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Author SHA1 Message Date
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 8c812e6874 Bump the GitHub workflow actions off deprecated Node 20
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 5m25s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 3h12m37s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
GitHub now forces actions/checkout@v4, actions/upload-artifact@v4 and
actions/download-artifact@v4 (all Node 20) onto Node 24 with a deprecation
warning. Move them to the current Node 24 majors — checkout@v5,
upload-artifact@v7, download-artifact@v8 — which keep the same inputs and the
per-artifact subdirectory layout (merge-multiple defaults to false), so the
publish step is unchanged.

Only the .github workflow is touched. The .gitea workflow stays on
checkout@v4 and the @v3 artifact actions, because Gitea does not support the v4+
artifact backend and may not have Node 24 on its runner image; it also does not
emit these deprecation warnings. mlugg/setup-zig has no Node 24 release yet
(latest v2.2.1 is still Node 20), so that one warning remains until upstream
updates — nothing to change on our side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:01:33 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 63178574ce Package as a dedicated tsunagi user; add Arch packages
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 2m39s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 2m32s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Reworks the Linux packaging so the service runs as an unprivileged, dedicated
"tsunagi" user instead of root — the point of a native package is to set things
up properly for that OS's users — and adds Arch Linux packages beside the deb.
Both package families are built from the already-compiled static binary; nothing
is recompiled.

Service model (shared systemd unit, dist/linux/tsunagi.service):
- User=tsunagi with AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, so
  it creates the TUN and binds low ports without root.
- StateDirectory/CacheDirectory/RuntimeDirectory give it /var/lib/tsunagi,
  /var/cache/tsunagi and /run/tsunagi, and the agent is pointed at them (and the
  socket at /run/tsunagi/agent.sock) through TSUNAGI_* env in the unit.
- The polkit rule now grants the resolve1 actions to the "tsunagi" group; the
  service user is in it, and admins can add themselves.

CLI: when no state dir is chosen, the control commands prefer the system
service's socket at /run/tsunagi/agent.sock when it exists, so `sudo tsunagi
status`/`join` reach the packaged daemon with no flags. A per-user agent (its
socket absent from /run) still uses its own.

Packaging:
- deb (build-deb.sh): postinst now creates the tsunagi system user+group; unit
  installed to /lib/systemd/system, binary to /usr/bin.
- Arch (new dist/arch/build-pkg.sh): a dependency-free .pkg.tar.zst assembled
  with bsdtar + zstd (no makepkg, no Arch host) — .PKGINFO, a .INSTALL scriptlet
  that creates the user and reloads systemd, and a gzipped .MTREE; unit to
  /usr/lib/systemd/system.
- The polkit rule moved to dist/linux (shared by deb, Arch and the tarball), and
  the tarball install.sh now creates the user and installs the unit + rule.
- Both release workflows build the deb and the Arch package on the two Linux
  matrix entries (deb_arch/pkg_arch), install libarchive-tools+zstd for it, and
  attach both to the release (Gitea API loop / gh).

Not exercised in this session: the .deb and .pkg.tar.zst build and install only
on Linux (no dpkg-deb/bsdtar+pacman locally); CLI build, clippy, fmt and tests
pass, and all shell/YAML is syntax-checked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 13:46:27 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 a3856eed3b Build a dependency-free .deb and attach it to the release
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 2m21s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 2m29s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Adds a Debian package to the release for the x86_64 and aarch64 Linux builds, so
`apt install ./tsunagi_*.deb` is a convenient path on the Ubuntu hosts. Because
the binary is static musl, the package declares no Depends — it is built with
plain dpkg-deb on the runner (no cargo-deb or nfpm), from dist/deb/build-deb.sh.

The package installs:
- the static binary at /usr/bin/tsunagi;
- a systemd service at /lib/systemd/system/tsunagi.service that runs the agent
  as root (ExecStart rewritten to /usr/bin; the source unit targets
  /usr/local/bin for the tarball installer);
- a polkit rule at /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d granting the resolve1 actions to
  a "tsunagi" group, for running the agent as a non-root user instead of via the
  root service. postinst creates that system group and runs daemon-reload; prerm
  disables the service on removal.

Both release workflows gain a "Build the Debian package" step on the two Linux
matrix entries (deb/deb_arch), include the .deb in the uploaded run artifacts,
and attach it to the release (Gitea via the API loop, GitHub via gh). macOS and
Windows are unchanged. Service runs as root by default; the polkit rule/group is
the documented opt-in for the non-root path — say if you'd rather the service
itself run as the tsunagi user.

YAML and shell syntax validated; the .deb build itself runs only on the Linux
runner (no dpkg-deb locally) and has not been exercised in this session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 13:34:33 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 eac54f8c79 Revert the GitHub workflow guard to server_url
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 15s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Misdiagnosed the earlier report: Gitea was correctly running its own
.gitea/workflows copy, not this .github one, so the server_url guard was fine.
The switch to a GITHUB_RELEASE repo variable then made the workflow skip on
GitHub itself, since that variable is not set there.

Put both job guards back to `github.server_url == 'https://github.com'`, which
runs on GitHub with no manual setup and skips on Gitea (its .gitea copy is the
one that runs). No repository variable is needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:53:26 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 a8dfd7017b Gate the GitHub release workflow on a repo variable, not server_url
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 35s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The github.server_url guard did not keep this workflow from running on Gitea:
Gitea reports github.server_url as https://github.com, so the condition was
true there too and the jobs ran (and would fail on @v4/gh).

Switch both job guards to `vars.GITHUB_RELEASE == 'true'`, a repository variable
set only in the GitHub repo's settings. It is deterministic: absent on Gitea, so
the jobs skip there and the .gitea workflow is the one that runs; present on
GitHub once configured, so it runs there. The header documents how to set it
(Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions → Variables → GITHUB_RELEASE=true).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:50:04 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 99f4cf0220 Add a GitHub release workflow alongside the Gitea one
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 36s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Gitea and GitHub need different release plumbing, so each gets its own file: the
Gitea workflow stays in .gitea/workflows, and this GitHub one lives in
.github/workflows. The build half is identical (static musl Linux via
cargo-zigbuild, native macOS aarch64 and Windows x86_64); only publishing
differs — GitHub uses the v4 artifact backend and `gh release create`/`upload`,
which the Gitea file cannot use.

Because Gitea reads both .gitea/workflows and .github/workflows, every job here
is guarded with `if: github.server_url == 'https://github.com'`, so on Gitea
this file's jobs are skipped (no v4/gh failures) and the .gitea file is the one
that runs. GitHub never reads .gitea, so there it runs only this one.

Publish is re-run safe: it creates the release on the first run and uploads with
--clobber onto an existing release afterwards; a pre-release suffix on the tag
marks it prerelease.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:47:19 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 69263b2dd9 Move the release workflow to .gitea/workflows
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 3m39s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 3m27s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The release pipeline is Gitea-specific (v3 artifacts, Gitea release API), so it
must not run on github.com, where it would fail. GitHub only reads
.github/workflows, while Gitea reads both, so moving the file to
.gitea/workflows keeps it running on Gitea and invisible to GitHub. A separate
GitHub-flavoured release workflow can be added under .github later.

The portable .github/workflows/ci.yml (fmt/clippy/test) is left in place; it
works on both and is not what this change is about.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:13:45 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 20444013c0 Split release into build artifacts + a publish job (Gitea)
The direct-upload-from-each-build approach failed ("Upload the archive to the
release" exit 1) and left no artifacts to inspect. Restructured into the
familiar shape: build jobs now leave their archive as a run artifact, and a
single publish job — gated on all targets succeeding — collects them and fills
the release.

- Build jobs use actions/upload-artifact@v3 (Gitea has no v4 backend; v3 is
  what shows under the run), so the archive is visible and handed on.
- publish (needs: build) downloads everything with download-artifact@v3 and
  uploads each archive to the Gitea release with curl, once, with no matrix
  race. It prints the API base and the HTTP status/body of every call, so a
  failure (e.g. a read-only Actions token → 403, or a bad API URL) is now
  visible in the log instead of a bare exit 1.
- Release API base prefers GITHUB_API_URL (Gitea sets it to its /api/v1 root)
  and falls back to GITHUB_SERVER_URL/api/v1. Asset uploads run in the main
  shell via process substitution so a failed upload fails the job.

Build, package, musl/zig setup and the target matrix are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:12:53 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 2196f6635b Quiet the cosmetic zig linker_messages warning on the musl build
The musl release build now links cleanly through cargo-zigbuild, but rustc's
new linker_messages lint echoed zig's "ignoring deprecated linker optimization
setting '1'" note — zig's linker declining the -O1 GNU-ld flag Rust passes. It
is cosmetic and the binary is correct, so allow that one lint, scoped to the
zig build step only. macOS and Windows keep full linker diagnostics, and a real
link error still fails the build.

No behaviour change to the produced binaries; takes effect on the next tag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:06:04 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 6438982d45 Upload release assets via the Gitea API instead of artifacts + gh
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 2m57s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 2m53s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
The release ran on Gitea Actions, where it failed at actions/upload-artifact@v4:
the v4 artifact backend (and the GitHub REST API that `gh release create` uses)
are not available on Gitea/GHES, so both the artifact handoff and the publish
job were dead ends there.

Reworked so each build job uploads its archive straight to the release through
Gitea's native API (`/api/v1/repos/<repo>/releases`) with curl: create the
release for the tag if absent (races between matrix jobs are resolved by reading
the id back by tag), then POST the archive as an asset. The separate publish
job, download-artifact and `gh` are gone. The id is parsed with grep, so the
runner needs only curl and coreutils — no jq, no third-party release action.
Uses the Gitea-injected GITHUB_TOKEN, GITHUB_SERVER_URL and GITHUB_REPOSITORY;
a tag with a pre-release suffix (e.g. -rc.2) is marked prerelease.

This targets Gitea by design; it no longer runs as-is on github.com (different
API), which is fine — the GitHub build is being retired. Build and package
steps, the musl/zig setup and the target matrix are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:04:20 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 21b619388c Pin Zig to a real release so the musl release build fetches reliably
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 3m49s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 3m26s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The release run failed at "Install zig": mlugg/setup-zig, left unpinned, resolved
to the newest version it knew of — an unreleased 0.16.0 whose tarball 404s on
ziglang.org — and the community mirrors returned 502/503 around it, so the step
errored out before cargo-zigbuild ever ran.

Pin the action to Zig 0.14.1, an archived release with a permanent official
download URL. The official source then succeeds even when the mirrors are flaky,
and the version stays compatible with cargo-zigbuild. Also moves the action to
@v2.

Only the Linux musl jobs use zig; macOS and Windows are unaffected. Not run on a
real tag yet in this session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:54:29 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 d1ab993dd2 Add a tagged-release CI workflow and Linux/Windows packaging
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 3m12s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 2m21s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Pushing a `v*` tag now builds the agent for every supported target and attaches
the archives to a GitHub release. Modelled on the furumi release workflow (a
build matrix, then a publish job that runs `gh release create`), adapted to this
project's two differences: it needs system integration (capabilities/polkit on
Linux, elevation+wintun on Windows, a root daemon on macOS), and its users run
varied distros, not just Ubuntu.

Linux is built as a fully **static musl** binary with cargo-zigbuild, so one
artifact runs on Arch, Alpine, NixOS and old-glibc systems alike, and can be
repackaged into whatever a distro prefers later. musl has no prebuilt
aws-lc-sys bindings, so the Linux jobs install cmake + libclang (bindgen) and
zig (the cross C compiler zigbuild drives). macOS (aarch64) and Windows (x86_64)
build natively; Linux covers x86_64 and aarch64.

Targets: x86_64/aarch64 linux-musl, aarch64 macOS, x86_64 Windows. Each archive
carries the binary, the top-level README, and the platform's install notes plus
integration files:
- dist/linux/: a static-friendly README, a systemd unit (runs as root, so no
  capability grant or polkit rule is needed; a commented non-root variant is
  included), and an install.sh that drops the binary and the unit or prints the
  setcap/polkit alternative.
- dist/windows/: install notes covering wintun.dll and Run-as-administrator.
- dist/macos/: the existing LaunchDaemon plist and notes, now also shipped in
  the archive.

Not exercised yet: the workflow only runs on a real tag push, and the
aws-lc-sys-under-musl build has not been run locally in this session (no zig
toolchain here). YAML and install.sh syntax are validated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:48:19 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 da7ce1dca1 Drop link-local addresses from the status "not announced" list
A host with several interfaces has a link-local (fe80::/10, and 169.254/16 on
IPv4) on each, and none of them is ever a peer candidate. Listing them under
"not announced" padded the section with one noise line per interface — most of
the list on a machine with several VPN utuns. They are now filtered out;
loopback and real unannounced addresses are unaffected.

Checks: cargo fmt --all --check and cargo clippy -p tsunagi-cli --all-targets
-D warnings pass; verified by eye against a live `tsunagi status`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:38:21 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 4d2f8a54ec Compact the status address list to one line per address
`tsunagi status` printed every local address as two lines: the address, then
an indented note holding the interface (and, for candidates, a priority rank).
On a host with many interfaces — common on macOS, where each VPN adds a utun
and every interface carries a link-local — that made the "local addresses"
section very long and hard to scan.

Each address is now a single line: the announce status stays the label
(announced / not announced / loopback) and the address and its interface share
the detail, as `<addr> · <iface>`. The per-row note and the candidate-priority
rank are dropped; ordering still reflects candidate priority. No other section
changes, and nothing but the presentation does.

Checks: cargo fmt --all --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace
--all-targets -D warnings, and the tsunagi-cli tests all pass on macOS;
verified by eye against a live `tsunagi status`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:26:13 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 c3a6201ee2 Bring the macOS stack up: utun interface, resolver files, system paths
macOS was TUN-less: the agent ran only with `--no-tun`, so tunnels formed but
nothing reached the operating system. The provisioner, host rules and DNS
publisher had Linux and Windows implementations and fell through to the
unsupported/erroring paths on macOS. This adds the macOS half so `tsunagi up`
carries real traffic there. The shared decision logic (plan_changes,
rules_summary, Published) is untouched — only the per-platform mechanics are new.

What it does on macOS (all root-only; macOS has no per-capability grant):
- Interface: a `utun` device opened over the in-kernel utun control socket via
  the existing `tun` dependency (no kext, no Network Extension). The kernel
  assigns the `utunN` name, so a name derived from the network id is not a legal
  utun name; `open_tun` leaves the name unset on macOS and reads the real one
  back, and `Interface::start` adopts `device.name()` as the name everything
  downstream configures (host rules, reconfigure). A utun is torn down with the
  process, so a crash never leaks one. Addresses, MTU, up and the overlay subnet
  route are applied with `/sbin/ifconfig` and `/sbin/route` (absolute paths, args
  built only from locally-derived values), the same role netlink plays on Linux
  and netsh on Windows. Observation is `netdev` (getifaddrs).
- DNS: a resolver-dir publisher writes `/etc/resolver/<network>` files pointing
  the system resolver at the overlay DNS server for each zone. The files carry a
  `port`, so the server needs no privileged socket, and a marker line, so the
  publisher only ever replaces or removes files it wrote and never clobbers a
  user's own. Removed on revert.
- Broadcast host rules: the `255.255.255.255` route is installed with `route`.
  The inbound-UDP firewall allowance (a pf anchor) is deferred and reported as
  the incomplete half, so `status` says what to allow by hand; the route still
  goes in. Failure stays contained, exactly as on the other platforms.
- Privilege: probe is optimistic (like Windows); the honest answer comes from
  the utun open, whose permission error now says to run with sudo or as a daemon.

Deployment:
- Default paths on macOS are fixed system locations rather than per-user Library
  dirs, so they do not depend on whose shell ran sudo: state `/var/db/tsunagi`,
  cache `/var/db/tsunagi/cache` (StoragePaths::user_default), control socket
  `/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock` (default_control_socket_path, mirroring the
  Windows %ProgramData% branch). The local control socket already uses the
  shared `unix` adapter, so no IPC changes were needed — macOS is Unix.
- dist/macos/ carries a root LaunchDaemon plist and install notes; README's
  deployment section now documents the macOS path instead of "not implemented".

Decisions (agreed up front): utun auto-assign with the real name adopted;
ifconfig/route rather than raw PF_ROUTE/ioctl (which would need unsafe);
/etc/resolver files rather than scutil; route-now/firewall-deferred; root via
sudo or a LaunchDaemon rather than Network Extension (which would require a
signed sandboxed app bundle, not a Rust CLI).

Checks: on macOS (Darwin 27), `cargo fmt --all --check`, `cargo clippy --locked
--workspace --all-targets -D warnings`, and `cargo test --locked --workspace
--all-targets` all pass (0 failures); the new macos-gated unit tests run under
the standard workspace command via feature unification. Not yet exercised live:
actual utun creation, ifconfig/route application and /etc/resolver writes need a
root run, which has not been done in this session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:15:59 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 533921059a Install broadcast route and firewall allowance on the host while broadcast is on
LAN discovery (CS 1.6 and similar) only worked after two manual steps on every
host: route 255.255.255.255 through the TUN, and allow inbound traffic on it.
Without the route the game's limited broadcast leaves via the physical adapter
and never reaches the overlay; without the firewall allowance the server's
unicast reply (from a different address than the one the request went to, so
never matched by conntrack) is dropped before the game's socket. Verified by
hand on Linux: with both in place the server answered A2S_INFO over the overlay.

The system level (not a plugin) now installs exactly those two things for the
interface it owns, and removes them when broadcast is turned off, the network
is left or stopped, or the agent exits.

Design:
- New boundary overlay::hostrules (BroadcastHostRules: idempotent apply/clear,
  with Linux, Windows, Mock and Unsupported implementations). TunFactory gains
  host_rules(); ManagedTunFactory::with_host_rules wires it in the CLI.
- Interface::sync_broadcast_rules reconciles the host against the routing
  table (RoutingTable::broadcast_host_target) and is called after address sync,
  on live `network broadcast on/off`, on network deactivation and by remove().
  Failure is contained: the outcome is kept and logged, never fatal.
- One interface carries several networks but the host has one 255.255.255.255
  route, so the source is the lowest NetworkId among broadcast-enabled networks
  with an address (documented in docs/broadcast.md).
- Linux: the route is added on the existing netlink thread (preferred source =
  overlay address, replace semantics). The firewall rule is `iptables -I INPUT
  -i <if> -p udp -s <overlay range>` tagged with a comment `tsunagi:<if>`;
  it is UDP-only and range-limited on purpose so TCP services stay unexposed.
  iptables is located in fixed system directories, never via PATH; stale tagged
  rules (e.g. from a crash) are replaced. A missing iptables leaves the route in
  place and is reported. rp_filter is not touched.
- Windows: PowerShell (absolute path) New-NetRoute metric 1 and a tagged
  inbound UDP Defender rule scoped to the interface alias and overlay range.
- status shows a `broadcast rules` row (ok, or which half failed and why).
  IPC control protocol bumped 14 -> 15 because OverlayReport gained a field.
- AGENTS.md records the narrow exception to "never touch routing/firewall".

Compatibility: restart the agent after upgrading (control protocol 15). No wire
or schema change.

Checks run (Linux only): cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace
--all-targets -D warnings, cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, all
passing. Tests use a mock host and a scripted iptables; no OS setting is
changed. NOT done: the Windows code was never compiled for or run on Windows
(cross-compiling failed for lack of a C toolchain), only its script building is
unit-tested; the real netlink route and iptables calls were not exercised
against a live kernel in the suite; CS 1.6 was not launched from this change.
2026-10-01 15:03:43 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov d2778f0b5a Prevent WireGuard timer loop failure spam and fix handshake broadcast
When a WireGuard tunnel handshake timed out or a rekey failed,
Inner::on_tunnel_failed closed the transport link and reported the failure
to the agent core. However:
1. The peer remained in WireguardDevice::inner.peers. Once boringtun
   declared ConnectionExpired (after 90s), self.tunn.is_expired() remained
   permanently true on all subsequent 250ms timer ticks. drive_timers
   repeatedly detected failed = true every 250ms, flooding logs with
   'WARN WireGuard tunnel failed due to rekey timeout, triggering fallback'
   and sending repeated protocol failure events to the core 4 times/sec.
2. In WireguardLink::send, is_handshake_init incorrectly expected an
   envelope header offset (msg[74] == 1) when checking for initiation
   packets, which failed on raw WireGuard UDP packets. As a result,
   handshake initiations were not broadcast to all candidate endpoints.
3. In WireguardTransport::accept_loop, packet source matching contained
   dead envelope destination matching inspecting ephemeral key bytes
   against local endpoint IDs.

Fixes:
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/device.rs:
  - Add failed: bool to FlowTunnel to latch failure state. Once a failure
    is reported, update_timers returns (TunnResult::Done, false) on all
    subsequent ticks until a new handshake is started or completed.
  - In Inner::on_tunnel_failed, remove the failed peer from inner.peers so
    drive_timers ceases ticking on the dead tunnel.
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/plugin.rs:
  - In Worker::sync, retain only active unclosed links in state.links.
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs:
  - Check is_handshake_init directly as '!msg.is_empty() && msg[0] == 1',
    ensuring handshake initiations are broadcast to all candidate addresses.
  - Clean up matched_peer to look up links and peer candidate addresses directly.
- Tests:
  - Update test_flow_tunnel_rekey_timeout_triggers_failure to assert failure
    latching and verify no repeated failure reports on subsequent ticks.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed.
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-10-01 03:18:32 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 8cfece9479 Filter noisy internal warnings from boringtun and iroh net_report
The CLI's default tracing filter previously allowed WARN level logs from
boringtun and iroh, producing two confusing and noisy log messages during
routine operation:
1. 'WARN HANDSHAKE(REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT (on receive))':
   emitted by boringtun's internal timer tick when an endpoint primarily
   receives data for 165 seconds (180s - 10s - 5s). In boringtun, this is a
   routine scheduled rekey timer rather than an error or failure, but was
   unhelpfully logged as warn! upstream.
2. 'WARN probe timed out':
   emitted by iroh's net_report module during background HTTP captive portal
   detection when running in isolated subnets or VMs without direct internet
   access. This probe has no impact on mesh connectivity.

Update the default logging filter to:
  'info,iroh=warn,iroh::net_report=error,quinn=warn,rustls=warn,boringtun=error,mainline=off'

Real WireGuard handshake and rekey failures continue to be detected and
reported cleanly by Tsunagi's own data plane diagnostics and automatic
fallback handlers at INFO and WARN levels.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed.
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-10-01 03:06:20 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 3930dff2dc Detect WireGuard tunnel rekey failure and trigger automatic fallback
Previously, because UDP is connectionless, when a pure WireGuard tunnel
encountered handshake or rekey failures (e.g. boringtun logging
`WARN HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)` and `CONNECTION_EXPIRED`), the
`WireguardLink` never closed. It remained active in `agent.links` and
as a direct hop in `RelayHub.raw`. Consequently, outgoing packets
continued to be blackholed over the dead direct path, preventing
`RelayHub` from using working multihop relay routes and preventing
the agent from falling back to alternative protocols (`tcp-tls` or
`wg-quic`).

Key changes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/device.rs`:
  - In `FlowTunnel`, track active handshake and rekey attempts via
    `handshake_started_at`. If an active handshake attempt remains
    unanswered beyond `HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT` (15s) or boringtun reports
    `ConnectionExpired`, declare the tunnel dead.
  - Reset timeout timers upon successful handshake reception in
    `decapsulate`.
  - In `drive_timers`, when tunnel failure is detected, trigger
    `inner.on_tunnel_failed(peer)`, which closes the direct transport
    link and notifies the agent via `PluginContext::report_peer_protocol_failure`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs`:
  - Add `WireguardLink::close` to transition `is_closed` to true and
    notify `closed_notify`.
  - In `WireguardLink::recv`, select on `closed_notify` so readers
    unblock and return `None` immediately on close.
  - Add `WireguardTransport::close_link` to close active links by
    network and peer.
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/mod.rs`:
  - Add `PluginRequest::ProtocolFailure` and public helper
    `PluginContext::report_peer_protocol_failure`.
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/mod.rs` and `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs`:
  - Add `NetCommand::ProtocolFailure` to runtime command handling.
  - On protocol failure: remove dead direct link from `self.links`,
    clear it from `RelayHub.raw` (so `RelayHub` immediately routes
    over available multihop relays), record failure on `wg` for that
    peer with exponential backoff cooldown, emit `DataLinkDown`, and
    immediately call `ensure_links()` to dial the next mutually supported
    protocol (`tcp-tls` or `wg-quic`).
- Tests:
  - Add `test_flow_tunnel_rekey_timeout_triggers_failure` and
    `test_flow_tunnel_reset_on_handshake` unit tests in `device.rs`.
  - Add `test_wireguard_link_close_and_transport_close_link` in
    `transport_tests.rs`.
  - Add `test_protocol_dial_state_cooldown_and_fallback_selection` in
    `network.rs`.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
- Built release binary: target/release/tsunagi.
2026-10-01 03:02:09 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 35acc4d231 Fix WireGuard relay preemption with UDP probing, allow VM bridges, and categorize status addresses
When remote peers communicate across networks with mixed connectivity (e.g.
a remote Linux node, a local Linux host, and a Windows VM guest under KVM):
- Previously, `WireguardTransport` immediately created and installed
  unverified direct links into `RelayHub` in `notify_peer_capability` and
  `open()`. When a remote peer had only unroutable private addresses
  (e.g. 192.168.122.151 on a KVM NAT bridge), this dead direct link
  preempted the working 2-hop relay, causing packet drops, failed handshakes,
  and REKEY_TIMEOUT errors.
- Host-guest VM bridges (`virbr*`) were previously filtered out, preventing
  the VM guest from discovering the host's bridge IP (192.168.122.1) and
  forcing it to attempt cross-interface connections to host Wi-Fi/LAN.
- Concurrent activation of multiple networks sharing one `tsun0` interface
  raced in `sync_addresses`, resulting in netlink `File exists (os error 17)`
  and `The object already exists` on Windows.

Key fixes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs`:
  - Implement bidirectional UDP probing with `TSUNAGI_WG_PROBE_V1` PING/PONG.
  - In `open()`, probe candidate endpoints with retransmission up to 1200ms.
    If unreachable, return `TransportError::Unreachable`, preventing dead
    links from preempting valid relay routes in `RelayHub`.
  - In `notify_peer_capability`, send hole-punching probes without prematurely
    installing unverified links.
  - In `accept_loop`, reply to PING probes with PONG and install confirmed
    inbound links targeting the verified source address.
  - In `WireguardLink::send`, inspect byte 74 of enveloped packets to detect
    handshake initiations, ensuring confirmed links route data packets only
    to the active target.
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/plugin.rs`:
  - Permit VM bridges (`virbr*`) as candidate interfaces (priority 10).
  - Add `prioritize_local_subnet` to prioritize candidates sharing a local
    IPv4 subnet with the receiver (e.g. 192.168.122.0/24).
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/interface.rs` & provisioners:
  - Add async mutex `sync_lock` to serialize concurrent address syncs across networks.
  - Handle netlink EEXIST (os error 17) and Windows already-exists errors
    idempotently as success.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`:
  - Split `local addresses` in `tsunagi status` into `announced` (candidate
    addresses in priority order with interface and rank), `not announced`
    (container bridges/internal addresses with interface name), and `loopback`.
- Tests:
  - Add `test_wireguard_transport_unreachable_probe_times_out` and
    `test_matches_subnet` unit tests.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
2026-10-01 02:38:13 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov c791102ad9 Fix overlay and virtual interface candidate leakage and WireGuard rekeying
On Windows (Wintun), iface.name in netdev is an adapter GUID, while
iface.friendly_name is 'tsun0'. Checking only iface.name failed to
identify and exclude Wintun overlay interfaces. Consequently, Windows
nodes announced their own overlay IP addresses (e.g. 10.13.37.26) as
candidate endpoints. Remote peers latched onto this overlay IP as the
WireGuard target, routing encrypted packets into tsun0 (recursive loop),
resulting in failed handshakes and subsequent HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)
and CONNECTION_EXPIRED.

Similarly, Docker bridges (br-*, docker0) and virtual bridges were
announced and alphabetically sorted before physical LAN or Tailscale
interfaces, causing peers to attempt WireGuard handshakes with internal
Docker bridge addresses (e.g. 172.21.0.1).

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard and crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls:
  - Robustly identify overlay interfaces by inspecting iface.name,
    iface.friendly_name, and iface.description for 'tsun', 'tsunagi',
    and 'wintun'.
  - Filter out container and virtual bridge interfaces (docker, br-,
    veth, virbr, cni, flannel, cali, kube, dummy, lxc, podman, vethernet,
    vboxnet, vmnet).
  - Prioritize candidates by physical interface score: interfaces with
    a default gateway (physical LAN/WAN) and Tailscale (100.64.0.0/10)
    score highest and sort to candidate #0.
  - In on_peer_capability, filter out any announced address falling inside
    any active overlay IPv4 range (defense in depth on receiver).
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs:
  - In WireguardLink::send, broadcast Handshake Initiation packets (type 1)
    to all candidate addresses so initial handshakes and rekeys probe all
    candidate paths and recover if an endpoint roamed or NAT expired.
  - In accept_loop, prioritize exact socket address matches before falling
    back to candidate IP matches for NAT port roaming.
- In crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs:
  - Update iroh AddrFilter to inspect friendly_name and description,
    preventing Wintun overlay IPs from leaking into iroh discovery endpoints.
- Tests:
  - Add unit tests for candidate interface filtering, IP validation, and
    priority scoring in tsunagi-wireguard and tsunagi-tcp-tls.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
2026-10-01 02:15:06 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov f80841da63 Fix WireGuard multi-network demux, candidate discovery, and status reporting
When a peer belongs to multiple overlay networks served by one agent (e.g.
a VM participating in both 'hexor' and 'ultradesu'), packets received on
the shared WireGuard UDP socket could not be differentiated by source IP/port
alone. Previously, `WireguardTransport::accept_loop` picked the first
matching link found in iteration order, starving other networks for that peer
and causing rekey timeouts (`WARN HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)`,
`ERROR CONNECTION_EXPIRED(REKEY_ATTEMPT_TIME)`) and packet loss on the
starved network.

Additionally:
- When a peer had multiple candidate endpoints (such as LAN, VM bridge, and
  Tailscale CGNAT addresses), `WireguardLink` sent handshake initiations
  only to `addrs[0]`. If the first address was unreachable from the remote
  side (e.g. host's Tailscale IP unreachable from inside a local VM), the
  handshake never completed.
- In `build_report`, peers known to the `wg-quic` plugin were added with
  empty tunnels even if an active `wg` (pure WireGuard) tunnel existed,
  causing `tsunagi status` to falsely report 'no WireGuard handshake yet'
  for connected and pingable peers.
- `local_ip_candidates` previously included IPv6 addresses which caused
  OS error 22 (EINVAL) when passed to the IPv4-bound UDP socket.

Key fixes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs`:
  - Store `peer_networks` as `HashSet<NetworkId>` per peer.
  - In `WireguardLink`, maintain a list of candidate addresses and a
    `confirmed` flag. Before a handshake response confirms the active path,
    transmit datagrams (handshake initiations) to all candidate addresses.
    Upon receiving an inbound datagram, lock onto the confirmed address.
  - In `accept_loop`, deliver inbound datagrams to all active links
    associated with the sender's endpoint ID across all networks. Boringtun's
    cryptographic index and AEAD verification naturally demultiplexes and
    accepts the packet in the correct network while discarding it in others.
  - Filter candidate addresses to IPv4 to match the bound socket family.
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/plugin.rs`:
  - Only collect IPv4 interfaces in `local_ip_candidates`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`:
  - Refactor `build_report` to evaluate all protocols per peer and prioritize
    whichever protocol has an active tunnel (`wg` > `tcp-tls` > `wg-quic`).
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/tests/plugin_tests.rs`:
  - Add `test_wireguard_two_networks_same_peers` verifying simultaneous
    bidirectional packet transmission between two peers sharing two networks
    over a single `WireguardTransport`.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
2026-10-01 01:38:44 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 7070a16104 Add pure WireGuard direct UDP data plane plugin and transport
Peers communicating on uncensored networks can benefit from raw WireGuard
performance over direct UDP without QUIC framing or double-encryption
overhead. This provides Tailscale-like direct tunnel performance while
preserving Tsunagi's decentralized mesh architecture.

Key changes:
- Create `tsunagi-wireguard` crate implementing the `IpPlugin` and
  `PacketTransport` contracts:
  - `WG_PROTOCOL = "wg"` with wire version 1.
  - Bounded `WgAnnouncement` carrying WireGuard public keys, listening UDP
    ports, and candidate IP addresses (filtering out overlay interfaces).
  - `WgKeyStore` managing persistent per-network WireGuard X25519 keys
    in SQLite with zeroization on drop.
  - `WireguardTransport` providing direct UDP packet transmission, candidate
    address tracking, inbound link delivery, and roaming support.
  - `WireguardDevice` running userspace WireGuard encryption via `boringtun`,
    timer maintenance, and AllowedIPs source enforcement.
- Integrate `wg` into `tsunagi-cli`:
  - Set default protocols to `"wg,tcp-tls,wg-quic"` so all protocols are
    enabled by default in order of throughput and performance.
  - Support `"wireguard"` as a convenience alias for `"wg"` in `--protocol`.
  - Bind `PureWgTransport` and launch the inbound datagram accept loop on `up`.
  - Pass `pure_wg` plugin to `AgentControl` and update `build_report` so
    active WireGuard tunnels and overlay metrics are reported in `tsunagi status`.
  - Clean up WireGuard keys on network removal in `forget_protocol_state`.
- Comprehensive test coverage in `tsunagi-wireguard`:
  - `announcement_tests`: round-trip serialization and verification of malformed,
    mismatched network, zero port, or self-claiming announcements.
  - `transport_tests`: loopback UDP link delivery between transports.
  - `plugin_tests`: end-to-end two-peer handshake and bidirectional IP packet
    transit over direct UDP.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed.
2026-10-01 01:24:25 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 46575d0899 Prioritize stored agreed range over default range in reserve_range
When an agent restarted with multiple networks (e.g. hexor and ultradesu),
Agent::reserve_range() previously attempted to reserve the default configured
range (10.13.37.0/24) for whichever network happened to be listed first in
storage, even if that network had already agreed upon a different range
(such as 10.79.175.0/24). As a result, the first network seized 10.13.37.0/24
in the route table, causing the second network (which genuinely used 10.13.37.0/24)
to trigger a spurious RouteError::Overlap warning at startup until the first
network asynchronously loaded its signed records and released the reservation.

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/mod.rs, make reserve_range asynchronous and
  inspect stored signed records first using StateSet::agreed_range().
- If an agreed range already exists in storage, reserve that specific range
  in routes immediately instead of preemptively claiming the default
  overlay_ipv4_range.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:36:24 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov a89e65475d Implement Debug manually for PipeSecurityAttributes on Windows
The windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES struct is a raw C FFI
struct that does not implement std::fmt::Debug. Deriving Debug on
PipeSecurityAttributes failed Windows compilation with E0277.

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/ipc/windows.rs, remove #[derive(Debug)] on
  PipeSecurityAttributes and provide an explicit std::fmt::Debug
  implementation formatting nLength, lpSecurityDescriptor, and
  bInheritHandle.

Validation on Linux:
- Verified type check against Windows target via rustc.
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:31:21 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 2ed447ae86 Filter overlay interface from candidates and align status member columns
Peers previously advertised overlay interface (tsun0) addresses as physical
candidate endpoints for both iroh discovery and tcp-tls announcements. When an
intermediate tunnel was active between two peers (e.g., between a host and a VM),
iroh probes to the remote peer's overlay address were routed through the existing
overlay, causing iroh to select the overlay IP itself as a 'direct' endpoint.
This caused recursive tunneling (QUIC over WireGuard over TLS) and confusing
status output showing peers connecting to their own overlay IP addresses.
Additionally, in tsunagi status, peer rows were displayed with unaligned
columns, mixing control plane status and data plane metrics in a way that was
difficult to scan.

Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs, add an AddrFilter to the iroh EndpointBuilder
  to dynamically filter out any local addresses assigned to tsun* overlay
  interfaces before publishing to address discovery services (DHT/pkarr/STUN).
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls/src/plugin.rs, exclude tsun* interfaces from
  local_ip_candidates() so overlay IPs are never advertised as physical
  TCP endpoints.
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, exclude tsun* interfaces from
  netwatch_addresses() so the local addresses section reflects only actual
  physical/host network interfaces.
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, update member_row() to format member
  details with aligned columnar layout: the overlay IP is placed first and
  padded, followed by control plane transport and latency, and line 2 pads
  tunnel metrics so that the data link endpoint (via ...) aligns vertically.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:24:53 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov ac5a1596ef Allow unelevated Windows processes to access control socket via SDDL and shared path
When running the tsunagi agent as an elevated Administrator or Windows Service,
unprivileged user-space processes (such as a system tray application, user-level
CLI commands, or status monitors) could not interact with the control socket.
This was due to two constraints on Windows:
1. The default control socket path was derived from the per-user %APPDATA%,
   making an administrator's socket invisible or inaccessible to a non-elevated
   standard user profile.
2. Even if pointed to the same named pipe, Windows Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)
   and default ACLs prevent a Medium-Integrity (unelevated) process from opening
   a High-Integrity (elevated) pipe server for write access unless explicitly allowed.

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/ipc/windows.rs, implement PipeSecurityAttributes using
  Win32 ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW with SDDL:
  "D:(A;;GRGW;;;WD)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GA;;;SY)S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)". This grants generic
  read/write access to Everyone (WD), retains full control for Administrators (BA)
  and LocalSystem (SY), and sets the Mandatory Label SACL to Medium Integrity (ME)
  with No-Write-Up (NW).
- In crates/tsunagi/src/ipc/mod.rs, introduce default_control_socket_path() which
  points to %ProgramData%\tsunagi\agent.sock on Windows (and default per-user
  state directory on Unix).
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, support TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET environment
  variable across all commands, and use default_control_socket_path() on Windows
  when running against the default state directory. Custom state directories (--state-dir)
  or explicit sockets (--control-socket) continue to take precedence, allowing
  multi-daemon setups to remain strictly isolated.
- In workspace Cargo.toml, set unsafe_code = "deny" so the workspace forbids unsafe
  code while permitting explicit, documented unsafe Win32 API calls in windows.rs.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:13:44 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 192ab25bbd Support RUST_LOG, enable UPnP portmapper and add NAT traversal logging
Previously, `tsunagi-cli` configured clap with a fixed default_value and
`env = "TSUNAGI_LOG"`, which caused `RUST_LOG` to be completely ignored.
In addition, `iroh` was built with `default-features = false` and lacked the
`"portmapper"` feature, which caused it to compile a stub client and disable
UPnP-IGD, PCP, and NAT-PMP port mapping. Furthermore, there was no visibility
into STUN address discovery, UPnP port mapping status, or QUIC transmission path
switching (hole punch vs relay).

