tsunagiandClaude Opus 5
3581feb9b9
Two members of a mesh could both reach a third and not each other, and that pair was simply lost to one another: a packet for a peer with no data link was counted undeliverable and dropped. Now it goes through a member that has both. What travels is not routes. Each agent says only which peers *it* has a live link with — first-hand, over the control plane, one hop, never a claim about somebody else's reachability — and everybody computes their own way through from that. The choice is local and deterministic (the lowest endpoint id among the peers that have a link to the destination), so there is nothing to agree, nothing to elect, and two agents may well route each direction differently. It is soft state: repeated while it holds, expired when it stops, so a relay that disappears stops being chosen without anybody revoking anything. The one in the middle carries bytes it cannot read. A datagram is wrapped with the peer it is for, and unwrapped on the other side into the link for the peer it came *from* — which matters, because a packet attributed to the carrier would be dropped as coming from an address the carrier does not hold. The tunnel stays end to end, and the relayed datagram goes link in, link out: it never reaches the middle's interface, so no routing, forwarding or firewall setting of that host is involved. One hop, so a loop cannot form without counting anything. A protocol is handed one link per peer that now outlives the paths under it. A direct link that dies, a hop that changes, a direct link that comes back: none of it tears down a tunnel any more, and the size a protocol may use does not change with the path. Where there was never a direct link at all, the link exists anyway as long as a hop does, so a peer reachable only through somebody still gets a tunnel. The data ALPN is `tsunagi/data/2`: every datagram now carries a tag saying whether it is direct, for somebody else, or from somebody else. The local control protocol is 13, for the relay counters — what this device carried for others is their traffic on its uplink, and that should not be invisible. `status` says `via <peer>` on a path through somebody. Fairness between the peers a relay carries for is deliberately not here yet: the queues are bounded and the counters are what a limit would be built on. Tested with fake links for the mechanics, and end to end with three real agents — two that cannot reach each other directly, a real WireGuard packet crossing through the middle. The one arrangement a single host cannot produce by itself is a pair that cannot see each other, so that is a `testing`-only switch on the agent config and exists in no release build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
8.4 KiB
Markdown
128 lines
8.4 KiB
Markdown
# Testing
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How to run everything is in [../README.md](../README.md). Rules for writing
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tests are in [../AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md).
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## Ground rules
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Tests use real iroh endpoints on loopback, real handshakes, real SQLite in
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per-test temporary directories, and independent agent instances. Discovery is
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substitutable; **iroh, authentication, message passing and persistent storage
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are not**.
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The suite runs with no internet, no DHT, no public relay, no administrator
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rights and no changes to OS network settings: endpoints bind `127.0.0.1:0` and
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`[::1]:0`, relays are disabled, address lookup is cleared, port mapping is
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disabled, and net-report probing is reduced to its minimum.
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Synchronisation is always "wait for a specific event or condition under one
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overall deadline" (`wait_event`, `wait_until`, 30 s). The deadline covers the
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probe as well as the gaps between probes: a call into a wedged agent that
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never answers fails the test rather than hanging the process, which is the
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difference between a red run and a test binary still burning a core the next
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day. `settle()` exists only for asserting that something did *not* happen.
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Ports are dynamic and directories are isolated, so tests run in parallel.
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Several library instances in one process is exactly that. It is **not** a test
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of several system processes, and is not presented as one.
