Files
tsunagi/README.md
T
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 2166ba4800 Separate internal WireGuard encryption from data carriers
AWG-only policy also selected a competing end-to-end plugin, so compatible
external links could still have no compatible encrypted data channel. Carrier
changes replaced tunnel state and status selected counters from different
engines. Use one internal WireGuard plugin and a separate DataCarrier contract
for external capabilities/lifecycle. Keep the logical link, keys, handshake,
interface and counter epoch across policy, fallback and direct/relay changes.
Control/discovery transport selection and membership remain independent.

Share the bounded per-neighbour UDP WireGuard engine between ordinary WG and
Amnezia masking. Encrypt the relay envelope inside the outer hop channel with
fresh pair keys/PSK. Remove duplicate WG key/device code and the TCP/TLS inner
cipher. TLS carries opaque internal WireGuard frames. Refuse missing native
transports instead of letting default iroh impersonate their protocol names.
Probe the actual authenticated carrier, independently of the shared IP tunnel;
failed local probe submissions count as loss too.

Apply the vendored iroh interface exclusion to actual direct candidates, not
just public discovery records. Exclude overlay subnets from introductions and
propagate the actual owned interface name, including kernel-assigned utun names,
to every carrier. Production logs showed paths through the overlay itself.
This removes a recursive transport path; it does not establish the historical
cause of the reported 100 GB absolute counter. Exit-node traffic is also real
peer IP traffic even when local applications are idle.

Hide inner cipher choices/handshake clutter in CLI and tray. Report external
routes, readiness and actionable policy/version failures. Count original IP
packets only when their ciphertext is accepted by the logical transport,
including queued packets' exact unpadded lengths. Exclude physical probes and
keepalives. Export counter epochs; sum per-peer rate deltas and discard stale
histories so joins/restarts cannot turn old totals into fresh traffic. Status
also prints exact IP byte totals for comparison with the tray.

Coordinated upgrade: data ALPN 6, internal wireguard-e2e capability v4,
wg/awg v2, QUIC carrier v1, TLS v2, local IPC v23. Control ALPN 8, device/network
identity derivation, signed records and saved network choices stay unchanged.
Keep the historical wg-quic key store; transactionally import missing keys from
wg then awg without replacing canonical keys. Forget removes legacy copies too,
on the blocking pool, to prevent resurrection after restart. Preserve historic
cipher options as shared settings, rejecting contradictory values.

Validation on Linux in the Nix development shell:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets (562 passed, 3 ignored)
The inherited service socket/secret/group environment overrides were removed
for isolated CLI process tests. A new carrier test initially raced the first
peer announcement; its deadline polling now waits for a peer row explicitly.
Real loopback endpoints, membership, SQLite, WG/AWG/TLS encryption and memory
TUNs cover mixed-carrier relaying and one smoltcp TCP connection surviving
relay/direct/policy changes and a dropped transmission. Counter tests check
exact plaintext lengths, refused sends, epochs, joins and stale histories.
Public DHT, privileged kernel and manual benchmark tests remain ignored;
macOS/Windows native TUNs, desktop GUI and WAN/DPI behavior were not run.
2026-10-22 01:07:52 +01:00