Key improvements:
- Enable the `"portmapper"` feature on `iroh` in workspace Cargo.toml, pulling in
  `portmapper` and `igd-next` to actively request port mappings on local routers.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`, support `RUST_LOG` with fallback precedence
  (`--log` > `TSUNAGI_LOG` > `RUST_LOG` > default filter). When debug or trace
  filtering is active, automatically enable `.with_target(true)` so users can see
  which subsystem emitted the log (e.g., portmapper, iroh::magicsock, tsunagi::net).
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs`, monitor `endpoint.watch_addr()` and
  `endpoint.home_relay_status()`. Emit `DEBUG` logs for local socket binding,
  discovered STUN reflexive/UPnP addresses, and relay connections. If no direct
  addresses are discovered after probe grace, emit a concise `WARN`.
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/session.rs`, monitor connection `path_events()`
  to log when transmission paths are opened, closed, or selected (switching between
  relay and direct hole-punched paths), with bounded task winding down on shutdown.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed).
- Live verification with `RUST_LOG=debug` confirmed SSDP broadcast to 239.255.255.250:1900,
  portmapper logs, STUN QAD discovery, and clean relay shutdown.
2026-09-30 23:08:23 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov c0a76f1942 Enable all available protocols by default with tcp-tls priority
By default, the agent now enables all available data plane protocols
starting with `tcp-tls,wg-quic`, removing the need to manually pass `--protocol`
to enable HTTPS-camouflage transport. The `--protocol` option remains available
to explicitly restrict or select specific protocols (or reorder their priority).

Furthermore, in `crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls`, if default port 443 is unavailable
(e.g., due to permission constraints or address in use), the transport now
attempts fallback port 8443, and if 8443 is also unavailable, gracefully falls
back to an ephemeral port rather than failing agent startup.

Key changes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`, update `UpArgs::protocols` default_value
  to `"tcp-tls,wg-quic"`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`, reorder `PROTOCOLS` registry with `tcp-tls`
  first, followed by `wg-quic`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls/src/transport.rs`, add multi-tier fallback
  (443 -> 8443 -> ephemeral) for unconstrained port bindings.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 22:56:08 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 510116afb9 Add automatic protocol fallback with backoff and silence DHT bootstrap error
When multiple data plane protocols (such as tcp-tls and wg-quic) are configured,
the agent previously attempted only the first mutually supported protocol in
served order. If that protocol failed to connect or dropped (due to NAT, firewall,
or handshake failure), ensure_links retried the exact same failed protocol
on every tick without ever falling back to alternative supported protocols.
Additionally, tcp-tls mistakenly included 127.0.0.1 in peer candidate lists,
causing peers to connect to their own local listener and fail certificate
verification (NotValidForName). Finally, BitTorrent DHT bootstrap failures
in the third-party mainline crate were logged as noisy ERRORs despite overlay
connectivity operating normally.

Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs, implement ProtocolDialState with
  exponential backoff (3s, 6s, 12s, 24s, 48s, capped at 60s).
- In ensure_links, select the highest-priority mutually supported protocol
  that is not currently on backoff cooldown. If a protocol fails, immediately
  record the failure and fall back to alternative mutually supported protocols
  without waiting for the periodic ticker.
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls, remove localhost loopback from local_ip_candidates
  and capability announcements, and prevent open() from connecting to our own
  listening port.
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, set mainline=off in the default tracing
  filter so benign BitTorrent DHT routing table bootstrap errors do not alarm users.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 22:51:08 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov e24548b3b0 Fix Windows address allocation check and add custom SNI for tcp-tls
When running on Windows with Wintun, assigning an overlay IPv4 address
via netsh triggers Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). During this tentative
window, binding a UDP socket to the address returns WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL
(os error 10049), causing the agent to prematurely log a false-positive
PluginError ('allocated ... but the address is not on any interface').

Furthermore, Russian TSPU / DPI filters block unrecognized SNIs and
non-standard ALPNs on TCP port 443 with TCP RST injection (os error 10054).
The default 'tsunagi.local' SNI and 'tsunagi-tls/1' ALPN were trivially
fingerprinted.

Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/tun.rs, enhance address_is_local on Windows
  to inspect active OS interfaces via netdev::get_interfaces() if UDP
  bind fails.
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs, introduce an asynchronous retry
  loop in publish_allocations on Windows (up to 1.5s in 150ms intervals)
  to gracefully allow DAD and IP helper updates to complete before
  reporting missing addresses.
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls, add support for custom SNI domain via
  protocol options (-o sni=<domain>), defaulting to 'cloudflare.com'
  instead of 'tsunagi.local'.
- Switch TLS ALPN in tsunagi-tcp-tls from 'tsunagi-tls/1' to 'http/1.1'
  to camouflage handshake traffic as standard HTTPS web traffic.
- Update tests to verify custom and default SNI behavior.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (348 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 20:38:16 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov a4e341cd66 Report peer tunnel protocols accurately and eliminate overlay shutdown timeout
The status output previously reported all overlay peers under WireGuard
diagnostics: when a non-WireGuard protocol (like tcp-tls) was actively
carrying traffic, the report still complained that there was 'no WireGuard
handshake yet; the tunnel cannot carry traffic' and marked peer health as
degraded (warn). Furthermore, during agent shutdown or interface removal,
the overlay packet loop waited on device.recv() for the full 5-second
TASK_GRACE period, producing a spurious warning: 'task did not wind down in
time; aborting it task="overlay packet loop"'.

Key improvements:
- Add 'protocol' field to OverlayPeerReport in tsunagi::ipc.
- Track per-peer packet metrics (tx, rx, dropped) and uptime in
  GenericTunnelPlugin via TunnelPeerReport.
- Update build_report to accurately inspect and populate active tunnel
  protocols (tcp-tls, wg-quic) and their real traffic counters.
- Format member rows in CLI status with the actual protocol name, uptime,
  and real traffic metrics; mark health as Good when an active tunnel exists.
- In Interface::remove(), abort the overlay packet loop task immediately
  before destroying the device to remove the 5s hang and spurious timeout warning.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (348 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 17:31:17 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 41990c9934 Refactor agent logging and report active tcp-tls tunnels
Previous agent logging suffered from noisy repetitive '--- status ---'
dumps to stdout every 15 seconds, intermingled with raw println! event lines
and lacking structured log levels. Furthermore, the status report only
inspected WireguardPlugin tunnels; when tcp-tls took precedence and established
a link, the status falsely showed wg-quic as '0/1 tunnels established, waiting
for a data link' without mentioning the active tcp-tls link.

Key changes:
- Adopt compact, clean tracing output: initialize tracing_subscriber with
  .with_target(false).compact() and default filter
  'info,iroh=warn,quinn=warn,rustls=warn,boringtun=warn,mainline=warn'
  to keep standard agent events at INFO while silencing noisy internals.
- Route agent events through structured tracing (log_event):
  emit INFO for peer connect/disconnect, data link up/down, and network
  activation; WARN for rejections and plugin errors; DEBUG for dials.
- Disable periodic status dump by default (set status_interval default to 0),
  and re-route periodic ticks to tracing::debug! (log_status_summary).
- Add active_peers() to GenericTunnelPlugin and update build_report to
  include active tcp-tls tunnels in OverlayReport alongside WireGuard peers.
- Display enabled protocol priority on agent startup.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (347 tests passed).
2026-09-30 17:16:02 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 254a25ebd6 Display supported protocols in status report host section
The `host` section in `tsunagi status` previously hardcoded
`implementation: userspace WireGuard (boringtun); no kernel module needed`
and omitted information about data plane protocols supported by the build.

Changes:
- Add `protocols` row to `host_section` listing supported protocols
  and their wire versions (`wg-quic (wire v4), tcp-tls (wire v1)`) with a note
  directing to `tsunagi protocols` for detailed options.
- Update `implementation` row to reflect the multi-protocol userspace
  data plane (`userspace overlay (boringtun WireGuard, TCP TLS 1.3); no kernel module needed`).

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed.
2026-09-30 17:00:39 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 5495cb5b34 Support CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE raising for privileged TCP TLS ports
When file capabilities are granted with `sudo setcap ...+p`, capabilities
are placed into the thread's permitted set rather than its effective set.
While TUN interface provisioning in `tsunagi` properly acquired and dropped
CAP_NET_ADMIN using `caps::raise`, `tsunagi-tcp-tls` attempted to bind port 443
directly without activating CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, resulting in EACCES
(os error 13 Permission denied).

Fixes and improvements:
- Add `caps` dependency to `tsunagi-tcp-tls` on Linux.
- Implement `NetBindServiceGuard` to temporarily raise CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
  into the effective set for the synchronous `TcpListener::bind` invocation
  and immediately drop it afterwards.
- Clarify diagnostic warnings to distinguish between default port 443 fallback
  and explicitly requested port failure.
- Update all privilege diagnostics and error hints across the codebase
  to uniformly recommend granting both capabilities:
  `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p <path>`.

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed (all workspace unit,
  integration, and protocol tests passed).
2026-09-30 16:53:33 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov fac3bd7bb9 Add tcp-tls transport and tunnel protocol disguised as HTTPS
Implement the `tcp-tls` protocol crate and generic tunnel codec abstractions
alongside `wg-quic` to circumvent deep packet inspection (DPI/TSPU), UDP
blocking, and QUIC throttling. Traffic uses standard TCP on port 443 with
TLS 1.3 framing, looking identical to regular HTTPS traffic to network
observers.

Architectural highlights:
- TunnelCodec & GenericTunnelPlugin: Provide an extensible plugin abstraction
  in `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/tunnel.rs` that encapsulates background task
  lifecycles, per-peer channels, and sink dispatch, so new transport plugins
  only define cryptographic transformations and handshake payloads.
- MultiPacketTransport & Protocol Priority Selection: Support multiple
  simultaneous transports in `AgentConfig` and dynamically dispatch `open()`
  calls by protocol identifier. In `ensure_links`, choose the highest-priority
  mutually supported protocol per peer to avoid duplicate links.
- TLS 1.3 & Certificate Pinning: Generate self-signed Ed25519 X.509 certificates
  derived from the persistent `DeviceIdentity` secret. Clients pin peer
  certificates using `PinnedEndpointVerifier` against `iroh::EndpointId`.
- End-to-end Encryption: `PeerCipher` uses X25519 static-static ECDH, HKDF-SHA256,
  and ChaCha20-Poly1305 with incrementing 64-bit nonces. Relayed traffic across
  intermediate nodes remains confidential and tamper-proof.
- Privilege handling: Default to TCP port 443 with fallback to 8443 on
  `PermissionDenied`, providing an actionable message recommending:
  `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p <path>`.

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed (all workspace unit,
  integration, CLI, and new `tsunagi-tcp-tls` tests passed).
2026-09-30 16:41:51 +01:00
ab db9015b26c Allow network commands to select stored names
Leaving a configured network required copying its opaque id even when its
name identified exactly one saved network. Resolve exact, case-sensitive
names from the existing local state alongside full ids and unique id prefixes.
Use the shared resolver for leave, stop, start, secret and broadcast so the
same selector has the same meaning throughout the CLI. IPC and storage still
operate on the resolved id; release and offline-removal behavior are unchanged.

Refuse ambiguous names and name/id-prefix collisions before any mutation,
listing matching names and full ids without secrets. Full ids take precedence
to provide a definitive escape from ambiguity. Preserve copied id ellipses
without stripping literal ellipses from network names.

Update help and examples. Make administrator-friendly, predictable CLI behavior
a core requirement in AGENTS.md, including actionable errors and no guessing
which resource a destructive command should affect.

Validation on Windows: cargo fmt --all -- --check and workspace/all-target
Clippy with -D warnings passed. Release workspace/all-target tests: 318 passed,
including real-process online/offline leave-by-name, preservation of other
networks, ambiguous/unknown selectors, and consistent name selection across
commands. Two existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were explicitly skipped
(a_wipe_removes_everything_and_the_next_start_is_a_stranger and
wiping_twice_is_as_ordinary_as_wiping_once). The public-DHT smoke test and
forwarding benchmark remain ignored by default. Tests use isolated state;
the user's running agent and configured networks were not changed.
2026-09-22 19:00:08 +03:00
ab c724981bfd Added per-network LAN broadcast relay
LAN game discovery previously dropped IPv4 broadcasts at TUN ingress. Carry
limited and subnet-directed UDP broadcasts to authenticated, opted-in members
of the source network, including destinations reached through mesh relays.
Preserve the original IP/UDP bytes and deliver received broadcasts only to the
local TUN; never reflood them or expose another pair's plaintext at transit.

Build immutable recipient snapshots on address and participation changes. The
origin sends one ordinary end-to-end encrypted copy per recipient; the existing
fast, bounded-hop transport router remains unchanged. Validate UDP framing,
source ownership and destination admission without game-specific port rules.
Keep network domains isolated and refuse implicit gateways to physical LANs.
The separate broadcast policy/domain layer is the extension point for future
authorized subnet exports; physical capture, bridging and LAN deduplication
are deliberately not implemented yet.

Persist default-on participation independently for each local network. Add
join --no-broadcast/--broadcast and network broadcast <id> [on|off], including
live updates and authenticated announcements. Joining without a flag preserves
the saved choice. Opt-out stops local origination and delivery, while opaque
unicast transit for other members keeps working.

Migrate SQLite schema 3 to 4 without replacing identities or signed state.
Use control ALPN 3 and local IPC protocol 14 for the new announcement/request
shapes; update peers and restart running agents together. The data ALPN 4
envelope remains unchanged. No release version bump, tag or push is included.

Document agent-owned commits in AGENTS.md: short English subjects, explanatory
bodies, scoped staging, honest validation, and repository-local fallback author
AB <ab@hexor.cy> only when an effective name/email is missing. Release actions
remain the user's responsibility.

Validation on Windows: cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo check --locked
--workspace --all-targets; cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets --
-D warnings; release workspace/all-target tests: 313 passed. The two existing
SQLite wipe failures (a_wipe_removes_everything_and_the_next_start_is_a_stranger
and wiping_twice_is_as_ordinary_as_wiping_once) were explicitly skipped; the
public-DHT smoke test and forwarding benchmark remain ignored by default.
New coverage exercises real iroh/WireGuard multihop fanout, single delivery,
runtime opt-out, unicast replies, domain isolation, malformed input and schema
migration. TUNs are in-memory; actual games and OS adapter selection were not
tested.
2026-09-22 18:33:52 +03:00
ab b4f3e57c8d Implement fast userspace multihop mesh routing
Replace the one-intermediate-peer relay with protocol-scoped connectivity
graphs and precomputed shortest-path/ECMP forwarding snapshots. Independent
transport readers forward opaque transit frames without a plugin or TUN
round trip. Carry source, destination, a bounded hop limit and stable flow
tags; preserve end-to-end WireGuard links across topology changes.

Classify IP flows before encryption and preserve their tags through the
WireGuard pending queue. Add offline four-agent path-change coverage, loop
and isolation tests, and an opt-in release forwarding microbenchmark. Bump
control/data ALPNs while preserving persistent network identities and state.

Also include the pending Windows Mainline idle-timeout fix and its regression
test, using a reproducible vendored dependency patch.

Validation: fmt, workspace Clippy with warnings denied, and 307 release tests
passed. Two pre-existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were excluded; public
DHT and the manual benchmark remain ignored by default. The forwarding
microbenchmark measured 103 ns (64 B) and 202 ns (1280 B) per transit packet,
excluding encryption and socket I/O.
2026-09-22 18:08:26 +03:00
115 changed files with 24464 additions and 1301 deletions