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## What is covered
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| # | scenario | file |
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| 1 | deterministic identity: same name + secret ⇒ same space on different devices; a changed name or secret changes it; hostname, device key and restart do not | `tests/identity.rs` |
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| 2 | four agents find each other, authenticate for real and exchange distinguishable messages; a late joiner is picked up; opaque plugin capabilities cross the control plane | `tests/multi_peer.rs` |
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| 3 | an attacker who knows the address and the correct public `NetworkId` but not the secret is rejected at the handshake | `tests/authentication.rs` |
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| 4 | one agent in two networks: statuses and messages do not mix; a session authenticated for one network cannot speak for the other; deactivating one leaves the other running | `tests/network_isolation.rs` |
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| 5 | full stop and recreation from the same database: identity and settings survive, sessions come back automatically, a new local UDP port does not break recovery | `tests/restart.rs` |
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| 6 | changing the secret through the library API: device identity survives, old sessions and messages get no access to the new space, and the retired space stays retired across a restart | `tests/restart.rs` |
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| 7 | missing, corrupt and stale cache do not prevent connecting; a corrupt mandatory store is a clear error and never a fresh identity; a newer schema is refused; secrets stay out of status and `Debug` | `tests/cache_and_state.rs` |
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| 8 | a dead candidate and a vanished peer do not block the others; retries are bounded and stop when the network is deactivated | `tests/resilience.rs` |
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| 9 | wrong version, a message before authentication, a proof replayed on another connection, an oversized frame and a `Hello` for an inactive network are all rejected without taking the agent down | `tests/authentication.rs` |
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| 10 | a second agent on the same state directory gets a clear error; after a clean stop the directory reopens; shutdown ends background tasks and refuses further work; independent agents coexist in one process | `tests/resilience.rs` |
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| 11 | leaving a network frees the address for the others, says plainly when there was nobody to tell, and rejoining afterwards is not mistaken for a stale record; a wipe empties both directories and the next start is a stranger, while a directory that is not ours is refused | `tests/leaving.rs`, `tests/cache_and_state.rs` |
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| 12 | a network can be joined into a running agent over the control socket and is live at once; a name with no secret resumes the one network of that name, invents one when there is none, and refuses to choose between two; two networks on one agent each get a range of their own | `tests/local_control.rs`, `tests/network_isolation.rs`, CLI unit tests |
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`tests/wireguard.rs` drives the WireGuard data plane over real iroh
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connections. Everything is real except the packet interface: real agents, real
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control plane, real data links, real WireGuard handshakes and encryption from
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boringtun, with an in-memory TUN device so none of it needs privileges. It
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covers real IPv6 packets travelling both ways through a tunnel, a three-agent
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mesh, a peer that sends from an address it does not own being dropped, packets
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for unowned addresses being counted rather than broadcast, a departing peer
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losing its tunnel, two networks keeping separate interfaces and keys, restart
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keeping the WireGuard identity, shutdown removing every interface, a forged
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overlay claim being rejected, and the core carrying the payload without
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interpreting it.
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`crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/relay.rs` has its own tests for the way
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through a peer in the middle: the wrapping and what a malformed one does, a
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direct path being preferred over a hop, the middle passing a datagram on
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without being handed it, what arrives through somebody reaching the peer it
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came from rather than the one that carried it, a link outliving the paths
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under it, and the datagram size not changing when the path does.
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`tests/wireguard.rs` proves it end to end — two agents that can each reach a
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third and not each other, with a real WireGuard packet crossing through the
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middle.
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Unit tests in `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` cover the signed record model directly: tampering
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with any field breaks verification, a newer version wins while an older one
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never rolls back, two authors claiming one address resolve the same way no
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matter the merge order, one key used in two places is reported rather than
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silently merged, a release survives a late-arriving old claim, a bad record in
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a batch does not stop the rest, and allocation is deterministic, spread out,
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walks past everything taken and reports a full range instead of handing out a
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duplicate.
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`tests/local_control.rs` covers the local control socket end to end: a client
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asking a running agent for status over a real Unix socket, joining and
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leaving a network through it, a leftover socket file being replaced while a
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live one is not, and the derived socket path staying short enough to bind.
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`crates/tsunagi-cli/tests/network_cli.rs` runs the real binary too: joining
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with no secret invents one, prints it in full and prints a line the other
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side can paste unchanged; a bare name this device already knows resumes
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that network instead of inventing another of the same name; and a network
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can be stopped and started again with its secret and its place intact.
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`crates/tsunagi-cli/tests/dns_service.rs` runs the real binary: the resolver
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comes up with no interface to attach it to, the listener is not rebuilt on
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the way past, a name outside every zone is refused, each network gets a zone
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of its own as it is joined, and the resolver can be switched on and off
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while the agent runs.
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`tests/discovery.rs` covers the discovery contract itself: a static bootstrap
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candidate is enough to join, several backends compose, entries are withdrawn
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when a network stops, and a forgotten network stays forgotten across a restart.
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Unit tests in `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/handshake.rs` cover the transcript construction
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itself: role separation, channel binding, identity and network binding,
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unambiguous encoding, and rejection under the wrong key.
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Unit tests in `crates/tsunagi-wg-quic/src/` cover key clamping against the RFC
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7748 vector, overlay derivation, announcement validation including the
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address-hijack attempt, interface naming, and IP header parsing against
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truncated and nonsense input.
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`tests/end_to_end.rs` is the vertical slice: persistent identity → network
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space → discovery → iroh → authentication → message exchange.
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What the default suite does **not** cover is the real TUN interface, because
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that needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. Everything above it does run.
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## Not covered, and not claimed to be
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Listed in [sync-model.md](sync-model.md#future-tests): snapshots, revocations,
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long partitions, hostname renames, recovery of a returning participant, NAT
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traversal, relay fallback, and multi-process or multi-host deployment. None of
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these are implemented, and none are marked as passing.
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## Debugging a test
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```bash
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TSUNAGI_TEST_LOG=tsunagi=debug cargo test --test multi_peer -- --nocapture
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```
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The library never installs a global subscriber; the harness opts in only when
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that variable is set.
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