Replace the one-intermediate-peer relay with protocol-scoped connectivity
graphs and precomputed shortest-path/ECMP forwarding snapshots. Independent
transport readers forward opaque transit frames without a plugin or TUN
round trip. Carry source, destination, a bounded hop limit and stable flow
tags; preserve end-to-end WireGuard links across topology changes.
Classify IP flows before encryption and preserve their tags through the
WireGuard pending queue. Add offline four-agent path-change coverage, loop
and isolation tests, and an opt-in release forwarding microbenchmark. Bump
control/data ALPNs while preserving persistent network identities and state.
Also include the pending Windows Mainline idle-timeout fix and its regression
test, using a reproducible vendored dependency patch.
Validation: fmt, workspace Clippy with warnings denied, and 307 release tests
passed. Two pre-existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were excluded; public
DHT and the manual benchmark remain ignored by default. The forwarding
microbenchmark measured 103 ns (64 B) and 202 ns (1280 B) per transit packet,
excluding encryption and socket I/O.
tsunagi-wg-quic. The line between a protocol and the system level is now
drawn by the compiler: nothing in it can reach into tsunagi beyond what
tsunagi makes public, and it carries its own version — which is not the
version peers compare.
Two things the compiler found the moment the boundary was real. The key
store was reaching into the core's `pub(crate)` file-permission helpers;
those are a legitimate service of the system level, because a protocol
keeping keys on disk has the same obligation the agent does, so they are
public now with that said. And the test harness was about to be copied
into a second crate, which is how two copies start to drift; it is a
`testing` feature of the core instead, which is also what anybody writing
a protocol would need.
The bridges put up while things were moving are gone: the error
conversion between the two levels, and the re-exports of the system
level's types from the protocol crate. Imports now say which level they
come from, which is the point.
One deliberate deviation, stated rather than hidden. The authenticated
transport stayed in the core. Moving it would have meant handing a
protocol the network's keys so it could prove membership itself, and a
plugin that can authenticate on the control plane is a worse trade than
a module boundary is worth. So the core proves who is at the other end
and the protocol owns what is said over it — the same separation, without
the secret crossing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5