying which of "joined" and "already there" happened. With no agent running it is written to the configuration and starts with the next `up`, and says so rather than implying it is live. The secret travels over an owner-only socket to the agent that stores it anyway, and `Request` has a hand-written `Debug` that redacts it, because a derived one would put it in any log line that printed a request. The lock error from a second `up` now answers the question behind it: add the network to the running agent with one command, or run a genuinely separate agent — a second identity, with its own directories, interface and range — with the other. That is the shape of the thing: one agent per identity, many networks on it, one interface; a second agent is isolated, not a second view of the first. AGENTS.md carries that as a boundary now, since it is the kind of thing a change could quietly break. The local control protocol is 9. Exercised against a running agent: a second `up` refused with both routes named, a network joined into the live agent and answering for status at once, the same one again reported as already there, a same-name network with a different secret joined with the warning, and `id` showing three networks and no secrets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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41604225ba |
Let a device leave a network, and start over
Joining was one command and leaving was nothing at all: a network went into `state.sqlite` on the first `up` and stayed there, so a mistyped secret left a second network beside the working one with no way to remove it but editing the database by hand. `tsunagi network` lists what this device belongs to. `tsunagi network leave <id>` publishes a signed release first — while the agent is running and its sessions are up — and only then deactivates the network and removes it. The order is the whole point: signed state has no expiry, so the tombstone is the only thing that ever frees the address and the name for the others, and after the network is gone there is nothing left here to sign one with. Peers pass it on, so a member that was away hears it from them rather than from an agent that has already left. With no agent running nothing can sign or send, and the command says so instead of quietly succeeding: `--offline` drops the network locally and says plainly that the others keep the old claim. The outcome always distinguishes "published to nobody" from "not published at all", because they leave the network in different states. A network is named by its id, and a unique prefix will do. The name is refused on purpose: two networks can share one — that is exactly the situation this command exists for — and picking between them for the user is how the wrong one gets left. The author's version counter deliberately survives. Rejoining the same network with the same key must continue above the release, or every replica that holds the release would treat the new claim as stale and the returning member would be invisible for good. The protocol key does not survive: rejoining is joining, not resuming, and coming back with a key the network was told to let go claims an identity nobody holds any more. Plugins learn about it through a new `on_network_forgotten`, which is about what outlives a session rather than what a deactivation tears down. A released member also drops out of the roster `status` prints. The tombstone stays in the record set — a replica that never heard of it would otherwise reinstate the old claim — but listing an author that gave everything up as a member made leaving look like a peer that had broken. `tsunagi wipe` is the other half: it empties both directories, so the device identity, every network, every signed record and everything a protocol kept beside them go at once and the next start is a stranger. It refuses while an agent holds the directory, and refuses a directory with no `state.sqlite` in it, so a mistyped `--state-dir` cannot take somebody's documents with it. Without `--yes` it only prints what it would remove and what membership would be lost. It is not a goodbye and says so: leaving the networks first is what frees their addresses. The local control protocol is 8 — the socket carries a `Leave` request now, since only the running agent can publish the release. Exercised end to end against real agents: leaving by prefix released the address to a connected peer, leaving by name was refused, `--offline` was refused until asked for explicitly, wipe was refused while the agent ran, and the directory afterwards had no identity in it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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fae3816bbf |
Answer DNS over both families, and only for our own interface
Questions now arrive over IPv4 or IPv6, whichever the resolver uses. The server opens one listener per family — the overlay address or `127.0.0.1`, and `[::1]` — and all of them are published to systemd-resolved in one call, which is what that call requires: sending them one at a time leaves only the last. A family that cannot be bound, IPv6 switched off in the kernel for instance, no longer stops the other from answering. The answers stay IPv4, because that is what the overlay is. A listening address is disposable, unlike an address a member holds in signed state, so serving one family over the overlay and the other over loopback costs nothing and loses nothing. `--no-tun` was also configuring the host. An in-memory interface has a name and an MTU and nothing else, but everything downstream read that name as a host interface: the resolver setting was pushed onto whatever else on the host happened