Files
tsunagi/AGENTS.md
T
tsunagiandClaude Opus 5 84c06c6cac Allocate IPv4 addresses and keep them, as signed state
Derived IPv4 addresses could not survive anything: they changed with the
range, and there was no way for a member to come back to the one it had.
Addresses are now allocated and recorded as signed facts, which is the
first slice of the model in docs/sync-model.md.

src/state/ holds one record per author per network, carrying that author's
complete current statement, signed with its persistent device key over a
length-prefixed canonical encoding. Merging follows the model's rules: a
higher version wins, an older one never rolls back a newer, duplicates are
idempotent, absence from a snapshot is not deletion, and a same-version
conflict is resolved identically on every replica and reported rather than
letting replicas diverge. Records are persisted in state.sqlite, with the
record and the author's version counter committed in one transaction
before anything is announced, and distributed as a State control message
that is merged into what the receiver already holds.

No vote, deliberately, despite the request. A majority is not a trust root
here — anyone with the secret can mint identities — and a quorum would
stall with one peer online and diverge across a partition. Signatures plus
a deterministic merge converge without either failure mode: two members
claiming one address at once are resolved by the lower endpoint id, and
the loser allocates again with a higher version.

The range moved from the plugin to the agent, defaults to 10.13.37.0/24,
and is now agreed rather than configured per member: a joining agent
adopts what the network already uses, so --ipv4-range only matters for
whoever starts it. The announcement went back to identity only (version 3)
since the range travels in signed records now.

A release tombstone exists and merges correctly, but nothing emits one
yet.

116 tests. The headline ones: an address survives restarting both agents,
three members get three distinct addresses, and a member started with a
different range adopts the one in use. Confirmed by hand with two CLI
agents restarted end to end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:43:01 +01:00

149 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown

# AGENTS.md
Rules for anyone — human or automated — changing this repository. Read this
before touching the code. Do not restate the full design here; follow the links.
## What this project is
A proof-of-concept agent library for small private mesh networks. A user
supplies a network name and one shared secret; agents derive the same network
space independently, find each other, prove membership and exchange control
messages. Scope and non-scope are in [README.md](README.md).
There is no central server, no owner, no registration and no majority vote.
Design accordingly: a majority is not a root of trust.
## Architectural boundaries
Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
- **Control plane vs data plane.** The separation is **logical, not physical**.
The control protocol in `src/proto/` knows nothing about packets, and
`src/dataplane/` knows nothing about the control protocol; either can be
replaced on its own. Both may ride on iroh — refusing to would throw away
iroh's NAT traversal and force the data plane to reimplement it. They use
different ALPNs and different connections, so a busy or broken data plane
cannot disturb control traffic.
- **Plugins never learn reachability.** An `IpPlugin` is handed a `PacketLink`
per peer and moves datagrams over it. Addresses, hole punching and relays
belong to `src/dataplane/transport/`. A plugin announcement says *who*, never
*where*.
- **The core never parses a plugin payload.** See `src/dataplane/mod.rs`. Only
`src/dataplane/wireguard/announcement.rs` interprets WireGuard payloads, and
only after bounding every field. A data plane failure must never stop the
control plane.
- **Derived, not claimed.** A peer's overlay address is derived from its public
key. Outbound packets are routed to the owner of the destination address;
inbound packets are dropped unless their source is the address derived for
the peer that sent them. Never trust an address a peer announces.
- **Signed state is the only durable agreement.** A fact that must survive a
participant being away goes in `src/state/` as a record signed by its
author, never in a session. Merging is deterministic, an older version never
rolls back a newer one, and absence from a snapshot is not deletion. Never
add a vote or a quorum: a majority is not a trust root here, and it would
stall with one peer online.
- **A record and the author's own version counter commit together**, in one
transaction, **before** the record is announced.
- **Plugins own their system objects.** A plugin creates and removes its own
interface and nothing else. Never touch routing, DNS or firewall settings.
- **Device identity vs network identity.** The iroh endpoint id is the device's
public key. `NetworkId` is derived from name + secret only. Never conflate
them, and never let one change the other.
- **Discovery vs authentication.** Discovery returns *unverified candidates*.
It never authenticates, never carries control messages and never mutates
agent state. Membership is decided only by the handshake.
- **Mandatory state vs disposable cache.** `state.sqlite` is never silently
reset: damage is a hard error. `cache.sqlite` may be deleted at any time and
is recreated. A stale cache must never bypass identity or network
authentication.
- **Candidate vs observed address vs verified path.** Report these as three
different things. A missing value is `None`, never invented.
## Rules that are not negotiable
1. **Tests come first.** Every substantial change ships with tests for the
normal path *and* the important failures. See [docs/testing.md](docs/testing.md).
Do not add tests for getters or to move a coverage number.
2. **Never change `IDENTITY_SCHEME`, the derivation labels, or the transcript
encoding** in `src/identity/network.rs` and `src/proto/handshake.rs` without
treating it as an incompatible protocol change. Bumping the crate version or
the control protocol version must not change an existing `NetworkId`.
3. **Secrets never leak.** Not into logs, not into `Debug`, not into status
output, not into anything exported to the network. `NetworkSecret` and
derived keys redact themselves and zeroize; keep it that way.
4. **No panics on untrusted input.** No `unwrap`, `expect` or `panic` on
anything that came off the network. Clippy enforces this at warn level in
the library; tests opt out explicitly at the top of each file.
5. **Bounds before allocation.** Frame lengths are checked against
`Limits::max_frame_len` before a buffer is allocated. Every string, list and
queue has a limit in `src/config.rs`.
6. **Failure is contained.** A bad signature, wrong secret, malformed packet or
unknown version rejects one message or one session. It never stops another
network and never stops the agent. There is no irreversible global error
flag. A data plane failure must never stop the control plane.
7. **The library owns no globals.** No global tokio runtime, no global tracing
subscriber, no signal handlers, no `fork`, no `process::exit`, no global
mutable state. Several agents must run in one test process.
8. **SQLite never blocks the executor.** All database work goes through
`spawn_blocking`. Never hold a transaction or a database lock across a
network `await`. When signed records land, writing the record and bumping
the author's own counter must be one transaction, committed **before**
publishing to the network.
9. **Shutdown is bounded.** A peer that stops reading must not be able to hold
up shutdown. Wind tasks down with a grace period and then abort.
10. **Nothing from a remote announcement becomes a shell command, a filesystem
path or an OS setting.** The agent never touches interfaces or OS settings
it did not create.
## Where things live
| path | responsibility |
|---------------------|----------------|
| `src/identity/` | device identity; deterministic network space identity and derived keys |
| `src/storage/` | `state.sqlite`, `cache.sqlite`, directory ownership lock |
| `src/discovery.rs` | candidate sources; test and static backends |
| `src/proto/` | framing, message formats, membership handshake |
| `src/net.rs` | iroh endpoint adapter and observability snapshots |
| `src/agent/` | agent lifecycle, per-network runtimes, sessions, events, status |
| `src/state/` | signed records that outlive a session, their merge rules and address allocation |
| `src/dataplane/` | the plugin contract, the packet transport, and the WireGuard plugin |
| `src/bin/tsunagi.rs`| the command line agent; the only place that owns a runtime, a logger and signals |
| `tests/` | integration tests; `tests/common/` is the shared harness |
Add abstractions only at real substitution or testing boundaries. Do not add a
trait per struct. Prefer one crate with clear modules over many small crates.
## Testing rules
- Use real iroh endpoints on loopback, real handshakes, real SQLite in
temporary directories, and independent agent instances.
- Discovery may be substituted. **iroh, authentication, message passing and
persistent storage may not be.**
- No arbitrary multi-second `sleep` as the primary synchronisation. Wait for a
specific event or condition under one overall deadline (`wait_event`,
`wait_until`). `settle()` exists only for asserting that something did *not*
happen.
- The default suite must pass with no internet, no DHT, no public relay, no
administrator rights and no changes to OS network settings. Anything needing
the internet or root stays out of the default set.
- The WireGuard packet interface may be substituted (`MemoryTunFactory`). Its
key handling, announcements, derived addressing, the WireGuard protocol
itself and address-ownership enforcement may not — the default suite runs
real handshakes and real encryption.
- Running several library instances in one process is not a test of several
system processes; do not describe it as one.
## Before you open a change
```bash
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets
```
CI runs these on Linux, macOS and Windows. A CI config existing is not evidence
that tests ran on every OS — say what you actually ran.
Check the real API of the iroh version in `Cargo.lock` before using it. Do not
invent methods from memory.