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<p align="center">
<img src="dist/linux/tsunagi.svg" width="96" alt="">
</p>
<h1 align="center">tsunagi</h1>
<p align="center">
<b>A mesh VPN with no server.</b><br>
Pick a network name, share a secret, and your machines are on one private network.
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/releases/latest"><img alt="release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/house-of-vanity/tsunagi?include_prereleases"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img alt="CI" src="https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg"></a>
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-WTFPL-blue"></a>
</p>
```console
laptop$ tsng join -n home
joined `home`
secret tsn1u7c…
server$ tsng join -n home -s tsn1u7c…
server$ tsng id hostname server
laptop$ ssh server.home
```
No account, no coordination server, no admin console, no keys to approve.
Anyone who knows the **name** and the **secret** is in. Nobody else can find
the network, let alone enter it.
## Why
Tailscale, Headscale and ZeroTier are great, but each needs a control server:
theirs, or one you have to run and keep alive. tsunagi doesn't. Machines find
each other through the public BitTorrent DHT, connect directly (hole punching,
with relay fallback), and keep the network state among themselves.
| | Tailscale | Headscale | ZeroTier | **tsunagi** |
| ---------------------- | ------------------ | ---------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- |
| Control server | hosted by vendor | you run it | hosted or self-run | **none** |
| Account / sign-in | yes | yes | yes | **no** |
| To join a network | sign in, get approved | pre-auth key | network ID, approval | **name + secret** |
| Direct connections | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Exit nodes | yes | yes | via routes | yes |
## Features
- **Two things to know:** a network name and a secret. A secret is generated for you when you make a network.
- **Direct, encrypted links** between members (WireGuard cryptography), with relay fallback behind strict NATs.
- **Names for machines:** `server.home` just works, even while `server` is switched off. A name belongs to whoever claimed it first; a later device with the same name keeps working by address and is told so.
- **Exit nodes:** send all your internet traffic through any member that offers one.
- **Multi-hop:** members that can't reach each other directly are routed through a member that can, over whatever kind of link each hop has. A member reached that way is online, and shown as relayed; traffic moves to a direct link by itself the moment one comes up.
- **LAN games:** UDP broadcasts are relayed, so "LAN" lobbies show up across the mesh.
- **Several networks at once** on one device.
- **Tray app** for Windows, macOS and Linux; a command line for everything.
## Install
Grab a build from the [latest release](https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/releases/latest).
| Platform | How |
| --------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Windows** | Run `tsunagi-setup-<version>-x86_64.exe`. Installs the service, the tray and `tsng`. |
| **macOS** | `brew tap house-of-vanity/tap && brew install --cask tsunagi-gui`<br>CLI only: `brew install tsunagi` |
| **Debian / Ubuntu** | `sudo apt install ./tsunagi-gui_<version>_amd64.deb` (`tsunagi_…` for no tray) |
| **Arch** | `sudo pacman -U tsunagi-gui-<version>-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst` |
| **NixOS** | [Flake and module](#nixos) below |
| **Any other Linux** | Unpack the tarball, then `sudo ./install.sh && sudo systemctl enable --now tsunagi` |
Linux packages run the agent as an unprivileged service user. Add yourself to
the `tsunagi` group (`sudo usermod -aG tsunagi $USER`, then log in again) to
use `tsng` and the tray without `sudo`.
## Quick start
```sh
tsng join -n home # first machine: makes the network and prints a secret
tsng join -n home -s tsn1… # every other machine
tsng status # who is online, over which path
```
Every new network gets a stable pseudorandom `/24` in `10.0.0.0/8`, derived
from its network id. Its members agree on that range even when starting offline,
and each gets a name like `<host>.home`. Existing signed ranges are preserved.
If two configured networks have overlapping ranges, the agent runs only one.
`tsng status`, `tsng network` and the tray show which network blocks the
other. `tsng network start <name-or-id>` or the tray’s “Switch to this network”
button suspends the conflicting networks. They resume automatically when the
selected network stops; the selection survives restarting the agent. Explicitly
stopping a suspended network cancels its automatic resume.
Machines are called `tsunagi-<id>` until you rename them: `tsng id hostname laptop`.
### Virtual services
```sh
tsng vip create home api
tsng vip port add home api tcp/443 --backend server1:6443 --backend server2:7443
tsng vip status home api --watch
```
Use `api.home:443`. Each client selects the available backend with the lowest
measured data-plane RTT. A VIP can have multiple independent TCP and UDP ports.
Every member may edit it; the tray's **VIP** button opens a draft editor with
explicit Save. [Commands, health, metrics and limits](docs/vip.md).
### Exit nodes
```sh
tsng network exit-node home on # on the machine that should be the exit
tsng exit-node # on another one: who offers an exit
tsng exit-node laptop # send everything through it
tsng exit-node off
```
The tray does the same with a checkbox. An exit node sees everything you send
through it, so use only members you trust.
[Details and per-OS notes](docs/exit-node.md).
The default data transport order is `wg,awg,wg-quic,tcp-tls`. AWG negotiates a