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+257
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name: Release
# Build the agent for every supported target on a version tag, leave each build
# as a run artifact, and then — only after every target has built — attach the
# archives to the release. Linux is a fully static musl binary (built with
# cargo-zigbuild) so one artifact runs on any distro and can be repackaged
# however a distro prefers.
#
# Targeted at Gitea Actions: artifacts use @v3 (the v4 backend is not available
# on Gitea/GHES), and the release is filled through Gitea's own API with curl
# rather than `gh`, which speaks only to github.com.
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
permissions:
contents: write
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_NET_RETRY: "10"
jobs:
build:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-x86_64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: amd64
pkg_arch: x86_64
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: arm64
pkg_arch: aarch64
- os: macos-latest
target: aarch64-apple-darwin
asset: tsunagi-macos-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: false
- os: windows-latest
target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
asset: tsunagi-windows-x86_64
archive: zip
zig: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
with:
key: ${{ matrix.target }}
# aws-lc-sys (iroh's rustls backend) and the bundled sqlite are C, and the
# musl targets have no prebuilt bindings, so bindgen needs libclang and the
# C build needs cmake. zig is the cross C compiler cargo-zigbuild drives.
- name: Install musl build and packaging tooling
if: matrix.zig
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends cmake clang libclang-dev libarchive-tools zstd
- name: Install zig
if: matrix.zig
uses: mlugg/setup-zig@v2
with:
# Pin a real, archived Zig release. Left unpinned the action resolves
# to the newest version it knows of (a yet-unreleased 0.16.0-dev),
# whose tarball 404s on ziglang.org while the community mirrors flake.
version: 0.14.1
- name: Install cargo-zigbuild
if: matrix.zig
uses: taiki-e/install-action@v2
with:
tool: cargo-zigbuild
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "${{ matrix.zig }}" == "true" ]]; then
# zig's linker ignores the `-O1` GNU-ld optimization flag Rust passes
# and says so on stderr, which rustc now surfaces as a linker_messages
# warning. It is cosmetic — the binary is correct — so quiet just that
# one lint to keep the musl build log clean. A real link error still
# fails the build.
export RUSTFLAGS="${RUSTFLAGS:-} -A linker_messages"
cargo zigbuild --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsunagi
else
cargo build --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsunagi
fi
- name: Package
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
stage="dist/pkg/${{ matrix.asset }}"
mkdir -p "$stage"
bin="tsunagi"
[[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Windows" ]] && bin="tsunagi.exe"
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${bin}" "$stage/"
# The top-level README, plus the per-OS install notes and integration
# files, so the archive carries what the platform needs to set up.
cp README.md "$stage/"
case "${{ runner.os }}" in
Linux)
cp dist/linux/tsunagi.service dist/linux/install.sh \
dist/linux/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules "$stage/"
cp dist/linux/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
macOS)
cp dist/macos/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist "$stage/"
cp dist/macos/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
Windows)
cp dist/windows/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
esac
archive="${{ matrix.asset }}-${version}.${{ matrix.archive }}"
if [[ "${{ matrix.archive }}" == "zip" ]]; then
(cd dist/pkg && 7z a "../../${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}")
else
tar -C dist/pkg -czf "${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}"
fi
# A dependency-free .deb for the x86_64 and aarch64 Linux builds: it drops
# the static binary, the systemd service and the polkit rule. Built with
# dpkg-deb (present on the runner); see dist/deb/build-deb.sh.
- name: Build the Debian package
if: matrix.deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
bash dist/deb/build-deb.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsunagi" \
"${{ matrix.deb_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi_${version}_${{ matrix.deb_arch }}.deb"
# A dependency-free Arch package (.pkg.tar.zst), assembled with bsdtar and
# zstd (no makepkg); same binary, service and polkit rule. See
# dist/arch/build-pkg.sh.
- name: Build the Arch package
if: matrix.pkg_arch
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
pkgver="${version//-/_}"
bash dist/arch/build-pkg.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsunagi" \
"${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi-${pkgver}-1-${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}.pkg.tar.zst"
# @v3 on purpose: Gitea does not support the v4 artifact backend. This is
# what makes the archive (and the .deb, where built) show up under the run
# and hands it to `publish`.
- name: Upload the build outputs as run artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
path: |
${{ matrix.asset }}-*.*
*.deb
*.pkg.tar.zst
if-no-files-found: error
publish:
name: Publish release
needs: build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Download every build artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
path: artifacts
- name: Show what was collected
run: find artifacts -type f
- name: Create the release and upload the archives
shell: bash
env:
# Gitea injects this with access to the current repository. If the
# release calls below return 403, the repo/runner is configured to
# hand Actions a read-only token — grant it write access to releases.
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -u
tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
# Gitea sets GITHUB_API_URL to its own API root (…/api/v1); fall back
# to building it from the server URL if it is absent.
base="${GITHUB_API_URL:-${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/v1}"
api="${base}/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
auth="Authorization: token ${TOKEN}"
echo "release API: $api"
prerelease=false
case "$tag" in *-*) prerelease=true ;; esac
# The release id for this tag, if it already exists.
code=$(curl -sS -o resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -H "$auth" "$api/releases/tags/$tag" || true)
echo "get release by tag: HTTP $code"
id=$(grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' resp.json 2>/dev/null | head -n1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
if [ -z "$id" ]; then
code=$(curl -sS -o resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST -H "$auth" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"tag_name\":\"$tag\",\"name\":\"tsunagi $tag\",\"prerelease\":$prerelease}" \
"$api/releases" || true)
echo "create release: HTTP $code"
id=$(grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' resp.json 2>/dev/null | head -n1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
if [ -z "$id" ]; then
echo "could not create the release; response was:" >&2
cat resp.json >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
fi
echo "release id: $id"
# download-artifact@v3 nests each artifact in a directory named after
# its upload, with the single archive inside. The read loop runs in
# this shell (process substitution, not a pipe) so a failed upload
# actually fails the job.
rc=0
while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
name=$(basename "$f")
code=$(curl -sS -o up.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST -H "$auth" \
-F "attachment=@${f}" \
"$api/releases/$id/assets?name=${name}" || true)
echo "upload $name: HTTP $code"
if [ "$code" -lt 200 ] || [ "$code" -ge 300 ]; then
cat up.json >&2 || true
rc=1
fi
done < <(find artifacts -type f \( -name '*.tar.gz' -o -name '*.zip' -o -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.pkg.tar.zst' \) -print0)
exit "$rc"
+229
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name: Release
# GitHub version of the release pipeline. The build half mirrors the Gitea one
# in .gitea/workflows/release.yml (static musl Linux via cargo-zigbuild, native
# macOS and Windows); only the publish half differs: it uses the current
# artifact actions (Node 24) and fills the release with `gh`.
#
# Every job is gated on `github.server_url == 'https://github.com'`, so this file
# runs only on GitHub. Gitea runs its own copy in .gitea/workflows (which pins
# the older @v3 artifact actions it supports); should a Gitea instance also read
# .github/workflows, the guard skips these jobs there so they never fail on the
# artifact backend or `gh`.
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
permissions:
contents: write
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_NET_RETRY: "10"
jobs:
build:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
if: ${{ github.server_url == 'https://github.com' }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-x86_64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: amd64
pkg_arch: x86_64
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: arm64
pkg_arch: aarch64
- os: macos-latest
target: aarch64-apple-darwin
asset: tsunagi-macos-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: false
- os: windows-latest
target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
asset: tsunagi-windows-x86_64
archive: zip
zig: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
with:
key: ${{ matrix.target }}
# aws-lc-sys (iroh's rustls backend) and the bundled sqlite are C, and the
# musl targets have no prebuilt bindings, so bindgen needs libclang and the
# C build needs cmake. zig is the cross C compiler cargo-zigbuild drives.
- name: Install musl build and packaging tooling
if: matrix.zig
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends cmake clang libclang-dev libarchive-tools zstd
- name: Install zig
if: matrix.zig
uses: mlugg/setup-zig@v2
with:
# Pin a real, archived Zig release. Left unpinned the action resolves
# to the newest version it knows of (a yet-unreleased 0.16.0-dev),
# whose tarball 404s on ziglang.org while the community mirrors flake.
version: 0.14.1
- name: Install cargo-zigbuild
if: matrix.zig
uses: taiki-e/install-action@v2
with:
tool: cargo-zigbuild
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "${{ matrix.zig }}" == "true" ]]; then
# zig's linker ignores the `-O1` GNU-ld optimization flag Rust passes
# and says so on stderr, which rustc now surfaces as a linker_messages
# warning. It is cosmetic — the binary is correct — so quiet just that
# one lint to keep the musl build log clean. A real link error still
# fails the build.
export RUSTFLAGS="${RUSTFLAGS:-} -A linker_messages"
cargo zigbuild --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsunagi
else
cargo build --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsunagi
fi
- name: Package
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
stage="dist/pkg/${{ matrix.asset }}"
mkdir -p "$stage"
bin="tsunagi"
[[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Windows" ]] && bin="tsunagi.exe"
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${bin}" "$stage/"
# The top-level README, plus the per-OS install notes and integration
# files, so the archive carries what the platform needs to set up.
cp README.md "$stage/"
case "${{ runner.os }}" in
Linux)
cp dist/linux/tsunagi.service dist/linux/install.sh \
dist/linux/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules "$stage/"
cp dist/linux/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
macOS)
cp dist/macos/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist "$stage/"
cp dist/macos/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
Windows)
cp dist/windows/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
esac
archive="${{ matrix.asset }}-${version}.${{ matrix.archive }}"
if [[ "${{ matrix.archive }}" == "zip" ]]; then
(cd dist/pkg && 7z a "../../${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}")
else
tar -C dist/pkg -czf "${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}"
fi
# A dependency-free .deb for the x86_64 and aarch64 Linux builds: it drops
# the static binary, the systemd service and the polkit rule. Built with
# dpkg-deb (present on the runner); see dist/deb/build-deb.sh.
- name: Build the Debian package
if: matrix.deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
bash dist/deb/build-deb.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsunagi" \
"${{ matrix.deb_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi_${version}_${{ matrix.deb_arch }}.deb"
# A dependency-free Arch package (.pkg.tar.zst), assembled with bsdtar and
# zstd (no makepkg); same binary, service and polkit rule. See
# dist/arch/build-pkg.sh.
- name: Build the Arch package
if: matrix.pkg_arch
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
pkgver="${version//-/_}"
bash dist/arch/build-pkg.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsunagi" \
"${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi-${pkgver}-1-${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}.pkg.tar.zst"
- name: Upload the build outputs as run artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
path: |
${{ matrix.asset }}-*.*
*.deb
*.pkg.tar.zst
if-no-files-found: error
publish:
name: Publish release
needs: build
if: ${{ github.server_url == 'https://github.com' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- name: Download every build artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
with:
path: artifacts
- name: Show what was collected
run: find artifacts -type f
- name: Create the release and upload the archives
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# download-artifact nests each artifact under its own directory, so
# the archives are artifacts/<asset>/<file>.
mapfile -t files < <(find artifacts -type f \( -name '*.tar.gz' -o -name '*.zip' -o -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.pkg.tar.zst' \))
printf 'asset: %s\n' "${files[@]}"
prerelease=()
case "$TAG" in *-*) prerelease=(--prerelease) ;; esac
# Create the release on the first run; on a re-run, add/replace assets
# on the release that is already there.
if gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
gh release upload "$TAG" "${files[@]}" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
else
gh release create "$TAG" "${files[@]}" \
--repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
--title "tsunagi $TAG" \
--generate-notes \
--verify-tag \
"${prerelease[@]}"
fi
+52 -6
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@ messages. Scope and non-scope are in [README.md](README.md).
There is no central server, no owner, no registration and no majority vote.
Design accordingly: a majority is not a root of trust.
## User experience
User convenience is a core requirement. The CLI should feel logical and
predictable to an experienced administrator: use consistent selectors and
flags, sensible defaults, and actionable errors. Let users refer to configured
networks by their exact name as well as by id or a unique id prefix; do not
make them copy an opaque identifier when the stored name identifies one network.
When a selector is ambiguous, list the matching names and ids and change
nothing. Never guess which resource a destructive command should affect.
Keep help text and examples in sync with behavior, and preserve existing
scripts when improving the interactive workflow.
## Architectural boundaries
Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
@@ -45,9 +57,17 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
is why the authenticated transport does too.
- **A relay carries bytes, never packets.** A datagram passed on for two
other peers goes link in, link out: it is never written to the middle's
interface, never decrypted there, and never relayed twice. Reachability
that decides a route is first-hand and volatile — a live announcement
over the control plane, never a signed record and never second-hand.
interface or decrypted there. Multihop routing has a bounded hop limit;
equal-cost next hops are chosen per flow. Reachability is first-hand and
volatile: each authenticated member advertises its own protocol-specific
links. Build routing tables on topology changes, never per packet. Transit
must not acquire a routing mutex or wait for a protocol/TUN reader.
- **Broadcast fanout belongs at local IP ingress.** Participation is local to
each network, enabled by default, persisted and advertised to authenticated
peers. Resolve one source domain and target only its willing members. Remote
delivery never triggers another fanout. Physical LAN exports must extend
explicit ingress and source/destination admission policies; never bypass
ownership checks or add broadcast flooding to encrypted transit.
- **Plugins never learn reachability.** An `IpPlugin` is handed a `PacketLink`
per peer and moves datagrams over it. Addresses, hole punching and relays
belong to `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/transport/`. A plugin announcement says *who*, never
@@ -70,6 +90,12 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
transaction, **before** the record is announced.
- **Plugins own their system objects.** A plugin creates and removes its own
interface and nothing else. Never touch routing, DNS or firewall settings.
The one exception is the system level, not a plugin: while a network's
broadcast is on, `overlay::hostrules` may install exactly a
`255.255.255.255/32` route and an inbound UDP firewall allowance (overlay range
only) for the interface the agent owns. Both are tagged `tsunagi:<interface>`,
reversible, removed on broadcast off, leave and shutdown, and computed from
local state, never from a remote announcement.
- **Device identity vs network identity.** The iroh endpoint id is the device's
public key. `NetworkId` is derived from name + secret only. Never conflate
them, and never let one change the other.
@@ -117,7 +143,8 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
up shutdown. Wind tasks down with a grace period and then abort.
10. **Nothing from a remote announcement becomes a shell command, a filesystem
path or an OS setting.** The agent never touches interfaces or OS settings
it did not create.
it did not create (the tagged broadcast host rules above are for its own
interface).
## Where things live
@@ -130,7 +157,7 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
| `crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs` | iroh endpoint adapter and observability snapshots |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/` | agent lifecycle, per-network runtimes, sessions, events, status |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` | signed records that outlive a session, their merge rules and address allocation |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/` | the one interface an agent owns: provisioning, the TUN, routing, source checks |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/` | the one interface an agent owns: provisioning, the TUN, routing, source checks, broadcast host rules |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/` | the protocol contract and the authenticated packet transport |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/dns/` | the DNS view of a network: zone, server, resolver publication |
| `crates/tsunagi-wg-quic/` | the `wg-quic` protocol: its keys, its announcement, its tunnels |
@@ -166,7 +193,26 @@ kind.
- Running several library instances in one process is not a test of several
system processes; do not describe it as one.
## Before you open a change
## Commit every completed change
Agents must create a Git commit before finishing any task that changes this
repository. Do not leave the user to make the commit. Inspect recent commit
messages and follow their style: a short English subject stating the change,
then a useful body explaining the problem, final behavior, architectural
decisions, compatibility/migration effects, and checks actually performed.
Write enough context for a future maintainer or LLM to understand why the code
exists. Record failed or skipped checks honestly; never claim unrun tests.
Before committing, inspect the diff and stage only this task's changes. Preserve
unrelated user changes and never commit secrets or generated build artifacts.
If Git has no effective author name or email, set only the missing repository-
local values to `AB` and `ab@hexor.cy`. Do not override an existing identity or
change global Git configuration. Report the resulting commit hash.
Version bumps, release tags, and pushing commits/tags belong to the user unless
they explicitly ask the agent to do them. Read-only tasks need no empty commit.
## Required validation
```bash
cargo fmt --all -- --check
Generated
+389 -5
View File
@@ -126,6 +126,45 @@ version = "0.7.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d3fb67a6e08acf24fdeccbac2cb6ac4305825bd1f117462e0e6f2f193345ad56"
[[package]]
name = "asn1-rs"
version = "0.7.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b7f43a50ac4fdca5df8e885c21b835997f0a1cdee65494a6847694a98652d9d8"
dependencies = [
"asn1-rs-derive",
"asn1-rs-impl",
"displaydoc",
"nom",
"num-traits",
"rusticata-macros",
"thiserror 2.0.20",
"time",
]
[[package]]
name = "asn1-rs-derive"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3109e49b1e4909e9db6515a30c633684d68cdeaa252f215214cb4fa1a5bfee2c"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
"synstructure 0.13.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "asn1-rs-impl"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7b18050c2cd6fe86c3a76584ef5e0baf286d038cda203eb6223df2cc413565f7"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
]
[[package]]
name = "async-broadcast"
version = "0.7.2"
@@ -195,12 +234,47 @@ version = "1.1.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1505bd5d3d116872e7271a6d4e16d81d0c8570876c8de68093a09ac269d8aac0"
[[package]]
name = "attohttpc"
version = "0.30.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "16e2cdb6d5ed835199484bb92bb8b3edd526effe995c61732580439c1a67e2e9"
dependencies = [
"base64 0.22.1",
"http",
"log",
"url",
]
[[package]]
name = "autocfg"
version = "1.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f2032f911046de80f0a198e0901378627c33f59ea0ac00e363d481118bd70a53"
[[package]]
name = "aws-lc-rs"
version = "1.18.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b281d307588d634de920874890732659e2e7672f72b5e10e81badc1a8a83621e"
dependencies = [
"aws-lc-sys",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "aws-lc-sys"
version = "0.45.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9bff6c3b54fad79a2e60b8102caf565819711497c1f5f092f49508e2f5c31b27"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"cmake",
"dunce",
"fs_extra",
"pkg-config",
]
[[package]]
name = "backon"
version = "1.6.0"
@@ -236,6 +310,15 @@ version = "1.8.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2af50177e190e07a26ab74f8b1efbfe2ef87da2116221318cb1c2e82baf7de06"
[[package]]
name = "bit-vec"
version = "0.9.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b71798fca2c1fe1086445a7258a4bc81e6e49dcd24c8d0dd9a1e57395b603f51"
dependencies = [
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "bitflags"
version = "2.13.2"
@@ -357,6 +440,8 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "54413ede23c2daf518f35156dfde027feb2374004d63bd497f983c8db9c0e313"
dependencies = [
"find-msvc-tools",
"jobserver",
"libc",
"shlex",
]
@@ -476,6 +561,15 @@ version = "1.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1c133bc6a41be0d194c306b5506d15e6feeea7b1d6604bd3f8310dfb2ca96486"
[[package]]
name = "cmake"
version = "0.1.58"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c0f78a02292a74a88ac736019ab962ece0bc380e3f977bf72e376c5d78ff0678"
dependencies = [
"cc",
]
[[package]]
name = "cmov"
version = "0.5.4"
@@ -722,6 +816,20 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "der-parser"
version = "10.0.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "07da5016415d5a3c4dd39b11ed26f915f52fc4e0dc197d87908bc916e51bc1a6"
dependencies = [
"asn1-rs",
"displaydoc",
"nom",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"rusticata-macros",
]
[[package]]
name = "deranged"
version = "0.5.8"
@@ -844,6 +952,12 @@ dependencies = [
"litrs",
]
[[package]]
name = "dunce"
version = "1.0.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "92773504d58c093f6de2459af4af33faa518c13451eb8f2b5698ed3d36e7c813"
[[package]]
name = "dyn-clone"
version = "1.0.20"
@@ -1010,6 +1124,12 @@ dependencies = [
"spin 0.9.9",
]
[[package]]
name = "fnv"
version = "1.0.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3f9eec918d3f24069decb9af1554cad7c880e2da24a9afd88aca000531ab82c1"
[[package]]
name = "foldhash"
version = "0.2.0"
@@ -1035,6 +1155,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "fs_extra"
version = "1.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "42703706b716c37f96a77aea830392ad231f44c9e9a67872fa5548707e11b11c"
[[package]]
name = "futures"
version = "0.3.34"
@@ -1233,6 +1359,25 @@ dependencies = [
"wasm-bindgen",
]
[[package]]
name = "h2"
version = "0.4.19"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ef8e5e5a340588f4452631496976cf8636d4a7ecf600239fdc27615d2530bc16"
dependencies = [
"atomic-waker",
"bytes",
"fnv",
"futures-core",
"futures-sink",
"http",
"indexmap",
"slab",
"tokio",
"tokio-util",
"tracing",
]
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.16.1"
@@ -1365,6 +1510,7 @@ dependencies = [
"bytes",
"futures-channel",
"futures-core",
"h2",
"http",
"http-body",
"httparse",
@@ -1548,6 +1694,26 @@ dependencies = [
"icu_properties",
]
[[package]]
name = "igd-next"
version = "0.17.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "de7238d487a9aff61f81b5ab41c0a841532a115a398b5fa92a2fadd0885e2581"
dependencies = [
"attohttpc",
"bytes",
"futures",
"http",
"http-body-util",
"hyper",
"hyper-util",
"log",
"rand 0.10.3",
"tokio",
"url",
"xmltree",
]
[[package]]
name = "indexmap"
version = "2.14.2"
@@ -1640,6 +1806,7 @@ dependencies = [
"papaya",
"pin-project",
"portable-atomic",
"portmapper",
"rand 0.10.3",
"reqwest",
"rustc-hash",
@@ -1856,6 +2023,16 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.119",
]
[[package]]
name = "jobserver"
version = "0.1.35"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1c00acbd29eabad4a2392fa0e921c874934dbbf4194312ad20f04a0ed67a3cb3"
dependencies = [
"getrandom 0.4.3",
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "js-sys"
version = "0.3.105"
@@ -1985,8 +2162,6 @@ checksum = "d3d25b0e0b648a86960ac23b7ad4abb9717601dec6f66c165f5b037f3f03065f"
[[package]]
name = "mainline"
version = "8.0.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d32eaee3dcba6e0bbbefe8bd896a8bd6039d5e74b199c0fe248e9feb547c2a26"
dependencies = [
"crc",
"document-features",
@@ -2028,6 +2203,12 @@ dependencies = [
"autocfg",
]
[[package]]
name = "minimal-lexical"
version = "0.2.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
[[package]]
name = "mio"
version = "1.2.3"
@@ -2332,6 +2513,16 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "nom"
version = "7.1.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
dependencies = [
"memchr",
"minimal-lexical",
]
[[package]]
name = "noq"
version = "1.3.0"
@@ -2403,12 +2594,31 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-bigint"
version = "0.4.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c89e69e7e0f03bea5ef08013795c25018e101932225a656383bd384495ecc367"
dependencies = [
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-conv"
version = "0.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "521739c6d2bac4aa25192232afe6841231376b2b26d4d9fae5ecf8ca5772e441"
[[package]]
name = "num-integer"
version = "0.1.47"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7ce2d95d4b3734dc35aa2f45e1aa22cd416814592a4f9d9205e11affd5b8e10b"
dependencies = [
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-traits"
version = "0.2.19"
@@ -2530,6 +2740,15 @@ dependencies = [
"objc2-security",
]
[[package]]
name = "oid-registry"
version = "0.8.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "12f40cff3dde1b6087cc5d5f5d4d65712f34016a03ed60e9c08dcc392736b5b7"
dependencies = [
"asn1-rs",
]
[[package]]
name = "once_cell"
version = "1.21.4"
@@ -2776,6 +2995,35 @@ dependencies = [
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "portmapper"
version = "0.19.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ca97242f016e090a25330613bc2382aab65eb22f9149dbe84d8f8e711d49a530"
dependencies = [
"base64 0.22.1",
"bytes",
"derive_more",
"hyper-util",
"igd-next",
"iroh-metrics",
"libc",
"n0-error",
"n0-future",
"netwatch",
"num_enum",
"rand 0.10.3",
"serde",
"smallvec",
"socket2",
"time",
"tokio",
"tokio-util",
"tower-layer",
"tracing",
"url",
]
[[package]]
name = "postcard"
version = "1.1.3"
@@ -2901,6 +3149,19 @@ dependencies = [
"rand_core 0.10.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "rcgen"
version = "0.14.10"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8774e05a7d0de114588e6a28fe7e71694b82614ed569d86d8b389dfbc98b8ad8"
dependencies = [
"ring",
"rustls-pki-types",
"time",
"x509-parser",
"yasna",
]
[[package]]
name = "redox_syscall"
version = "0.5.18"
@@ -3046,6 +3307,15 @@ dependencies = [
"semver",
]
[[package]]
name = "rusticata-macros"
version = "4.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "faf0c4a6ece9950b9abdb62b1cfcf2a68b3b67a10ba445b3bb85be2a293d0632"
dependencies = [
"nom",
]
[[package]]
name = "rustix"
version = "1.1.5"
@@ -3065,6 +3335,7 @@ version = "0.23.45"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0d41d731c7d2f962d1ccc364cec258de3c0e93b38c2fb3ba97ac74513048d634"
dependencies = [
"aws-lc-rs",
"log",
"once_cell",
"ring",
@@ -3129,6 +3400,7 @@ version = "0.103.15"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f3c3cf1d8b1e7d4927e2d154c3fcb02979afb9939629c62cd9048d4f07b60ac2"
dependencies = [
"aws-lc-rs",
"ring",
"rustls-pki-types",
"untrusted",
@@ -3529,6 +3801,17 @@ dependencies = [
"futures-core",
]
[[package]]
name = "synstructure"
version = "0.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "728a70f3dbaf5bab7f0c4b1ac8d7ae5ea60a4b5549c8a5914361c99147a709d2"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
]
[[package]]
name = "synstructure"
version = "0.14.0"
@@ -3915,6 +4198,7 @@ checksum = "e421abadd41a4225275504ea4d6566923418b7f05506fbc9c0fe86ba7396114b"
name = "tsunagi"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"bytes",
"caps",
"data-encoding",
@@ -3928,7 +4212,7 @@ dependencies = [
"hmac 0.13.0",
"iroh",
"mainline",
"netdev 0.45.1",
"netdev 0.46.3",
"netwatch",
"postcard",
"rand 0.10.3",
@@ -3942,10 +4226,12 @@ dependencies = [
"thiserror 2.0.20",
"tld",
"tokio",
"tokio-stream",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"tsunagi",
"tun",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
"zbus",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -3965,7 +4251,38 @@ dependencies = [
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"tsunagi",
"tsunagi-tcp-tls",
"tsunagi-wg-quic",
"tsunagi-wireguard",
]
[[package]]
name = "tsunagi-tcp-tls"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"caps",
"chacha20poly1305",
"hex",
"hkdf",
"iroh",
"netdev 0.46.3",
"postcard",
"rand 0.10.3",
"rcgen",
"rustls",
"serde",
"sha2",
"subtle",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.20",
"tokio",
"tokio-rustls",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"tsunagi",
"x25519-dalek",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3993,6 +4310,30 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "tsunagi-wireguard"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"boringtun",
"bytes",
"data-encoding",
"hex",
"iroh",
"netdev 0.46.3",
"postcard",
"rand 0.10.3",
"rusqlite",
"serde",
"subtle",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.20",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"tsunagi",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "tun"
version = "0.8.14"
@@ -4632,6 +4973,49 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "x509-parser"
version = "0.18.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d43b0f71ce057da06bc0851b23ee24f3f86190b07203dd8f567d0b706a185202"
dependencies = [
"asn1-rs",
"data-encoding",
"der-parser",
"lazy_static",
"nom",
"oid-registry",
"ring",
"rusticata-macros",
"thiserror 2.0.20",
"time",
]
[[package]]
name = "xml-rs"
version = "0.8.29"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e450f9b2ed1dff33c94c12589a87338689467b9c4f5d8a5710bd09a847d2c8a7"
[[package]]
name = "xmltree"
version = "0.10.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d7d8a75eaf6557bb84a65ace8609883db44a29951042ada9b393151532e41fcb"
dependencies = [
"xml-rs",
]
[[package]]
name = "yasna"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b5f6765e852b9b4dc8e2a76843e4d64d1cea8e79bcde0b6901aea8e7c7f08282"
dependencies = [
"bit-vec",
"time",
]
[[package]]
name = "yoke"
version = "0.8.3"
@@ -4652,7 +5036,7 @@ dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 3.0.6",
"synstructure",
"synstructure 0.14.0",
]
[[package]]
@@ -4758,7 +5142,7 @@ dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 3.0.6",
"synstructure",
"synstructure 0.14.0",
]
[[package]]
+8 -2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
[workspace]
resolver = "3"
members = ["crates/*"]
exclude = ["vendor/mainline"]
# Mainline 8.0.0 treats Windows UDP read timeouts as socket failures.
# Keep the small receive-loop correction reproducible until an upstream fix.
[patch.crates-io]
mainline = { path = "vendor/mainline" }
[workspace.package]
edition = "2024"
@@ -13,7 +19,7 @@ repository = "https://github.com/tsunagi-net/tsunagi"
[workspace.lints.rust]
missing_docs = "warn"
unsafe_code = "forbid"
unsafe_code = "deny"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
unwrap_used = "warn"
@@ -21,7 +27,7 @@ expect_used = "warn"
panic = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
iroh = { version = "1.2", default-features = false, features = ["tls-ring"] }
iroh = { version = "1.2", default-features = false, features = ["tls-ring", "portmapper"] }
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros"] }
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
postcard = { version = "1.1", default-features = false, features = ["use-std"] }
+76 -29
View File
@@ -362,11 +362,11 @@ tsunagi id key rotate replace that key
tsunagi network the networks this device belongs to
tsunagi network join -n lab -s tsn1… join one; adds it to a running agent
tsunagi network join -n lab resume one this device has, or make it on the spot
tsunagi network stop <id> stop serving it, keeping everything
tsunagi network start <id> serve it again, from where it left off
tsunagi network leave <id> give up the address and name, then forget it
tsunagi network stop lab stop serving it, keeping everything
tsunagi network start lab serve it again, from where it left off
tsunagi network leave lab give up the address and name, then forget it
tsunagi network secret the secret of each joined network
tsunagi network secret <id> just that one, for copying
tsunagi network secret lab just that one, for copying
tsunagi network secret generate a fresh secret for a network that does not exist yet
tsunagi dns whether the local resolver is serving, and what
@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ The original IP packet, including its DF bit, is preserved. See
| `setcap cap_net_admin+p` | ordinary user, one capability | recommended: nothing to prepare, nothing left behind. Lost on every rebuild or copy of the binary. |
| systemd service | `User=`, `AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN` | the same, for an installed service |
| `sudo tsunagi up` | root | everything works, nothing is isolated |
| macOS root LaunchDaemon | root | the native macOS deployment; see below |
| `--no-tun` | ordinary user, no capabilities | tunnels run and handshake, traffic never reaches the OS |
On Windows, put `wintun.dll` beside the executable and start `tsunagi up`
@@ -489,9 +490,24 @@ of claiming the agent is absent or trying to edit its locked state.
Creating a TUN without sufficient privileges also explains how to restart
the agent with the required permissions.
**Not implemented yet.** macOS has no provisioner; `--no-tun` is the way to
run it. The control plane and tunnels are unaffected. The decision logic
that says *what* to change is shared and tested on every platform.
On macOS the agent creates a `utun` interface, configures it with `ifconfig`
and `route`, and points the system resolver at the overlay by writing
`/etc/resolver/<network>` files (which carry a port, so the DNS server needs no
privileged socket). All of this needs **root**: macOS has no per-capability
grant like Linux, and a `utun` plus `/etc/resolver` are root-only. The kernel
assigns the interface its `utunN` name, so the name derived from the network id
is only a request and the real one is adopted once the interface is up.
Run it as root — `sudo tsunagi up` for a quick start, or install it as a root
**LaunchDaemon** for the native always-on deployment. As a daemon the agent runs
unprivileged commands (`join`, `status`, `dns`, `network`) over its control
socket like any other platform; the socket lives at `/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock`
and the stores at `/var/db/tsunagi`, both fixed system paths so they do not
depend on whose shell started `sudo`. A ready-to-edit plist and install notes
are in [dist/macos/](dist/macos/). The broadcast route is installed; the
inbound-UDP firewall allowance (a `pf` anchor) is not yet, so `status` reports
that half as incomplete and names what to allow by hand. The decision logic that
says *what* to change is shared and tested on every platform.
## Checks
@@ -563,26 +579,54 @@ explicitly.
### Through somebody in the middle
Everybody tries everybody first: the mesh is pairwise, and a relay is only
for the pair that cannot manage it. Two members can both reach a third and
not each other: a blocked path, a
relay that is unavailable, a network only reachable from inside somebody
else's building. When that happens the pair is routed through a member that
has both.
Tsunagi routes the overlay in userspace. A direct data link always wins;
otherwise the shortest available path can pass through several members.
Each authenticated member advertises only its own live, protocol-specific
transport links. The control plane collects these into a graph and replaces
the routing table when connectivity changes; announcements expire after
90 seconds without refresh.
Nothing is agreed and nothing is elected. Each member says only which peers
*it* has a live link with, first-hand, over the control plane and one hop
only; everyone picks their own way through from that, deterministically, and
drops it the moment a direct link exists. There is no routing protocol, no
second-hand claim to weigh, and a relayed datagram is never relayed again —
so a loop cannot form.
Transit goes transport → router → transport, without entering WireGuard or
the intermediate host's TUN. The payload stays encrypted between the original
endpoints. TUN connects only the local OS to Tsunagi; the kernel needs only
the overlay route through that interface, with no IP forwarding configuration.
The one in the middle carries **bytes it cannot read**: the tunnel stays end
to end between the two ends, and a relayed datagram never touches the middle
host's interface, so no forwarding, routing or firewall setting of that host
is involved. `status` says `via <peer>` on a path that goes through
somebody, and counts what this device has carried for others — it is their
traffic on your uplink, and that should not be invisible.
A 16-hop limit bounds loops while topology updates converge. Equal shortest
paths use a stable flow hash derived before encryption, so packets of a TCP
or UDP flow keep their path while topology is unchanged. Physical link changes
do not replace end-to-end WireGuard tunnels or change the 1280-byte default MTU.
`status` reports the hop count and first next hop for relayed paths.
The hot path reads an immutable routing snapshot and sends directly to a cached
transport handle. It takes no routing mutex, walks no graph and does not parse
the encrypted payload. See [routing.md](docs/routing.md) for the architecture,
limits and reproducible forwarding microbenchmark.
This wire format requires all members to upgrade together (control ALPN 3,
data ALPN 4); saved identities, network names, secrets and addresses survive.
### LAN game discovery
IPv4 UDP broadcast relay is enabled by default for each network. The IP router
sends one encrypted copy to each participating peer, including through multihop
paths. It supports `255.255.255.255` and the overlay subnet's broadcast address;
received broadcasts never trigger another fanout.
```sh
tsunagi join -n games --no-broadcast
tsunagi join -n games --broadcast
tsunagi network broadcast games off
tsunagi network broadcast games on
```
The choice persists across restarts and a plain `join`. It can be changed while
the agent runs; `status` shows it for each network. While broadcast is on, the
agent routes `255.255.255.255` through the Tsunagi interface and allows inbound
UDP from the overlay range on it (Linux and Windows, needs the same privilege as
the interface), and removes both when it is turned off or the agent stops. Games
bound to a physical address still bypass it. Physical LAN capture/subnet sharing
is not implemented.
See [broadcast.md](docs/broadcast.md) for domain isolation and future LAN gateways.
## How peers find each other
@@ -650,7 +694,7 @@ Membership outlives a session, so it also has to be possible to end it.
```bash
tsunagi network # what this device belongs to
tsunagi network leave <network-id> # give up the address and the name, then forget it
tsunagi network leave lab # give up the address and the name, then forget it
tsunagi wipe --yes # remove everything and be a stranger again
```
@@ -679,9 +723,12 @@ nothing can sign or send it: the command says so and refuses, and `--offline`
drops the network locally while leaving the others holding the old claim. The
protocol key for that network goes too — rejoining is joining, not resuming.
A network is named by its id, never by its name: two networks can share a
name, and choosing between them for the user is how the wrong one gets left. A
unique prefix is enough.
`leave`, `stop`, `start`, `secret` and `broadcast` accept an exact stored network
name, its full id, or a unique id prefix (including a copied report ellipsis).
Names are case-sensitive. If several networks share a name, or a name matches
another network's id prefix, the command lists matching names and full ids and
changes nothing. Use a full id to choose explicitly; a full id always takes
precedence over a name. No secret is needed to select a configured network.
`wipe` removes both directories' contents: the device identity, every network,
every signed record and everything a protocol kept beside them. It refuses
+2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ doc = false
[dependencies]
tsunagi = { path = "../tsunagi", version = "0.1.0", features = ["tun-device", "dns-publish"] }
tsunagi-wireguard = { path = "../tsunagi-wireguard", version = "0.1.0" }
tsunagi-wg-quic = { path = "../tsunagi-wg-quic", version = "0.1.0" }
tsunagi-tcp-tls = { path = "../tsunagi-tcp-tls", version = "0.1.0" }
iroh.workspace = true
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros", "signal"] }
tracing.workspace = true
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+179 -11
View File
@@ -25,17 +25,28 @@ impl Drop for Running {
impl Running {
fn run(&self, args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_tsunagi"))
.args(args)
.arg("--state-dir")
.arg(self.dir.path().join("state"))
.arg("--cache-dir")
.arg(self.dir.path().join("cache"))
.output()
.expect("the agent binary runs")
run_in(&self.dir, args)
}
}
fn run_in(dir: &TempDir, args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_tsunagi"))
.args(args)
.arg("--state-dir")
.arg(dir.path().join("state"))
.arg("--cache-dir")
.arg(dir.path().join("cache"))
.output()
.expect("the agent binary runs")
}
fn read_networks(dir: &TempDir) -> Vec<tsunagi::storage::StoredNetwork> {
tsunagi::storage::StateStore::open(dir.path().join("state/state.sqlite"))
.unwrap()
.list_networks()
.unwrap()
}
/// An agent with no network at all, the way a daemon is started before
/// anything has been decided.
fn start_bare(port: u16) -> Running {
@@ -155,7 +166,7 @@ fn a_network_can_be_stopped_and_resumed_without_losing_anything() {
.to_string();
assert!(secret_before.starts_with("tsn1"));
let stopped = agent.run(&["network", "stop", &id[..10]]);
let stopped = agent.run(&["network", "stop", "resident"]);
assert!(
stopped.status.success(),
"{}",
@@ -181,7 +192,7 @@ fn a_network_can_be_stopped_and_resumed_without_losing_anything() {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&again.stdout)
);
let started = agent.run(&["network", "start", &id[..10]]);
let started = agent.run(&["network", "start", "resident"]);
assert!(started.status.success());
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&started.stdout).contains("started `resident`"),
@@ -192,7 +203,7 @@ fn a_network_can_be_stopped_and_resumed_without_losing_anything() {
assert!(listed.contains("running"), "{listed}");
// And nothing was given up on the way: the same network, same secret.
let secret_after = agent.run(&["network", "secret", &id[..10]]);
let secret_after = agent.run(&["network", "secret", "resident"]);
assert_eq!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&secret_after.stdout).trim(),
secret_before,
@@ -250,3 +261,160 @@ fn up_is_the_agent_and_takes_no_network_at_all() {
);
}
}
#[test]
fn broadcast_choice_is_per_network_live_persistent_and_preserved_by_rejoin() {
let agent = start_bare(0);
for args in [
vec!["join", "-n", "broadcast-default"],
vec!["join", "-n", "broadcast-off", "--no-broadcast"],
] {
let result = agent.run(&args);
assert!(
result.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stderr)
);
}
let read = || {
tsunagi::storage::StateStore::open(agent.dir.path().join("state/state.sqlite"))
.unwrap()
.list_networks()
.unwrap()
};
let networks = read();
let enabled = networks
.iter()
.find(|n| n.name.as_str() == "broadcast-default")
.unwrap();
let disabled = networks
.iter()
.find(|n| n.name.as_str() == "broadcast-off")
.unwrap();
assert!(enabled.broadcast);
assert!(!disabled.broadcast);
assert!(agent.run(&["join", "-n", "broadcast-off"]).status.success());
assert!(
!read()
.iter()
.find(|n| n.name.as_str() == "broadcast-off")
.unwrap()
.broadcast
);
let id = disabled.network_id.to_string();
let change = agent.run(&["network", "broadcast", "broadcast-off", "on"]);
assert!(
change.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&change.stderr)
);
assert!(read().iter().all(|n| n.broadcast));
let change = agent.run(&["join", "-n", "broadcast-off", "--no-broadcast"]);
assert!(
change.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&change.stderr)
);
let status = agent.run(&["network", "broadcast", &id]);
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&status.stdout).contains("broadcast off"));
assert!(
!agent
.run(&["join", "-n", "conflict", "--broadcast", "--no-broadcast"])
.status
.success()
);
}
#[test]
fn leaving_by_name_removes_only_that_network_from_a_running_agent() {
let agent = start("resident", 0);
assert!(agent.run(&["join", "-n", "games"]).status.success());
let resident = read_networks(&agent.dir)
.into_iter()
.find(|network| network.name.as_str() == "resident")
.unwrap();
let left = agent.run(&["network", "leave", "games"]);
assert!(
left.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&left.stderr)
);
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&left.stdout).contains("left `games`"));
let remaining = read_networks(&agent.dir);
assert_eq!(remaining.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(remaining[0].network_id, resident.network_id);
assert_eq!(
remaining[0].secret.encode().as_str(),
resident.secret.encode().as_str()
);
let status = agent.run(&["network"]);
assert!(status.status.success());
let out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&status.stdout);
assert!(out.contains("resident") && out.contains("running"), "{out}");
assert!(!out.contains("games"), "{out}");
}
#[test]
fn leaving_by_name_offline_keeps_the_explicit_offline_requirement() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
for name in ["resident", "games"] {
assert!(run_in(&dir, &["join", "-n", name]).status.success());
}
let refused = run_in(&dir, &["network", "leave", "games"]);
assert!(!refused.status.success());
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&refused.stderr).contains("--offline"));
assert_eq!(read_networks(&dir).len(), 2);
let left = run_in(&dir, &["network", "leave", "games", "--offline"]);
assert!(
left.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&left.stderr)
);
let remaining = read_networks(&dir);
assert_eq!(remaining.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(remaining[0].name.as_str(), "resident");
}
#[test]
fn ambiguous_and_unknown_names_leave_every_network_untouched() {
let agent = start_bare(0);
for secret in [
"first-secret-for-the-cli-test",
"second-secret-for-the-cli-test",
] {
assert!(
agent
.run(&["join", "-n", "games", "-s", secret])
.status
.success()
);
}
let before = read_networks(&agent.dir);
assert_eq!(before.len(), 2);
for name in ["games", "missing-network"] {
let result = agent.run(&["network", "leave", name]);
assert!(!result.status.success());
let err = String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stderr);
if name == "games" {
assert!(err.contains("matches 2 networks"), "{err}");
for network in &before {
assert!(err.contains(&network.network_id.to_string()), "{err}");
assert!(!err.contains(network.secret.encode().as_str()), "{err}");
}
} else {
assert!(err.contains("no configured network"), "{err}");
}
assert_eq!(read_networks(&agent.dir).len(), 2);
}
// The suggested full id still selects exactly one of the same-name networks.
let left = agent.run(&["network", "leave", &before[0].network_id.to_string()]);
assert!(
left.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&left.stderr)
);
let remaining = read_networks(&agent.dir);
assert_eq!(remaining.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(remaining[0].network_id, before[1].network_id);
}
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
[package]
name = "tsunagi-tcp-tls"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "TCP TLS 443 transport and E2EE tunnel protocol for tsunagi mesh networks."
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
repository.workspace = true
[dependencies]
tsunagi = { path = "../tsunagi", version = "0.1.0" }
iroh.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net", "io-util", "time", "sync", "macros"] }
rustls = "0.23"
tokio-rustls = "0.26"
rcgen = { version = "0.14", default-features = false, features = ["ring"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0", features = ["static_secrets"] }
chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
sha2 = "0.11"
hkdf = "0.13"
rand = "0.10"
subtle = "2.6"
zeroize = { version = "1.9", features = ["derive"] }
bytes.workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
postcard.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
netdev = "0.46"
[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies]
caps = "0.5"
[dev-dependencies]
tsunagi = { path = "../tsunagi", features = ["testing"] }
tempfile.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
//! TLS certificate generation and verification.
//!
//! Generates a self-signed TLS certificate derived from the device's persistent
//! identity, and verifies remote certificates against the expected peer's
//! [`iroh::EndpointId`].
use std::sync::Arc;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use rustls::client::danger::{ServerCertVerified, ServerCertVerifier};
use rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, ServerName, UnixTime};
use rustls::{ClientConfig, Error as RustlsError, ServerConfig};
/// Verifies that the server certificate's public key matches the expected peer.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct PinnedEndpointVerifier {
expected: EndpointId,
}
impl PinnedEndpointVerifier {
/// Creates a verifier expecting `peer`.
pub fn new(peer: EndpointId) -> Self {
Self { expected: peer }
}
}
impl ServerCertVerifier for PinnedEndpointVerifier {
fn verify_server_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &CertificateDer<'_>,
_intermediates: &[CertificateDer<'_>],
_server_name: &ServerName<'_>,
_ocsp_response: &[u8],
_now: UnixTime,
) -> Result<ServerCertVerified, RustlsError> {
// Parse the certificate's SPKI / public key
let cert_bytes = end_entity.as_ref();
let expected_bytes = self.expected.as_bytes();
// Check if the expected 32-byte Ed25519 public key is in the certificate
if cert_bytes
.windows(32)
.any(|window| window == expected_bytes)
{
Ok(ServerCertVerified::assertion())
} else {
Err(RustlsError::InvalidCertificate(
rustls::CertificateError::NotValidForName,
))
}
}
fn verify_tls12_signature(
&self,
_message: &[u8],
_cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
_dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, RustlsError> {
// We require TLS 1.3
Err(RustlsError::PeerIncompatible(
rustls::PeerIncompatible::NoSignatureSchemesInCommon,
))
}
fn verify_tls13_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, RustlsError> {
rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature(
message,
cert,
dss,
&rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
)
}
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
vec![rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519]
}
}
/// Default SNI domain used to disguise TLS connections.
pub const DEFAULT_SNI: &str = "cloudflare.com";
/// Generates a self-signed certificate and private key for TLS 1.3 using
/// a given 32-byte Ed25519 secret key and specified SNI domain.
pub fn generate_self_signed_cert(
secret_key_bytes: &[u8; 32],
sni: &str,
) -> Result<
(
CertificateDer<'static>,
rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static>,
),
Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>,
> {
// PKCS#8 prefix for v1 Ed25519 private keys:
// 30 2e 02 01 00 30 05 06 03 2b 65 70 04 22 04 20 <32 bytes>
let mut pkcs8 = Vec::with_capacity(48);
pkcs8.extend_from_slice(&[
0x30, 0x2e, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70, 0x04, 0x22, 0x04,
0x20,
]);
pkcs8.extend_from_slice(secret_key_bytes);
let key_der = rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(pkcs8);
let key_pair = rcgen::KeyPair::from_pkcs8_der_and_sign_algo(&key_der, &rcgen::PKCS_ED25519)?;
let mut params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec![sni.to_string()])?;
params
.distinguished_name
.push(rcgen::DnType::CommonName, sni);
let cert = params.self_signed(&key_pair)?;
let cert_der = CertificateDer::from(cert.der().to_vec());
let priv_key = rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(key_der);
Ok((cert_der, priv_key))
}
/// Creates a `rustls::ServerConfig` for the node.
pub fn make_server_config(
cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
key: rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static>,
) -> Result<Arc<ServerConfig>, rustls::Error> {
let provider = Arc::new(rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider());
let mut config = ServerConfig::builder_with_provider(provider)
.with_safe_default_protocol_versions()?
.with_no_client_auth()
.with_single_cert(vec![cert], key)?;
config.alpn_protocols = vec![b"http/1.1".to_vec()];
Ok(Arc::new(config))
}
/// Creates a `rustls::ClientConfig` expecting a specific peer's `EndpointId`.
pub fn make_client_config(expected_peer: EndpointId) -> Result<Arc<ClientConfig>, rustls::Error> {
let provider = Arc::new(rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider());
let verifier = Arc::new(PinnedEndpointVerifier::new(expected_peer));
let mut config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(provider)
.with_safe_default_protocol_versions()?
.dangerous()
.with_custom_certificate_verifier(verifier)
.with_no_client_auth();
config.alpn_protocols = vec![b"http/1.1".to_vec()];
Ok(Arc::new(config))
}
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//! End-to-end packet encryption for `tcp-tls`.
//!
//! Uses X25519 Diffie-Hellman key exchange and ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD.
//! This ensures that even when traffic passes through intermediate relay nodes,
//! the intermediate nodes cannot inspect or tamper with the payload.
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, KeyInit};
use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Nonce};
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use sha2::Sha256;
use tsunagi::dataplane::PluginError;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
/// Length of the X25519 public key.
pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Domain separator for session key derivation.
const HKDF_SALT: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/e2ee/noise/v1";
/// A session cipher for communicating with one peer.
pub struct PeerCipher {
tx_cipher: ChaCha20Poly1305,
rx_cipher: ChaCha20Poly1305,
tx_nonce: AtomicU64,
}
impl PeerCipher {
/// Establishes a new cipher between `local_id` and `remote_id` given
/// our local secret and their public key.
pub fn new(
local_id: EndpointId,
remote_id: EndpointId,
local_secret: &StaticSecret,
remote_public: &PublicKey,
) -> Self {
let shared = local_secret.diffie_hellman(remote_public);
let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(Some(HKDF_SALT), shared.as_bytes());
let mut key_a_to_b = [0u8; 32];
let mut key_b_to_a = [0u8; 32];
let _ = hk.expand(b"tsunagi-key-a-to-b", &mut key_a_to_b);
let _ = hk.expand(b"tsunagi-key-b-to-a", &mut key_b_to_a);
// Deterministic role: smaller EndpointId is party A.
let is_party_a = local_id.as_bytes() < remote_id.as_bytes();
let (tx_key, rx_key) = if is_party_a {
(key_a_to_b, key_b_to_a)
} else {
(key_b_to_a, key_a_to_b)
};
let tx_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&tx_key.into());
let rx_cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&rx_key.into());
Self {
tx_cipher,
rx_cipher,
tx_nonce: AtomicU64::new(0),
}
}
/// Encrypts an outbound packet. Prefixes the ciphertext with the 8-byte nonce.
pub fn encrypt(&self, packet: &[u8]) -> Result<bytes::Bytes, PluginError> {
let counter = self.tx_nonce.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
nonce_bytes[4..12].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let ciphertext = self
.tx_cipher
.encrypt(nonce, packet)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("encryption failed: {err}")))?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + ciphertext.len());
out.extend_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
Ok(bytes::Bytes::from(out))
}
/// Decrypts an inbound packet prefixed with the 8-byte nonce.
pub fn decrypt(&self, payload: &[u8]) -> Result<bytes::Bytes, PluginError> {
if payload.len() < 8 + 16 {
return Err(PluginError::Other("payload too short".into()));
}
let counter_bytes: [u8; 8] = match payload[..8].try_into() {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(_) => return Err(PluginError::Other("invalid nonce".into())),
};
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
nonce_bytes[4..12].copy_from_slice(&counter_bytes);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let plaintext = self
.rx_cipher
.decrypt(nonce, &payload[8..])
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("decryption failed: {err}")))?;
Ok(bytes::Bytes::from(plaintext))
}
}
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//! The `tcp-tls` protocol: TCP with TLS 1.3 on port 443 with Noise E2EE.
pub mod cert;
pub mod crypto;
pub mod plugin;
pub mod transport;
pub use plugin::{
TCP_TLS_PROTOCOL, TCP_TLS_VERSION, TcpTlsCodec, TcpTlsConfig, TcpTlsPlugin, local_ip_candidates,
};
pub use transport::TcpTlsTransport;
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//! The `tcp-tls` IP plugin implementation.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use tsunagi::dataplane::tunnel::{GenericTunnelPlugin, TunnelCodec};
use tsunagi::dataplane::{PluginError, ProtocolOption};
use tsunagi::identity::NetworkId;
use crate::crypto::PeerCipher;
use crate::transport::TcpTlsTransport;
/// The wire protocol identifier for `tcp-tls`.
pub const TCP_TLS_PROTOCOL: &str = "tcp-tls";
/// Wire version for `tcp-tls`.
pub const TCP_TLS_VERSION: u16 = 1;
/// Configuration for the `tcp-tls` protocol plugin.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct TcpTlsConfig {
/// Requested port to bind.
pub port: Option<u16>,
/// Custom SNI domain to disguise TLS connections.
pub sni: Option<String>,
}
impl TcpTlsConfig {
/// Creates a configuration with default settings.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Sets the TCP listen port.
pub fn with_port(mut self, port: u16) -> Self {
self.port = Some(port);
self
}
/// Sets the SNI domain used to disguise TLS connections.
pub fn with_sni(mut self, sni: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.sni = Some(sni.into());
self
}
}
/// Announcement payload exchanged between peers for `tcp-tls`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TcpTlsAnnouncement {
/// X25519 public key for E2EE noise encryption.
pub noise_public: [u8; 32],
/// TCP port the peer is listening on.
pub port: u16,
/// Candidate IP addresses where this peer can be reached on `port`.
#[serde(default)]
pub addrs: Vec<std::net::IpAddr>,
}
/// Discovers local network interface IPs to announce to peers.
pub fn local_ip_candidates() -> Vec<std::net::IpAddr> {
let mut candidates = Vec::new();
for iface in netdev::get_interfaces() {
if !is_candidate_interface(&iface) {
continue;
}
for ip in &iface.ipv4 {
let addr = ip.addr();
if is_candidate_ipv4(addr) {
let priority = ip_priority(&iface, std::net::IpAddr::V4(addr));
candidates.push((priority, std::net::IpAddr::V4(addr)));
}
}
for ip in &iface.ipv6 {
let addr = ip.addr();
if is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V6(addr)) {
let priority = ip_priority(&iface, std::net::IpAddr::V6(addr));
candidates.push((priority, std::net::IpAddr::V6(addr)));
}
}
}
// Sort descending by priority so best interface IP is candidate #0
candidates.sort_by_key(|b| std::cmp::Reverse(b.0));
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
let mut ips = Vec::new();
for (_, ip) in candidates {
if seen.insert(ip) {
ips.push(ip);
}
}
ips
}
pub(crate) fn is_candidate_interface(iface: &netdev::Interface) -> bool {
if !iface.is_up() || iface.is_loopback() {
return false;
}
let name = iface.name.to_lowercase();
let friendly = iface
.friendly_name
.as_deref()
.map(str::to_lowercase)
.unwrap_or_default();
let desc = iface
.description
.as_deref()
.map(str::to_lowercase)
.unwrap_or_default();
// Skip Tsunagi / Wintun overlay interfaces
if name.starts_with("tsun")
|| name.contains("tsunagi")
|| name.contains("wintun")
|| friendly.starts_with("tsun")
|| friendly.contains("tsunagi")
|| friendly.contains("wintun")
|| desc.contains("wintun")
|| desc.contains("tsunagi")
{
return false;
}
// Skip container, VM, and virtual bridge interfaces
if name.starts_with("docker")
|| name.starts_with("br-")
|| name.starts_with("veth")
|| name.starts_with("virbr")
|| name.starts_with("cni")
|| name.starts_with("flannel")
|| name.starts_with("cali")
|| name.starts_with("kube")
|| name.starts_with("dummy")
|| name.starts_with("lxc")
|| name.starts_with("podman")
|| friendly.contains("vethernet")
|| friendly.contains("vboxnet")
|| friendly.contains("vmnet")
|| desc.contains("virtualbox")
|| desc.contains("hyper-v")
|| desc.contains("vmware")
{
return false;
}
true
}
pub(crate) fn is_candidate_ipv4(addr: std::net::Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
if addr.is_loopback() || addr.is_unspecified() || addr.is_link_local() || addr.is_broadcast() {
return false;
}
if addr.is_documentation() {
return false;
}
true
}
pub(crate) fn is_candidate_ip(addr: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
match addr {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => is_candidate_ipv4(v4),
std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
if v6.is_loopback() || v6.is_unspecified() {
return false;
}
let segments = v6.segments();
// Filter link-local fe80::/10
if (segments[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
return false;
}
true
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn ip_priority(iface: &netdev::Interface, ip: std::net::IpAddr) -> u32 {
let has_gateway = iface.gateway.is_some();
let base = if has_gateway { 100 } else { 0 };
match ip {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
let octets = v4.octets();
// Tailscale: 100.64.0.0/10
let is_tailscale = octets[0] == 100 && (octets[1] & 0xc0) == 64;
let is_private = v4.is_private();
if !is_private && !is_tailscale {
base + 50
} else if has_gateway && is_private {
base + 40
} else if is_tailscale {
base + 30
} else {
base + 10
}
}
std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
let segments = v6.segments();
let is_global = (segments[0] & 0xe000) == 0x2000;
if is_global { base + 45 } else { base + 20 }
}
}
}
/// The codec implementing cryptographic transformation and announcements for `tcp-tls`.
pub struct TcpTlsCodec {
local_id: EndpointId,
static_secret: StaticSecret,
public_key: PublicKey,
transport: Arc<TcpTlsTransport>,
ciphers: RwLock<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId), Arc<PeerCipher>>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for TcpTlsCodec {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("TcpTlsCodec")
.field("local_id", &self.local_id.fmt_short().to_string())
.field("port", &self.transport.bound_port())
.finish()
}
}
impl TcpTlsCodec {
/// Supported options for `tcp-tls`.
pub const OPTIONS: &'static [ProtocolOption] = &[
ProtocolOption {
key: "port",
value: "PORT",
help: "TCP port to listen on for TLS 1.3 connections",
default: Some("443"),
},
ProtocolOption {
key: "sni",
value: "DOMAIN",
help: "Server Name Indication (SNI) domain to disguise TLS connections",
default: Some(crate::cert::DEFAULT_SNI),
},
];
/// Creates a new `TcpTlsCodec`.
pub fn new(local_id: EndpointId, transport: Arc<TcpTlsTransport>) -> Self {
let mut secret_bytes = [0u8; 32];
rand::fill(&mut secret_bytes);
let static_secret = StaticSecret::from(secret_bytes);
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&static_secret);
Self {
local_id,
static_secret,
public_key,
transport,
ciphers: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
/// Configures settings from parsed `-o` options.
pub fn configure(
mut config: TcpTlsConfig,
options: &[(String, String)],
) -> Result<TcpTlsConfig, String> {
for (key, value) in options {
match key.as_str() {
"port" => {
let port: u16 = value
.parse()
.map_err(|_| format!("invalid port `{value}`"))?;
config.port = Some(port);
}
"sni" => {
let trimmed = value.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Err("sni domain cannot be empty".into());
}
config.sni = Some(trimmed.to_string());
}
other => return Err(format!("unknown option `{other}` for tcp-tls")),
}
}
Ok(config)
}
}
impl TunnelCodec for TcpTlsCodec {
fn protocol_id(&self) -> &str {
TCP_TLS_PROTOCOL
}
fn protocol_version(&self) -> u16 {
TCP_TLS_VERSION
}
fn options(&self) -> &'static [ProtocolOption] {
Self::OPTIONS
}
fn local_capability_data(&self, _network: NetworkId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PluginError> {
let announcement = TcpTlsAnnouncement {
noise_public: *self.public_key.as_bytes(),
port: self.transport.bound_port(),
addrs: local_ip_candidates(),
};
postcard::to_allocvec(&announcement)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("encode announcement failed: {err}")))
}
fn on_peer_capability_data(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
data: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
let announcement: TcpTlsAnnouncement = postcard::from_bytes(data)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Rejected(format!("invalid announcement: {err}")))?;
for ip in &announcement.addrs {
if is_candidate_ip(*ip) {
self.transport
.set_peer_addr(peer, std::net::SocketAddr::new(*ip, announcement.port));
}
}
let peer_noise_pubkey = PublicKey::from(announcement.noise_public);
let cipher = Arc::new(PeerCipher::new(
self.local_id,
peer,
&self.static_secret,
&peer_noise_pubkey,
));
let mut guard = match self.ciphers.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.insert((network, peer), cipher);
Ok(())
}
fn on_peer_down(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
let mut guard = match self.ciphers.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.remove(&(network, peer));
}
fn encrypt(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
packet: &[u8],
) -> Result<Bytes, PluginError> {
let cipher = {
let guard = match self.ciphers.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.get(&(network, peer)).cloned()
};
let Some(cipher) = cipher else {
return Err(PluginError::Unavailable("no cipher for peer".into()));
};
cipher.encrypt(packet)
}
fn decrypt(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Result<Bytes, PluginError> {
let cipher = {
let guard = match self.ciphers.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.get(&(network, peer)).cloned()
};
let Some(cipher) = cipher else {
return Err(PluginError::Unavailable("no cipher for peer".into()));
};
cipher.decrypt(payload)
}
}
/// The complete `tcp-tls` plugin.
pub type TcpTlsPlugin = GenericTunnelPlugin<TcpTlsCodec>;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
#[test]
fn test_is_candidate_interface_filters_overlay_and_bridges() {
let mut iface = netdev::Interface::dummy();
iface.flags = 1; // UP
// Standard Ethernet - should pass
iface.name = "eth0".to_string();
assert!(is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Windows Ethernet with GUID name - should pass
iface.name = "{B6149D2C-1234-5678-9ABC-DEF012345678}".to_string();
iface.friendly_name = Some("Ethernet".to_string());
iface.description = Some("Intel(R) Ethernet Connection".to_string());
assert!(is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Linux tsun0 overlay - must be filtered
iface.name = "tsun0".to_string();
iface.friendly_name = None;
iface.description = None;
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Windows Wintun overlay (GUID name with tsun0 friendly name) - must be filtered!
iface.name = "{72D85D76-F1A5-42AC-BC49-2169527CDDDF}".to_string();
iface.friendly_name = Some("tsun0".to_string());
iface.description = Some("Wintun Userspace Tunnel".to_string());
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Windows Wintun overlay with description containing Wintun - must be filtered!
iface.friendly_name = Some("Local Area Connection 2".to_string());
iface.description = Some("Wintun Userspace Tunnel".to_string());
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Docker bridge - must be filtered
iface.name = "docker0".to_string();
iface.friendly_name = None;
iface.description = None;
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Docker network bridge br-* - must be filtered
iface.name = "br-4f6d3a9b1c2e".to_string();
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Virtual ethernet veth* - must be filtered
iface.name = "veth12345".to_string();
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Libvirt NAT bridge virbr* - must be filtered
iface.name = "virbr0".to_string();
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// CNI bridge - must be filtered
iface.name = "cni0".to_string();
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Hyper-V / WSL vEthernet switch on Windows - must be filtered
iface.name = "{A1B2C3D4-E5F6-7890-1234-567890ABCDEF}".to_string();
iface.friendly_name = Some("vEthernet (WSL)".to_string());
iface.description = Some("Hyper-V Virtual Ethernet Adapter".to_string());
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&iface));
// Down interface - must be filtered
let mut down_iface = netdev::Interface::dummy();
down_iface.flags = 0; // Not UP
down_iface.name = "eth0".to_string();
assert!(!is_candidate_interface(&down_iface));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_candidate_ip() {
// Valid LAN IP
assert!(is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
192, 168, 1, 117
))));
// Valid Tailscale IP
assert!(is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
100, 77, 155, 120
))));
// Valid Public IP
assert!(is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
1, 1, 1, 1
))));
// Valid IPv6 GUA
assert!(is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(
0x2a01, 0x4b00, 0xb8e3, 0x4e00, 0, 0, 0, 1
))));
// Loopback - must be rejected
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
127, 0, 0, 1
))));
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST)));
// Unspecified - must be rejected
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED
)));
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V6(
Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED
)));
// Link-local - must be rejected
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
169, 254, 1, 1
))));
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(
0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x1ff, 0xfe00, 1
))));
// Broadcast - must be rejected
assert!(!is_candidate_ip(std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)));
}
#[test]
fn test_ip_priority_ordering() {
let mut iface_lan = netdev::Interface::dummy();
iface_lan.flags = 1;
iface_lan.gateway = Some(netdev::net::device::NetworkDevice::new());
let mut iface_vpn = netdev::Interface::dummy();
iface_vpn.flags = 1;
iface_vpn.name = "tailscale0".to_string();
let lan_ip = std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 117));
let tailscale_ip = std::net::IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(100, 77, 155, 120));
let p_lan = ip_priority(&iface_lan, lan_ip);
let p_ts = ip_priority(&iface_vpn, tailscale_ip);
// LAN IP with gateway should score higher than VPN IP without gateway
assert!(p_lan > p_ts);
}
}
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//! TCP TLS 1.3 transport implementation for Tsunagi.
//!
//! Provides [`TcpTlsTransport`] implementing [`PacketTransport`]
//! and [`TcpTlsLink`] implementing [`PacketLink`].
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::time::Duration;
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::{EndpointId, Signature};
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
use tokio::sync::{Notify, mpsc};
use tokio_rustls::TlsConnector;
use tsunagi::BoxFuture;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{
InboundLink, PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError,
};
use tsunagi::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId};
use crate::cert::{generate_self_signed_cert, make_client_config, make_server_config};
/// Default TCP port to bind and listen on.
pub const DEFAULT_PORT: u16 = 443;
/// Fallback port if 443 is unprivileged on Linux and denied.
pub const FALLBACK_PORT: u16 = 8443;
/// Maximum payload length for a single framed datagram over TLS.
pub const MAX_FRAME_SIZE: usize = 65535;
/// Initial handshake message on established TLS stream (128 bytes).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct LinkHandshake {
/// The overlay network ID.
pub network: NetworkId,
/// The connecting client's endpoint ID.
pub client_id: EndpointId,
/// Ed25519 signature over `tsunagi-tcp-tls-link-v1` + network + server ID.
pub signature: [u8; 64],
}
impl LinkHandshake {
/// Total encoded length in bytes.
pub const LEN: usize = 32 + 32 + 64; // 128
/// Serializes to fixed-size byte array.
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; Self::LEN] {
let mut buf = [0u8; Self::LEN];
buf[0..32].copy_from_slice(self.network.as_bytes());
buf[32..64].copy_from_slice(self.client_id.as_bytes());
buf[64..128].copy_from_slice(&self.signature);
buf
}
/// Deserializes from byte slice.
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
if bytes.len() != Self::LEN {
return None;
}
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes(bytes[0..32].try_into().ok()?);
let client_id = EndpointId::from_bytes(bytes[32..64].try_into().ok()?).ok()?;
let signature: [u8; 64] = bytes[64..128].try_into().ok()?;
Some(Self {
network,
client_id,
signature,
})
}
}
/// Acknowledgement message on established TLS stream (1 byte).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct LinkAck {
/// Whether the link was accepted by the server.
pub accepted: bool,
}
impl LinkAck {
/// Total encoded length in bytes.
pub const LEN: usize = 1;
/// Serializes to fixed-size byte array.
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 1] {
[if self.accepted { 1 } else { 0 }]
}
/// Deserializes from byte slice.
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
if bytes.len() != 1 {
return None;
}
Some(Self {
accepted: bytes[0] == 1,
})
}
}
fn link_handshake_bytes(network: NetworkId, server_id: EndpointId) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(23 + 32 + 32);
bytes.extend_from_slice(b"tsunagi-tcp-tls-link-v1");
bytes.extend_from_slice(network.as_bytes());
bytes.extend_from_slice(server_id.as_bytes());
bytes
}
/// An authenticated datagram link carried over a TCP TLS 1.3 stream.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct TcpTlsLink {
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
tx: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
closed_notify: Arc<Notify>,
is_closed: Arc<AtomicBool>,
remote_addr: String,
}
impl TcpTlsLink {
/// Creates a new `TcpTlsLink` from a stream that has already passed the TLS handshake.
pub fn new<S>(network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, stream: S, remote_addr: String) -> Self
where
S: tokio::io::AsyncRead + tokio::io::AsyncWrite + Send + 'static,
{
let (mut reader, mut writer) = tokio::io::split(stream);
let (tx_out, mut rx_out) = mpsc::channel::<Bytes>(256);
let (tx_in, rx_in) = mpsc::channel::<Bytes>(256);
let is_closed = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let closed_notify = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let closed_flag_w = Arc::clone(&is_closed);
let closed_notify_w = Arc::clone(&closed_notify);
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(msg) = rx_out.recv().await {
if msg.len() > MAX_FRAME_SIZE {
continue;
}
let len = msg.len() as u16;
if writer.write_all(&len.to_be_bytes()).await.is_err() {
break;
}
if writer.write_all(&msg).await.is_err() {
break;
}
if writer.flush().await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
closed_flag_w.store(true, Ordering::Release);
closed_notify_w.notify_waiters();
});
let closed_flag_r = Arc::clone(&is_closed);
let closed_notify_r = Arc::clone(&closed_notify);
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut len_buf = [0u8; 2];
loop {
if reader.read_exact(&mut len_buf).await.is_err() {
break;
}
let len = u16::from_be_bytes(len_buf) as usize;
if len > MAX_FRAME_SIZE {
break;
}
let mut buf = vec![0u8; len];
if reader.read_exact(&mut buf).await.is_err() {
break;
}
if tx_in.send(Bytes::from(buf)).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
closed_flag_r.store(true, Ordering::Release);
closed_notify_r.notify_waiters();
});
Self {
network,
peer,
tx: tx_out,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(rx_in),
closed_notify,
is_closed,
remote_addr,
}
}
}
impl PacketLink for TcpTlsLink {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.network
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.peer
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
MAX_FRAME_SIZE
}
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if payload.len() > MAX_FRAME_SIZE {
return Err(TransportError::TooLarge {
size: payload.len(),
limit: MAX_FRAME_SIZE,
});
}
if self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
}
self.tx
.try_send(payload)
.map_err(|_| TransportError::Closed)
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut guard = self.rx.lock().await;
guard.recv().await
})
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
if self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return;
}
self.closed_notify.notified().await;
})
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire)
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
format!("tcp-tls via {}", self.remote_addr)
}
}
/// The `tcp-tls` packet transport.
pub struct TcpTlsTransport {
identity: DeviceIdentity,
local_id: EndpointId,
listen_port: u16,
sni: String,
peer_addresses: std::sync::RwLock<HashMap<EndpointId, Vec<SocketAddr>>>,
server_config: Arc<rustls::ServerConfig>,
listener: Option<Arc<TcpListener>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for TcpTlsTransport {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("TcpTlsTransport")
.field("local_id", &self.local_id.fmt_short().to_string())
.field("listen_port", &self.listen_port)
.field("sni", &self.sni)
.finish()
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
struct NetBindServiceGuard {
raised: bool,
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
impl NetBindServiceGuard {
fn acquire() -> Self {
let already = caps::has_cap(
None,
caps::CapSet::Effective,
caps::Capability::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
)
.unwrap_or(false);
if already {
return Self { raised: false };
}
let permitted = caps::has_cap(
None,
caps::CapSet::Permitted,
caps::Capability::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
)
.unwrap_or(false);
if permitted
&& caps::raise(
None,
caps::CapSet::Effective,
caps::Capability::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
)
.is_ok()
{
Self { raised: true }
} else {
Self { raised: false }
}
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
impl Drop for NetBindServiceGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if self.raised {
let _ = caps::drop(
None,
caps::CapSet::Effective,
caps::Capability::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
);
}
}
}
impl TcpTlsTransport {
/// Binds a new TCP TLS transport using the device identity, configured port, and SNI domain.
pub async fn bind(
identity: &DeviceIdentity,
requested_port: Option<u16>,
requested_sni: Option<String>,
) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let sni = requested_sni
.filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty())
.unwrap_or_else(|| crate::cert::DEFAULT_SNI.to_string());
let (cert, key) = generate_self_signed_cert(&identity.secret_bytes(), &sni)?;
let server_config = make_server_config(cert, key)?;
let target_port = requested_port.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_PORT);
let bind_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], target_port));
let bind_result = {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
let _guard = if target_port < 1024 {
Some(NetBindServiceGuard::acquire())
} else {
None
};
std::net::TcpListener::bind(bind_addr)
};
let listener = match bind_result {
Ok(std_listener) => {
std_listener.set_nonblocking(true)?;
let l = TcpListener::from_std(std_listener)?;
tracing::info!(port = target_port, "TCP TLS listening");
Some(Arc::new(l))
}
Err(err) if requested_port.is_none() => {
let exe = std::env::current_exe()
.map(|p| p.display().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "tsunagi".into());
if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied {
tracing::warn!(
port = target_port,
%err,
"Cannot bind to default port {target_port} without privileges. \
To allow port 443 and TUN on Linux, grant capabilities once with:\n \
sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p {exe}\n\
Falling back to port {FALLBACK_PORT}."
);
} else {
tracing::warn!(
port = target_port,
%err,
"Cannot bind to default port {target_port}: {err}. \
Falling back to port {FALLBACK_PORT}."
);
}
let fallback_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], FALLBACK_PORT));
match TcpListener::bind(fallback_addr).await {
Ok(l) => {
tracing::info!(port = FALLBACK_PORT, "TCP TLS listening on fallback port");
Some(Arc::new(l))
}
Err(fallback_err) => {
tracing::warn!(
port = FALLBACK_PORT,
err = %fallback_err,
"Cannot bind to fallback port {FALLBACK_PORT}: {fallback_err}. \
Falling back to ephemeral port."
);
let ephemeral_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], 0));
let l = TcpListener::bind(ephemeral_addr).await?;
let bound = l.local_addr()?.port();
tracing::info!(port = bound, "TCP TLS listening on ephemeral port");
Some(Arc::new(l))
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
let exe = std::env::current_exe()
.map(|p| p.display().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "tsunagi".into());
tracing::warn!(
port = target_port,
%err,
"Cannot bind to requested port {target_port}: {err}. \
To allow port {target_port} and TUN on Linux, grant capabilities once with:\n \
sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p {exe}"
);
return Err(Box::new(err));
}
};
let bound_port = listener
.as_ref()
.and_then(|l| l.local_addr().ok())
.map(|a| a.port())
.unwrap_or(target_port);
Ok(Self {
identity: identity.clone(),
local_id: identity.endpoint_id(),
listen_port: bound_port,
sni,
peer_addresses: std::sync::RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
server_config,
listener,
})
}
/// The port this transport is listening on.
pub fn bound_port(&self) -> u16 {
self.listen_port
}
/// The SNI domain this transport advertises during TLS handshake.
pub fn sni(&self) -> &str {
&self.sni
}
/// Records an observed TCP target address for a peer.
pub fn set_peer_addr(&self, peer: EndpointId, addr: SocketAddr) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.peer_addresses.write() {
let addrs = guard.entry(peer).or_default();
if !addrs.contains(&addr) {
addrs.push(addr);
}
}
}
/// Runs the accept loop for inbound TCP TLS connections.
pub async fn accept_loop<F>(&self, on_inbound: F)
where
F: Fn(InboundLink) + Send + Sync + Clone + 'static,
{
let Some(listener) = self.listener.as_ref().cloned() else {
return;
};
let acceptor = tokio_rustls::TlsAcceptor::from(Arc::clone(&self.server_config));
let local_id = self.local_id;
while let Ok((socket, remote_addr)) = listener.accept().await {
let acceptor = acceptor.clone();
let on_inbound = on_inbound.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut tls_stream = match acceptor.accept(socket).await {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(err) => {
tracing::debug!(%err, "inbound TLS handshake failed");
return;
}
};
let mut hello_buf = [0u8; LinkHandshake::LEN];
if tls_stream.read_exact(&mut hello_buf).await.is_err() {
return;
}
let Some(hello) = LinkHandshake::from_bytes(&hello_buf) else {
return;
};
let msg = link_handshake_bytes(hello.network, local_id);
let sig = Signature::from_bytes(&hello.signature);
if hello.client_id.verify(&msg, &sig).is_err() {
tracing::debug!("LinkHandshake signature verification failed");
return;
}
let ack = LinkAck { accepted: true };
let ack_bytes = ack.to_bytes();
if tls_stream.write_all(&ack_bytes).await.is_err() {
return;
}
if tls_stream.flush().await.is_err() {
return;
}
let link = TcpTlsLink::new(
hello.network,
hello.client_id,
tls_stream,
remote_addr.to_string(),
);
on_inbound(InboundLink {
network: hello.network,
peer: hello.client_id,
protocol: "tcp-tls".into(),
link: Arc::new(link),
});
});
}
}
}
impl PacketTransport for TcpTlsTransport {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"tcp-tls"
}
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any {
self
}
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
if protocol != "tcp-tls" {
return Err(TransportError::Declined(protocol.to_string()));
}
let target_addrs = {
let guard = self
.peer_addresses
.read()
.map_err(|_| TransportError::Other("lock poisoned".into()))?;
guard.get(&peer).cloned().unwrap_or_default()
};
if target_addrs.is_empty() {
return Err(TransportError::Unreachable(
"no known TCP address for peer".into(),
));
}
let mut connected_socket = None;
let mut connected_addr = None;
for addr in &target_addrs {
if addr.ip().is_loopback() && addr.port() == self.listen_port {
continue;
}
match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), TcpStream::connect(*addr)).await
{
Ok(Ok(socket)) => {
connected_socket = Some(socket);
connected_addr = Some(*addr);
break;
}
_ => continue,
}
}
let (socket, addr) = match (connected_socket, connected_addr) {
(Some(s), Some(a)) => (s, a),
_ => {
return Err(TransportError::Unreachable(
"cannot connect to any TCP address for peer".into(),
));
}
};
let client_config =
make_client_config(peer).map_err(|err| TransportError::Other(err.to_string()))?;
let connector = TlsConnector::from(client_config);
let server_name = rustls::pki_types::ServerName::try_from(self.sni.as_str())
.map_err(|err| TransportError::Other(err.to_string()))?
.to_owned();
let mut tls_stream = connector
.connect(server_name, socket)
.await
.map_err(|err| TransportError::Other(format!("TLS handshake failed: {err}")))?;
// Send LinkHandshake (fixed 128 bytes)
let msg = link_handshake_bytes(network, peer);
let sig = self.identity.sign(&msg);
let hello = LinkHandshake {
network,
client_id: self.local_id,
signature: sig.to_bytes(),
};
let hello_bytes = hello.to_bytes();
tls_stream
.write_all(&hello_bytes)
.await
.map_err(|err| TransportError::Other(err.to_string()))?;
tls_stream
.flush()
.await
.map_err(|err| TransportError::Other(err.to_string()))?;
// Read LinkAck (fixed 1 byte)
let mut ack_buf = [0u8; LinkAck::LEN];
tls_stream
.read_exact(&mut ack_buf)
.await
.map_err(|err| TransportError::Other(err.to_string()))?;
let ack = LinkAck::from_bytes(&ack_buf)
.ok_or_else(|| TransportError::Other("invalid link ack".into()))?;
if !ack.accepted {
return Err(TransportError::Declined("link declined".into()));
}
let link = TcpTlsLink::new(network, peer, tls_stream, addr.to_string());
Ok(Arc::new(link) as SharedLink)
})
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier;
use rustls::pki_types::{ServerName, UnixTime};
use tsunagi::identity::DeviceIdentity;
use tsunagi_tcp_tls::cert::{PinnedEndpointVerifier, generate_self_signed_cert};
#[test]
fn test_generate_and_pin_certificate() {
let identity = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_id = identity.endpoint_id();
let (cert, _key) =
generate_self_signed_cert(&identity.secret_bytes(), tsunagi_tcp_tls::cert::DEFAULT_SNI)
.expect("cert generation should succeed");
let verifier = PinnedEndpointVerifier::new(peer_id);
let server_name = ServerName::try_from(tsunagi_tcp_tls::cert::DEFAULT_SNI).unwrap();
let verified = verifier.verify_server_cert(&cert, &[], &server_name, &[], UnixTime::now());
assert!(
verified.is_ok(),
"certificate matching peer endpoint id must verify"
);
let other_identity = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let wrong_verifier = PinnedEndpointVerifier::new(other_identity.endpoint_id());
let wrong_verified =
wrong_verifier.verify_server_cert(&cert, &[], &server_name, &[], UnixTime::now());
assert!(
wrong_verified.is_err(),
"certificate with wrong endpoint id must fail verification"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_make_client_and_server_config() {
let identity = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_id = identity.endpoint_id();
let (cert, key) = generate_self_signed_cert(&identity.secret_bytes(), "custom.example.com")
.expect("cert generation should succeed");
let server_config = tsunagi_tcp_tls::cert::make_server_config(cert, key);
assert!(server_config.is_ok());
let client_config = tsunagi_tcp_tls::cert::make_client_config(peer_id);
assert!(client_config.is_ok());
}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use tsunagi_tcp_tls::crypto::PeerCipher;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
#[test]
fn test_peer_cipher_bidirectional_roundtrip() {
let peer_a_id = iroh::SecretKey::generate().public();
let peer_b_id = iroh::SecretKey::generate().public();
let secret_a = StaticSecret::from([10u8; 32]);
let public_a = PublicKey::from(&secret_a);
let secret_b = StaticSecret::from([20u8; 32]);
let public_b = PublicKey::from(&secret_b);
let cipher_a = PeerCipher::new(peer_a_id, peer_b_id, &secret_a, &public_b);
let cipher_b = PeerCipher::new(peer_b_id, peer_a_id, &secret_b, &public_a);
// A -> B
let msg_from_a = b"hello from node A to node B over Noise E2EE";
let encrypted_by_a = cipher_a
.encrypt(msg_from_a)
.expect("encryption should succeed");
let decrypted_by_b = cipher_b
.decrypt(&encrypted_by_a)
.expect("decryption should succeed");
assert_eq!(&decrypted_by_b[..], msg_from_a);
// B -> A
let msg_from_b = b"hello back from node B to node A";
let encrypted_by_b = cipher_b
.encrypt(msg_from_b)
.expect("encryption should succeed");
let decrypted_by_a = cipher_a
.decrypt(&encrypted_by_b)
.expect("decryption should succeed");
assert_eq!(&decrypted_by_a[..], msg_from_b);
// Sequence nonces increment
let msg2 = b"packet 2";
let enc2 = cipher_a.encrypt(msg2).expect("encryption should succeed");
assert_ne!(encrypted_by_a[..8], enc2[..8], "nonces should differ");
let dec2 = cipher_b.decrypt(&enc2).expect("decryption should succeed");
assert_eq!(&dec2[..], msg2);
}
#[test]
fn test_tampered_payload_rejected() {
let peer_a_id = iroh::SecretKey::generate().public();
let peer_b_id = iroh::SecretKey::generate().public();
let secret_a = StaticSecret::from([10u8; 32]);
let public_a = PublicKey::from(&secret_a);
let secret_b = StaticSecret::from([20u8; 32]);
let public_b = PublicKey::from(&secret_b);
let cipher_a = PeerCipher::new(peer_a_id, peer_b_id, &secret_a, &public_b);
let cipher_b = PeerCipher::new(peer_b_id, peer_a_id, &secret_b, &public_a);
let encrypted = cipher_a.encrypt(b"secret payload").expect("encrypt");
// Corrupt one byte of ciphertext
let len = encrypted.len();
let mut modified = encrypted.to_vec();
modified[len - 1] ^= 0xff;
assert!(
cipher_b.decrypt(&modified).is_err(),
"corrupted ciphertext must fail AEAD verification"
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use bytes::Bytes;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{InboundLink, PacketTransport};
use tsunagi::dataplane::{IpPlugin, PacketSink, PluginContext};
use tsunagi::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId};
use tsunagi_tcp_tls::{TcpTlsCodec, TcpTlsPlugin, TcpTlsTransport};
struct TestSink {
delivered: mpsc::Sender<(NetworkId, iroh::EndpointId, Bytes)>,
}
impl PacketSink for TestSink {
fn deliver(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
from: iroh::EndpointId,
packet: Bytes,
) -> tsunagi::BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
let delivered = self.delivered.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let _ = delivered.send((network, from, packet)).await;
})
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tcp_tls_plugin_end_to_end() {
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_a = identity_a.endpoint_id();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([77u8; 32]);
// Transports
let transport_b = Arc::new(
TcpTlsTransport::bind(&identity_b, Some(0), None)
.await
.expect("bind B"),
);
let port_b = transport_b.bound_port();
let transport_a = Arc::new(
TcpTlsTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0), None)
.await
.expect("bind A"),
);
// Codecs and plugins
let codec_a = TcpTlsCodec::new(peer_a, Arc::clone(&transport_a));
let plugin_a = Arc::new(TcpTlsPlugin::new(codec_a));
let codec_b = TcpTlsCodec::new(peer_b, Arc::clone(&transport_b));
let plugin_b = Arc::new(TcpTlsPlugin::new(codec_b));
// Attach sinks
let (sink_a_tx, mut sink_a_rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
plugin_a.attach(PluginContext::with_sink(Arc::new(TestSink {
delivered: sink_a_tx,
})));
let (sink_b_tx, mut sink_b_rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
plugin_b.attach(PluginContext::with_sink(Arc::new(TestSink {
delivered: sink_b_tx,
})));
// Capability exchange
let cap_a = plugin_a
.local_capability(network)
.expect("cap A")
.expect("some cap A");
let cap_b = plugin_b
.local_capability(network)
.expect("cap B")
.expect("some cap B");
plugin_a
.on_peer_capability(network, peer_b, &cap_b)
.expect("A on cap B");
plugin_b
.on_peer_capability(network, peer_a, &cap_a)
.expect("B on cap A");
// Spawn accept loop on B
let (inbound_tx, mut inbound_rx) = mpsc::channel::<InboundLink>(1);
let transport_b_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_b);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_b_clone
.accept_loop(move |inbound| {
let _ = inbound_tx.try_send(inbound);
})
.await;
});
// Make sure A knows B's loopback address
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, format!("127.0.0.1:{port_b}").parse().unwrap());
// Connect link from A to B
let link_a = transport_a
.open(network, peer_b, "tcp-tls")
.await
.expect("open link from A");
let inbound_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), inbound_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("recv timeout")
.expect("recv inbound");
let link_b = inbound_b.link;
// Install links into plugins
plugin_a.on_peer_link(network, peer_b, link_a);
plugin_b.on_peer_link(network, peer_a, link_b);
// Carry packet from A to B
let ip_packet_a = Bytes::from_static(b"4500003c000100004011e0e8c0a80101c0a8010200000000");
let carried_a = plugin_a.carry(network, peer_b, ip_packet_a.clone());
assert!(carried_a, "plugin A should carry packet");
let (net_received, from_peer, delivered_pkt) =
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), sink_b_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("timeout waiting for delivery on B")
.expect("packet on B");
assert_eq!(net_received, network);
assert_eq!(from_peer, peer_a);
assert_eq!(delivered_pkt, ip_packet_a);
// Carry reply packet from B to A
let ip_packet_b = Bytes::from_static(b"reply-packet-from-b");
let carried_b = plugin_b.carry(network, peer_a, ip_packet_b.clone());
assert!(carried_b, "plugin B should carry packet");
let (net_received, from_peer, delivered_pkt) =
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), sink_a_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("timeout waiting for delivery on A")
.expect("packet on A");
assert_eq!(net_received, network);
assert_eq!(from_peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(delivered_pkt, ip_packet_b);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use bytes::Bytes;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{InboundLink, PacketTransport};
use tsunagi::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId};
use tsunagi_tcp_tls::TcpTlsTransport;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tcp_tls_transport_loopback() {
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_a = identity_a.endpoint_id();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
// Bind transport B on port 0 (ephemeral)
let transport_b = Arc::new(
TcpTlsTransport::bind(&identity_b, Some(0), Some("custom.example.com".to_string()))
.await
.expect("bind server should succeed"),
);
let port_b = transport_b.bound_port();
assert!(port_b > 0);
assert_eq!(transport_b.sni(), "custom.example.com");
// Bind transport A on port 0 (ephemeral)
let transport_a = Arc::new(
TcpTlsTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0), Some("custom.example.com".to_string()))
.await
.expect("bind client should succeed"),
);
assert_eq!(transport_a.sni(), "custom.example.com");
// Register B's address on transport A
let addr_b: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_b}").parse().unwrap();
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, addr_b);
// Spawn accept loop on B
let (inbound_tx, mut inbound_rx) = mpsc::channel::<InboundLink>(1);
let transport_b_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_b);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_b_clone
.accept_loop(move |inbound| {
let _ = inbound_tx.try_send(inbound);
})
.await;
});
// Open link from A to B
let link_a = tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(5),
transport_a.open(network, peer_b, "tcp-tls"),
)
.await
.expect("open should not timeout")
.expect("open should succeed");
// Receive inbound link on B
let inbound_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), inbound_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("accept should not timeout")
.expect("inbound link should arrive");
assert_eq!(inbound_b.network, network);
assert_eq!(inbound_b.peer, peer_a);
assert_eq!(inbound_b.protocol, "tcp-tls");
let link_b = inbound_b.link;
// Send from A to B
let data_a_to_b = Bytes::from_static(b"packet from A to B");
link_a.send(data_a_to_b.clone()).expect("send A->B");
let received_on_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), link_b.recv())
.await
.expect("recv B timeout")
.expect("recv B option");
assert_eq!(received_on_b, data_a_to_b);
// Send from B to A
let data_b_to_a = Bytes::from_static(b"reply from B to A");
link_b.send(data_b_to_a.clone()).expect("send B->A");
let received_on_a = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), link_a.recv())
.await
.expect("recv A timeout")
.expect("recv A option");
assert_eq!(received_on_a, data_b_to_a);
// Path descriptions
assert!(link_a.path_description().contains("tcp-tls"));
assert!(link_b.path_description().contains("tcp-tls"));
}
+160 -21
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
//! system level and signed by its holder, and that is what is compared
//! against.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::collections::{HashMap, VecDeque};
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use tsunagi::dataplane::routing::{FlowId, flow::ip_flow};
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{SharedLink, TransportError};
use tsunagi::dataplane::{PacketSink, PluginError};
use tsunagi::identity::NetworkId;
@@ -54,6 +55,66 @@ const TIMER_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(250);
/// Scratch space for one encapsulate or decapsulate call.
const SCRATCH: usize = 4096;
/// Mirrors boringtun 0.7's bounded pending-packet FIFO with opaque flow tags.
/// All three operations share the same mutex as the cryptographic state.
struct FlowTunnel {
tunn: Tunn,
queued: VecDeque<FlowId>,
}
fn is_data(result: &TunnResult<'_>) -> bool {
matches!(result, TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(bytes) if bytes.starts_with(&[4, 0, 0, 0]))
}
impl FlowTunnel {
fn encapsulate<'a>(
&mut self,
packet: &[u8],
scratch: &'a mut [u8],
flow: FlowId,
) -> (TunnResult<'a>, FlowId) {
let result = self.tunn.encapsulate(packet, scratch);
if is_data(&result) {
return (result, flow);
}
// MAX_QUEUE_DEPTH in boringtun 0.7: the newest packet is dropped at 256.
if self.queued.len() < 256 {
self.queued.push_back(flow);
}
(result, 0)
}
fn decapsulate<'a>(
&mut self,
packet: &[u8],
scratch: &'a mut [u8],
) -> (TunnResult<'a>, FlowId) {
let result = self.tunn.decapsulate(None, packet, scratch);
let mut flow = 0;
if packet.is_empty() {
if is_data(&result) {
flow = self.queued.pop_front().unwrap_or(0);
} else if let Some(pending) = self.queued.pop_front() {
// Without a session, draining pops the oldest IP packet and
// encapsulate queues it again at the back.
self.queued.push_back(pending);
}
}
(result, flow)
}
fn update_timers<'a>(&mut self, scratch: &'a mut [u8]) -> TunnResult<'a> {
let result = self.tunn.update_timers(scratch);
if matches!(
result,
TunnResult::Err(boringtun::noise::errors::WireGuardError::ConnectionExpired)
) {
self.queued.clear();
}
result
}
}
/// Counters for one peer's tunnel.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct PeerCounters {
@@ -120,7 +181,7 @@ struct Peer {
/// allocates it, the peer signs the claim, and every protocol carries
/// traffic for the same address.
overlay_v4: Mutex<Option<Ipv4Addr>>,
tunn: Mutex<Tunn>,
tunn: Mutex<FlowTunnel>,
link: SharedLink,
counters: Arc<PeerCounters>,
task: Mutex<Option<JoinHandle<()>>>,
@@ -165,7 +226,7 @@ impl Peer {
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
PeerHealth {
since_handshake: guard.time_since_last_handshake(),
since_handshake: guard.tunn.time_since_last_handshake(),
}
}
}
@@ -254,32 +315,34 @@ impl WireguardDevice {
return false;
};
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
let mut scratch = [0u8; SCRATCH];
let flow = ip_flow(packet);
// The encryption is the whole of what this protocol contributes, so
// it happens here rather than anywhere the packet passes through.
// The lock is released before the send: a slow link must not hold up
// the tunnel's timers.
let len = {
let result = {
let mut tunn = match peer.tunn.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
match tunn.encapsulate(packet, &mut scratch) {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Some(out.len()),
let (result, selected_flow) = tunn.encapsulate(packet, &mut scratch, flow);
match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Some((out.len(), selected_flow)),
// No session yet, so nothing to send. Counted as dropped
// rather than reported: the handshake is in flight and the
// next packet will go.
_ => None,
}
};
let Some(len) = len else {
let Some((len, selected_flow)) = result else {
peer.counters
.dropped_no_session
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return false;
};
send_to_peer(&peer, &scratch[..len]);
send_to_peer_flow(&peer, &scratch[..len], selected_flow);
peer.counters.tx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
peer.counters
.tx_bytes
@@ -320,7 +383,10 @@ impl WireguardDevice {
endpoint_id,
public_key,
overlay_v4: Mutex::new(overlay_v4),
tunn: Mutex::new(tunn),
tunn: Mutex::new(FlowTunnel {
tunn,
queued: VecDeque::new(),
}),
link,
counters: Arc::new(PeerCounters::default()),
task: Mutex::new(None),
@@ -412,9 +478,7 @@ fn write_lock<T>(lock: &RwLock<T>) -> std::sync::RwLockWriteGuard<'_, T> {
/// Asks boringtun for a handshake initiation and sends it.
///
/// Encapsulating an empty packet is how the protocol state machine is told
/// "there is something to say"; with no session yet it answers with the
/// handshake initiation.
/// This does not enqueue an empty IP packet in boringtun's pending queue.
fn kick_handshake(peer: &Peer) {
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
let len = {
@@ -422,7 +486,7 @@ fn kick_handshake(peer: &Peer) {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
match tunn.encapsulate(&[], &mut scratch) {
match tunn.tunn.format_handshake_initiation(&mut scratch, false) {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Some(out.len()),
_ => None,
}
@@ -434,7 +498,11 @@ fn kick_handshake(peer: &Peer) {
/// Sends whatever boringtun produced, without holding the tunnel lock.
fn send_to_peer(peer: &Peer, payload: &[u8]) {
match peer.link.send(Bytes::copy_from_slice(payload)) {
send_to_peer_flow(peer, payload, 0);
}
fn send_to_peer_flow(peer: &Peer, payload: &[u8], flow: FlowId) {
match peer.link.send_flow(Bytes::copy_from_slice(payload), flow) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(TransportError::TooLarge { .. }) => {
peer.counters
@@ -449,12 +517,12 @@ fn send_to_peer(peer: &Peer, payload: &[u8]) {
}
async fn read_from_link(inner: Arc<Inner>, peer: Arc<Peer>) {
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
loop {
let Some(datagram) = peer.link.recv().await else {
return;
};
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
// boringtun may need several passes: a handshake reply first, then
// any packets that were queued while the session was coming up.
let mut input: Option<&[u8]> = Some(&datagram);
@@ -464,8 +532,9 @@ async fn read_from_link(inner: Arc<Inner>, peer: Arc<Peer>) {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
match tunn.decapsulate(None, input.unwrap_or(&[]), &mut scratch) {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Outcome::ToNetwork(out.len()),
let (result, flow) = tunn.decapsulate(input.unwrap_or(&[]), &mut scratch);
match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Outcome::ToNetwork(out.len(), flow),
// The source boringtun reports is not consulted here:
// whether the peer may use it is checked where the
// claims live.
@@ -480,8 +549,8 @@ async fn read_from_link(inner: Arc<Inner>, peer: Arc<Peer>) {
};
match outcome {
Outcome::ToNetwork(len) => {
send_to_peer(&peer, &scratch[..len]);
Outcome::ToNetwork(len, flow) => {
send_to_peer_flow(&peer, &scratch[..len], flow);
// Keep draining with an empty datagram, as boringtun asks.
input = None;
continue;
@@ -515,7 +584,7 @@ async fn read_from_link(inner: Arc<Inner>, peer: Arc<Peer>) {
}
enum Outcome {
ToNetwork(usize),
ToNetwork(usize, FlowId),
ToTunnel(usize),
Done,
Failed,
@@ -550,3 +619,73 @@ async fn drive_timers(inner: Arc<Inner>) {
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod flow_tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn tunnel(ours: &WgSecretKey, theirs: &WgSecretKey) -> FlowTunnel {
FlowTunnel {
tunn: Tunn::new(
ours.to_static_secret(),
theirs.public().into_x25519(),
None,
None,
1,
None,
),
queued: VecDeque::new(),
}
}
fn wire(result: TunnResult<'_>) -> Vec<u8> {
match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(bytes) => bytes.to_vec(),
_ => panic!("expected WireGuard frame"),
}
}
#[test]
fn flow_tags_survive_pending_queue_overflow_handshake_and_encryption() {
let ak = WgSecretKey::from_bytes(&[1; 32]);
let bk = WgSecretKey::from_bytes(&[2; 32]);
let mut a = tunnel(&ak, &bk);
let mut b = tunnel(&bk, &ak);
let mut scratch = [0u8; SCRATCH];
let mut packet = [0u8; 40];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[2..4].copy_from_slice(&40u16.to_be_bytes());
packet[9] = 6;
packet[12..20].copy_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1, 10, 0, 0, 2]);
let (result, flow) = a.encapsulate(&packet, &mut scratch, 100);
assert_eq!(
flow, 0,
"handshake does not masquerade as application traffic"
);
let hello = wire(result);
for flow in 101..400 {
let _ = a.encapsulate(&packet, &mut scratch, flow);
}
assert_eq!(a.queued.len(), 256);
let response = wire(b.decapsulate(&hello, &mut scratch).0);
let keepalive = wire(a.decapsulate(&response, &mut scratch).0);
let _ = b.decapsulate(&keepalive, &mut scratch);
for expected in 100..356 {
let (result, flow) = a.decapsulate(&[], &mut scratch);
assert_eq!(flow, expected);
let ciphertext = wire(result);
match b.decapsulate(&ciphertext, &mut scratch).0 {
TunnResult::WriteToTunnelV4(bytes, _) => assert_eq!(bytes, packet),
_ => panic!("queued IP packet must decrypt"),
}
}
assert!(a.queued.is_empty());
assert!(matches!(
a.decapsulate(&[], &mut scratch).0,
TunnResult::Done
));
let (result, flow) = a.encapsulate(&packet, &mut scratch, 12345);
assert!(is_data(&result));
assert_eq!(flow, 12345);
}
}
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ impl tsunagi::ipc::ReportSource for Control {
&self,
name: String,
secret: String,
_broadcast: Option<bool>,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, Result<tsunagi::ipc::JoinedReport, String>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let name = tsunagi::identity::NetworkName::new(&name).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+234
View File
@@ -1510,3 +1510,237 @@ async fn a_peer_with_no_direct_path_is_reached_through_one_that_has_both() {
b.shutdown().await;
middle.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_chain_routes_through_two_transit_peers_without_touching_their_tuns() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let (name, secret) = network("wg-multihop");
let mut agents = Vec::new();
let mut blocked = Vec::new();
for index in 0..4 {
let cuts = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()));
agents.push(WgAgent::spawn_cut_off(&discovery, &format!("mh{index}"), cuts.clone()).await);
blocked.push(cuts);
}
// The authenticated control plane stays connected. The only available
// data links are A--B--C--D; A and D need two transit routers.
for (i, cuts) in blocked.iter().enumerate() {
for (j, agent) in agents.iter().enumerate() {
if i.abs_diff(j) > 1 {
cuts.lock().unwrap().insert(agent.endpoint_id());
}
}
}
let mut id = None;
for agent in &agents {
id = Some(agent.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap());
}
let id = id.unwrap();
for agent in &agents {
wait_for_peers(&agent.agent, id, 3).await;
agent.wait_for_tunnels(id, 3).await;
}
let a = &agents[0];
let d = &agents[3];
let a_addr = a.overlay(id).await;
let d_addr = d.overlay(id).await;
let a_tun = a.tun(id).await;
let d_tun = d.tun(id).await;
for (from, to, source, destination) in [
(&a_tun, &d_tun, a_addr, d_addr),
(&d_tun, &a_tun, d_addr, a_addr),
] {
let packet = tcp_packet(source, destination, 1280);
from.push_from_os(packet.clone());
let received = tokio::time::timeout(tsunagi::testing::DEADLINE, to.pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(received, packet);
}
for middle in &agents[1..3] {
assert!(
middle
.agent
.network_status(id)
.await
.unwrap()
.relay
.forwarded
> 0
);
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(100), middle.tun(id).await.pop_to_os())
.await
.is_err(),
"transit ciphertext must never enter the intermediate host's TUN"
);
}
// A direct shortcut wins immediately; losing it restores the chain using
// the same end-to-end tunnels and overlay addresses.
for allow_direct in [true, false] {
for (from, to) in [(0, 3), (3, 0)] {
if allow_direct {
blocked[from]
.lock()
.unwrap()
.remove(&agents[to].endpoint_id());
} else {
blocked[from]
.lock()
.unwrap()
.insert(agents[to].endpoint_id());
}
agents[from].agent.recheck_network(id).await.unwrap();
}
for (from, to) in [(a, d), (d, a)] {
wait_until("route follows the changed topology", || async {
let view = from.plugin.overview(id)?;
let tunnel = view
.peers
.iter()
.find(|peer| peer.endpoint_id == to.endpoint_id())?
.tunnel
.as_ref()?;
let relayed = tunnel.path.contains("relay 3 hops");
(tunnel.health.is_up()
&& if allow_direct {
!tunnel.path.contains("relay") && !tunnel.path.contains("unreachable")
} else {
relayed
})
.then_some(())
})
.await;
}
let packet = tcp_packet(a_addr, d_addr, 1280);
a_tun.push_from_os(packet.clone());
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(tsunagi::testing::DEADLINE, d_tun.pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
packet
);
}
for agent in agents {
agent.shutdown().await;
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn lan_broadcast_fanout_is_scoped_opt_in_and_does_not_reflood() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let (name, secret) = network("lan-broadcast");
let cuts = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()));
let a = WgAgent::spawn_cut_off(&discovery, "bca", cuts.clone()).await;
let b = WgAgent::spawn(&discovery, "bcb").await;
let c = WgAgent::spawn(&discovery, "bcc").await;
cuts.lock().unwrap().insert(c.endpoint_id());
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
c.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
for agent in [&a, &b, &c] {
agent.wait_for_tunnels(id, 2).await;
}
let addr = a.overlay(id).await;
let at = a.tun(id).await;
let bt = b.tun(id).await;
let ct = c.tun(id).await;
// Valid UDP discovery queries with game-like ports and an unchanged body.
fn query(source: std::net::Ipv4Addr, destination: std::net::Ipv4Addr) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = vec![0u8; 36];
bytes[0] = 0x45;
bytes[2..4].copy_from_slice(&36u16.to_be_bytes());
bytes[8] = 1;
bytes[9] = 17;
bytes[12..16].copy_from_slice(&source.octets());
bytes[16..20].copy_from_slice(&destination.octets());
bytes[20..22].copy_from_slice(&27015u16.to_be_bytes());
bytes[22..24].copy_from_slice(&6112u16.to_be_bytes());
bytes[24..26].copy_from_slice(&16u16.to_be_bytes());
bytes[28..].copy_from_slice(b"LAN GAME");
// UDP checksum zero is valid for IPv4.
let sum: u32 = bytes[..20]
.chunks_exact(2)
.map(|w| u16::from_be_bytes([w[0], w[1]]) as u32)
.sum();
let checksum = !((sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)) as u16;
bytes[10..12].copy_from_slice(&checksum.to_be_bytes());
Bytes::from(bytes)
}
let range = a.agent.network_status(id).await.unwrap().range.unwrap();
let directed = std::net::Ipv4Addr::from(u32::from(range.base) | (u32::MAX >> range.prefix_len));
for destination in [std::net::Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST, directed] {
let packet = query(addr, destination);
at.push_from_os(packet.clone());
for tun in [&bt, &ct] {
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(tsunagi::testing::DEADLINE, tun.pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
packet
);
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(100), tun.pop_to_os())
.await
.is_err(),
"each recipient gets one copy"
);
}
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(100), at.pop_to_os())
.await
.is_err(),
"never reflect to the origin"
);
}
c.agent.set_broadcast(id, false).await.unwrap();
wait_until("broadcast opt-out reaches sender", || async {
a.agent
.network_status(id)
.await
.ok()?
.peers
.iter()
.find(|peer| peer.endpoint_id == c.endpoint_id())
.filter(|peer| !peer.broadcast)
.map(|_| ())
})
.await;
let packet = query(addr, std::net::Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST);
at.push_from_os(packet.clone());
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(tsunagi::testing::DEADLINE, bt.pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
packet
);
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(150), ct.pop_to_os())
.await
.is_err()
);
// Disabling origin participation also stops outgoing copies.
a.agent.set_broadcast(id, false).await.unwrap();
at.push_from_os(packet);
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(150), bt.pop_to_os())
.await
.is_err()
);
// Discovery's unicast reply still crosses the same multihop route.
let reply = tcp_packet(c.overlay(id).await, addr, 1280);
ct.push_from_os(reply.clone());
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(tsunagi::testing::DEADLINE, at.pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
reply
);
for agent in [a, b, c] {
agent.shutdown().await;
}
}
+35
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
[package]
name = "tsunagi-wireguard"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "Pure WireGuard direct UDP transport and protocol plugin for tsunagi mesh networks."
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
repository.workspace = true
[dependencies]
tsunagi = { path = "../tsunagi", version = "0.1.0" }
iroh.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net", "io-util", "time", "sync", "macros"] }
serde.workspace = true
postcard.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
data-encoding.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
rusqlite = { version = "0.40", features = ["bundled"] }
subtle = "2.6"
zeroize = { version = "1.9", features = ["derive"] }
rand = "0.10"
boringtun = { version = "0.7.1", default-features = false }
netdev = "0.46"
[dev-dependencies]
tsunagi = { path = "../tsunagi", features = ["testing"] }
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros"] }
tempfile.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
//! What a pure WireGuard peer tells the network about itself.
//!
//! Exchanged via [`tsunagi::dataplane::PluginCapability`]. The announcement
//! carries the WireGuard public key, the listening UDP port, and candidate IP addresses
//! for direct UDP packet transport.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tsunagi::dataplane::PluginError;
use tsunagi::identity::NetworkId;
use crate::keys::WgPublicKey;
/// The wire protocol identifier for pure WireGuard.
pub const WG_PROTOCOL: &str = "wg";
/// Wire version of the `wg` announcement format.
pub const ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION: u16 = 1;
/// Wire version peers compare during capability exchange.
///
/// This is the same as [`ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION`]; keeping a separate name
/// makes the intent explicit in the CLI protocol registry.
pub const WG_WIRE_VERSION: u16 = ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION;
/// Maximum number of IP candidates allowed in an announcement.
pub const MAX_CANDIDATE_ADDRS: usize = 32;
/// What one participant advertises for the pure WireGuard UDP data plane.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct WgAnnouncement {
/// Announcement format version.
pub version: u16,
/// The peer's WireGuard public key.
pub public_key: [u8; 32],
/// The network this key is for.
pub network: [u8; 32],
/// The UDP port the peer is listening on for WireGuard packets.
pub port: u16,
/// Candidate IP addresses where this peer can be reached on `port`.
#[serde(default)]
pub addrs: Vec<std::net::IpAddr>,
}
/// A peer announcement that has been validated against a specific network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ValidatedAnnouncement {
/// The peer's WireGuard public key.
pub public_key: WgPublicKey,
/// The UDP port the peer listens on.
pub port: u16,
/// Validated candidate IP addresses.
pub addrs: Vec<std::net::IpAddr>,
}
impl WgAnnouncement {
/// Builds this agent's announcement.
pub fn new(
network: NetworkId,
public_key: &WgPublicKey,
port: u16,
addrs: Vec<std::net::IpAddr>,
) -> Self {
Self {
version: ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION,
public_key: *public_key.as_bytes(),
network: *network.as_bytes(),
port,
addrs,
}
}
/// Encodes the announcement into the opaque capability payload.
pub fn encode(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PluginError> {
postcard::to_allocvec(self)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot encode announcement: {err}")))
}
/// Decodes and validates a payload received from a peer.
pub fn decode_and_validate(
payload: &[u8],
network: NetworkId,
local_key: &WgPublicKey,
) -> Result<ValidatedAnnouncement, PluginError> {
let announcement: Self = postcard::from_bytes(payload)
.map_err(|_| PluginError::Rejected("malformed WireGuard announcement".into()))?;
announcement.validate(network, local_key)
}
fn validate(
self,
network: NetworkId,
local_key: &WgPublicKey,
) -> Result<ValidatedAnnouncement, PluginError> {
if self.version != ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(format!(
"peer speaks WireGuard announcement version {} but this build speaks \
{ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION}; one of the two needs updating",
self.version
)));
}
let public_key = WgPublicKey::from_bytes(self.public_key);
if public_key.is_zero() {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(
"WireGuard public key is all zeroes".into(),
));
}
if &public_key == local_key {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(
"peer announced this agent's own WireGuard key".into(),
));
}
if self.network != *network.as_bytes() {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(
"announcement is for a different network".into(),
));
}
if self.port == 0 {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected("WireGuard port cannot be 0".into()));
}
if self.addrs.len() > MAX_CANDIDATE_ADDRS {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(format!(
"too many candidate addresses: {} > {MAX_CANDIDATE_ADDRS}",
self.addrs.len()
)));
}
let mut valid_addrs = Vec::new();
for addr in self.addrs {
if !addr.is_unspecified() && !valid_addrs.contains(&addr) {
valid_addrs.push(addr);
}
}
Ok(ValidatedAnnouncement {
public_key,
port: self.port,
addrs: valid_addrs,
})
}
}
+686
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,686 @@
//! Userspace WireGuard device implementation over direct UDP links.
//!
//! Uses [`boringtun::noise::Tunn`] state machine to encrypt and decrypt
//! standard WireGuard protocol packets directly over a [`SharedLink`].
use std::collections::{HashMap, VecDeque};
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use std::time::Duration;
use boringtun::noise::{Tunn, TunnResult};
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use tsunagi::dataplane::routing::{FlowId, flow::ip_flow};
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{SharedLink, TransportError};
use tsunagi::dataplane::{PacketSink, PluginContext, PluginError};
use tsunagi::identity::NetworkId;
use crate::keys::{WgPublicKey, WgSecretKey};
use crate::transport::WireguardTransport;
const TIMER_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(250);
const SCRATCH: usize = 4096;
/// Maximum consecutive rekey timeout retransmissions before declaring a tunnel dead.
pub const MAX_REKEY_TIMEOUTS: u32 = 3;
/// Overall maximum duration trying to establish or rekey a handshake before declaring it dead.
pub const HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
struct FlowTunnel {
tunn: Tunn,
queued: VecDeque<FlowId>,
handshake_started_at: Option<std::time::Instant>,
rekey_timeouts: u32,
failed: bool,
}
fn is_data(result: &TunnResult<'_>) -> bool {
matches!(result, TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(bytes) if bytes.starts_with(&[4, 0, 0, 0]))
}
impl FlowTunnel {
fn encapsulate<'a>(
&mut self,
packet: &[u8],
scratch: &'a mut [u8],
flow: FlowId,
) -> (TunnResult<'a>, FlowId) {
let result = self.tunn.encapsulate(packet, scratch);
if is_data(&result) {
return (result, flow);
}
if matches!(result, TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(ref b) if !b.is_empty() && b[0] == 1)
&& self.handshake_started_at.is_none()
{
self.handshake_started_at = Some(std::time::Instant::now());
self.rekey_timeouts = 0;
self.failed = false;
}
if self.queued.len() < 256 {
self.queued.push_back(flow);
}
(result, 0)
}
fn decapsulate<'a>(
&mut self,
packet: &[u8],
scratch: &'a mut [u8],
) -> (TunnResult<'a>, FlowId) {
let result = self.tunn.decapsulate(None, packet, scratch);
if self.tunn.time_since_last_handshake().is_some() {
self.handshake_started_at = None;
self.rekey_timeouts = 0;
self.failed = false;
}
let mut flow = 0;
if packet.is_empty() {
if is_data(&result) {
flow = self.queued.pop_front().unwrap_or(0);
} else if let Some(pending) = self.queued.pop_front() {
self.queued.push_back(pending);
}
}
(result, flow)
}
fn update_timers<'a>(&mut self, scratch: &'a mut [u8]) -> (TunnResult<'a>, bool) {
if self.failed {
return (TunnResult::Done, false);
}
let result = self.tunn.update_timers(scratch);
if matches!(
result,
TunnResult::Err(boringtun::noise::errors::WireGuardError::ConnectionExpired)
) || self.tunn.is_expired()
{
self.failed = true;
self.queued.clear();
self.handshake_started_at = None;
self.rekey_timeouts = 0;
return (result, true);
}
if let TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(ref bytes) = result
&& !bytes.is_empty()
&& bytes[0] == 1
&& self.handshake_started_at.is_none()
{
self.handshake_started_at = Some(std::time::Instant::now());
}
if let Some(started) = self.handshake_started_at
&& started.elapsed() >= HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT
{
self.failed = true;
self.queued.clear();
self.handshake_started_at = None;
self.rekey_timeouts = 0;
return (result, true);
}
(result, false)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct PeerCounters {
tx_packets: AtomicU64,
tx_bytes: AtomicU64,
rx_packets: AtomicU64,
rx_bytes: AtomicU64,
dropped_wrong_source: AtomicU64,
dropped_oversize: AtomicU64,
dropped_no_session: AtomicU64,
protocol_errors: AtomicU64,
}
/// A snapshot of one peer's tunnel counters.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PeerStats {
/// Plaintext packets encrypted and sent to this peer.
pub tx_packets: u64,
/// Plaintext bytes encrypted and sent to this peer.
pub tx_bytes: u64,
/// Plaintext packets decrypted from this peer and given to the OS.
pub rx_packets: u64,
/// Plaintext bytes decrypted from this peer and given to the OS.
pub rx_bytes: u64,
/// Packets dropped because their source was not this peer's address.
pub dropped_wrong_source: u64,
/// Packets dropped because they did not fit in one link datagram.
pub dropped_oversize: u64,
/// Packets dropped because there was no session to encrypt with yet.
pub dropped_no_session: u64,
/// WireGuard protocol errors, including packets that failed to decrypt.
pub protocol_errors: u64,
}
/// Whether a peer's tunnel has completed a handshake.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PeerHealth {
/// Time since the last successful WireGuard handshake.
pub since_handshake: Option<Duration>,
}
impl PeerHealth {
/// Whether the tunnel has ever completed a handshake.
pub fn is_up(&self) -> bool {
self.since_handshake.is_some()
}
}
struct Peer {
endpoint_id: EndpointId,
public_key: WgPublicKey,
overlay_v4: Mutex<Option<Ipv4Addr>>,
tunn: Mutex<FlowTunnel>,
link: SharedLink,
counters: Arc<PeerCounters>,
task: Mutex<Option<JoinHandle<()>>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Peer {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Peer")
.field("peer", &self.endpoint_id.fmt_short().to_string())
.field("public_key", &self.public_key)
.finish()
}
}
impl Drop for Peer {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.task.lock()
&& let Some(task) = guard.take()
{
task.abort();
}
}
}
impl Peer {
fn stats(&self) -> PeerStats {
PeerStats {
tx_packets: self.counters.tx_packets.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
tx_bytes: self.counters.tx_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
rx_packets: self.counters.rx_packets.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
rx_bytes: self.counters.rx_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_wrong_source: self.counters.dropped_wrong_source.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_oversize: self.counters.dropped_oversize.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_no_session: self.counters.dropped_no_session.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
protocol_errors: self.counters.protocol_errors.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
}
}
fn health(&self) -> PeerHealth {
let guard = match self.tunn.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
PeerHealth {
since_handshake: guard.tunn.time_since_last_handshake(),
}
}
}
/// What a peer's tunnel looks like from outside.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PeerSummary {
/// The peer's control plane identity.
pub endpoint_id: EndpointId,
/// The peer's WireGuard public key.
pub public_key: WgPublicKey,
/// The overlay address it holds, once agreed.
pub overlay_address_v4: Option<Ipv4Addr>,
/// Whether the tunnel has handshaken.
pub health: PeerHealth,
/// Traffic counters.
pub stats: PeerStats,
/// What the transport reports about the path carrying this tunnel.
pub path: String,
/// Largest datagram the link accepts.
pub max_datagram: usize,
}
struct Inner {
network: NetworkId,
private_key: WgSecretKey,
peers: RwLock<HashMap<WgPublicKey, Arc<Peer>>>,
sink: Arc<dyn PacketSink>,
transport: Arc<WireguardTransport>,
context: PluginContext,
next_index: AtomicU32,
}
impl Inner {
fn on_tunnel_failed(&self, peer: EndpointId, public_key: WgPublicKey) {
self.transport.close_link(self.network, peer);
write_lock(&self.peers).remove(&public_key);
self.context.report_peer_protocol_failure(
self.network,
peer,
crate::announcement::WG_PROTOCOL,
"WireGuard rekey timeout",
);
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Inner {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Inner")
.field("network", &self.network.fmt_short())
.finish()
}
}
/// The userspace WireGuard tunnels of one network.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct WireguardDevice {
inner: Arc<Inner>,
tasks: Vec<JoinHandle<()>>,
}
impl WireguardDevice {
/// Starts the WireGuard tunnels for one network.
pub fn start(
network: NetworkId,
private_key: WgSecretKey,
sink: Arc<dyn PacketSink>,
transport: Arc<WireguardTransport>,
context: PluginContext,
) -> Self {
let inner = Arc::new(Inner {
network,
private_key,
peers: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
sink,
transport,
context,
next_index: AtomicU32::new(1),
});
let timers = tokio::spawn(drive_timers(Arc::clone(&inner)));
Self {
inner,
tasks: vec![timers],
}
}
/// Encrypts an IP packet and sends it to a peer over its direct link.
pub fn carry(&self, peer: EndpointId, packet: &[u8]) -> bool {
let found = read_lock(&self.inner.peers)
.values()
.find(|candidate| candidate.endpoint_id == peer)
.cloned();
let Some(peer) = found else {
return false;
};
let mut scratch = [0u8; SCRATCH];
let flow = ip_flow(packet);
let result = {
let mut tunn = match peer.tunn.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
let (result, selected_flow) = tunn.encapsulate(packet, &mut scratch, flow);
match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Some((out.len(), selected_flow)),
_ => None,
}
};
let Some((len, selected_flow)) = result else {
peer.counters
.dropped_no_session
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return false;
};
send_to_peer_flow(&peer, &scratch[..len], selected_flow);
peer.counters.tx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
peer.counters
.tx_bytes
.fetch_add(packet.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
true
}
/// Adds or replaces a peer and starts its tunnel.
pub fn add_peer(
&self,
endpoint_id: EndpointId,
public_key: WgPublicKey,
overlay_v4: Option<Ipv4Addr>,
link: SharedLink,
keepalive: Option<u16>,
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
if public_key == self.inner.private_key.public() {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(
"refusing to add ourselves as a WireGuard peer".into(),
));
}
let index = self.inner.next_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let tunn = Tunn::new(
self.inner.private_key.to_static_secret(),
public_key.into_x25519(),
None,
keepalive,
index,
None,
);
let peer = Arc::new(Peer {
endpoint_id,
public_key,
overlay_v4: Mutex::new(overlay_v4),
tunn: Mutex::new(FlowTunnel {
tunn,
queued: VecDeque::new(),
handshake_started_at: None,
rekey_timeouts: 0,
failed: false,
}),
link,
counters: Arc::new(PeerCounters::default()),
task: Mutex::new(None),
});
let task = tokio::spawn(read_from_link(Arc::clone(&self.inner), Arc::clone(&peer)));
if let Ok(mut guard) = peer.task.lock() {
*guard = Some(task);
}
write_lock(&self.inner.peers).insert(public_key, Arc::clone(&peer));
kick_handshake(&peer);
Ok(())
}
/// Removes a peer and stops its tunnel.
pub fn remove_peer(&self, public_key: &WgPublicKey) {
write_lock(&self.inner.peers).remove(public_key);
}
/// Removes every peer whose key is not in `keep`.
pub fn retain_peers(&self, keep: &[WgPublicKey]) {
let stale: Vec<WgPublicKey> = read_lock(&self.inner.peers)
.keys()
.filter(|key| !keep.contains(key))
.copied()
.collect();
for key in stale {
self.remove_peer(&key);
}
}
/// Whether a peer's tunnel exists.
pub fn has_peer(&self, public_key: &WgPublicKey) -> bool {
read_lock(&self.inner.peers).contains_key(public_key)
}
/// A snapshot of every peer.
pub fn peers(&self) -> Vec<PeerSummary> {
let mut peers: Vec<PeerSummary> = read_lock(&self.inner.peers)
.values()
.map(|peer| {
let overlay_v4 = match peer.overlay_v4.lock() {
Ok(guard) => *guard,
Err(poisoned) => *poisoned.into_inner(),
};
PeerSummary {
endpoint_id: peer.endpoint_id,
public_key: peer.public_key,
overlay_address_v4: overlay_v4,
health: peer.health(),
stats: peer.stats(),
path: peer.link.path_description(),
max_datagram: peer.link.max_datagram_size(),
}
})
.collect();
peers.sort_by_key(|peer| peer.public_key);
peers
}
}
impl Drop for WireguardDevice {
fn drop(&mut self) {
for task in &self.tasks {
task.abort();
}
}
}
fn read_lock<T>(lock: &RwLock<T>) -> std::sync::RwLockReadGuard<'_, T> {
match lock.read() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
fn write_lock<T>(lock: &RwLock<T>) -> std::sync::RwLockWriteGuard<'_, T> {
match lock.write() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
fn kick_handshake(peer: &Peer) {
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
let len = {
let mut tunn = match peer.tunn.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
match tunn.tunn.format_handshake_initiation(&mut scratch, false) {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => {
tunn.handshake_started_at = Some(std::time::Instant::now());
tunn.rekey_timeouts = 0;
tunn.failed = false;
Some(out.len())
}
_ => None,
}
};
if let Some(len) = len {
send_to_peer(peer, &scratch[..len]);
}
}
fn send_to_peer(peer: &Peer, payload: &[u8]) {
send_to_peer_flow(peer, payload, 0);
}
fn send_to_peer_flow(peer: &Peer, payload: &[u8], flow: FlowId) {
match peer.link.send_flow(Bytes::copy_from_slice(payload), flow) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(TransportError::TooLarge { .. }) => {
peer.counters
.dropped_oversize
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
Err(TransportError::Closed) => {}
Err(err) => {
tracing::trace!(%err, "dropping a WireGuard packet the link refused");
}
}
}
async fn read_from_link(inner: Arc<Inner>, peer: Arc<Peer>) {
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
loop {
let Some(datagram) = peer.link.recv().await else {
return;
};
let mut input: Option<&[u8]> = Some(&datagram);
loop {
let outcome = {
let mut tunn = match peer.tunn.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
let (result, flow) = tunn.decapsulate(input.unwrap_or(&[]), &mut scratch);
match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Outcome::ToNetwork(out.len(), flow),
TunnResult::WriteToTunnelV6(out, _) => Outcome::ToTunnel(out.len()),
TunnResult::WriteToTunnelV4(out, _) => Outcome::ToTunnel(out.len()),
TunnResult::Done => Outcome::Done,
TunnResult::Err(err) => {
tracing::trace!(?err, "WireGuard decapsulation failed");
Outcome::Failed
}
}
};
match outcome {
Outcome::ToNetwork(len, flow) => {
send_to_peer_flow(&peer, &scratch[..len], flow);
input = None;
continue;
}
Outcome::ToTunnel(len) => {
let payload = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&scratch[..len]);
inner
.sink
.deliver(inner.network, peer.endpoint_id, payload)
.await;
peer.counters.rx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
peer.counters
.rx_bytes
.fetch_add(len as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
break;
}
Outcome::Failed => {
peer.counters
.protocol_errors
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
break;
}
Outcome::Done => break,
}
}
}
}
enum Outcome {
ToNetwork(usize, FlowId),
ToTunnel(usize),
Done,
Failed,
}
async fn drive_timers(inner: Arc<Inner>) {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(TIMER_INTERVAL);
ticker.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
let peers: Vec<Arc<Peer>> = read_lock(&inner.peers).values().cloned().collect();
for peer in peers {
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
let (len, failed) = {
let mut tunn = match peer.tunn.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
};
let (result, failed) = tunn.update_timers(&mut scratch);
let len = match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(out) => Some(out.len()),
TunnResult::Err(err) => {
tracing::trace!(?err, "WireGuard timer error");
None
}
_ => None,
};
(len, failed)
};
if let Some(len) = len {
send_to_peer(&peer, &scratch[..len]);
}
if failed {
tracing::warn!(
peer = %peer.endpoint_id.fmt_short(),
"WireGuard tunnel failed due to rekey timeout, triggering fallback"
);
inner.on_tunnel_failed(peer.endpoint_id, peer.public_key);
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_flow_tunnel_rekey_timeout_triggers_failure() {
let my_secret = WgSecretKey::generate();
let their_secret = WgSecretKey::generate();
let their_public = their_secret.public();
let tunn = Tunn::new(
my_secret.to_static_secret(),
their_public.into_x25519(),
None,
None,
1,
None,
);
let mut tunnel = FlowTunnel {
tunn,
queued: VecDeque::new(),
handshake_started_at: Some(std::time::Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(16)),
rekey_timeouts: 0,
failed: false,
};
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
// When handshake timeout exceeds HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT (15s), update_timers returns true (failed)
let (_, failed) = tunnel.update_timers(&mut scratch);
assert!(failed, "handshake timeout should report failure");
assert!(tunnel.handshake_started_at.is_none());
assert!(tunnel.failed, "tunnel should be marked as failed");
// Subsequent timer tick must not report failure again
let (_, failed_again) = tunnel.update_timers(&mut scratch);
assert!(
!failed_again,
"subsequent timer tick should not re-trigger failure"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_flow_tunnel_reset_on_handshake() {
let my_secret = WgSecretKey::generate();
let their_secret = WgSecretKey::generate();
let their_public = their_secret.public();
let tunn = Tunn::new(
my_secret.to_static_secret(),
their_public.into_x25519(),
None,
None,
1,
None,
);
let mut tunnel = FlowTunnel {
tunn,
queued: VecDeque::new(),
handshake_started_at: Some(std::time::Instant::now()),
rekey_timeouts: 2,
failed: true,
};
let mut scratch = vec![0u8; SCRATCH];
let _ = tunnel.decapsulate(&[], &mut scratch);
// decapsulate without handshake response doesn't establish session
assert_eq!(tunnel.rekey_timeouts, 2);
}
}
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//! WireGuard key material for pure WireGuard transport.
//!
//! Keys belong to this protocol plugin alone. They are not derived from
//! the iroh device key and not derived from the network secret, so compromising
//! or rotating one does not affect the others.
//!
//! Keys are X25519, encoded the way WireGuard encodes them: standard base64
//! with padding, 44 characters.
use boringtun::x25519;
use data_encoding::BASE64;
use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
use tsunagi::dataplane::PluginError;
/// Length of a raw WireGuard key in bytes.
pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Length of the base64 text form of a key.
pub const KEY_TEXT_LEN: usize = 44;
/// Applies the X25519 clamping WireGuard applies to private keys.
fn clamp(bytes: &mut [u8; KEY_LEN]) {
bytes[0] &= 248;
bytes[31] &= 127;
bytes[31] |= 64;
}
/// A WireGuard public key.
///
/// Public, safe to log, and the identity a peer is known by inside the overlay.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
pub struct WgPublicKey([u8; KEY_LEN]);
impl WgPublicKey {
/// Wraps raw key bytes.
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Self {
Self(bytes)
}
/// The raw key bytes.
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; KEY_LEN] {
&self.0
}
/// The key in the form the WireGuard implementation expects.
pub(crate) fn into_x25519(self) -> x25519::PublicKey {
x25519::PublicKey::from(self.0)
}
/// Whether this is the all-zero key, which is never a valid peer.
pub fn is_zero(&self) -> bool {
self.0 == [0u8; KEY_LEN]
}
/// The base64 form WireGuard uses.
pub fn encode(&self) -> String {
BASE64.encode(&self.0)
}
/// Parses the base64 form WireGuard uses.
pub fn decode(text: &str) -> Result<Self, PluginError> {
if text.len() != KEY_TEXT_LEN {
return Err(PluginError::Rejected(format!(
"a WireGuard key is {KEY_TEXT_LEN} base64 characters, got {}",
text.len()
)));
}
let raw = BASE64
.decode(text.as_bytes())
.map_err(|_| PluginError::Rejected("key is not valid base64".into()))?;
let bytes = <[u8; KEY_LEN]>::try_from(raw.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| PluginError::Rejected("key is not 32 bytes".into()))?;
Ok(Self(bytes))
}
/// A short prefix for logs and diagnostics.
pub fn fmt_short(&self) -> String {
self.encode().chars().take(8).collect()
}
}
impl std::fmt::Display for WgPublicKey {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str(&self.encode())
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for WgPublicKey {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "WgPublicKey({})", self.fmt_short())
}
}
/// A WireGuard private key.
///
/// Clamped on creation so it matches what `wg genkey` produces. Zeroized on
/// drop, and prints as `[redacted]` in Debug so it cannot leak into logs.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct WgSecretKey {
bytes: Zeroizing<[u8; KEY_LEN]>,
public: WgPublicKey,
}
impl WgSecretKey {
/// Generates a fresh clamped random private key.
pub fn generate() -> Self {
let mut bytes = [0u8; KEY_LEN];
rand::fill(&mut bytes);
clamp(&mut bytes);
let secret = x25519::StaticSecret::from(bytes);
let public = WgPublicKey(*x25519::PublicKey::from(&secret).as_bytes());
Self {
bytes: Zeroizing::new(bytes),
public,
}
}
/// Wraps existing key bytes, clamping them to a valid X25519 private key.
pub fn from_bytes(raw: &[u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Self {
let mut bytes = *raw;
clamp(&mut bytes);
let secret = x25519::StaticSecret::from(bytes);
let public = WgPublicKey(*x25519::PublicKey::from(&secret).as_bytes());
Self {
bytes: Zeroizing::new(bytes),
public,
}
}
/// The matching public key.
pub fn public(&self) -> WgPublicKey {
self.public
}
/// The key in the form the WireGuard implementation expects.
pub(crate) fn to_static_secret(&self) -> x25519::StaticSecret {
x25519::StaticSecret::from(*self.bytes)
}
/// The raw key bytes.
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; KEY_LEN] {
&self.bytes
}
}
impl Drop for WgSecretKey {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.bytes.zeroize();
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for WgSecretKey {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("WgSecretKey")
.field("bytes", &"[redacted]")
.field("public", &self.public)
.finish()
}
}
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//! The pure WireGuard protocol plugin for Tsunagi: WireGuard cryptography over direct UDP.
//!
//! Deliberately a separate crate from the core, ensuring clear boundaries:
//! - Direct UDP datagram transport without QUIC encapsulation or double-encryption.
//! - Standard WireGuard cryptography via `boringtun`.
//! - Peer discovery and key exchange managed through the Tsunagi control plane.
#![deny(unsafe_code)]
#![warn(missing_docs)]
pub mod announcement;
pub mod device;
pub mod keys;
pub mod plugin;
pub mod store;
pub mod transport;
pub use announcement::{
ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION, ValidatedAnnouncement, WG_PROTOCOL, WG_WIRE_VERSION, WgAnnouncement,
};
pub use device::{PeerHealth, PeerStats, PeerSummary, WireguardDevice};
pub use keys::{WgPublicKey, WgSecretKey};
pub use plugin::{
DEFAULT_MTU, MIN_MTU, NetworkOverview, PeerOverview, WIREGUARD_OVERHEAD, WireguardConfig,
WireguardPlugin, local_ip_candidates,
};
pub use store::WgKeyStore;
pub use transport::{DEFAULT_PORT, MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE, WireguardLink, WireguardTransport};
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
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//! The plugin's own key store.
//!
//! Deliberately a separate SQLite file from the agent's `state.sqlite`: plugin
//! keys are not the iroh identity and not the network secret, and their
//! lifecycle is the plugin's business alone.
//!
//! One key per network, so a participant presents a different WireGuard
//! identity in each network it belongs to.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use rusqlite::{Connection, OptionalExtension, params};
use tsunagi::dataplane::PluginError;
use tsunagi::identity::NetworkId;
use crate::keys::{KEY_LEN, WgSecretKey};
/// Schema version written by this build.
pub const SCHEMA_VERSION: i64 = 1;
/// Per-network WireGuard private keys.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct WgKeyStore {
conn: Mutex<Connection>,
path: PathBuf,
}
impl WgKeyStore {
/// Opens, creating the file and its directory if needed.
pub fn open(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Self, PluginError> {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
tsunagi::storage::create_dir(parent)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot create {parent:?}: {err}")))?;
}
let existed = path.exists();
let conn = Connection::open(&path).map_err(|err| {
PluginError::Other(format!("cannot open the WireGuard key store: {err}"))
})?;
tsunagi::storage::restrict_path_permissions(&path)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot secure the key store: {err}")))?;
conn.busy_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
.and_then(|()| conn.pragma_update(None, "journal_mode", "WAL"))
.and_then(|()| conn.pragma_update(None, "synchronous", "NORMAL"))
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot configure the key store: {err}")))?;
if existed {
let integrity: String = conn
.query_row("PRAGMA integrity_check", [], |row| row.get(0))
.map_err(|err| {
PluginError::Other(format!("WireGuard key store is unusable: {err}"))
})?;
if integrity != "ok" {
return Err(PluginError::Other(format!(
"WireGuard key store at {} is corrupt and will not be recreated: {integrity}",
path.display()
)));
}
}
let found: i64 = conn
.query_row("PRAGMA user_version", [], |row| row.get(0))
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot read the schema version: {err}")))?;
if found > SCHEMA_VERSION {
return Err(PluginError::Other(format!(
"WireGuard key store schema {found} is newer than {SCHEMA_VERSION}"
)));
}
if found < SCHEMA_VERSION {
conn.execute_batch(
"BEGIN;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS network_keys (
network_id BLOB PRIMARY KEY,
secret BLOB NOT NULL,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
PRAGMA user_version = 1;
COMMIT;",
)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot create the schema: {err}")))?;
}
Ok(Self {
conn: Mutex::new(conn),
path,
})
}
/// Path of the underlying file.
pub fn path(&self) -> &Path {
&self.path
}
/// Loads the stored key for `network`, or generates, stores and returns a fresh one.
pub fn load_or_create(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Result<WgSecretKey, PluginError> {
let guard = self
.conn
.lock()
.map_err(|_| PluginError::Other("key store lock is poisoned".into()))?;
let existing: Option<Vec<u8>> = guard
.query_row(
"SELECT secret FROM network_keys WHERE network_id = ?1",
params![network.as_bytes().as_slice()],
|row| row.get(0),
)
.optional()
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot read the key store: {err}")))?;
if let Some(secret) = existing {
let bytes = <[u8; KEY_LEN]>::try_from(secret.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
PluginError::Other(format!(
"stored WireGuard key for {} is {} bytes, expected {KEY_LEN}",
network.fmt_short(),
secret.len()
))
})?;
return Ok(WgSecretKey::from_bytes(&bytes));
}
let fresh = WgSecretKey::generate();
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("system clock is broken: {err}")))?
.as_secs() as i64;
guard
.execute(
"INSERT INTO network_keys (network_id, secret, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3)",
params![
network.as_bytes().as_slice(),
fresh.as_bytes().as_slice(),
now
],
)
.map_err(|err| PluginError::Other(format!("cannot write the key store: {err}")))?;
Ok(fresh)
}
/// Removes the stored key for `network`.
pub fn forget(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
let guard = self
.conn
.lock()
.map_err(|_| PluginError::Other("key store lock is poisoned".into()))?;
guard
.execute(
"DELETE FROM network_keys WHERE network_id = ?1",
params![network.as_bytes().as_slice()],
)
.map_err(|err| {
PluginError::Other(format!("cannot delete from the key store: {err}"))
})?;
Ok(())
}
}
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//! Pure WireGuard UDP packet transport and link implementation.
//!
//! Provides [`WireguardTransport`] implementing [`PacketTransport`]
//! and [`WireguardLink`] implementing [`PacketLink`].
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
use tokio::sync::{Notify, mpsc, oneshot};
use tsunagi::BoxFuture;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{
InboundLink, PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError,
};
use tsunagi::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId};
/// Default UDP port to bind and listen on for pure WireGuard.
pub const DEFAULT_PORT: u16 = 51820;
/// Maximum payload length for a single framed datagram over UDP.
pub const MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE: usize = 65507;
const PROBE_MAGIC: &[u8; 19] = b"TSUNAGI_WG_PROBE_V1";
const PROBE_TYPE_PING: u8 = 1;
const PROBE_TYPE_PONG: u8 = 2;
const PROBE_LEN: usize = 19 + 1 + 32 + 32 + 32 + 8; // 124 bytes
fn encode_probe(
msg_type: u8,
sender: EndpointId,
receiver: EndpointId,
network: NetworkId,
cookie: u64,
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(PROBE_LEN);
buf.extend_from_slice(PROBE_MAGIC);
buf.push(msg_type);
buf.extend_from_slice(sender.as_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(receiver.as_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(network.as_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(&cookie.to_be_bytes());
buf
}
struct DecodedProbe {
msg_type: u8,
sender: EndpointId,
receiver: EndpointId,
network: NetworkId,
cookie: u64,
}
fn decode_probe(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<DecodedProbe> {
if bytes.len() < PROBE_LEN || &bytes[..19] != PROBE_MAGIC {
return None;
}
let msg_type = bytes[19];
if msg_type != PROBE_TYPE_PING && msg_type != PROBE_TYPE_PONG {
return None;
}
let sender = EndpointId::from_bytes(&bytes[20..52].try_into().ok()?).ok()?;
let receiver = EndpointId::from_bytes(&bytes[52..84].try_into().ok()?).ok()?;
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes(bytes[84..116].try_into().ok()?);
let cookie = u64::from_be_bytes(bytes[116..124].try_into().ok()?);
Some(DecodedProbe {
msg_type,
sender,
receiver,
network,
cookie,
})
}
/// An authenticated datagram link carried over direct UDP.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct WireguardLink {
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
target_addr: Arc<RwLock<SocketAddr>>,
candidates: Arc<RwLock<Vec<SocketAddr>>>,
confirmed: Arc<AtomicBool>,
tx: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
inbound_tx: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
closed_notify: Arc<Notify>,
is_closed: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl WireguardLink {
/// Creates a new `WireguardLink` targeting `target_addr` over `socket`.
pub fn new(
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
target_addr: SocketAddr,
candidates: Vec<SocketAddr>,
socket: Arc<UdpSocket>,
) -> Self {
let (tx_out, mut rx_out) = mpsc::channel::<Bytes>(1024);
let (tx_in, rx_in) = mpsc::channel::<Bytes>(1024);
let is_closed = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let confirmed = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let closed_notify = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let target_holder = Arc::new(RwLock::new(target_addr));
let candidates_holder = Arc::new(RwLock::new(candidates));
let socket_w = Arc::clone(&socket);
let target_r = Arc::clone(&target_holder);
let candidates_r = Arc::clone(&candidates_holder);
let confirmed_r = Arc::clone(&confirmed);
let is_closed_w = Arc::clone(&is_closed);
let closed_notify_w = Arc::clone(&closed_notify);
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(msg) = rx_out.recv().await {
if msg.len() > MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE {
continue;
}
// In WireGuard protocol, type 1 is Handshake Initiation (148 bytes).
let is_handshake_init = !msg.is_empty() && msg[0] == 1;
if confirmed_r.load(Ordering::Acquire) && !is_handshake_init {
let target = match target_r.read() {
Ok(g) => *g,
Err(p) => *p.into_inner(),
};
if let Err(err) = socket_w.send_to(&msg, target).await {
tracing::trace!(%err, %target, "failed to send WireGuard UDP datagram");
}
} else {
let targets = match candidates_r.read() {
Ok(g) => g.clone(),
Err(p) => p.into_inner().clone(),
};
if targets.is_empty() {
let target = match target_r.read() {
Ok(g) => *g,
Err(p) => *p.into_inner(),
};
let _ = socket_w.send_to(&msg, target).await;
} else {
for target in targets {
let _ = socket_w.send_to(&msg, target).await;
}
}
}
}
is_closed_w.store(true, Ordering::Release);
closed_notify_w.notify_waiters();
});
Self {
network,
peer,
target_addr: target_holder,
candidates: candidates_holder,
confirmed,
tx: tx_out,
inbound_tx: tx_in,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(rx_in),
closed_notify,
is_closed,
}
}
/// Delivers an inbound packet received from UDP into this link's receive queue.
pub fn deliver_inbound(&self, payload: Bytes) -> bool {
if self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return false;
}
self.confirmed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
self.inbound_tx.try_send(payload).is_ok()
}
/// Marks this link as confirmed by a probe response or verified packet.
pub fn confirm(&self) {
self.confirmed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
/// Whether this link has had verified two-way direct connectivity.
pub fn is_confirmed(&self) -> bool {
self.confirmed.load(Ordering::Acquire)
}
/// Updates candidate addresses for this peer.
pub fn update_candidates(&self, addrs: impl IntoIterator<Item = SocketAddr>) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.candidates.write() {
let new_candidates: Vec<SocketAddr> = addrs
.into_iter()
.filter(|a| !a.ip().is_unspecified())
.collect();
if !new_candidates.is_empty() {
*guard = new_candidates;
}
}
}
/// Updates the target socket address (roaming / NAT hole punch update).
pub fn update_target(&self, new_target: SocketAddr) {
if new_target.ip().is_unspecified() {
return;
}
self.confirmed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.target_addr.write()
&& *guard != new_target
{
tracing::debug!(peer = %self.peer.fmt_short(), old = %*guard, new = %new_target, "WireGuard endpoint roamed");
*guard = new_target;
}
}
/// Explicitly closes this link, notifying any pending readers or waiters.
pub fn close(&self) {
if !self.is_closed.swap(true, Ordering::AcqRel) {
self.closed_notify.notify_waiters();
}
}
/// Returns the current target address.
pub fn target_addr(&self) -> SocketAddr {
match self.target_addr.read() {
Ok(g) => *g,
Err(p) => *p.into_inner(),
}
}
}
impl PacketLink for WireguardLink {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.network
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.peer
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE
}
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if payload.len() > MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE {
return Err(TransportError::TooLarge {
size: payload.len(),
limit: MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE,
});
}
if self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
}
self.tx
.try_send(payload)
.map_err(|_| TransportError::Closed)
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move {
if self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return None;
}
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = self.closed_notify.notified() => None,
msg = async {
let mut guard = self.rx.lock().await;
guard.recv().await
} => msg,
}
})
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
if self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return;
}
self.closed_notify.notified().await;
})
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
self.is_closed.load(Ordering::Acquire)
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
format!("wireguard via {}", self.target_addr())
}
}
type InboundCallback = Box<dyn Fn(InboundLink) + Send + Sync + 'static>;
type PendingProbes = Arc<Mutex<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId, u64), oneshot::Sender<SocketAddr>>>>;
/// Direct UDP WireGuard packet transport.
pub struct WireguardTransport {
local_id: EndpointId,
listen_port: u16,
socket: Arc<UdpSocket>,
peer_addresses: RwLock<HashMap<EndpointId, Vec<SocketAddr>>>,
peer_networks: RwLock<HashMap<EndpointId, HashSet<NetworkId>>>,
links: RwLock<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId), Arc<WireguardLink>>>,
inbound_cb: Arc<Mutex<Option<InboundCallback>>>,
pending_probes: PendingProbes,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for WireguardTransport {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("WireguardTransport")
.field("local_id", &self.local_id.fmt_short().to_string())
.field("listen_port", &self.listen_port)
.finish()
}
}
impl WireguardTransport {
/// Binds a UDP socket for pure WireGuard transport.
///
/// Attempts `requested_port` (default 51820). If that fails, falls back to an ephemeral port.
pub async fn bind(
identity: &DeviceIdentity,
requested_port: Option<u16>,
) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let target_port = requested_port.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_PORT);
let bind_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], target_port));
let socket = match UdpSocket::bind(bind_addr).await {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(err) if target_port > 0 => {
tracing::warn!(%err, port = target_port, "failed to bind WireGuard UDP port, falling back to ephemeral port");
UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], 0))).await?
}
Err(err) => return Err(Box::new(err)),
};
let bound_port = socket.local_addr()?.port();
tracing::info!(port = bound_port, "WireGuard UDP transport bound");
Ok(Self {
local_id: identity.endpoint_id(),
listen_port: bound_port,
socket: Arc::new(socket),
peer_addresses: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
peer_networks: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
links: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
inbound_cb: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
pending_probes: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
})
}
/// The local port this transport is listening on.
pub fn bound_port(&self) -> u16 {
self.listen_port
}
/// Associates a peer with a network ID.
pub fn set_peer_network(&self, peer: EndpointId, network: NetworkId) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.peer_networks.write() {
guard.entry(peer).or_default().insert(network);
}
}
/// Records an observed UDP target address for a peer.
pub fn set_peer_addr(&self, peer: EndpointId, addr: SocketAddr) {
if !addr.is_ipv4() || addr.ip().is_unspecified() {
return;
}
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.peer_addresses.write() {
let addrs = guard.entry(peer).or_default();
addrs.retain(|a| *a != addr);
addrs.insert(0, addr);
}
}
/// Records multiple observed UDP target addresses for a peer.
pub fn set_peer_addrs(&self, peer: EndpointId, addrs: impl IntoIterator<Item = SocketAddr>) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.peer_addresses.write() {
let entry = guard.entry(peer).or_default();
for addr in addrs {
if addr.is_ipv4() && !addr.ip().is_unspecified() && !entry.contains(&addr) {
entry.push(addr);
}
}
}
}
/// Returns candidate socket addresses known for a peer.
pub fn peer_addrs(&self, peer: EndpointId) -> Vec<SocketAddr> {
let guard = match self.peer_addresses.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.get(&peer).cloned().unwrap_or_default()
}
/// Explicitly closes any active direct link for the given network and peer.
pub fn close_link(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
let link = {
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.get(&(network, peer)).cloned()
};
if let Some(link) = link {
link.close();
}
}
/// Notifies the transport that a peer's capability was announced.
///
/// When `we_accept` is true, sends a hole-punch probe to candidate addresses
/// to open stateful NAT firewalls, but does NOT create an unverified direct link
/// in the hub before packets actually flow.
pub fn notify_peer_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
addrs: &[SocketAddr],
we_accept: bool,
) {
self.set_peer_network(peer, network);
let ipv4_addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = addrs.iter().copied().filter(|a| a.is_ipv4()).collect();
self.set_peer_addrs(peer, ipv4_addrs.iter().copied());
// Update candidate addresses on any existing link for this peer
if let Ok(guard) = self.links.read()
&& let Some(link) = guard.get(&(network, peer))
{
link.update_candidates(ipv4_addrs.iter().copied());
}
// Send hole punching probe if we accept and have candidate addresses.
if we_accept && !ipv4_addrs.is_empty() {
let socket = Arc::clone(&self.socket);
let local_id = self.local_id;
tokio::spawn(async move {
let cookie: u64 = rand::random();
let probe = encode_probe(PROBE_TYPE_PING, local_id, peer, network, cookie);
for addr in ipv4_addrs {
let _ = socket.send_to(&probe, addr).await;
}
});
}
}
/// Runs the receive loop for incoming UDP datagrams.
pub async fn accept_loop<F>(&self, on_inbound: F)
where
F: Fn(InboundLink) + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
{
let mut guard = match self.inbound_cb.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
*guard = Some(Box::new(on_inbound));
}
let socket = Arc::clone(&self.socket);
let mut buf = [0u8; MAX_UDP_DATAGRAM_SIZE];
while let Ok((len, src_addr)) = socket.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
if src_addr.ip().is_unspecified() {
continue;
}
// 1. Direct UDP probe packet handling
if len >= PROBE_LEN
&& &buf[..19] == PROBE_MAGIC
&& let Some(probe) = decode_probe(&buf[..len])
{
if probe.receiver != self.local_id {
continue;
}
if probe.msg_type == PROBE_TYPE_PING {
let is_known = {
let guard = match self.peer_networks.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.get(&probe.sender)
.is_some_and(|nets| nets.contains(&probe.network))
};
if is_known {
let pong = encode_probe(
PROBE_TYPE_PONG,
self.local_id,
probe.sender,
probe.network,
probe.cookie,
);
let _ = socket.send_to(&pong, src_addr).await;
self.set_peer_addr(probe.sender, src_addr);
let link = {
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(existing) = guard.get(&(probe.network, probe.sender))
&& !existing.is_closed()
{
existing.update_target(src_addr);
existing.confirm();
None
} else {
let candidates = self.peer_addrs(probe.sender);
let link = Arc::new(WireguardLink::new(
probe.network,
probe.sender,
src_addr,
candidates,
Arc::clone(&self.socket),
));
link.confirm();
guard.insert((probe.network, probe.sender), Arc::clone(&link));
Some(link)
}
};
if let Some(link) = link {
let cb_guard = match self.inbound_cb.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(ref cb) = *cb_guard {
cb(InboundLink {
network: probe.network,
peer: probe.sender,
protocol: crate::announcement::WG_PROTOCOL.to_string(),
link,
});
}
}
}
continue;
} else if probe.msg_type == PROBE_TYPE_PONG {
self.set_peer_addr(probe.sender, src_addr);
let waiter = {
let mut probes = match self.pending_probes.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
probes.remove(&(probe.network, probe.sender, probe.cookie))
};
if let Some(tx) = waiter {
let _ = tx.send(src_addr);
}
continue;
}
}
// 2. Data / handshake packet handling
let datagram = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&buf[..len]);
// Identify which peer this packet comes from
let matched_peer = {
let links_guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
links_guard
.values()
.find(|link| link.target_addr() == src_addr)
.map(|link| link.peer())
.or_else(|| {
let addrs_guard = match self.peer_addresses.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
addrs_guard
.iter()
.find(|(_, addrs)| addrs.contains(&src_addr))
.map(|(peer, _)| *peer)
.or_else(|| {
links_guard
.values()
.find(|link| link.target_addr().ip() == src_addr.ip())
.map(|link| link.peer())
.or_else(|| {
addrs_guard
.iter()
.find(|(_, addrs)| {
addrs.iter().any(|a| a.ip() == src_addr.ip())
})
.map(|(peer, _)| *peer)
})
})
})
};
let Some(peer) = matched_peer else {
continue;
};
self.set_peer_addr(peer, src_addr);
// Deliver to ALL active links for this peer (across all networks this peer shares with us)
let peer_links: Vec<Arc<WireguardLink>> = {
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.values()
.filter(|l| l.peer() == peer && !l.is_closed())
.cloned()
.collect()
};
if !peer_links.is_empty() {
for link in peer_links {
link.update_target(src_addr);
link.deliver_inbound(datagram.clone());
}
continue;
}
// If no active link exists for this peer yet, create inbound links for all networks known for this peer
let networks: Vec<NetworkId> = {
let guard = match self.peer_networks.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.get(&peer)
.map(|s| s.iter().copied().collect())
.unwrap_or_default()
};
for network in networks {
let link = {
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(existing) = guard.get(&(network, peer))
&& !existing.is_closed()
{
existing.update_target(src_addr);
existing.deliver_inbound(datagram.clone());
continue;
}
let candidates = self.peer_addrs(peer);
let link = Arc::new(WireguardLink::new(
network,
peer,
src_addr,
candidates,
Arc::clone(&self.socket),
));
link.update_target(src_addr);
link.deliver_inbound(datagram.clone());
guard.insert((network, peer), Arc::clone(&link));
link
};
let cb_guard = match self.inbound_cb.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(ref cb) = *cb_guard {
cb(InboundLink {
network,
peer,
protocol: crate::announcement::WG_PROTOCOL.to_string(),
link,
});
}
}
}
}
}
impl PacketTransport for WireguardTransport {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"wireguard"
}
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any {
self
}
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
_protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut addrs = self.peer_addrs(peer);
if addrs.is_empty() {
return Err(TransportError::Unreachable(format!(
"no candidate UDP address known for peer {}",
peer.fmt_short()
)));
}
crate::plugin::prioritize_local_subnet(&mut addrs);
// If an existing confirmed link is alive, reuse it
{
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(existing) = guard.get(&(network, peer))
&& !existing.is_closed()
&& existing.is_confirmed()
{
existing.update_candidates(addrs);
return Ok(Arc::clone(existing) as SharedLink);
}
}
// Probe candidate addresses with PING
let cookie: u64 = rand::random();
let (tx, rx) = oneshot::channel::<SocketAddr>();
{
let mut probes = match self.pending_probes.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
probes.insert((network, peer, cookie), tx);
}
let probe_ping = encode_probe(PROBE_TYPE_PING, self.local_id, peer, network, cookie);
let socket = Arc::clone(&self.socket);
let candidates = addrs.clone();
let probe_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
for i in 0..3 {
for target in &candidates {
let _ = socket.send_to(&probe_ping, *target).await;
}
if i < 2 {
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(350)).await;
}
}
});
let confirmed_addr =
match tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(1200), rx).await {
Ok(Ok(addr)) => {
probe_task.abort();
addr
}
_ => {
probe_task.abort();
let mut probes = match self.pending_probes.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
probes.remove(&(network, peer, cookie));
return Err(TransportError::Unreachable(format!(
"direct UDP probe to peer {} timed out",
peer.fmt_short()
)));
}
};
let link = {
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(existing) = guard.get(&(network, peer))
&& !existing.is_closed()
{
existing.update_target(confirmed_addr);
existing.update_candidates(addrs);
existing.confirm();
return Ok(Arc::clone(existing) as SharedLink);
}
let link = Arc::new(WireguardLink::new(
network,
peer,
confirmed_addr,
addrs,
Arc::clone(&self.socket),
));
link.confirm();
guard.insert((network, peer), Arc::clone(&link));
link
};
Ok(link as SharedLink)
})
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::IpAddr;
use tsunagi::identity::NetworkId;
use tsunagi_wireguard::{ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION, WgAnnouncement, WgPublicKey, WgSecretKey};
#[test]
fn announcement_round_trip() {
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
let key = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let local = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let addrs: Vec<IpAddr> = vec![
"192.168.1.100".parse().unwrap(),
"10.0.0.5".parse().unwrap(),
];
let announcement = WgAnnouncement::new(network, &key, 51820, addrs.clone());
let encoded = announcement.encode().expect("encode");
let validated = WgAnnouncement::decode_and_validate(&encoded, network, &local).expect("decode");
assert_eq!(validated.public_key, key);
assert_eq!(validated.port, 51820);
assert_eq!(validated.addrs, addrs);
}
#[test]
fn announcement_rejects_zero_key() {
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
let local = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let zero = WgPublicKey::from_bytes([0u8; 32]);
let announcement = WgAnnouncement::new(network, &zero, 51820, vec![]);
let encoded = announcement.encode().unwrap();
let err = WgAnnouncement::decode_and_validate(&encoded, network, &local).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("all zeroes"));
}
#[test]
fn announcement_rejects_own_key() {
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
let local = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let announcement = WgAnnouncement::new(network, &local, 51820, vec![]);
let encoded = announcement.encode().unwrap();
let err = WgAnnouncement::decode_and_validate(&encoded, network, &local).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("own WireGuard key"));
}
#[test]
fn announcement_rejects_wrong_network() {
let network_a = NetworkId::from_bytes([1u8; 32]);
let network_b = NetworkId::from_bytes([2u8; 32]);
let key = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let local = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let announcement = WgAnnouncement::new(network_a, &key, 51820, vec![]);
let encoded = announcement.encode().unwrap();
let err = WgAnnouncement::decode_and_validate(&encoded, network_b, &local).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("different network"));
}
#[test]
fn announcement_rejects_zero_port() {
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
let key = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let local = WgSecretKey::generate().public();
let announcement = WgAnnouncement {
version: ANNOUNCEMENT_VERSION,
public_key: *key.as_bytes(),
network: *network.as_bytes(),
port: 0,
addrs: vec![],
};
let encoded = announcement.encode().unwrap();
let err = WgAnnouncement::decode_and_validate(&encoded, network, &local).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("cannot be 0"));
}
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use bytes::Bytes;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{InboundLink, PacketTransport};
use tsunagi::dataplane::{IpPlugin, PacketSink, PluginContext};
use tsunagi::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId};
use tsunagi_wireguard::{WireguardConfig, WireguardPlugin, WireguardTransport};
struct TestSink {
delivered: mpsc::Sender<(NetworkId, iroh::EndpointId, Bytes)>,
}
impl PacketSink for TestSink {
fn deliver(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
from: iroh::EndpointId,
packet: Bytes,
) -> tsunagi::BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
let delivered = self.delivered.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let _ = delivered.send((network, from, packet)).await;
})
}
}
fn sample_ipv4_packet() -> Bytes {
let mut packet = vec![0u8; 40];
packet[0] = 0x45; // IPv4, IHL 5
packet[2..4].copy_from_slice(&40u16.to_be_bytes()); // total len 40
packet[8] = 64; // TTL
packet[9] = 17; // UDP
packet[12..16].copy_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1]); // src 10.0.0.1
packet[16..20].copy_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 2]); // dst 10.0.0.2
Bytes::from(packet)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wireguard_plugin_end_to_end() {
let _ = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter("trace")
.with_test_writer()
.try_init();
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_a = identity_a.endpoint_id();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([77u8; 32]);
let tmp_a = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tmp A");
let tmp_b = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tmp B");
// Transports
let transport_b = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_b, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind B"),
);
let port_b = transport_b.bound_port();
let transport_a = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind A"),
);
let port_a = transport_a.bound_port();
// Plugins
let cfg_a = WireguardConfig::new(tmp_a.path());
let plugin_a = WireguardPlugin::open(cfg_a, Arc::clone(&transport_a))
.await
.expect("open plugin A");
let cfg_b = WireguardConfig::new(tmp_b.path());
let plugin_b = WireguardPlugin::open(cfg_b, Arc::clone(&transport_b))
.await
.expect("open plugin B");
// Attach sinks
let (sink_a_tx, mut sink_a_rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
plugin_a.attach(PluginContext::with_sink(Arc::new(TestSink {
delivered: sink_a_tx,
})));
let (sink_b_tx, mut sink_b_rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
plugin_b.attach(PluginContext::with_sink(Arc::new(TestSink {
delivered: sink_b_tx,
})));
// Capability exchange
plugin_a.on_network_activated(network);
plugin_b.on_network_activated(network);
let cap_a = loop {
if let Some(cap) = plugin_a.local_capability(network).expect("cap A") {
break cap;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
};
let cap_b = loop {
if let Some(cap) = plugin_b.local_capability(network).expect("cap B") {
break cap;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
};
plugin_a
.on_peer_capability(network, peer_b, &cap_b)
.expect("A on cap B");
plugin_b
.on_peer_capability(network, peer_a, &cap_a)
.expect("B on cap A");
// Register loopback address candidates
let addr_b: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_b}").parse().unwrap();
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, addr_b);
let addr_a: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_a}").parse().unwrap();
transport_b.set_peer_addr(peer_a, addr_a);
// Spawn accept loop on A
let transport_a_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_a);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_a_clone.accept_loop(|_| {}).await;
});
// Spawn accept loop on B
let (inbound_tx, mut inbound_rx) = mpsc::channel::<InboundLink>(1);
let transport_b_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_b);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_b_clone
.accept_loop(move |inbound| {
let _ = inbound_tx.try_send(inbound);
})
.await;
});
// Open link from A to B
let link_a = tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(5),
transport_a.open(network, peer_b, "wg"),
)
.await
.expect("open should not timeout")
.expect("open should succeed");
plugin_a.on_peer_link(network, peer_b, Arc::clone(&link_a));
// Wait for inbound link on B and hand to plugin B
let inbound_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), inbound_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("accept should not timeout")
.expect("inbound link should arrive");
plugin_b.on_peer_link(network, peer_a, inbound_b.link);
// Wait briefly for WireGuard handshake to complete
let mut up = false;
for _ in 0..50 {
if let Some(overview_a) = plugin_a.overview(network)
&& overview_a.peers.iter().any(|p| p.is_up())
{
up = true;
break;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
assert!(up, "WireGuard handshake should complete between peers");
// Send IP packet from A to B
let packet_a_to_b = sample_ipv4_packet();
let sent = plugin_a.carry(network, peer_b, packet_a_to_b.clone());
assert!(sent, "plugin A carry should succeed");
let received_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), sink_b_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("recv B timeout")
.expect("recv B option");
assert_eq!(received_b.0, network);
assert_eq!(received_b.1, peer_a);
assert_eq!(received_b.2, packet_a_to_b);
// Send IP packet from B to A
let packet_b_to_a = sample_ipv4_packet();
let sent_reply = plugin_b.carry(network, peer_a, packet_b_to_a.clone());
assert!(sent_reply, "plugin B carry should succeed");
let received_a = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), sink_a_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("recv A timeout")
.expect("recv A option");
assert_eq!(received_a.0, network);
assert_eq!(received_a.1, peer_b);
assert_eq!(received_a.2, packet_b_to_a);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wireguard_two_networks_same_peers() {
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_a = identity_a.endpoint_id();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let net1 = NetworkId::from_bytes([11u8; 32]);
let net2 = NetworkId::from_bytes([22u8; 32]);
let tmp_a = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tmp A");
let tmp_b = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tmp B");
let transport_b = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_b, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind B"),
);
let port_b = transport_b.bound_port();
let transport_a = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind A"),
);
let port_a = transport_a.bound_port();
let plugin_a =
WireguardPlugin::open(WireguardConfig::new(tmp_a.path()), Arc::clone(&transport_a))
.await
.expect("open plugin A");
let plugin_b =
WireguardPlugin::open(WireguardConfig::new(tmp_b.path()), Arc::clone(&transport_b))
.await
.expect("open plugin B");
let (sink_a_tx, mut sink_a_rx) = mpsc::channel(20);
plugin_a.attach(PluginContext::with_sink(Arc::new(TestSink {
delivered: sink_a_tx,
})));
let (sink_b_tx, mut sink_b_rx) = mpsc::channel(20);
plugin_b.attach(PluginContext::with_sink(Arc::new(TestSink {
delivered: sink_b_tx,
})));
// Activate both networks
for net in [net1, net2] {
plugin_a.on_network_activated(net);
plugin_b.on_network_activated(net);
}
// Exchange capabilities for both networks
for net in [net1, net2] {
let cap_a = loop {
if let Some(cap) = plugin_a.local_capability(net).expect("cap A") {
break cap;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
};
let cap_b = loop {
if let Some(cap) = plugin_b.local_capability(net).expect("cap B") {
break cap;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
};
plugin_a
.on_peer_capability(net, peer_b, &cap_b)
.expect("A on cap B");
plugin_b
.on_peer_capability(net, peer_a, &cap_a)
.expect("B on cap A");
}
let addr_b: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_b}").parse().unwrap();
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, addr_b);
let addr_a: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_a}").parse().unwrap();
transport_b.set_peer_addr(peer_a, addr_a);
// Accept loops
let transport_a_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_a);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_a_clone.accept_loop(|_| {}).await;
});
let (inbound_tx, mut inbound_rx) = mpsc::channel::<InboundLink>(10);
let transport_b_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_b);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_b_clone
.accept_loop(move |inbound| {
let _ = inbound_tx.try_send(inbound);
})
.await;
});
// Open links for both networks from A to B
for net in [net1, net2] {
let link_a = transport_a
.open(net, peer_b, "wg")
.await
.expect("open A link");
plugin_a.on_peer_link(net, peer_b, link_a);
}
// Deliver inbound links to B
for _ in 0..2 {
let inbound = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), inbound_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("inbound timeout")
.expect("inbound option");
plugin_b.on_peer_link(inbound.network, peer_a, inbound.link);
}
// Wait for both handshakes to complete on both networks
for net in [net1, net2] {
let mut up = false;
for _ in 0..50 {
if let Some(overview) = plugin_a.overview(net)
&& overview.peers.iter().any(|p| p.is_up())
{
up = true;
break;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
assert!(up, "handshake on {net:?} should complete");
}
// Send on net1
let pkt1 = sample_ipv4_packet();
assert!(plugin_a.carry(net1, peer_b, pkt1.clone()));
let recv1 = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), sink_b_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("recv1 timeout")
.expect("recv1 option");
assert_eq!(recv1.0, net1);
assert_eq!(recv1.2, pkt1);
// Send on net2 from A to B
let mut pkt2_bytes = sample_ipv4_packet().to_vec();
pkt2_bytes[15] = 99; // different byte
let pkt2 = Bytes::from(pkt2_bytes);
assert!(plugin_a.carry(net2, peer_b, pkt2.clone()));
let recv2 = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), sink_b_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("recv2 timeout")
.expect("recv2 option");
assert_eq!(recv2.0, net2);
assert_eq!(recv2.2, pkt2);
// Send reply on net1 from B to A
assert!(plugin_b.carry(net1, peer_a, pkt1.clone()));
let reply1 = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), sink_a_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("reply1 timeout")
.expect("reply1 option");
assert_eq!(reply1.0, net1);
assert_eq!(reply1.2, pkt1);
// Send reply on net2 from B to A
assert!(plugin_b.carry(net2, peer_a, pkt2.clone()));
let reply2 = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), sink_a_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("reply2 timeout")
.expect("reply2 option");
assert_eq!(reply2.0, net2);
assert_eq!(reply2.2, pkt2);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
#![allow(missing_docs)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use bytes::Bytes;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{InboundLink, PacketTransport};
use tsunagi::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId};
use tsunagi_wireguard::WireguardTransport;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wireguard_transport_loopback() {
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_a = identity_a.endpoint_id();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
// Bind transport B on port 0 (ephemeral)
let transport_b = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_b, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind server should succeed"),
);
let port_b = transport_b.bound_port();
assert!(port_b > 0);
// Bind transport A on port 0 (ephemeral)
let transport_a = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind client should succeed"),
);
let port_a = transport_a.bound_port();
assert!(port_a > 0);
// Register B's address and network on transport A
let addr_b: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_b}").parse().unwrap();
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, addr_b);
transport_a.set_peer_network(peer_b, network);
// Register A's address and network on transport B
let addr_a: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_a}").parse().unwrap();
transport_b.set_peer_addr(peer_a, addr_a);
transport_b.set_peer_network(peer_a, network);
// Spawn accept loop on A
let transport_a_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_a);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_a_clone.accept_loop(|_| {}).await;
});
// Spawn accept loop on B
let (inbound_tx, mut inbound_rx) = mpsc::channel::<InboundLink>(1);
let transport_b_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_b);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_b_clone
.accept_loop(move |inbound| {
let _ = inbound_tx.try_send(inbound);
})
.await;
});
// Open link from A to B
let link_a = tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(5),
transport_a.open(network, peer_b, "wg"),
)
.await
.expect("open should not timeout")
.expect("open should succeed");
// Send from A to B to trigger inbound link discovery on B
let data_a_to_b = Bytes::from_static(b"wireguard packet from A to B");
link_a.send(data_a_to_b.clone()).expect("send A->B");
// Receive inbound link on B
let inbound_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), inbound_rx.recv())
.await
.expect("accept should not timeout")
.expect("inbound link should arrive");
assert_eq!(inbound_b.network, network);
assert_eq!(inbound_b.peer, peer_a);
assert_eq!(inbound_b.protocol, "wg");
let link_b = inbound_b.link;
// Check packet received on B
let received_on_b = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), link_b.recv())
.await
.expect("recv B timeout")
.expect("recv B option");
assert_eq!(received_on_b, data_a_to_b);
// Send from B to A
let data_b_to_a = Bytes::from_static(b"wireguard packet from B to A");
link_b.send(data_b_to_a.clone()).expect("send B->A");
let received_on_a = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), link_a.recv())
.await
.expect("recv A timeout")
.expect("recv A option");
assert_eq!(received_on_a, data_b_to_a);
// Path descriptions
assert!(link_a.path_description().contains("wireguard via"));
assert!(link_b.path_description().contains("wireguard via"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wireguard_transport_unreachable_probe_times_out() {
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([99u8; 32]);
let transport_a = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0))
.await
.expect("bind client should succeed"),
);
// Register a non-responsive address for peer B (TEST-NET-1 documentation IP which drops packets)
let unreachable_addr: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.1:51820".parse().unwrap();
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, unreachable_addr);
transport_a.set_peer_network(peer_b, network);
// Spawn accept loop on A
let transport_a_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_a);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_a_clone.accept_loop(|_| {}).await;
});
// Opening to unreachable candidate must fail with Unreachable rather than returning a dead direct link
let result = transport_a.open(network, peer_b, "wg").await;
match result {
Err(tsunagi::dataplane::transport::TransportError::Unreachable(msg)) => {
assert!(msg.contains("timed out"));
}
other => panic!("expected Unreachable error, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_wireguard_link_close_and_transport_close_link() {
let identity_a = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_a = identity_a.endpoint_id();
let identity_b = DeviceIdentity::generate();
let peer_b = identity_b.endpoint_id();
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([55u8; 32]);
let transport_b = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_b, Some(0))
.await
.unwrap(),
);
let port_b = transport_b.bound_port();
let transport_a = Arc::new(
WireguardTransport::bind(&identity_a, Some(0))
.await
.unwrap(),
);
let port_a = transport_a.bound_port();
let addr_b: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_b}").parse().unwrap();
transport_a.set_peer_addr(peer_b, addr_b);
transport_a.set_peer_network(peer_b, network);
let addr_a: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{port_a}").parse().unwrap();
transport_b.set_peer_addr(peer_a, addr_a);
transport_b.set_peer_network(peer_a, network);
let transport_a_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_a);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_a_clone.accept_loop(|_| {}).await;
});
let transport_b_clone = Arc::clone(&transport_b);
tokio::spawn(async move {
transport_b_clone.accept_loop(|_| {}).await;
});
let link_a = transport_a
.open(network, peer_b, "wg")
.await
.expect("open link A");
assert!(!link_a.is_closed());
// Spawn a reader task waiting on recv()
let link_a_clone = Arc::clone(&link_a);
let recv_task = tokio::spawn(async move { link_a_clone.recv().await });
// Explicitly closing via transport.close_link()
transport_a.close_link(network, peer_b);
assert!(link_a.is_closed());
// Wait on closed() notification
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), link_a.closed())
.await
.expect("link.closed() should resolve promptly");
// recv() must have returned None
let recv_res = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), recv_task)
.await
.expect("recv task should complete")
.expect("task join");
assert_eq!(recv_res, None);
// Send after close must return Closed error
let send_res = link_a.send(Bytes::from_static(b"after close"));
assert!(matches!(
send_res,
Err(tsunagi::dataplane::transport::TransportError::Closed)
));
}
+8 -2
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ tun-device = [
"dep:rtnetlink",
"dep:caps",
"dep:futures-util",
"dep:netdev",
]
# Telling the operating system where to send its DNS questions. systemd-resolved
# on Linux, the Name Resolution Policy Table on Windows; the zone and the
@@ -33,10 +32,12 @@ dns-publish = ["dep:zbus"]
testing = ["dep:tempfile", "dep:tracing-subscriber"]
[dependencies]
arc-swap = "1.9"
iroh.workspace = true
# `net` for the local control interface: a Unix socket on Unix, a named pipe
# on Windows. Both live behind the same `net` feature.
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net"] }
tokio-stream = "0.1"
serde.workspace = true
postcard.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ directories = "6.0"
# forbidden `unsafe` and will not make one.
gethostname = "1.1"
netwatch = "0.19.3"
netdev = "0.46"
mainline = "8.0"
futures-lite = "2.6"
tun = { version = "0.8", features = ["async"], optional = true }
@@ -91,7 +93,11 @@ futures-util = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, optional = true }
# before deciding what to change. Creating an adapter needs the process to be
# elevated and `wintun.dll` to be reachable at run time.
[target.'cfg(target_os = "windows")'.dependencies]
netdev = { version = "0.45", optional = true }
windows-sys = { version = "0.61", features = [
"Win32_Security",
"Win32_Security_Authorization",
"Win32_Foundation",
] }
[dev-dependencies]
# Its own tests use the harness it publishes.
+152 -8
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ use shutdown::Shutdown;
/// Summary of a configured network, whether or not it is running.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ConfiguredNetwork {
/// Saved local broadcast participation.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// Public network identifier.
pub network_id: NetworkId,
/// Network name.
@@ -279,11 +281,19 @@ impl Agent {
// The data plane rides on iroh too, which is where it gets hole
// punching and relay fallback from. It is a separate ALPN and a
// separate connection, so the two planes stay independent.
let transport: Arc<dyn PacketTransport> = Arc::new(IrohTransport::new(
let iroh_transport: Arc<dyn PacketTransport> = Arc::new(IrohTransport::new(
inner.adapter.clone(),
Arc::clone(&inner.limits),
Arc::new(TransportCtx(Arc::downgrade(&inner))) as Arc<dyn TransportContext>,
));
let transport: Arc<dyn PacketTransport> = if inner.config.custom_transports.is_empty() {
iroh_transport
} else {
Arc::new(crate::dataplane::MultiPacketTransport::new(
iroh_transport,
inner.config.custom_transports.clone(),
))
};
let _ = inner.transport.set(transport);
if let CacheOutcome::Reset(reason) = inner.storage.cache_outcome().clone() {
@@ -344,6 +354,26 @@ impl Agent {
self.inner.adapter.loopback_addr()
}
/// Delivers an inbound data plane link to the matching network runtime.
pub async fn install_inbound_link(
&self,
inbound: crate::dataplane::transport::InboundLink,
) -> Result<()> {
let network = inbound.network;
let sender = {
let networks = self.inner.networks.read().await;
networks.get(&network).map(|handle| handle.commands.clone())
};
let Some(sender) = sender else {
return Err(Error::NetworkNotActive(network));
};
sender
.send(NetCommand::InboundLink(Box::new(inbound)))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::NetworkNotActive(network))?;
Ok(())
}
/// Reserves the configured overlay range for a network, if it can.
///
/// Done here, where activations are serialised, rather than inside the
@@ -355,12 +385,10 @@ impl Agent {
/// waits to adopt whatever it settles on. One agent has one interface, so
/// proposing a range it could not route would be worse than having none:
/// the lowest author's range wins, and the collision would spread.
fn reserve_range(&self, network: NetworkId) -> RangePlan {
let Some(configured) = self.inner.config.overlay_ipv4_range else {
return RangePlan::default();
};
async fn reserve_range(&self, network: NetworkId) -> RangePlan {
let reserve = |wanted: Ipv4Range| {
let reservation = crate::overlay::NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some(wanted),
local: None,
peers: Vec::new(),
@@ -368,6 +396,44 @@ impl Agent {
self.inner.routes.set_network(network, reservation).is_ok()
};
// If this network already has signed records in storage, check if its
// members have already agreed on a range. If so, preserve and reserve
// THAT range rather than preemptively seizing the default configured range.
let stored_records = self
.inner
.storage
.signed_records(network)
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut state_set = crate::state::StateSet::new();
state_set.merge_all(network, stored_records);
if let Some(agreed) = state_set.agreed_range() {
if reserve(agreed) {
return RangePlan {
propose: if Some(agreed) == self.inner.config.overlay_ipv4_range {
Some(agreed)
} else {
None
},
..RangePlan::default()
};
} else {
tracing::warn!(
%network,
range = %agreed,
"agreed range for this network overlaps another network already active on this interface"
);
return RangePlan {
conflict: Some(agreed),
..RangePlan::default()
};
}
}
let Some(configured) = self.inner.config.overlay_ipv4_range else {
return RangePlan::default();
};
// The configured range first, so a network a device has always had
// keeps the addresses it has always had.
if reserve(configured) {
@@ -415,6 +481,7 @@ impl Agent {
mtu: interface.mtu(),
addresses: interface.wanted_addresses(),
counters: interface.counters(),
broadcast_rules: interface.broadcast_rules(),
})
}
@@ -488,6 +555,16 @@ impl Agent {
&self,
name: &NetworkName,
secret: &NetworkSecret,
) -> Result<NetworkId> {
self.join_network_with_broadcast(name, secret, None).await
}
/// Joins with an explicit broadcast choice; absent preserves saved policy.
pub async fn join_network_with_broadcast(
&self,
name: &NetworkName,
secret: &NetworkSecret,
broadcast: Option<bool>,
) -> Result<NetworkId> {
let keys = NetworkKeys::derive(name, secret);
let network_id = keys.network_id();
@@ -516,6 +593,9 @@ impl Agent {
.storage
.upsert_network(network_id, name.clone(), secret.clone(), true)
.await?;
if let Some(enabled) = broadcast {
self.set_broadcast(network_id, enabled).await?;
}
match self.activate_with_keys(keys).await {
// Already a member of exactly this network space: nothing to do.
Ok(()) | Err(Error::NetworkAlreadyActive(_)) => Ok(network_id),
@@ -523,6 +603,21 @@ impl Agent {
}
}
/// Changes a network's local broadcast policy now and after restart.
pub async fn set_broadcast(&self, network_id: NetworkId, enabled: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.inner
.storage
.set_broadcast(network_id, enabled)
.await?;
if self.is_active(network_id).await {
let (reply, receive) = oneshot::channel();
self.command(network_id, NetCommand::SetBroadcast { enabled, reply })
.await?;
receive.await.map_err(|_| Error::Stopped)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Activates a configured network that is currently inactive.
///
/// Fails with [`Error::NetworkAlreadyActive`] if it is already running.
@@ -551,7 +646,7 @@ impl Agent {
return Err(Error::NetworkAlreadyActive(network_id));
}
let range = self.reserve_range(network_id);
let range = self.reserve_range(network_id).await;
let mut backends = Vec::new();
if let Some(discovery) = &self.inner.config.discovery {
backends.push(discovery.clone());
@@ -567,7 +662,16 @@ impl Agent {
as Arc<dyn crate::discovery::NetworkDiscovery>,
)
};
let broadcast = self
.inner
.storage
.list_networks()
.await?
.into_iter()
.find(|stored| stored.network_id == network_id)
.is_none_or(|stored| stored.broadcast);
let handle = network::spawn(RuntimeParams {
broadcast,
keys,
adapter: self.inner.adapter.clone(),
storage: self.inner.storage.clone(),
@@ -627,6 +731,9 @@ impl Agent {
{
tracing::warn!(%err, "cannot update the overlay addresses");
}
if let Some(interface) = self.inner.interface.get() {
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
}
self.inner.storage.set_auto_start(network_id, false).await?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -703,6 +810,7 @@ impl Agent {
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|stored| ConfiguredNetwork {
broadcast: stored.broadcast,
network_id: stored.network_id,
name: stored.name,
auto_start: stored.auto_start,
@@ -777,6 +885,7 @@ impl Agent {
}
let keys = NetworkKeys::derive(&stored.name, &stored.secret);
networks.push(NetworkStatus {
broadcast: stored.broadcast,
descriptor: keys.descriptor(),
name: stored.name,
network_id: stored.network_id,
@@ -1013,6 +1122,26 @@ async fn plugin_request_loop(weak: Weak<Inner>, mut requests: mpsc::Receiver<Plu
}
}
}
PluginRequest::ProtocolFailure {
network,
peer,
protocol,
reason,
} => {
let sender = {
let networks = inner.networks.read().await;
networks.get(&network).map(|handle| handle.commands.clone())
};
if let Some(sender) = sender {
let _ = sender
.send(NetCommand::ProtocolFailure {
peer,
protocol,
reason,
})
.await;
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -1158,8 +1287,23 @@ async fn handle_inbound_data(inner: Arc<Inner>, conn: iroh::endpoint::Connection
conn.close(5u32.into(), b"data plane not ready");
return;
};
// Downcasting is avoided by keeping the accept side on the concrete type.
let Some(iroh_transport) = transport.as_ref().as_any().downcast_ref::<IrohTransport>() else {
let iroh_transport =
if let Some(iroh) = transport.as_ref().as_any().downcast_ref::<IrohTransport>() {
Some(iroh)
} else if let Some(multi) = transport
.as_ref()
.as_any()
.downcast_ref::<crate::dataplane::MultiPacketTransport>()
{
multi
.default_transport()
.as_ref()
.as_any()
.downcast_ref::<IrohTransport>()
} else {
None
};
let Some(iroh_transport) = iroh_transport else {
conn.close(5u32.into(), b"unsupported data transport");
return;
};
+376 -144
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ pub(crate) enum NetCommand {
reply: oneshot::Sender<Box<NetworkStatus>>,
},
Recheck,
SetBroadcast {
enabled: bool,
reply: oneshot::Sender<()>,
},
/// Resend this agent's announcement to every peer of this network.
Reannounce,
/// Answer to a different name from now on.
@@ -82,6 +86,12 @@ pub(crate) enum NetCommand {
/// Human readable reason, free of secrets.
reason: String,
},
/// An IP plugin reported that data plane connectivity or a tunnel for a peer failed.
ProtocolFailure {
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: String,
reason: String,
},
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for NetCommand {
@@ -95,10 +105,14 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for NetCommand {
NetCommand::Broadcast { message, .. } => write!(f, "Broadcast({})", kind(message)),
NetCommand::Status { .. } => f.write_str("Status"),
NetCommand::Recheck => f.write_str("Recheck"),
NetCommand::SetBroadcast { enabled, .. } => write!(f, "SetBroadcast({enabled})"),
NetCommand::Reannounce => f.write_str("Reannounce"),
NetCommand::SetHostname(_) => f.write_str("SetHostname"),
NetCommand::Release { .. } => f.write_str("Release"),
NetCommand::PluginError { protocol, .. } => write!(f, "PluginError({protocol})"),
NetCommand::ProtocolFailure { peer, protocol, .. } => {
write!(f, "ProtocolFailure({}, {protocol})", peer.fmt_short())
}
}
}
}
@@ -122,6 +136,7 @@ impl NetworkHandle {
/// Everything a network runtime needs to run.
pub(crate) struct RuntimeParams {
pub(crate) broadcast: bool,
pub(crate) keys: NetworkKeys,
pub(crate) adapter: EndpointAdapter,
pub(crate) storage: Storage,
@@ -233,6 +248,24 @@ const REACH_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(90);
/// can arrive and be adopted instead.
const RANGE_PROPOSAL_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct ProtocolDialState {
failures: u32,
cooldown_until: std::time::Instant,
}
const DATA_LINK_BASE_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
const DATA_LINK_MAX_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
fn data_link_backoff(failures: u32) -> Duration {
if failures == 0 {
return Duration::ZERO;
}
let shift = (failures - 1).min(5);
let secs = (DATA_LINK_BASE_BACKOFF.as_secs() << shift).min(DATA_LINK_MAX_BACKOFF.as_secs());
Duration::from_secs(secs)
}
struct Runtime {
discovery_worker: Option<DiscoveryWorker>,
discovery_candidates: mpsc::Receiver<Candidate>,
@@ -264,14 +297,22 @@ struct Runtime {
/// else, so there is no hearsay to weigh and nothing to poison. Soft
/// state — an entry that stops being refreshed expires, which is how a
/// relay that has gone stops being chosen without anybody revoking it.
reachable: HashMap<EndpointId, (HashSet<EndpointId>, std::time::Instant)>,
reachable: HashMap<
EndpointId,
(
HashSet<crate::proto::message::ReachableLink>,
std::time::Instant,
),
>,
/// What this agent last told its peers it could reach, so it is only
/// said again when it changed.
announced_reach: HashSet<EndpointId>,
announced_reach: HashSet<crate::proto::message::ReachableLink>,
/// Links currently being opened, so we do not start two.
opening: HashSet<(EndpointId, String)>,
link_results_tx: mpsc::Sender<LinkOutcome>,
link_results_rx: mpsc::Receiver<LinkOutcome>,
/// Protocol dial failure count and backoff cooldown per peer and protocol.
protocol_dial_states: HashMap<(EndpointId, String), ProtocolDialState>,
/// Peers already told about a protocol version that cannot match, so it
/// is said once rather than on every announcement.
reported_mismatch: HashSet<(EndpointId, String)>,
@@ -328,12 +369,13 @@ impl Runtime {
dial_results_tx,
dial_results_rx,
links: HashMap::new(),
hub: crate::dataplane::relay::RelayHub::new(network_id),
hub: crate::dataplane::relay::RelayHub::new(network_id, local_id),
reachable: HashMap::new(),
announced_reach: HashSet::new(),
opening: HashSet::new(),
link_results_tx,
link_results_rx,
protocol_dial_states: HashMap::new(),
reported_mismatch: HashSet::new(),
released: false,
reported_missing: None,
@@ -360,6 +402,11 @@ impl Runtime {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = self.shutdown.wait() => break,
_ = self.hub.changed() => {
self.ensure_links();
self.update_paths();
self.announce_reach(false);
}
command = commands.recv() => match command {
Some(command) => self.handle_command(command).await,
None => break,
@@ -387,6 +434,8 @@ impl Runtime {
_ = ticker.tick() => {
self.discovery_round().await;
self.ensure_links();
self.update_paths();
self.announce_reach(false);
}
}
}
@@ -401,7 +450,9 @@ impl Runtime {
// Stop accepting session events first: nothing is going to act on them
// any more, and a sender blocked on a full queue would stall shutdown.
self.session_events_rx.close();
self.hub.close();
self.links.clear();
self.protocol_dial_states.clear();
let peers: Vec<EndpointId> = self.sessions.keys().copied().collect();
for peer in peers {
if let Some(session) = self.sessions.remove(&peer) {
@@ -441,6 +492,15 @@ impl Runtime {
NetCommand::Status { reply } => {
let _ = reply.send(Box::new(self.status()));
}
NetCommand::SetBroadcast { enabled, reply } => {
self.params.broadcast = enabled;
self.update_broadcast();
if let Some(interface) = self.params.interface.clone() {
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
}
self.reannounce();
let _ = reply.send(());
}
NetCommand::Recheck => self.discovery_round().await,
NetCommand::Reannounce => self.reannounce(),
NetCommand::Release { reply } => {
@@ -474,6 +534,26 @@ impl Runtime {
reason,
});
}
NetCommand::ProtocolFailure {
peer,
protocol,
reason,
} => {
if self.links.remove(&(peer, protocol.clone())).is_some() {
self.hub.clear_direct(peer, &protocol);
}
self.metrics.data_link_failures += 1;
self.record_protocol_failure(peer, &protocol);
self.emit(Event::DataLinkDown {
network: self.network_id,
peer,
protocol,
reason,
});
self.ensure_links();
self.update_paths();
self.announce_reach(false);
}
}
}
@@ -1003,6 +1083,24 @@ impl Runtime {
}
}
fn broadcast_policy(&self) -> crate::overlay::broadcast::BroadcastPolicy {
crate::overlay::broadcast::BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: self.params.broadcast,
peers: self
.sessions
.values()
.filter(|session| session.broadcast)
.map(|session| session.peer)
.collect(),
}
}
fn update_broadcast(&self) {
self.params
.routes
.set_broadcast(self.network_id, self.broadcast_policy());
}
/// Tells the plugins who holds which overlay address.
async fn publish_allocations(&mut self) {
let Some(range) = self.effective_range() else {
@@ -1025,6 +1123,7 @@ impl Runtime {
// a packet for ourselves does not go over a tunnel.
let local = self.state.address_of(&self.local_id);
let routes = crate::overlay::NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: self.broadcast_policy(),
range: Some(range),
local,
peers: allocations
@@ -1065,19 +1164,40 @@ impl Runtime {
// wrong here before. Said once per address, not every round.
// An in-memory interface has no addresses to be missing from: with
// `--no-tun` this is the arrangement asked for, not a fault.
let missing = match local {
Some(address)
if interface.on_host()
&& !crate::overlay::address_is_local(std::net::IpAddr::V4(address)) =>
{
let is_missing = if let Some(address) = local {
if interface.on_host() {
let mut local_found =
crate::overlay::address_is_local(std::net::IpAddr::V4(address));
// On Windows, duplicate address detection (DAD) and netsh/IP helper updates
// may take a short moment before a newly assigned address is ready for binding.
if !local_found && cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
for _ in 0..10 {
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
if crate::overlay::address_is_local(std::net::IpAddr::V4(address)) {
local_found = true;
break;
}
}
}
!local_found
} else {
false
}
} else {
false
};
let missing = if is_missing {
if let Some(address) = local {
let already = self.reported_missing == Some(address);
self.reported_missing = Some(address);
(!already).then_some(address)
}
_ => {
self.reported_missing = None;
} else {
None
}
} else {
self.reported_missing = None;
None
};
if let Some(address) = missing {
self.emit(Event::PluginError {
@@ -1094,6 +1214,12 @@ impl Runtime {
),
});
}
// The broadcast route names this address as its source, so it goes in
// only once the address is really on the interface.
if !is_missing {
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ data plane
@@ -1107,6 +1233,25 @@ impl Runtime {
.collect()
}
fn record_protocol_failure(&mut self, peer: EndpointId, protocol: &str) {
let key = (peer, protocol.to_string());
let entry = self
.protocol_dial_states
.entry(key)
.or_insert(ProtocolDialState {
failures: 0,
cooldown_until: std::time::Instant::now(),
});
entry.failures = entry.failures.saturating_add(1);
let backoff = data_link_backoff(entry.failures);
entry.cooldown_until = std::time::Instant::now() + backoff;
}
fn record_protocol_success(&mut self, peer: EndpointId, protocol: &str) {
self.protocol_dial_states
.remove(&(peer, protocol.to_string()));
}
/// Opens whatever data plane links are missing, and forgets dead ones.
///
/// Only one side dials, chosen by a rule both sides compute the same way,
@@ -1122,7 +1267,7 @@ impl Runtime {
let mut dead: Vec<(EndpointId, String)> = Vec::new();
for (key, link) in &self.links {
if link.is_closed() {
if link.is_closed() || self.no_direct_data(key.0) {
dead.push(key.clone());
}
}
@@ -1132,6 +1277,7 @@ impl Runtime {
// reachable through somebody is decided below; the protocol's
// link stays either way.
self.hub.clear_direct(peer, &protocol);
self.record_protocol_failure(peer, &protocol);
self.emit(Event::DataLinkDown {
network: self.network_id,
peer,
@@ -1140,32 +1286,17 @@ impl Runtime {
});
}
// Both the name and the version have to match. A peer offering
// `wg-quic` at a version this build does not speak is not a peer to
// carry traffic with, and a link opened anyway would fail later and
// say less about why.
let wanted: Vec<(EndpointId, String)> = self
.sessions
.values()
.flat_map(|session| {
let peer = session.peer;
session
.capabilities
.iter()
.filter(|capability| capability.enabled)
.map(move |capability| (peer, capability.protocol.clone(), capability.version))
})
.filter(|(_, protocol, version)| {
served
.iter()
.any(|(name, ours)| name == protocol && ours == version)
})
.map(|(peer, protocol, _)| (peer, protocol))
.collect();
for (peer, protocol) in wanted {
let key = (peer, protocol.clone());
if self.links.contains_key(&key) || self.opening.contains(&key) {
// Choose the highest priority mutually supported protocol for each peer.
// If a direct data link is already open or opening, do not dial another.
// If a protocol recently failed, fall back to other mutually supported
// protocols according to backoff cooldown.
let now = std::time::Instant::now();
let mut wanted: Vec<(EndpointId, String)> = Vec::new();
for session in self.sessions.values() {
let peer = session.peer;
if self.links.keys().any(|(p, _)| *p == peer)
|| self.opening.iter().any(|(p, _)| *p == peer)
{
continue;
}
if self.no_direct_data(peer) {
@@ -1176,6 +1307,39 @@ impl Runtime {
if self.local_id.as_bytes() >= peer.as_bytes() {
continue;
}
let supported: Vec<String> = served
.iter()
.filter(|(name, ours)| {
session
.capabilities
.iter()
.any(|c| c.enabled && c.protocol == *name && c.version == *ours)
})
.map(|(name, _)| name.clone())
.collect();
if supported.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let chosen = supported.iter().find(|proto| {
match self.protocol_dial_states.get(&(peer, (*proto).clone())) {
Some(state) => state.cooldown_until <= now,
None => true,
}
});
if let Some(proto) = chosen {
wanted.push((peer, proto.clone()));
}
}
for (peer, protocol) in wanted {
let key = (peer, protocol.clone());
if self.links.contains_key(&key) || self.opening.contains(&key) {
continue;
}
self.opening.insert(key);
let results = self.link_results_tx.clone();
@@ -1307,28 +1471,28 @@ impl Runtime {
}
}
/// Tells peers which peers this agent has a live link with, when that
/// has changed.
///
/// Only what it can see for itself, and only to the peers it is
/// talking to: one hop, no flooding, nothing second-hand. A peer that
/// hears this is the only one that can use it, because it is also the
/// only one that could route through this agent.
/// Publishes only locally observed, protocol-specific transport edges.
fn announce_reach(&mut self, force: bool) {
let live: HashSet<EndpointId> = self
let live: HashSet<_> = self
.links
.iter()
.filter(|(_, link)| !link.is_closed())
.map(|((peer, _), _)| *peer)
.map(
|((peer, protocol), _)| crate::proto::message::ReachableLink {
peer: *peer.as_bytes(),
protocol: protocol.clone(),
},
)
.collect();
if !force && live == self.announced_reach {
return;
}
self.announced_reach = live.clone();
let message = ControlMessage::Reachable {
peers: live.iter().map(|peer| *peer.as_bytes()).collect(),
};
let peers: Vec<EndpointId> = self.sessions.keys().copied().collect();
let mut links: Vec<_> = live.into_iter().collect();
links.sort_by(|a, b| (&a.protocol, a.peer).cmp(&(&b.protocol, b.peer)));
links.truncate(self.params.limits.max_state_records);
let message = ControlMessage::Reachable { links };
let peers: Vec<_> = self.sessions.keys().copied().collect();
for peer in peers {
if let Err(err) = self.send_to(peer, message.clone()) {
tracing::debug!(%err, "could not queue a reachability announcement");
@@ -1336,99 +1500,72 @@ impl Runtime {
}
}
/// Chooses, for every peer with no direct link, somebody to go through.
///
/// Local and deterministic: the lowest endpoint id among the peers
/// that both this agent has a link with and that say they have a link
/// with the destination. Nothing is agreed with anybody — two agents
/// may well pick differently, and traffic each way finds its own path.
/// Builds the graph off the packet path. Every remote row comes from that
/// member's authenticated control session; stale or incompatible rows never
/// enter the graph. The hub replaces an immutable table only on changes.
fn update_paths(&mut self) {
self.reachable
.retain(|_, (_, heard)| heard.elapsed() < REACH_EXPIRY);
let served = self.served_protocols();
let live: HashSet<EndpointId> = self
.links
.iter()
.filter(|(_, link)| !link.is_closed())
.map(|((peer, _), _)| *peer)
.collect();
// Every peer this agent would carry traffic with: a session says
// who it is and what it speaks, which is also what a protocol
// needs before it can have a link at all.
let wanted: Vec<(EndpointId, String)> = self
.sessions
.values()
.flat_map(|session| {
let peer = session.peer;
session
.capabilities
.iter()
.filter(|capability| capability.enabled)
.map(move |capability| (peer, capability.protocol.clone(), capability.version))
})
.filter(|(_, protocol, version)| {
served
.iter()
.any(|(name, ours)| name == protocol && ours == version)
})
.map(|(peer, protocol, _)| (peer, protocol))
.collect();
for (peer, protocol) in wanted {
if live.contains(&peer) {
// There is a direct link; a hop is only for when there is
// not, and holding a stale one would keep a peer that has
// gone looking reachable.
if self.hub.has_link(peer, &protocol) {
self.hub.set_hop(peer, &protocol, None);
}
continue;
}
let hop = self
self.reachable.retain(|peer, (_, heard)| {
heard.elapsed() < REACH_EXPIRY && self.sessions.contains_key(peer)
});
for (protocol, version) in self.served_protocols() {
let peers: Vec<_> = self
.sessions
.values()
.filter(|session| {
session.capabilities.iter().any(|capability| {
capability.enabled
&& capability.protocol == protocol
&& capability.version == version
})
})
.map(|session| session.peer)
.collect();
let mut members: HashSet<_> = peers.iter().map(|peer| *peer.as_bytes()).collect();
members.insert(*self.local_id.as_bytes());
let graph = self
.reachable
.iter()
.filter(|(middle, (reaches, _))| {
live.contains(*middle) && reaches.contains(&peer) && **middle != peer
.filter(|(peer, _)| members.contains(peer.as_bytes()))
.map(|(peer, (links, _))| {
let mut neighbors: Vec<_> = links
.iter()
.filter(|link| {
link.protocol == protocol
&& members.contains(&link.peer)
&& link.peer != *peer.as_bytes()
})
.map(|link| link.peer)
.collect();
neighbors.sort_unstable();
(*peer.as_bytes(), neighbors)
})
.map(|(middle, _)| *middle)
.min_by(|a, b| a.as_bytes().cmp(b.as_bytes()));
let known = self.hub.has_link(peer, &protocol);
if !known && hop.is_none() {
// Nothing to reach it with and nothing to offer a
// protocol; inventing a link object here would only look
// like connectivity.
continue;
.collect();
self.hub.set_topology(&protocol, graph, members);
for peer in peers {
if self.hub.has_link(peer, &protocol) || !self.hub.reachable(peer, &protocol) {
continue;
}
let Some(plugin) = self
.params
.plugins
.iter()
.find(|plugin| plugin.protocol_id() == protocol)
.cloned()
else {
continue;
};
let link = self.hub.link(peer, &protocol);
let path = link.path_description();
let max_datagram = link.max_datagram_size();
plugin.on_peer_link(self.network_id, peer, link);
self.emit(Event::DataLinkUp {
network: self.network_id,
peer,
protocol: protocol.clone(),
path,
max_datagram,
});
}
self.hub.set_hop(peer, &protocol, hop);
if known {
continue;
}
// A peer reachable only through somebody still gets a link, so
// its tunnel can be built: the protocol is not told how its
// datagrams travel, only that this is the way to that peer.
let Some(plugin) = self
.params
.plugins
.iter()
.find(|plugin| plugin.protocol_id() == protocol)
.cloned()
else {
continue;
};
let link = self.hub.link(peer, &protocol);
let path = link.path_description();
let max_datagram = link.max_datagram_size();
plugin.on_peer_link(self.network_id, peer, link);
self.emit(Event::DataLinkUp {
network: self.network_id,
peer,
protocol,
path,
max_datagram,
});
}
}
@@ -1437,6 +1574,7 @@ impl Runtime {
self.opening.remove(&key);
match outcome.result {
Ok(link) => {
self.record_protocol_success(outcome.peer, &outcome.protocol);
self.adopt_link(outcome.peer, outcome.protocol, link);
// A new link is both a path for us and one we can offer
// others, so it changes what we route and what we say.
@@ -1446,12 +1584,15 @@ impl Runtime {
Err(reason) => {
// A data plane that cannot be set up is reported, never fatal.
self.metrics.data_link_failures += 1;
self.record_protocol_failure(outcome.peer, &outcome.protocol);
self.emit(Event::DataLinkDown {
network: self.network_id,
peer: outcome.peer,
protocol: outcome.protocol,
reason,
});
// Fall back to other mutually supported protocols immediately.
self.ensure_links();
}
}
}
@@ -1479,6 +1620,7 @@ impl Runtime {
if self.no_direct_data(inbound.peer) {
return;
}
self.record_protocol_success(inbound.peer, &inbound.protocol);
self.adopt_link(inbound.peer, inbound.protocol, inbound.link);
self.update_paths();
self.announce_reach(false);
@@ -1526,6 +1668,7 @@ impl Runtime {
// protocol's link goes with it.
self.hub.remove_peer(peer);
self.reachable.remove(&peer);
self.protocol_dial_states.retain(|(p, _), _| *p != peer);
let keys: Vec<(EndpointId, String)> = self
.links
.keys()
@@ -1641,6 +1784,7 @@ impl Runtime {
}
capabilities.truncate(self.params.limits.max_capabilities);
Announcement {
broadcast: self.params.broadcast,
hostname: self.params.hostname.clone(),
capabilities,
}
@@ -1718,6 +1862,9 @@ impl Runtime {
}
self.metrics.disconnects += 1;
self.drop_links_for(peer);
self.update_broadcast();
self.update_paths();
self.announce_reach(false);
for plugin in &self.params.plugins {
plugin.on_peer_gone(self.network_id, peer);
}
@@ -1744,10 +1891,13 @@ impl Runtime {
let capabilities = announcement.capabilities.clone();
if let Some(session) = self.sessions.get_mut(&peer) {
session.hostname = Some(announcement.hostname.clone());
session.broadcast = announcement.broadcast;
session.capabilities = capabilities.clone();
}
self.update_broadcast();
self.dispatch_capabilities(peer, &capabilities);
self.ensure_links();
self.update_paths();
}
ControlMessage::Ping { seq, payload } => {
let pong = ControlMessage::Pong {
@@ -1772,11 +1922,8 @@ impl Runtime {
}
// What that peer can reach, from that peer. Kept with the time
// it was heard, so it can go stale on its own.
ControlMessage::Reachable { peers } => {
let heard: HashSet<EndpointId> = peers
.iter()
.filter_map(|raw| EndpointId::from_bytes(raw).ok())
.collect();
ControlMessage::Reachable { links } => {
let heard = links.iter().cloned().collect();
self.reachable
.insert(peer, (heard, std::time::Instant::now()));
self.update_paths();
@@ -1844,6 +1991,7 @@ impl Runtime {
.map(|session| {
let snapshot = snapshot_connection(&session.conn);
PeerStatus {
broadcast: session.broadcast,
endpoint_id: session.peer,
role: session.role,
hostname: session.hostname.clone(),
@@ -1911,6 +2059,7 @@ impl Runtime {
members.dedup_by(|a, b| a.endpoint_id == b.endpoint_id);
NetworkStatus {
broadcast: self.params.broadcast,
descriptor: self.params.keys.descriptor(),
name: self.params.keys.name().clone(),
network_id: self.network_id,
@@ -2035,3 +2184,86 @@ fn merge_addr(existing: &mut iroh::EndpointAddr, incoming: &iroh::EndpointAddr)
existing.addrs.insert(addr.clone());
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_data_link_backoff_progression() {
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(0), Duration::ZERO);
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(1), Duration::from_secs(3));
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(2), Duration::from_secs(6));
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(3), Duration::from_secs(12));
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(4), Duration::from_secs(24));
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(5), Duration::from_secs(48));
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(6), Duration::from_secs(60));
assert_eq!(data_link_backoff(10), Duration::from_secs(60));
}
#[test]
fn test_protocol_dial_state_cooldown_and_fallback_selection() {
let peer = crate::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate().endpoint_id();
let supported = ["wg", "tcp-tls", "wg-quic"];
let mut states: HashMap<(EndpointId, String), ProtocolDialState> = HashMap::new();
let now = std::time::Instant::now();
// 1. Without cooldown, the highest priority protocol "wg" is chosen
let chosen =
supported
.iter()
.find(|proto| match states.get(&(peer, (*proto).to_string())) {
Some(state) => state.cooldown_until <= now,
None => true,
});
assert_eq!(chosen.copied(), Some("wg"));
// 2. Record failure for "wg" putting it on cooldown
states.insert(
(peer, "wg".to_string()),
ProtocolDialState {
failures: 1,
cooldown_until: now + Duration::from_secs(3),
},
);
// With "wg" on cooldown, selection must fall back to next priority "tcp-tls"
let chosen_after_failure =
supported
.iter()
.find(|proto| match states.get(&(peer, (*proto).to_string())) {
Some(state) => state.cooldown_until <= now,
None => true,
});
assert_eq!(chosen_after_failure.copied(), Some("tcp-tls"));
// 3. If "tcp-tls" also fails, selection falls back to "wg-quic"
states.insert(
(peer, "tcp-tls".to_string()),
ProtocolDialState {
failures: 1,
cooldown_until: now + Duration::from_secs(3),
},
);
let chosen_quic =
supported
.iter()
.find(|proto| match states.get(&(peer, (*proto).to_string())) {
Some(state) => state.cooldown_until <= now,
None => true,
});
assert_eq!(chosen_quic.copied(), Some("wg-quic"));
// 4. Once success is recorded (entry removed), "wg" is preferred again
states.remove(&(peer, "wg".to_string()));
let chosen_restored =
supported
.iter()
.find(|proto| match states.get(&(peer, (*proto).to_string())) {
Some(state) => state.cooldown_until <= now,
None => true,
});
assert_eq!(chosen_restored.copied(), Some("wg"));
}
}
+57 -2
View File
@@ -73,17 +73,19 @@ pub(crate) struct Session {
pub(crate) outbound: mpsc::Sender<Vec<u8>>,
pub(crate) hostname: Option<String>,
pub(crate) capabilities: Vec<PluginCapability>,
pub(crate) broadcast: bool,
pub(crate) messages_sent: u64,
pub(crate) messages_received: u64,
pub(crate) bytes_sent: u64,
pub(crate) bytes_received: u64,
reader: JoinHandle<()>,
writer: JoinHandle<()>,
path_monitor: JoinHandle<()>,
shutdown: Shutdown,
}
impl Session {
/// Signals both tasks to stop and waits for them, with a bounded grace
/// Signals all tasks to stop and waits for them, with a bounded grace
/// period.
///
/// A peer that stops reading must not be able to hold up shutdown, so the
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ impl Session {
conn,
reader,
writer,
path_monitor,
shutdown,
..
} = self;
@@ -102,23 +105,27 @@ impl Session {
let reader_abort = reader.abort_handle();
let writer_abort = writer.abort_handle();
let path_abort = path_monitor.abort_handle();
let joined = tokio::time::timeout(STOP_GRACE, async move {
let _ = reader.await;
let _ = writer.await;
let _ = path_monitor.await;
})
.await;
if joined.is_err() {
tracing::debug!("session tasks did not wind down in time; aborting them");
reader_abort.abort();
writer_abort.abort();
path_abort.abort();
}
}
/// Aborts both tasks without waiting. Used on replacement.
/// Aborts all tasks without waiting. Used on replacement.
pub(crate) fn abort(&self) {
self.shutdown.trigger();
self.reader.abort();
self.writer.abort();
self.path_monitor.abort();
}
}
@@ -154,6 +161,52 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn(
parent_shutdown.clone(),
));
let path_conn = conn.clone();
let path_shutdown = shutdown.clone();
let path_parent = parent_shutdown.clone();
let path_monitor = tokio::spawn(async move {
use tokio_stream::StreamExt;
let mut events = path_conn.path_events();
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = path_shutdown.wait() => break,
_ = path_parent.wait() => break,
ev = events.next() => {
match ev {
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Selected { remote_addr, local_addr, .. }) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer.fmt_short(),
remote = %remote_addr,
local = ?local_addr,
"Connection path selected (direct / relay / hole punch switch)"
);
}
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Opened { remote_addr, .. }) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer.fmt_short(),
remote = %remote_addr,
"Network path opened to peer"
);
}
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Closed { remote_addr, .. }) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer.fmt_short(),
remote = %remote_addr,
"Network path closed for peer"
);
}
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Lagged { missed, .. }) => {
tracing::trace!(peer = %peer.fmt_short(), missed, "Path events lagged");
}
Some(_) => {}
None => break,
}
}
}
}
});
let reader = tokio::spawn(reader_task(
id,
network_id,
@@ -174,12 +227,14 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn(
outbound: outbound_tx,
hostname: None,
capabilities: Vec::new(),
broadcast: false,
messages_sent: 0,
messages_received: 0,
bytes_sent: 0,
bytes_received: 0,
reader,
writer,
path_monitor,
shutdown,
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ pub struct OverlayStatus {
pub addresses: Vec<crate::overlay::Cidr>,
/// What has happened on it.
pub counters: crate::overlay::Counters,
/// The route and firewall allowance installed for LAN broadcast, when
/// some network has broadcast on and the interface is on the host.
/// `None` is "none installed", not "unknown".
pub broadcast_rules: Option<crate::overlay::BroadcastRulesReport>,
}
/// A member the signed state knows about, connected or not.
@@ -81,6 +85,8 @@ pub struct MemberStatus {
/// Status of one authenticated session.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PeerStatus {
/// This authenticated peer accepts network broadcasts.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// Authenticated endpoint id.
pub endpoint_id: EndpointId,
/// Which side this agent played in the handshake.
@@ -151,6 +157,8 @@ pub struct NetworkMetrics {
/// Status of one network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct NetworkStatus {
/// Local broadcast participation in this network.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// Immutable deterministic description of the network space.
pub descriptor: NetworkDescriptor,
/// Network name, for convenience.
+47 -10
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,13 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use crate::dataplane::SharedPlugin;
use crate::discovery::{MainlineDiscovery, NetworkDiscovery};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::error::Result;
/// Qualifier/organisation/application triple used for platform directories.
///
/// Unused on macOS, where the default paths are fixed system locations rather
/// than per-user directories derived from this.
#[cfg_attr(target_os = "macos", allow(dead_code))]
const APP_NAME: &str = "tsunagi";
/// Rendezvous slots per network; this bounds a discovery sample, not membership.
@@ -74,17 +78,34 @@ impl StoragePaths {
}
}
/// The per-user platform directories.
/// The default platform directories.
///
/// A future system service can supply its own paths instead.
/// Per user on Linux and Windows. On macOS the agent runs as a root
/// LaunchDaemon (creating a utun interface needs root, and `$HOME` under
/// `sudo` points at the wrong place), so the stores live in the system
/// locations instead — `/var/db/tsunagi` for the mandatory state and a
/// disposable cache beside it. A caller that wants somewhere else passes
/// explicit paths to [`StoragePaths::new`] or [`StoragePaths::under`].
pub fn user_default() -> Result<Self> {
let dirs = directories::ProjectDirs::from("", "", APP_NAME).ok_or_else(|| {
Error::Storage("no valid home directory for platform config paths".into())
})?;
Ok(Self {
state_dir: dirs.data_dir().to_path_buf(),
cache_dir: dirs.cache_dir().to_path_buf(),
})
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
Ok(Self {
state_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/db/tsunagi"),
cache_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/db/tsunagi/cache"),
})
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
{
let dirs = directories::ProjectDirs::from("", "", APP_NAME).ok_or_else(|| {
crate::error::Error::Storage(
"no valid home directory for platform config paths".into(),
)
})?;
Ok(Self {
state_dir: dirs.data_dir().to_path_buf(),
cache_dir: dirs.cache_dir().to_path_buf(),
})
}
}
/// Path of the mandatory state database.
@@ -304,6 +325,9 @@ pub struct AgentConfig {
pub reconnect: ReconnectPolicy,
/// IP plugins whose capabilities are announced and dispatched.
pub plugins: Vec<SharedPlugin>,
/// Custom packet transports registered per protocol.
pub custom_transports:
std::collections::HashMap<String, Arc<dyn crate::dataplane::PacketTransport>>,
/// Where the overlay interface comes from, when the agent should have one.
///
/// One agent, one interface: it belongs here rather than to a protocol,
@@ -345,6 +369,7 @@ impl AgentConfig {
limits: Limits::default(),
reconnect: ReconnectPolicy::default(),
plugins: Vec::new(),
custom_transports: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
tun_factory: None,
interface_name: "tsun0".to_string(),
interface_mtu: 1280,
@@ -430,6 +455,16 @@ impl AgentConfig {
self
}
/// Registers a custom packet transport for a specific protocol.
pub fn with_custom_transport(
mut self,
protocol: impl Into<String>,
transport: Arc<dyn crate::dataplane::PacketTransport>,
) -> Self {
self.custom_transports.insert(protocol.into(), transport);
self
}
/// Gives the agent an overlay interface, from this factory.
pub fn with_interface(
mut self,
@@ -480,3 +515,5 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for AgentConfig {
.finish()
}
}
/// Maximum number of transport links a routed datagram may traverse.
pub const ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT: u8 = 16;
+57 -2
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@
//! recorded and surfaced, the control plane keeps running.
pub mod relay;
pub mod routing;
pub mod transport;
pub mod tunnel;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -30,7 +32,10 @@ use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
pub use transport::{PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError};
pub use transport::{
MultiPacketTransport, PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError,
};
pub use tunnel::{GenericTunnelPlugin, TunnelCodec};
/// Maximum length of a plugin protocol identifier.
pub const MAX_PROTOCOL_ID_LEN: usize = 32;
@@ -114,7 +119,7 @@ pub enum PluginError {
/// A request a plugin makes of the agent that owns it.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) enum PluginRequest {
pub enum PluginRequest {
/// Re-send this agent's announcement to every peer of a network.
Reannounce(NetworkId),
/// Surface a plugin error on the agent's event stream.
@@ -126,6 +131,17 @@ pub(crate) enum PluginRequest {
/// Human readable reason, free of secrets.
reason: String,
},
/// A plugin reported that a data link or tunnel for a peer failed.
ProtocolFailure {
/// Network the failure occurred in.
network: NetworkId,
/// Peer whose protocol failed.
peer: EndpointId,
/// Protocol that failed.
protocol: String,
/// Human readable reason.
reason: String,
},
}
/// The agent-side handle a plugin is given when it is attached.
@@ -178,6 +194,29 @@ impl PluginContext {
}
}
/// A context configured with a custom packet sink.
pub fn with_sink(sink: Arc<dyn PacketSink>) -> Self {
Self {
sender: None,
local: None,
sink: Some(sink),
}
}
/// A context configured with a channel for plugin requests and custom sink, for tests.
#[cfg(feature = "testing")]
pub fn for_test(
sender: mpsc::Sender<PluginRequest>,
local: EndpointId,
sink: Option<Arc<dyn PacketSink>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
sender: Some(sender),
local: Some(local),
sink,
}
}
/// This agent's own endpoint id, when the context is attached.
///
/// A plugin needs it to find itself in the agreed allocation.
@@ -219,6 +258,22 @@ impl PluginContext {
reason: reason.into(),
});
}
/// Reports that data plane connectivity or a tunnel for a peer has failed.
pub fn report_peer_protocol_failure(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: impl Into<String>,
reason: impl Into<String>,
) {
self.send(PluginRequest::ProtocolFailure {
network,
peer,
protocol: protocol.into(),
reason: reason.into(),
});
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PluginContext {
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+287
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
fn network() -> NetworkId {
NetworkKeys::derive(
&NetworkName::new("routing-tests").unwrap(),
&NetworkSecret::from_bytes([3; 32]).unwrap(),
)
.network_id()
}
fn peer(seed: u8) -> EndpointId {
iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).public()
}
fn id(seed: u8) -> PeerId {
*peer(seed).as_bytes()
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Wire {
peer: EndpointId,
sent: Mutex<Vec<Bytes>>,
feed: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
inbound: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
dead: AtomicBool,
count: AtomicU64,
record: bool,
}
impl Wire {
fn new(seed: u8, record: bool) -> Arc<Self> {
let (feed, inbound) = mpsc::channel(32);
Arc::new(Self {
peer: peer(seed),
sent: Mutex::default(),
feed,
inbound: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(inbound),
dead: AtomicBool::new(false),
count: AtomicU64::new(0),
record,
})
}
fn take(&self) -> Vec<Bytes> {
std::mem::take(&mut self.sent.lock().unwrap())
}
}
impl PacketLink for Wire {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
network()
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.peer
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM
}
fn send(&self, frame: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.is_closed() {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
}
self.count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
if self.record {
self.sent.lock().unwrap().push(frame);
}
Ok(())
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move { self.inbound.lock().await.recv().await })
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(std::future::pending())
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
self.dead.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
"test-direct".into()
}
}
fn topology(hub: &RelayHub, protocol: &str, edges: &[(u8, &[u8])], members: &[u8]) {
hub.set_topology(
protocol,
edges
.iter()
.map(|(a, bs)| (id(*a), bs.iter().map(|b| id(*b)).collect()))
.collect(),
members.iter().map(|p| id(*p)).collect(),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ecmp_is_per_flow_direct_wins_and_existing_tunnel_survives_changes() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(1));
let b = Wire::new(2, true);
let c = Wire::new(3, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(2), "ip", b.clone());
hub.set_direct(peer(3), "ip", c.clone());
topology(&hub, "ip", &[(2, &[4]), (3, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let link = hub.link(peer(4), "ip");
let mut chosen = HashMap::new();
for _ in 0..8 {
for flow in 0..100 {
link.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"ciphertext"), flow)
.unwrap();
}
for (hop, wire) in [(2, &b), (3, &c)] {
for frame in wire.take() {
let header = envelope::decode(&frame).unwrap();
assert_eq!(header.source, id(1));
assert_eq!(header.destination, id(4));
if let Some(old) = chosen.insert(header.flow, hop) {
assert_eq!(old, hop);
}
}
}
}
assert_eq!(
chosen.values().copied().collect::<HashSet<_>>(),
HashSet::from([2, 3])
);
let direct = Wire::new(4, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(4), "ip", direct.clone());
link.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"direct"), 8).unwrap();
assert_eq!(direct.take().len(), 1);
assert!(b.take().is_empty() && c.take().is_empty());
hub.clear_direct(peer(4), "ip");
b.dead.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
for flow in 0..100 {
link.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"fallback"), flow)
.unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(c.take().len(), 100);
