c791102ad9e5d2a483bf387bf5277ff13931e37d
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Aleksandr Bogomiakov
|
c791102ad9 |
Fix overlay and virtual interface candidate leakage and WireGuard rekeying
On Windows (Wintun), iface.name in netdev is an adapter GUID, while
iface.friendly_name is 'tsun0'. Checking only iface.name failed to
identify and exclude Wintun overlay interfaces. Consequently, Windows
nodes announced their own overlay IP addresses (e.g. 10.13.37.26) as
candidate endpoints. Remote peers latched onto this overlay IP as the
WireGuard target, routing encrypted packets into tsun0 (recursive loop),
resulting in failed handshakes and subsequent HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)
and CONNECTION_EXPIRED.
Similarly, Docker bridges (br-*, docker0) and virtual bridges were
announced and alphabetically sorted before physical LAN or Tailscale
interfaces, causing peers to attempt WireGuard handshakes with internal
Docker bridge addresses (e.g. 172.21.0.1).
Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard and crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls:
- Robustly identify overlay interfaces by inspecting iface.name,
iface.friendly_name, and iface.description for 'tsun', 'tsunagi',
and 'wintun'.
- Filter out container and virtual bridge interfaces (docker, br-,
veth, virbr, cni, flannel, cali, kube, dummy, lxc, podman, vethernet,
vboxnet, vmnet).
- Prioritize candidates by physical interface score: interfaces with
a default gateway (physical LAN/WAN) and Tailscale (100.64.0.0/10)
score highest and sort to candidate #0.
- In on_peer_capability, filter out any announced address falling inside
any active overlay IPv4 range (defense in depth on receiver).
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs:
- In WireguardLink::send, broadcast Handshake Initiation packets (type 1)
to all candidate addresses so initial handshakes and rekeys probe all
candidate paths and recover if an endpoint roamed or NAT expired.
- In accept_loop, prioritize exact socket address matches before falling
back to candidate IP matches for NAT port roaming.
- In crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs:
- Update iroh AddrFilter to inspect friendly_name and description,
preventing Wintun overlay IPs from leaking into iroh discovery endpoints.
- Tests:
- Add unit tests for candidate interface filtering, IP validation, and
priority scoring in tsunagi-wireguard and tsunagi-tcp-tls.
Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
|
||
|
Aleksandr Bogomiakov
|
2ed447ae86 |
Filter overlay interface from candidates and align status member columns
Peers previously advertised overlay interface (tsun0) addresses as physical candidate endpoints for both iroh discovery and tcp-tls announcements. When an intermediate tunnel was active between two peers (e.g., between a host and a VM), iroh probes to the remote peer's overlay address were routed through the existing overlay, causing iroh to select the overlay IP itself as a 'direct' endpoint. This caused recursive tunneling (QUIC over WireGuard over TLS) and confusing status output showing peers connecting to their own overlay IP addresses. Additionally, in tsunagi status, peer rows were displayed with unaligned columns, mixing control plane status and data plane metrics in a way that was difficult to scan. Key improvements: - In crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs, add an AddrFilter to the iroh EndpointBuilder to dynamically filter out any local addresses assigned to tsun* overlay interfaces before publishing to address discovery services (DHT/pkarr/STUN). - In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls/src/plugin.rs, exclude tsun* interfaces from local_ip_candidates() so overlay IPs are never advertised as physical TCP endpoints. - In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, exclude tsun* interfaces from netwatch_addresses() so the local addresses section reflects only actual physical/host network interfaces. - In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, update member_row() to format member details with aligned columnar layout: the overlay IP is placed first and padded, followed by control plane transport and latency, and line 2 pads tunnel metrics so that the data link endpoint (via ...) aligns vertically. Validation on Linux: - cargo fmt --all -- --check passed. - cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed. - cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed). |
||
|
Aleksandr Bogomiakov
|
510116afb9 |
Add automatic protocol fallback with backoff and silence DHT bootstrap error