fresh masking profile and outer keys for each pair connection attempt, including
reentry after fallback. Sustained data loss triggers switching independently of
the iroh control connection. [Configuration and limits](docs/amnezia.md).
Change a network's protocol selection without editing its service or restarting:
```sh
tsng protocols # available protocols and settings
tsng protocols home # this device's choice for home
tsng protocols home awg,wg-quic # prefer AWG, retain QUIC as fallback
tsng protocols home none # control plane only
```
Exact network names, full ids and unique id prefixes work here. The choice is
local to this device, saved per network and applied immediately; an offline
change applies on the next start. In the tray, expand **data transports** on a network
tile to toggle protocols or change their preference order. Adjacent peers need a common external transport at the same wire version.
Selection applies to this device's incoming and outgoing data links; control and
discovery are independent. A relay's next hop may use a different transport.
Every pair uses one internal WireGuard cipher, hidden from these controls.
Changing transport or moving direct → relay → direct preserves that channel,
addresses and interface. An existing TCP connection can resume after temporary
loss, subject to its own timeouts. `tsng up --protocol` supplies the
initial defaults for networks without a saved choice; it does not restrict
which built-in protocols can be enabled later.
Remove an obsolete offline device from a network's shared history:
```sh
tsng network forget-node home old-laptop
tsng network forget-node home 10.13.37.143
```
Networks accept exact names, full ids or unique id prefixes; nodes accept those
id selectors, exact hostnames or overlay IPv4 addresses. Ambiguous selectors
change nothing. Start the network first if it is stopped. In **Show devices**,
click **Forget** beside an offline node and confirm its identity.
Every member has the same cleanup right. The signed cleanup frees the observed
claim's name and IPv4 reservation, survives restarts and reaches offline replicas
when they reconnect. It does not ban the device: a newer signed claim can return.
Online nodes and the currently selected exit node cannot be forgotten.
[State and limits](docs/sync-model.md#offline-node-cleanup).
## Platforms
| Platform | Build | CLI `tsng` | Tray | Exit node: offer / use | Packages |
| ------------------------- | ------------ | :--------: | :--: | :--------------------: | ----------------------------------- |
| Linux x86_64 | release | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ / ✔ | `.deb`, `.pkg.tar.zst`, tarball, Nix |
| Linux aarch64 | release | ✔ | –¹ | ✔ / ✔ | `.deb`, `.pkg.tar.zst`, tarball, Nix |
| Linux armv7 | release | ✔ | –¹ | ✔ / ✔ | `.deb`, `.pkg.tar.zst`, tarball |
| macOS, Apple silicon | release | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ / ✔² | Homebrew, tarball |
| macOS, Intel | from source | ✔³ | ✔³ | ✔ / ✔²³ | – |
| Windows x86_64 | release | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ / ✔² | installer, zip |
<sup>¹ Not in the release; builds from source (and through Nix).
² Newer and less battle-tested than on Linux.
³ Builds from source, not covered by CI.</sup>
The Linux CLI is a single static binary: it runs on any distribution.
## NixOS
The repository is a flake with a package and a module.
```nix
# flake.nix
{
inputs.tsunagi.url = "github:house-of-vanity/tsunagi";
outputs = { nixpkgs, tsunagi, ... }: {
nixosConfigurations.myhost = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
modules = [
tsunagi.nixosModules.default
{
services.tsunagi = {
enable = true;
tray.enable = true; # optional, for desktops
users = [ "alice" ]; # may use tsng and the tray without sudo
};
}
];
};
};
}
```
Just trying it: `nix run github:house-of-vanity/tsunagi#tsunagi-cli -- --help`.
`packages.<system>.tsunagi` (with the tray) and `tsunagi-cli` are also exported,
along with `overlays.default`.
For development from a checkout, `nix develop` also exposes the tray's native
runtime libraries, including AppIndicator and graphics/windowing libraries.
Cargo-built binaries such as `target/debug/tsunagi-tray` can run directly inside
this shell, without installing the packaged wrapper.
## Build from source
Rust 1.91 or newer.
```sh
cargo build --release --bin tsng # the agent and CLI
cargo build --release --bin tsunagi-tray # the tray (Linux needs GTK 3 and libayatana-appindicator)
```
Windows needs [Wintun](https://www.wintun.net) next to `tsng.exe`.
Per-platform notes: [Linux](dist/linux/README.md), [Arch](dist/arch/README.md),
[macOS](dist/macos/README.md), [Windows](dist/windows/README.md).
## How it works
- Your name and secret derive a network identity. Members publish signed
contact records to the public Mainline DHT under it, and find each other there.
- Every connection proves knowledge of the secret before it's accepted.
Traffic between members is end-to-end encrypted, relays included.
- Addresses and names are claimed with each device's own key and replicated
between members. There is no one in charge, so nothing to be taken down.
The secret is the only key, so make it a good one (the generated ones are).
The [threat model](docs/threat-model.md) says what this does and doesn't protect against.
## Documentation
[Architecture](docs/architecture.md) ·
[Protocol](docs/protocol.md) ·
[WireGuard data plane](docs/wireguard.md) ·
[Pairwise Amnezia transport](docs/amnezia.md) ·
[Routing](docs/routing.md) ·
[Exit nodes](docs/exit-node.md) ·
[Virtual services](docs/vip.md) ·
[Threat model](docs/threat-model.md) ·
[Contributing](AGENTS.md)
## Licence
[WTFPL](LICENSE): do what the fuck you want to.