to be called `tsun0` — which, with two agents on one machine, is another agent's live interface. A factory now says whether what it creates is on the host, and the resolver setting goes only to an interface the agent created. For the same reason the complaint that "the allocated address is not on any interface" no longer fires under `--no-tun`, where there was never going to be one; it had people looking for something that had removed their address. The status line says `tsun0 (in memory, --no-tun)` rather than printing an address beside a name the operating system does not have. That distinction also corrected a test that used the in-memory interface as a stand-in for an unconfigured host interface. They are not the same case, so the test now uses a factory that claims the host and puts nothing there — a provisioner that reported a success it did not achieve — and a second test covers `--no-tun` being an arrangement rather than a fault. An in-memory device now reports end of stream when it is destroyed. It never did, so the packet loop reading it could not end, and since shutdown became bounded that cost every `--no-tun` agent the full five-second grace before the loop was aborted instead of finishing. And `status` says when there is no local resolver at all. Its absence is the answer to "why does this name not resolve?", and leaving the section out made a report with DNS switched off look exactly like one where it was running. The local control protocol is 7: `DnsReport` carries a list of listening addresses and `OverlayReport` says whether the interface is on the host. Verified against the running systemd-resolved: it takes `127.0.0.1:5354 [::1]:5354` on one link in a single call, and forward and reverse questions for a peer's name are answered identically over both transports. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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0b3915d52b |
Bound every wait that could last for ever
Nine orphaned test processes were found still running from the day before, three of them spinning on a core each for twenty hours. The code they ran is several changes old and the mesh test passes twenty times over now, so the wedge itself is gone — but nothing in the way it was waited on was bounded, which is why a wedge lasted a day instead of failing a run. The harness enforced its deadline only between probes. A probe that never returned — one call into a wedged runtime, which is exactly what a status request is — waited for ever inside the deadline it was supposed to obey. The probe is now bounded too, so the same wedge fails the test in thirty seconds. Shutdown claimed to be bounded and was not. The plugins had a grace period; the network runtimes, the accept loop, the plugin request loop and the endpoint close did not, and a peer that stops reading is enough to hold any of them open. Each now gets a grace period and is aborted after it. The overlay packet loop was not stopped at all: it ends when the device reports end of stream, which a live interface never does, so it outlived the interface it was reading. And a plugin's grace period abandoned the future without stopping the task behind it, so the helper is public and `wg-quic` uses it on its own runtime. The local control socket was unbounded in both directions. A wedged agent left `tsunagi status` hanging with nothing on screen and no way out but Ctrl-C; it now says the agent did not answer, after five seconds, and falls back to the state store as it already did for a socket that refuses a connection. On the serving side, a connection that sends no request no longer holds a task open. Tests cover the mechanism — a task that stops on its own is not aborted, one that ignores the grace is cut off and drops what it held — and both sides of the change in behaviour: a probe that never answers fails its deadline, and a silent agent is reported rather than waited out. Also: the binary opts out of rustdoc, since it shares a name with the library and `cargo doc` cannot put both in one directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
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142fdf995c |
Make the protocol a crate of its own
tsunagi-wg-quic. The line between a protocol and the system level is now drawn by the compiler: nothing in it can reach into tsunagi beyond what tsunagi makes public, and it carries its own version — which is not the version peers compare. Two things the compiler found the moment the boundary was real. The key store was reaching into the core's `pub(crate)` file-permission helpers; those are a legitimate service of the system level, because a protocol keeping keys on disk has the same obligation the agent does, so they are public now with that said. And the test harness was about to be copied into a second crate, which is how two copies start to drift; it is a `testing` feature of the core instead, which is also what anybody writing a protocol would need. The bridges put up while things were moving are gone: the error conversion between the two levels, and the re-exports of the system level's types from the protocol crate. Imports now say which level they come from, which is the point. One deliberate deviation, stated rather than hidden. The authenticated transport stayed in the core. Moving it would have meant handing a protocol the network's keys so it could prove membership itself, and a plugin that can authenticate on the control plane is a worse trade than a module boundary is worth. So the core proves who is at the other end and the protocol owns what is said over it — the same separation, without the secret crossing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |