Files
tsunagi/AGENTS.md
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tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 44a799faee Split the command line along the line the system draws
`id` had grown into the place where everything was shown and changed,
including the secret of every network this device had joined — and it
printed them all in its ordinary overview, which is a poor default for
output that gets pasted into chats and issue trackers. Now that networks
have a command of their own, the boundary is the one the system already
has: `id` is this **device**, `network` is what it **belongs to**. A device
outlives every network it is in and a network outlives any device in it, so
a command that mixed them had to be read twice.

`id` keeps the key, the name and the directories, and says how many
networks there are without naming their secrets. `network secret` prints
one, or all of them, and only when asked. Nothing else ever does.

`network join` is the part that was missing entirely. One state directory
is one identity and one live agent, so a second `tsunagi up` on it is
refused — and until now that refusal was the end of the road: a network
could be left while the agent ran but never added. It goes over the control
socket, takes effect at once, and is idempotent, saying which of "joined"
and "already there" happened. With no agent running it is written to the
configuration and starts with the next `up`, and says so rather than
implying it is live. The secret travels over an owner-only socket to the
agent that stores it anyway, and `Request` has a hand-written `Debug` that
redacts it, because a derived one would put it in any log line that printed
a request.

The lock error from a second `up` now answers the question behind it: add
the network to the running agent with one command, or run a genuinely
separate agent — a second identity, with its own directories, interface and
range — with the other. That is the shape of the thing: one agent per
identity, many networks on it, one interface; a second agent is isolated,
not a second view of the first. AGENTS.md carries that as a boundary now,
since it is the kind of thing a change could quietly break.

The local control protocol is 9.

Exercised against a running agent: a second `up` refused with both routes
named, a network joined into the live agent and answering for status at
once, the same one again reported as already there, a same-name network
with a different secret joined with the warning, and `id` showing three
networks and no secrets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:16:57 +01:00

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Markdown

# AGENTS.md
Rules for anyone — human or automated — changing this repository. Read this
before touching the code. Do not restate the full design here; follow the links.
## What this project is
A proof-of-concept agent library for small private mesh networks. A user
supplies a network name and one shared secret; agents derive the same network
space independently, find each other, prove membership and exchange control
messages. Scope and non-scope are in [README.md](README.md).
There is no central server, no owner, no registration and no majority vote.
Design accordingly: a majority is not a root of trust.
## Architectural boundaries
Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
- **Control plane vs data plane.** The separation is **logical, not physical**.
The control protocol in `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/` knows nothing about
packets, and a protocol crate knows nothing about the control protocol;
either can be replaced on its own. Both may ride on iroh — refusing to
would throw away iroh's NAT traversal and force the data plane to
reimplement it. They use different ALPNs and different connections, so a
busy or broken data plane cannot disturb control traffic.
- **One agent, one interface.** It belongs to the system level, along with
the addresses on it and the decision of whose packet is whose. Several
protocols may be carrying traffic at once and none of them owns the thing
they carry it for. A protocol is handed a routed packet and hands back a
decrypted one; it never creates an interface and never picks an address.
- **One state directory, one identity, one live agent — many networks.** A
network is added to the agent that is already running, never by starting a
second one on the same directory. A second agent is a second identity and
is isolated: its own directories, its own interface, its own runtime. Do
not add anything that lets two agents share a directory, and do not make a
network's lifetime depend on the process that happened to start it.
- **A protocol is a separate crate with its own version.** The version peers
compare is the *wire* version, never the software version: two peers on
different releases work together for as long as the bytes between them
have not changed. Nothing negotiated may be derived from anything that
moves with a release.
- **A protocol never sees the network secret.** It proves who is at the other
end of a tunnel; proving membership of a network stays in the core, which
is why the authenticated transport does too.
- **Plugins never learn reachability.** An `IpPlugin` is handed a `PacketLink`
per peer and moves datagrams over it. Addresses, hole punching and relays
belong to `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/transport/`. A plugin announcement says *who*, never
*where*.
- **The core never parses a plugin payload.** See `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/mod.rs`. Only
`crates/tsunagi-wg-quic/src/announcement.rs` interprets `wg-quic` payloads, and
only after bounding every field. A data plane failure must never stop the
control plane.
- **Derived, not claimed.** A peer's overlay address is derived from its public
key. Outbound packets are routed to the owner of the destination address;
inbound packets are dropped unless their source is the address derived for
the peer that sent them. Never trust an address a peer announces.
- **Signed state is the only durable agreement.** A fact that must survive a
participant being away goes in `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` as a record signed by its
author, never in a session. Merging is deterministic, an older version never
rolls back a newer one, and absence from a snapshot is not deletion. Never
add a vote or a quorum: a majority is not a trust root here, and it would
stall with one peer online.
- **A record and the author's own version counter commit together**, in one
transaction, **before** the record is announced.
- **Plugins own their system objects.** A plugin creates and removes its own
interface and nothing else. Never touch routing, DNS or firewall settings.
- **Device identity vs network identity.** The iroh endpoint id is the device's
public key. `NetworkId` is derived from name + secret only. Never conflate
them, and never let one change the other.
- **Discovery vs authentication.** Discovery returns *unverified candidates*.
It never authenticates, never carries control messages and never mutates
agent state. Membership is decided only by the handshake.
- **Mandatory state vs disposable cache.** `state.sqlite` is never silently
reset: damage is a hard error. `cache.sqlite` may be deleted at any time and
is recreated. A stale cache must never bypass identity or network
authentication.
- **Candidate vs observed address vs verified path.** Report these as three
different things. A missing value is `None`, never invented.
## Rules that are not negotiable
1. **Tests come first.** Every substantial change ships with tests for the
normal path *and* the important failures. See [docs/testing.md](docs/testing.md).
Do not add tests for getters or to move a coverage number.
2. **Never change `IDENTITY_SCHEME`, the derivation labels, or the transcript
encoding** in `crates/tsunagi/src/identity/network.rs` and `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/handshake.rs` without
treating it as an incompatible protocol change. Bumping the crate version or
the control protocol version must not change an existing `NetworkId`.
3. **Secrets never leak.** Not into logs, not into `Debug`, not into status
output, not into anything exported to the network. `NetworkSecret` and
derived keys redact themselves and zeroize; keep it that way.
4. **No panics on untrusted input.** No `unwrap`, `expect` or `panic` on
anything that came off the network. Clippy enforces this at warn level in
the library; tests opt out explicitly at the top of each file.
5. **Bounds before allocation.** Frame lengths are checked against
`Limits::max_frame_len` before a buffer is allocated. Every string, list and
queue has a limit in `crates/tsunagi/src/config.rs`.
6. **Failure is contained.** A bad signature, wrong secret, malformed packet or
unknown version rejects one message or one session. It never stops another
network and never stops the agent. There is no irreversible global error
flag. A data plane failure must never stop the control plane.
7. **The library owns no globals.** No global tokio runtime, no global tracing
subscriber, no signal handlers, no `fork`, no `process::exit`, no global
mutable state. Several agents must run in one test process.
8. **SQLite never blocks the executor.** All database work goes through
`spawn_blocking`. Never hold a transaction or a database lock across a
network `await`. When signed records land, writing the record and bumping
the author's own counter must be one transaction, committed **before**
publishing to the network.
9. **Shutdown is bounded.** A peer that stops reading must not be able to hold
up shutdown. Wind tasks down with a grace period and then abort.
10. **Nothing from a remote announcement becomes a shell command, a filesystem
path or an OS setting.** The agent never touches interfaces or OS settings
it did not create.
## Where things live
| path | responsibility |
|---------------------|----------------|
| `crates/tsunagi/src/identity/` | device identity; deterministic network space identity and derived keys |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/storage/` | `state.sqlite`, `cache.sqlite`, directory ownership lock |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/discovery.rs` | candidate sources; test and static backends |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/` | framing, message formats, membership handshake |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs` | iroh endpoint adapter and observability snapshots |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/` | agent lifecycle, per-network runtimes, sessions, events, status |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` | signed records that outlive a session, their merge rules and address allocation |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/` | the one interface an agent owns: provisioning, the TUN, routing, source checks |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/` | the protocol contract and the authenticated packet transport |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/dns/` | the DNS view of a network: zone, server, resolver publication |
| `crates/tsunagi-wg-quic/` | the `wg-quic` protocol: its keys, its announcement, its tunnels |
| `crates/tsunagi-cli/` | the command line agent; the only place that owns a runtime, a logger and signals |
| `tests/` | integration tests; `tests/common/` is the shared harness |
Add abstractions only at real substitution or testing boundaries. Do not add a
trait per struct.
**The system level and its plugins are separate crates**, so that boundary is
checked by the compiler and not by discipline: a plugin can reach only what
`tsunagi` makes public, and carries its own version. Everything else stays
one crate with clear modules — do not split further without a reason of that
kind.
## Testing rules
- Use real iroh endpoints on loopback, real handshakes, real SQLite in
temporary directories, and independent agent instances.
- Discovery may be substituted. **iroh, authentication, message passing and
persistent storage may not be.**
- No arbitrary multi-second `sleep` as the primary synchronisation. Wait for a
specific event or condition under one overall deadline (`wait_event`,
`wait_until`). `settle()` exists only for asserting that something did *not*
happen.
- The default suite must pass with no internet, no DHT, no public relay, no
administrator rights and no changes to OS network settings. Anything needing
the internet or root stays out of the default set.
- The WireGuard packet interface may be substituted (`MemoryTunFactory`). Its
key handling, announcements, derived addressing, the WireGuard protocol
itself and address-ownership enforcement may not — the default suite runs
real handshakes and real encryption.
- Running several library instances in one process is not a test of several
system processes; do not describe it as one.
## Before you open a change
```bash
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets
```
CI runs these on Linux, macOS and Windows. A CI config existing is not evidence
that tests ran on every OS — say what you actually ran.
Check the real API of the iroh version in `Cargo.lock` before using it. Do not
invent methods from memory.