When multiple data plane protocols (such as tcp-tls and wg-quic) are configured, the agent previously attempted only the first mutually supported protocol in served order. If that protocol failed to connect or dropped (due to NAT, firewall, or handshake failure), ensure_links retried the exact same failed protocol on every tick without ever falling back to alternative supported protocols. Additionally, tcp-tls mistakenly included 127.0.0.1 in peer candidate lists, causing peers to connect to their own local listener and fail certificate verification (NotValidForName). Finally, BitTorrent DHT bootstrap failures in the third-party mainline crate were logged as noisy ERRORs despite overlay connectivity operating normally. Key improvements: - In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs, implement ProtocolDialState with exponential backoff (3s, 6s, 12s, 24s, 48s, capped at 60s). - In ensure_links, select the highest-priority mutually supported protocol that is not currently on backoff cooldown. If a protocol fails, immediately record the failure and fall back to alternative mutually supported protocols without waiting for the periodic ticker. - In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls, remove localhost loopback from local_ip_candidates and capability announcements, and prevent open() from connecting to our own listening port. - In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, set mainline=off in the default tracing filter so benign BitTorrent DHT routing table bootstrap errors do not alarm users. Validation on Linux: - cargo fmt --all -- --check passed. - cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed. - cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed). - cargo build --release passed. |
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|
Aleksandr Bogomiakov
|
e24548b3b0 |
Fix Windows address allocation check and add custom SNI for tcp-tls
When running on Windows with Wintun, assigning an overlay IPv4 address
via netsh triggers Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). During this tentative
window, binding a UDP socket to the address returns WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL
(os error 10049), causing the agent to prematurely log a false-positive
PluginError ('allocated ... but the address is not on any interface').
Furthermore, Russian TSPU / DPI filters block unrecognized SNIs and
non-standard ALPNs on TCP port 443 with TCP RST injection (os error 10054).
The default 'tsunagi.local' SNI and 'tsunagi-tls/1' ALPN were trivially
fingerprinted.
Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/tun.rs, enhance address_is_local on Windows
to inspect active OS interfaces via netdev::get_interfaces() if UDP
bind fails.
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs, introduce an asynchronous retry
loop in publish_allocations on Windows (up to 1.5s in 150ms intervals)
to gracefully allow DAD and IP helper updates to complete before
reporting missing addresses.
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls, add support for custom SNI domain via
protocol options (-o sni=<domain>), defaulting to 'cloudflare.com'
instead of 'tsunagi.local'.
- Switch TLS ALPN in tsunagi-tcp-tls from 'tsunagi-tls/1' to 'http/1.1'
to camouflage handshake traffic as standard HTTPS web traffic.
- Update tests to verify custom and default SNI behavior.
Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (348 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
|
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|
Aleksandr Bogomiakov
|
fac3bd7bb9 |
Add tcp-tls transport and tunnel protocol disguised as HTTPS
Implement the `tcp-tls` protocol crate and generic tunnel codec abstractions alongside `wg-quic` to circumvent deep packet inspection (DPI/TSPU), UDP blocking, and QUIC throttling. Traffic uses standard TCP on port 443 with TLS 1.3 framing, looking identical to regular HTTPS traffic to network observers. Architectural highlights: - TunnelCodec & GenericTunnelPlugin: Provide an extensible plugin abstraction in `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/tunnel.rs` that encapsulates background task lifecycles, per-peer channels, and sink dispatch, so new transport plugins only define cryptographic transformations and handshake payloads. - MultiPacketTransport & Protocol Priority Selection: Support multiple simultaneous transports in `AgentConfig` and dynamically dispatch `open()` calls by protocol identifier. In `ensure_links`, choose the highest-priority mutually supported protocol per peer to avoid duplicate links. - TLS 1.3 & Certificate Pinning: Generate self-signed Ed25519 X.509 certificates derived from the persistent `DeviceIdentity` secret. Clients pin peer certificates using `PinnedEndpointVerifier` against `iroh::EndpointId`. - End-to-end Encryption: `PeerCipher` uses X25519 static-static ECDH, HKDF-SHA256, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 with incrementing 64-bit nonces. Relayed traffic across intermediate nodes remains confidential and tamper-proof. - Privilege handling: Default to TCP port 443 with fallback to 8443 on `PermissionDenied`, providing an actionable message recommending: `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p <path>`. Validation on Linux: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed. - `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed. - `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed (all workspace unit, integration, CLI, and new `tsunagi-tcp-tls` tests passed). |