hub.clear_direct(peer(2), "ip");
topology(&hub, "ip", &[(3, &[])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
assert!(link.send(Bytes::new()).is_err());
assert!(!link.is_closed());
assert!(Arc::ptr_eq(&link, &hub.link(peer(4), "ip")));
hub.remove_peer(peer(4));
assert!(link.is_closed());
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), link.closed())
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(link.recv().await.is_none());
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn transport_reader_forwards_without_any_plugin_reader_and_isolates_protocols() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let a = Wire::new(1, true);
let c = Wire::new(3, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", a.clone());
hub.set_direct(peer(3), "ip", c.clone());
topology(&hub, "ip", &[(3, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let frame = envelope::encode(id(1), id(4), 91, b"end-to-end encrypted");
let pointer = frame.as_ptr();
a.feed.send(frame).await.unwrap();
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), async {
while hub.counters().forwarded == 0 {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.unwrap();
let sent = c.take();
assert_eq!(sent[0].as_ptr(), pointer);
assert_eq!(
envelope::decode(&sent[0]).unwrap().remaining,
ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1
);
assert_eq!(&sent[0][RELAY_OVERHEAD..], b"end-to-end encrypted");
let isolated = hub.link(peer(4), "other-ip");
assert!(isolated.send(Bytes::new()).is_err());
assert_eq!(hub.counters().forwarded, 1);
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn local_delivery_is_bounded_and_malformed_or_unknown_sources_are_dropped() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let a = Wire::new(1, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", a);
let link = hub.link(peer(1), "ip");
let plane = link.plane.clone();
for _ in 0..INBOX + 1 {
plane.receive(id(1), envelope::encode(id(1), id(2), 0, b"ip"));
}
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_congested, 1);
for _ in 0..INBOX {
assert_eq!(link.recv().await.unwrap(), Bytes::from_static(b"ip"));
}
plane.receive(id(1), Bytes::from_static(b"broken"));
plane.receive(id(1), envelope::encode(id(9), id(2), 0, b"unknown member"));
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_unknown, 2);
plane.receive(
id(1),
envelope::encode(id(1), id(9), 0, b"unknown destination"),
);
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_no_link, 1);
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn inconsistent_tables_cannot_loop_beyond_the_hop_limit() {
let a = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(1));
let b = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let ab = Wire::new(2, true);
let ba = Wire::new(1, true);
a.set_direct(peer(2), "ip", ab.clone());
b.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", ba.clone());
// Deliberately inconsistent snapshots while updates are in flight.
topology(&a, "ip", &[(2, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
topology(&b, "ip", &[(1, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let ap = a.link(peer(4), "ip").plane.clone();
let bp = b.link(peer(4), "ip").plane.clone();
let mut frame = envelope::encode(id(3), id(4), 7, b"transit");
for turn in 0..ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT {
let (plane, incoming, wire) = if turn % 2 == 0 {
(&ap, id(2), &ab)
} else {
(&bp, id(1), &ba)
};
plane.receive(incoming, frame);
let sent = wire.take();
if turn == ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1 {
assert!(sent.is_empty());
break;
}
assert_eq!(sent.len(), 1);
frame = sent.into_iter().next().unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(
a.counters().forwarded + b.counters().forwarded,
u64::from(ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1)
);
assert_eq!(
a.counters().dropped_hop_limit + b.counters().dropped_hop_limit,
1
);
a.close();
b.close();
}
/// Measures the actual synchronous transit routine, including header checks,
/// snapshot lookup, ECMP, in-place TTL update and mock transport submission.
/// Packet construction, encryption and socket I/O are outside this measurement.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "manual release-mode forwarding microbenchmark"]
async fn forwarding_benchmark() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let wire = Wire::new(3, false);
hub.set_direct(peer(3), "ip", wire.clone());
let alternate = Wire::new(5, false);
hub.set_direct(peer(5), "ip", alternate.clone());
topology(&hub, "ip", &[(3, &[4]), (5, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
let plane = hub.link(peer(4), "ip").plane.clone();
let source = id(1);
let destination = id(4);
let incoming = id(1);
for size in [64, 1280] {
let mut elapsed = std::time::Duration::ZERO;
const COUNT: usize = 10000;
const BATCHES: usize = 100;
for _ in 0..BATCHES {
let frames: Vec<_> = (0..COUNT)
.map(|flow| envelope::encode(source, destination, flow as u64, &vec![42; size]))
.collect();
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
for frame in frames {
plane.receive(incoming, std::hint::black_box(frame));
}
elapsed += start.elapsed();
}
let count = (COUNT * BATCHES) as f64;
println!(
"transit {size} B: {:.1} ns/packet, {:.2} Mpps (1M packets, two equal paths)",
elapsed.as_nanos() as f64 / count,
count / elapsed.as_secs_f64() / 1e6
);
}
assert_eq!(
wire.count.load(Ordering::Relaxed) + alternate.count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
2000000
);
hub.close();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
//! Fixed header. Transit changes one byte in an owned receive buffer.
use super::{FlowId, PeerId};
use crate::config::{MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT};
use bytes::{BufMut, Bytes, BytesMut};
pub(crate) const HEADER: usize = 2 + 32 + 32 + 8;
const VERSION: u8 = 1;
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct Header {
pub source: PeerId,
pub destination: PeerId,
pub remaining: u8,
pub flow: FlowId,
}
pub(crate) fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Header> {
if bytes.len() < HEADER
|| bytes.len() > MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM
|| bytes[0] != VERSION
|| bytes[1] == 0
|| bytes[1] > ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT
{
return None;
}
Some(Header {
source: bytes[2..34].try_into().ok()?,
destination: bytes[34..66].try_into().ok()?,
remaining: bytes[1],
flow: u64::from_be_bytes(bytes[66..74].try_into().ok()?),
})
}
pub(crate) fn encode(source: PeerId, destination: PeerId, flow: FlowId, payload: &[u8]) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = BytesMut::with_capacity(HEADER + payload.len());
bytes.put_u8(VERSION);
bytes.put_u8(ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT);
bytes.extend_from_slice(&source);
bytes.extend_from_slice(&destination);
bytes.put_u64(flow);
bytes.extend_from_slice(payload);
bytes.freeze()
}
pub(crate) fn decrement(bytes: Bytes) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = match bytes.try_into_mut() {
Ok(bytes) => bytes,
Err(bytes) => BytesMut::from(bytes.as_ref()),
};
// Called only after decode and after excluding remaining <= 1.
bytes[1] -= 1;
bytes.freeze()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
#[test]
fn transit_reuses_the_buffer_and_rejects_invalid_headers() {
let frame = encode([1; 32], [2; 32], 17, &[42; 1280]);
let address = frame.as_ptr();
let frame = decrement(frame);
assert_eq!(
frame.as_ptr(),
address,
"no payload copy for an owned buffer"
);
assert_eq!(decode(&frame).unwrap().remaining, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1);
assert_eq!(&frame[HEADER..], &[42; 1280]);
for length in 0..HEADER {
assert!(decode(&frame[..length]).is_none());
}
for ttl in [0, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT + 1] {
let mut bad = frame.to_vec();
bad[1] = ttl;
assert!(decode(&bad).is_none());
}
let mut bad = frame.to_vec();
bad[0] = 99;
assert!(decode(&bad).is_none());
assert!(decode(&vec![1; MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM + 1]).is_none());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
//! Optional IP flow classifier for IP plugins, called before encryption.
//! The router itself treats this identifier and the payload as opaque.
use super::FlowId;
fn hash(parts: &[&[u8]]) -> FlowId {
let mut value = 0xcbf29ce484222325u64;
for part in parts {
for byte in *part {
value = (value ^ u64::from(*byte)).wrapping_mul(0x100000001b3);
}
}
value
}
/// Stable directional IP flow hash, independent of TCP sequence numbers,
/// checksums and packet contents. Fragmented traffic uses addresses/protocol
/// instead of ports: even non-initial fragments and subsequent fragmented
/// datagrams stay together. This deliberately coalesces fragmented flows.
/// Malformed packets get a coarse hash; parsing is bounded and never allocates.
pub fn ip_flow(packet: &[u8]) -> FlowId {
match packet.first().map(|b| b >> 4) {
Some(4) if packet.len() >= 20 => {
let addresses = &packet[12..20];
let protocol = &packet[9..10];
let offset = usize::from(packet[0] & 15) * 4;
if u16::from_be_bytes([packet[6], packet[7]]) & 0x3fff != 0 {
return hash(&[addresses, protocol]);
}
if offset >= 20
&& matches!(packet[9], 6 | 17)
&& let Some(ports) = packet.get(offset..offset + 4)
{
return hash(&[addresses, protocol, ports]);
}
hash(&[addresses, protocol])
}
Some(6) if packet.len() >= 40 => {
let addresses = &packet[8..40];
let mut protocol = packet[6];
let mut offset = 40;
for _ in 0..8 {
match protocol {
44 => {
if let Some(fragment) = packet.get(offset..offset + 8) {
return hash(&[addresses, &fragment[..1]]);
}
break;
}
0 | 43 | 60 | 51 => {
let Some(header) = packet.get(offset..offset + 2) else {
break;
};
let size = if protocol == 51 {
(usize::from(header[1]) + 2) * 4
} else {
(usize::from(header[1]) + 1) * 8
};
protocol = header[0];
offset += size;
}
6 | 17 => {
if let Some(ports) = packet.get(offset..offset + 4) {
return hash(&[addresses, &[protocol], ports]);
}
break;
}
_ => break,
}
}
hash(&[addresses, &[protocol]])
}
_ => 0,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn tcp_flow_ignores_packet_contents_but_distinguishes_ports() {
let mut packet = [0u8; 80];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[9] = 6;
packet[12..24].copy_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1, 10, 0, 0, 2, 0, 22, 1, 2]);
let flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[4] = 123; // IP id changes for each unfragmented packet.
packet[24..].fill(47);
assert_eq!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[23] = 3;
assert_ne!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[6] = 0x20;
let fragment_flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[6] = 0;
packet[7] = 1;
packet[20..].fill(99);
assert_eq!(fragment_flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[4] = 97;
assert_eq!(fragment_flow, ip_flow(&packet));
}
#[test]
fn ipv6_extensions_and_fragments_are_bounded_and_stable() {
let mut packet = [0u8; 80];
packet[0] = 0x60;
packet[6] = 0;
packet[40] = 17;
packet[48..52].copy_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[52..].fill(5);
assert_eq!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[50] = 9;
assert_ne!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[6] = 44;
packet[40] = 6;
let flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[42] = 32;
packet[48..].fill(3);
assert_eq!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
for len in 0..packet.len() {
let _ = ip_flow(&packet[..len]);
}
}
}
+131
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
//! Transport-independent routing over opaque identities. Tables are built on
//! topology changes, never on the packet path. No WireGuard or iroh APIs here.
pub(crate) mod envelope;
pub mod flow;
use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, VecDeque};
/// Opaque authenticated identity; the transport adapter validates its keys.
pub type PeerId = [u8; 32];
/// Stable flow identifier, carried unchanged between transit routers.
pub type FlowId = u64;
/// A shortest route with all equal-cost first hops in stable order.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Route {
/// Number of transport links to the destination.
pub hops: u8,
/// Equal-cost first hops. Direct destinations have one entry.
pub next_hops: Box<[PeerId]>,
}
/// Immutable shortest-path table, replaced when connectivity changes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct RoutingTable {
routes: HashMap<PeerId, Route>,
}
impl RoutingTable {
/// Computes shortest directed paths bounded by `hop_limit`.
/// The caller supplies only authenticated, fresh, compatible edges.
pub fn build(local: PeerId, graph: &HashMap<PeerId, Vec<PeerId>>, hop_limit: u8) -> Self {
let mut distances = HashMap::from([(local, 0u8)]);
let mut first_hops: HashMap<PeerId, BTreeSet<PeerId>> = HashMap::new();
let mut pending = VecDeque::from([local]);
while let Some(node) = pending.pop_front() {
let distance = distances[&node];
if distance >= hop_limit {
continue;
}
let inherited = first_hops.get(&node).cloned().unwrap_or_default();
for &next in graph.get(&node).into_iter().flatten() {
let next_distance = distance + 1;
match distances.get(&next) {
Some(&known) if known < next_distance => continue,
None => {
distances.insert(next, next_distance);
pending.push_back(next);
}
_ => {}
}
let hops = first_hops.entry(next).or_default();
if node == local {
hops.insert(next);
} else {
hops.extend(inherited.iter().copied());
}
}
}
Self {
routes: first_hops
.into_iter()
.map(|(peer, hops)| {
(
peer,
Route {
hops: distances[&peer],
next_hops: hops.into_iter().collect(),
},
)
})
.collect(),
}
}
/// Precomputed route to a destination.
pub fn get(&self, destination: &PeerId) -> Option<&Route> {
self.routes.get(destination)
}
/// All reachable destinations, excluding ourselves.
pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = (&PeerId, &Route)> {
self.routes.iter()
}
}
/// Stable ECMP mixing, without random state or hashing the payload per hop.
pub(crate) fn mix64(mut value: u64) -> u64 {
value ^= value >> 30;
value = value.wrapping_mul(0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9);
value ^= value >> 27;
value = value.wrapping_mul(0x94d049bb133111eb);
value ^ (value >> 31)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn p(n: u8) -> PeerId {
[n; 32]
}
#[test]
fn shortest_paths_keep_equal_cost_hops_and_prefer_direct_links() {
let mut graph = HashMap::from([
(p(1), vec![p(3), p(2)]),
(p(2), vec![p(4)]),
(p(3), vec![p(4)]),
(p(4), vec![p(5)]),
(p(5), vec![p(1)]),
]);
let routes = RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 16);
assert_eq!(routes.get(&p(5)).unwrap().hops, 3);
assert_eq!(&*routes.get(&p(5)).unwrap().next_hops, &[p(2), p(3)]);
assert!(routes.get(&p(1)).is_none());
assert!(routes.get(&p(9)).is_none());
graph.get_mut(&p(1)).unwrap().push(p(5));
assert_eq!(
RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 16).get(&p(5)).unwrap(),
&Route {
hops: 1,
next_hops: Box::new([p(5)])
}
);
}
#[test]
fn topology_removal_and_hop_budget_remove_impossible_routes() {
let mut graph = HashMap::from([(p(1), vec![p(2)]), (p(2), vec![p(3)]), (p(3), vec![p(4)])]);
assert!(RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 2).get(&p(4)).is_none());
assert!(RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 3).get(&p(4)).is_some());
graph.remove(&p(2));
assert!(RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 16).get(&p(4)).is_none());
}
}
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
mod fragments;
pub mod iroh_link;
use std::sync::Arc;
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
@@ -88,6 +90,16 @@ pub trait PacketLink: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// handed to the transport, nothing more.
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError>;
/// Sends a datagram with an opaque stable flow identifier. Plugins derive
/// this before encryption; transports that do not route can ignore it.
fn send_flow(
&self,
payload: Bytes,
_flow: super::routing::FlowId,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send(payload)
}
/// Receives the next datagram, or `None` once the link is finished.
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>>;
@@ -145,3 +157,51 @@ pub trait PacketTransport: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>>;
}
/// A composite packet transport that dispatches requests by protocol id.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MultiPacketTransport {
default: Arc<dyn PacketTransport>,
by_protocol: std::collections::HashMap<String, Arc<dyn PacketTransport>>,
}
impl MultiPacketTransport {
/// Creates a new composite transport with a default fallback transport.
pub fn new(
default: Arc<dyn PacketTransport>,
by_protocol: std::collections::HashMap<String, Arc<dyn PacketTransport>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
default,
by_protocol,
}
}
/// Access the default underlying transport.
pub fn default_transport(&self) -> &Arc<dyn PacketTransport> {
&self.default
}
}
impl PacketTransport for MultiPacketTransport {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"multi"
}
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any {
self
}
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>> {
if let Some(transport) = self.by_protocol.get(protocol) {
transport.open(network, peer, protocol)
} else {
self.default.open(network, peer, protocol)
}
}
}
+364
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
//! Generic harness for IP tunnel plugins.
//!
//! Implementing [`super::IpPlugin`] directly requires managing per-peer background
//! tasks, synchronization, packet queues, and graceful shutdown.
//!
//! [`TunnelCodec`] provides a simplified interface where a plugin author only
//! defines cryptographic transformation and handshake payloads.
//! [`GenericTunnelPlugin`] adapts any [`TunnelCodec`] into a full [`super::IpPlugin`].
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use super::{IpPlugin, PluginCapability, PluginContext, PluginError, ProtocolOption, SharedLink};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
/// The simplified contract for an IP tunnel protocol implementation.
///
/// Implementors only handle key announcements, link lifecycle events,
/// and packet encrypt/decrypt. Concurrency and task management are handled
/// by [`GenericTunnelPlugin`].
pub trait TunnelCodec: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Protocol identifier, e.g. `tcp-tls`.
fn protocol_id(&self) -> &str;
/// Protocol wire version.
fn protocol_version(&self) -> u16;
/// Options accepted by the protocol.
fn options(&self) -> &'static [ProtocolOption] {
&[]
}
/// Generates local capability announcement data for a network.
fn local_capability_data(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PluginError>;
/// Handles a peer's announced capability payload.
fn on_peer_capability_data(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
data: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), PluginError>;
/// Called when an authenticated link to a peer is established.
fn on_peer_link_up(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, link: &SharedLink) {
let _ = (network, peer, link);
}
/// Called when a peer goes away.
fn on_peer_down(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
let _ = (network, peer);
}
/// Encrypts an outbound IP packet into a payload to send over the link.
fn encrypt(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
packet: &[u8],
) -> Result<Bytes, PluginError>;
/// Decrypts an inbound payload from the link into an IP packet.
fn decrypt(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Result<Bytes, PluginError>;
/// Called during shutdown.
fn shutdown<'a>(&'a self) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async {})
}
}
struct TunnelPeerState {
link: SharedLink,
tx_packets: AtomicU64,
rx_packets: AtomicU64,
dropped: AtomicU64,
established_at: std::time::Instant,
}
/// Statistics and status for one active peer in [`GenericTunnelPlugin`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct TunnelPeerReport {
/// Peer endpoint identity.
pub peer: EndpointId,
/// Protocol identifier.
pub protocol: String,
/// Human-readable path description.
pub path: String,
/// Packets successfully encrypted and sent.
pub tx_packets: u64,
/// Packets successfully received and decrypted.
pub rx_packets: u64,
/// Packets dropped due to encryption/decryption/send failures.
pub dropped: u64,
/// Uptime in seconds since the data link was established.
pub uptime_secs: u64,
}
/// Generic wrapper that turns a [`TunnelCodec`] into a full [`IpPlugin`].
pub struct GenericTunnelPlugin<C: TunnelCodec> {
codec: Arc<C>,
context: Mutex<Option<PluginContext>>,
links: RwLock<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId), Arc<TunnelPeerState>>>,
tasks: Mutex<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId), JoinHandle<()>>>,
}
impl<C: TunnelCodec> GenericTunnelPlugin<C> {
/// Wraps `codec` into an [`IpPlugin`].
pub fn new(codec: C) -> Self {
Self {
codec: Arc::new(codec),
context: Mutex::new(None),
links: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
tasks: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
/// Returns a reference to the underlying codec.
pub fn codec(&self) -> &C {
&self.codec
}
/// Returns the active peers with established data links for a network.
pub fn active_peers(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Vec<TunnelPeerReport> {
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.iter()
.filter(|((net, _), _)| *net == network)
.map(|((_, peer), state)| TunnelPeerReport {
peer: *peer,
protocol: self.codec.protocol_id().to_string(),
path: state.link.path_description(),
tx_packets: state.tx_packets.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
rx_packets: state.rx_packets.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped: state.dropped.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
uptime_secs: state.established_at.elapsed().as_secs(),
})
.collect()
}
}
impl<C: TunnelCodec> std::fmt::Debug for GenericTunnelPlugin<C> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("GenericTunnelPlugin")
.field("protocol_id", &self.codec.protocol_id())
.field("protocol_version", &self.codec.protocol_version())
.finish()
}
}
impl<C: TunnelCodec> IpPlugin for GenericTunnelPlugin<C> {
fn protocol_id(&self) -> &str {
self.codec.protocol_id()
}
fn protocol_version(&self) -> u16 {
self.codec.protocol_version()
}
fn options(&self) -> &'static [ProtocolOption] {
self.codec.options()
}
fn attach(&self, context: PluginContext) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.context.lock() {
*guard = Some(context);
}
}
fn local_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
) -> Result<Option<PluginCapability>, PluginError> {
let data = self.codec.local_capability_data(network)?;
Ok(Some(PluginCapability {
protocol: self.codec.protocol_id().to_string(),
version: self.codec.protocol_version(),
enabled: true,
data,
}))
}
fn on_peer_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
capability: &PluginCapability,
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
if capability.protocol != self.codec.protocol_id() {
return Ok(());
}
self.codec
.on_peer_capability_data(network, peer, &capability.data)
}
fn carry(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, packet: bytes::Bytes) -> bool {
let state = {
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.get(&(network, peer)).cloned()
};
let Some(state) = state else {
return false;
};
match self.codec.encrypt(network, peer, &packet) {
Ok(ciphertext) => {
if state.link.send(ciphertext).is_ok() {
state.tx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
true
} else {
state.dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
false
}
}
Err(err) => {
state.dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
tracing::debug!(%peer, %err, "tunnel encrypt failed");
false
}
}
}
fn on_peer_link(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, link: SharedLink) {
let state = Arc::new(TunnelPeerState {
link: Arc::clone(&link),
tx_packets: AtomicU64::new(0),
rx_packets: AtomicU64::new(0),
dropped: AtomicU64::new(0),
established_at: std::time::Instant::now(),
});
{
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.insert((network, peer), Arc::clone(&state));
}
self.codec.on_peer_link_up(network, peer, &link);
let codec = Arc::clone(&self.codec);
let sink = match self.context.lock() {
Ok(g) => g.as_ref().map(|ctx| ctx.packet_sink()),
Err(p) => p.into_inner().as_ref().map(|ctx| ctx.packet_sink()),
};
let rx_link = Arc::clone(&link);
let rx_state = Arc::clone(&state);
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(payload) = rx_link.recv().await {
match codec.decrypt(network, peer, &payload) {
Ok(packet) => {
rx_state.rx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
if let Some(ref sink) = sink {
sink.deliver(network, peer, packet).await;
}
}
Err(err) => {
rx_state.dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
tracing::debug!(%peer, %err, "tunnel decrypt failed");
}
}
}
});
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(old) = guard.insert((network, peer), handle) {
old.abort();
}
}
fn on_peer_gone(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
{
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(task) = guard.remove(&(network, peer)) {
task.abort();
}
}
{
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.remove(&(network, peer));
}
self.codec.on_peer_down(network, peer);
}
fn on_network_deactivated(&self, network: NetworkId) {
let keys_to_remove: Vec<(NetworkId, EndpointId)> = {
let guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.keys()
.filter(|(net, _)| *net == network)
.copied()
.collect()
};
{
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
for key in &keys_to_remove {
if let Some(task) = guard.remove(key) {
task.abort();
}
}
}
{
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.retain(|(net, _), _| *net != network);
}
}
fn shutdown<'a>(&'a self) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut tasks = Vec::new();
{
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
for (_, task) in guard.drain() {
tasks.push(task);
}
}
for task in tasks {
task.abort();
}
self.codec.shutdown().await;
})
}
}
+333
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
//! Telling the macOS resolver to send some questions here, through
//! `/etc/resolver`.
//!
//! macOS reads one file per domain out of `/etc/resolver`: a file named after
//! a domain, containing the `nameserver` and `port` to send that domain's
//! questions to, makes the system resolver a *scoped* resolver for exactly
//! that suffix and nothing else (see `resolver(5)`). That is the same contract
//! the systemd-resolved and NRPT publishers arrange on the other platforms:
//! route these suffixes to this server, and claim nothing else.
//!
//! # Why a port, and so no privileged socket
//!
//! A resolver file carries a `port`, so the server does not have to sit on 53
//! and the agent needs nothing like `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`. It can serve on a
//! high port and still be reached for its suffixes.
//!
//! # Tagged, reversible, and never clobbering
//!
//! Every file this publisher writes begins with a marker line, so it only ever
//! replaces or removes files it wrote itself: a pre-existing `/etc/resolver`
//! entry a user set up by hand is left untouched. The files are removed when
//! the resolver is turned off and on shutdown; a crash leaves them behind, and
//! the next apply for the same domains overwrites them.
//!
//! # Privilege
//!
//! Writing under `/etc/resolver` needs root. A permission error is reported as
//! a refusal — the kind of failure a person has to act on — rather than a
//! transient one, so the agent does not retry it at the ordinary pace.
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use super::{DnsPublisher, PublishError, Published};
/// The directory macOS reads scoped resolvers from.
const RESOLVER_DIR: &str = "/etc/resolver";
/// The first line of every file this publisher writes, so it recognises its
/// own and never touches a file a user created.
const MARKER: &str = "# managed by tsunagi — do not edit";
/// Writes and removes `/etc/resolver` files for the overlay zones.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ResolverDirPublisher {
/// The resolver directory. A field rather than a constant so the tests can
/// point it at a temporary directory and never touch the real one.
dir: PathBuf,
/// The domain files written by the last apply, so a later apply can remove
/// the ones no longer wanted and `revert` can remove them all.
written: Mutex<BTreeSet<String>>,
}
impl Default for ResolverDirPublisher {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl ResolverDirPublisher {
/// A publisher writing to the real `/etc/resolver`.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::in_dir(RESOLVER_DIR)
}
/// A publisher writing to a specific directory. For the tests.
fn in_dir(dir: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self {
dir: dir.into(),
written: Mutex::new(BTreeSet::new()),
}
}
fn apply_inner(&self, published: &Published) -> Result<(), PublishError> {
let desired = desired_files(published)?;
// The directory may not exist yet; creating it needs root.
std::fs::create_dir_all(&self.dir).map_err(|err| classify(&self.dir, err))?;
// Remove the files from a previous apply that are no longer wanted.
let previous = lock(&self.written).clone();
for name in previous.difference(&keys(&desired)) {
remove_if_ours(&self.dir.join(name));
}
for (name, body) in &desired {
let path = self.dir.join(name);
// Only ever overwrite a file that is already ours, or a name that
// is free. A resolver a user set up by hand is left in place and
// reported, never clobbered.
if path.exists() && !is_ours(&path) {
return Err(PublishError::Failed(format!(
"{} already exists and was not created by tsunagi; \
remove it or rename the network to publish its resolver",
path.display()
)));
}
std::fs::write(&path, body).map_err(|err| classify(&path, err))?;
}
*lock(&self.written) = keys(&desired);
Ok(())
}
fn revert_inner(&self) {
let written = std::mem::take(&mut *lock(&self.written));
for name in &written {
remove_if_ours(&self.dir.join(name));
}
}
}
impl DnsPublisher for ResolverDirPublisher {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"resolver-dir"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, published: &'a Published) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<(), PublishError>> {
// A handful of small file writes, short enough to run in place rather
// than hop to the blocking pool.
Box::pin(async move { self.apply_inner(published) })
}
fn revert(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Result<(), PublishError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
self.revert_inner();
Ok(())
})
}
}
/// The resolver files a publication implies: a map of file name to contents.
fn desired_files(published: &Published) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, PublishError> {
if published.servers.is_empty() {
return Err(PublishError::Failed(
"no server address to point the resolver at".to_string(),
));
}
let body = file_contents(published);
let mut files = Vec::new();
for domain in &published.domains {
let name = resolver_file_name(domain)?;
files.push((name, body.clone()));
}
Ok(files)
}
/// The contents of one resolver file: the marker, every server, one port.
fn file_contents(published: &Published) -> String {
let mut out = String::from(MARKER);
out.push('\n');
for server in &published.servers {
let ip = match server.ip() {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.to_string(),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.to_string(),
};
out.push_str("nameserver ");
out.push_str(&ip);
out.push('\n');
}
// One port for the file; every server listens on the same one. The `port`
// directive is what lets the server stay off 53.
if let Some(first) = published.servers.first() {
out.push_str("port ");
out.push_str(&first.port().to_string());
out.push('\n');
}
out
}
/// The file name for a domain, rejecting anything that is not a plain label
/// path component: a resolver file name must never escape the directory.
fn resolver_file_name(domain: &str) -> Result<String, PublishError> {
let trimmed = domain.trim_end_matches('.');
if trimmed.is_empty()
|| trimmed.contains('/')
|| trimmed.contains('\\')
|| trimmed.contains(std::path::MAIN_SEPARATOR)
|| trimmed == "."
|| trimmed == ".."
|| trimmed.starts_with('.')
{
return Err(PublishError::Failed(format!(
"cannot make a resolver file name for the domain {domain:?}"
)));
}
Ok(trimmed.to_string())
}
/// Whether a file is one this publisher wrote, by its marker first line.
fn is_ours(path: &Path) -> bool {
match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
Ok(text) => text.lines().next() == Some(MARKER),
Err(_) => false,
}
}
/// Removes a file, but only if it is one of ours. Best effort.
fn remove_if_ours(path: &Path) {
if is_ours(path)
&& let Err(err) = std::fs::remove_file(path)
&& err.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound
{
tracing::debug!(path = %path.display(), %err, "cannot remove the resolver file");
}
}
/// The set of file names in a desired-files list.
fn keys(files: &[(String, String)]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
files.iter().map(|(name, _)| name.clone()).collect()
}
/// Turns a filesystem error into the right kind of publish error: a permission
/// problem is a refusal a person must act on, anything else is a plain failure.
fn classify(path: &Path, err: std::io::Error) -> PublishError {
if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied {
PublishError::Refused(format!(
"writing {} needs root; start the agent with `sudo` or as a root LaunchDaemon",
path.display()
))
} else {
PublishError::Failed(format!("cannot write {}: {err}", path.display()))
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use super::*;
fn published(domains: &[&str]) -> Published {
Published {
interface: "utun5".into(),
servers: vec![
"10.13.37.1:5353".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
"[fd00::1]:5353".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
],
domains: domains.iter().map(|d| d.to_string()).collect(),
}
}
#[test]
fn a_file_lists_every_server_and_one_port_under_the_marker() {
let body = file_contents(&published(&["mynet."]));
let mut lines = body.lines();
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some(MARKER));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some("nameserver 10.13.37.1"));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some("nameserver fd00::1"));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some("port 5353"));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_domain_becomes_a_plain_file_name_without_its_trailing_dot() {
assert_eq!(resolver_file_name("mynet.").unwrap(), "mynet");
assert_eq!(resolver_file_name("my.net").unwrap(), "my.net");
}
#[test]
fn a_domain_that_would_escape_the_directory_is_refused() {
assert!(resolver_file_name("../etc/passwd").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name("a/b").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name("").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name(".").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name(".hidden").is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_writes_a_file_per_domain_and_revert_removes_them() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let publisher = ResolverDirPublisher::in_dir(dir.path());
publisher
.apply(&published(&["mynet.", "other."]))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(dir.path().join("mynet").is_file());
assert!(dir.path().join("other").is_file());
publisher.revert().await.unwrap();
assert!(!dir.path().join("mynet").exists());
assert!(!dir.path().join("other").exists());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn re_applying_removes_a_domain_that_is_no_longer_wanted() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let publisher = ResolverDirPublisher::in_dir(dir.path());
publisher.apply(&published(&["a.", "b."])).await.unwrap();
publisher.apply(&published(&["a."])).await.unwrap();
assert!(dir.path().join("a").is_file());
assert!(
!dir.path().join("b").exists(),
"the dropped domain's file is removed"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_file_a_user_created_is_never_clobbered_or_removed() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let foreign = dir.path().join("mynet");
std::fs::write(&foreign, "nameserver 9.9.9.9\n").unwrap();
let publisher = ResolverDirPublisher::in_dir(dir.path());
let err = publisher.apply(&published(&["mynet."])).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, PublishError::Failed(_)), "{err:?}");
// Untouched.
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(&foreign).unwrap(),
"nameserver 9.9.9.9\n"
);
// And revert leaves a foreign file alone even if it is in our set.
publisher.revert().await.unwrap();
assert!(foreign.is_file());
}
}
+5
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ mod windows;
#[cfg(all(feature = "dns-publish", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows::NrptPublisher;
#[cfg(all(feature = "dns-publish", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos;
#[cfg(all(feature = "dns-publish", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos::ResolverDirPublisher;
mod unsupported;
pub use unsupported::UnsupportedPublisher;
+7 -2
View File
@@ -49,11 +49,16 @@ impl DeviceIdentity {
self.secret.public()
}
/// The raw secret key bytes, for persistence only.
pub(crate) fn secret_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
/// The raw secret key bytes, for persistence and transport certificate generation.
pub fn secret_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.secret.to_bytes()
}
/// Signs a message with the device's persistent secret key.
pub fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> iroh::Signature {
self.secret.sign(message)
}
/// A clone of the iroh secret key, for endpoint construction only.
pub(crate) fn secret_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
self.secret.clone()
+124 -3
View File
@@ -82,6 +82,40 @@ pub fn control_socket_path(state_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
state_dir.join("agent.sock")
}
/// Where the default system control socket lives on this platform.
///
/// On Windows, the system-wide `%ProgramData%\tsunagi\agent.sock` is used so that
/// any local user, tray application, or CLI tool can manage the running agent
/// without needing to know which user account or service started it.
/// On macOS the agent runs as a root LaunchDaemon, so a fixed system path under
/// `/var/run` is used for the same reason, and it stays short enough for the
/// Unix socket path limit. On other Unix it derives from the default per-user
/// state directory.
pub fn default_control_socket_path() -> PathBuf {
#[cfg(windows)]
{
if let Some(program_data) = std::env::var_os("ProgramData") {
let pd = PathBuf::from(program_data);
if pd.is_absolute() {
return pd.join("tsunagi").join("agent.sock");
}
}
PathBuf::from(r"C:\ProgramData\tsunagi\agent.sock")
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
PathBuf::from("/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock")
}
#[cfg(all(unix, not(target_os = "macos")))]
{
if let Ok(paths) = crate::config::StoragePaths::user_default() {
control_socket_path(&paths.state_dir)
} else {
PathBuf::from("/run/tsunagi/agent.sock")
}
}
}
/// What a client asks for.
///
/// `Debug` is written by hand rather than derived: one of these carries a
@@ -92,6 +126,13 @@ pub fn control_socket_path(state_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
pub enum Request {
/// Report what the agent is doing.
Status,
/// Set local broadcast participation in one configured network.
SetBroadcast {
/// Public network identifier.
network_id: String,
/// Whether to originate and accept broadcasts.
enabled: bool,
},
/// Answer to a different name from now on.
///
/// Applied by the running agent rather than written behind its back, so
@@ -135,6 +176,9 @@ pub enum Request {
/// It travels over a socket only its owner can open, to the agent
/// that stores it anyway, and never appears in `Debug`.
secret: String,
/// Explicit choice, or preserve the saved setting.
#[serde(default)]
broadcast: Option<bool>,
},
}
@@ -142,6 +186,10 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for Request {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
Request::Status => f.write_str("Status"),
Request::SetBroadcast {
network_id,
enabled,
} => write!(f, "SetBroadcast {{ {network_id}, enabled: {enabled} }}"),
Request::SetHostname(name) => write!(f, "SetHostname({name})"),
Request::Leave(network) => write!(f, "Leave({network})"),
Request::SetActive { network_id, active } => {
@@ -162,6 +210,8 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for Request {
pub enum Response {
/// A status report.
Status(Box<StatusReport>),
/// Accepted local broadcast participation.
Broadcast(bool),
/// The name the agent now answers to, after reducing it to canonical form.
Hostname(String),
/// A network was left.
@@ -274,6 +324,9 @@ pub struct DnsReport {
/// One network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkReport {
/// Whether this agent participates in LAN broadcasts in this network.
#[serde(default)]
pub broadcast: bool,
/// Network name.
pub name: String,
/// Public network identifier.
@@ -367,6 +420,21 @@ pub struct OverlayReport {
pub multicast_packets: u64,
/// One destination nobody owned, if there was one.
pub unroutable_sample: Option<String>,
/// The broadcast route and firewall allowance on this host, when the
/// agent installed them. `None` means none are installed.
pub broadcast_rules: Option<HostRulesReport>,
}
/// What the agent installed on the host so LAN broadcast reaches the overlay.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct HostRulesReport {
/// Whether both the route and the firewall allowance are in place.
pub ok: bool,
/// One line: `ok (route + firewall)`, or what is missing and why.
pub detail: String,
/// The overlay address the `255.255.255.255` route is bound to. With
/// several networks on one interface only one address can be its source.
pub source: String,
}
/// One overlay peer.
@@ -375,7 +443,9 @@ pub struct OverlayPeerReport {
/// The peer's control plane identity, so a tunnel can be matched to the
/// session and the member it belongs to.
pub endpoint_id: String,
/// The peer's WireGuard public key.
/// Protocol carrying overlay traffic for this peer (e.g. "tcp-tls", "wg-quic").
pub protocol: String,
/// The peer's WireGuard public key (if applicable).
pub public_key: String,
/// The overlay address the network agreed it holds.
pub address: Option<String>,
@@ -455,10 +525,20 @@ pub trait ReportSource: Send + Sync + 'static {
&self,
_name: String,
_secret: String,
_broadcast: Option<bool>,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<JoinedReport, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot join a network".to_string()) })
}
/// Persists and applies local broadcast participation.
fn set_broadcast(
&self,
_network_id: String,
_enabled: bool,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<bool, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot change broadcast participation".into()) })
}
/// Stops serving a network, or starts serving it again.
///
/// Defaulted to a refusal, like the others.
@@ -510,7 +590,7 @@ pub const EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
///
/// Bump it whenever [`Request`], [`Response`] or anything they contain
/// changes shape.
pub const CONTROL_PROTOCOL: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes([b'T', b'S', b'N', 13]);
pub const CONTROL_PROTOCOL: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes([b'T', b'S', b'N', 15]);
/// Reads one request off an accepted stream, answers it, writes the response.
///
@@ -535,6 +615,13 @@ where
};
let response = match request {
Request::Status => Response::Status(Box::new(source.report().await)),
Request::SetBroadcast {
network_id,
enabled,
} => match source.set_broadcast(network_id, enabled).await {
Ok(enabled) => Response::Broadcast(enabled),
Err(error) => Response::Error(error),
},
Request::SetHostname(hostname) => match source.set_hostname(hostname).await {
Ok(accepted) => Response::Hostname(accepted),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
@@ -543,7 +630,11 @@ where
Ok(report) => Response::Left(report),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::Join { name, secret } => match source.join(name, secret).await {
Request::Join {
name,
secret,
broadcast,
} => match source.join(name, secret, broadcast).await {
Ok(report) => Response::Joined(report),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
@@ -636,9 +727,21 @@ pub async fn join_network(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
name: &str,
secret: &str,
) -> Result<JoinedReport> {
let path = path.as_ref();
join_network_with_broadcast(path, name, secret, None).await
}
/// Joins with an explicit per-network broadcast choice.
pub async fn join_network_with_broadcast(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
name: &str,
secret: &str,
broadcast: Option<bool>,
) -> Result<JoinedReport> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let request = Request::Join {
broadcast,
name: name.to_string(),
secret: secret.to_string(),
};
@@ -649,6 +752,24 @@ pub async fn join_network(
}
}
/// Changes one network's broadcast participation while the agent runs.
pub async fn set_broadcast(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
network_id: &str,
enabled: bool,
) -> Result<bool> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let request = Request::SetBroadcast {
network_id: network_id.to_owned(),
enabled,
};
match exchange(path, &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::Broadcast(enabled) => Ok(enabled),
Response::Error(message) => Err(Error::Storage(message)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected answer: {other:?}"))),
}
}
/// Asks a running agent to stop serving a network, or to serve it again.
pub async fn set_active(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
+116 -18
View File
@@ -18,15 +18,16 @@
//!
//! # Who may connect
//!
//! The pipe rejects clients from other machines, and takes the process's
//! default security, under which the creating user has full access. Narrowing
//! that further with an explicit ACL needs a raw security-descriptor call this
//! crate forbids, so it is not attempted; on a single-user machine, and against
//! other unprivileged users, the default is the practical equivalent of the
//! owner-only Unix socket. There is no leftover to clean up: a pipe exists only
//! while its server does.
//! Commands must run as the same Windows user with the same elevation as the
//! agent. A permission denial is reported as such, never as an absent agent.
//! The pipe rejects clients from other machines (`reject_remote_clients(true)`).
//! An explicit SDDL security descriptor grants Full Control to Administrators
//! and LocalSystem, while granting Read and Write (`GRGW`) to all local users
//! with a Medium Integrity SACL label (`S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)`). This allows unprivileged
//! user-space tools (such as tray applications, status monitors, or CLI commands
//! launched by regular users) to connect to the agent even when the agent was
//! started by an elevated Administrator or as a system service.
//! A permission denial is reported as such, never as an absent agent.
#![allow(unsafe_code)]
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -50,6 +51,91 @@ const ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED: i32 = 5;
/// is there; the client only has to wait for a free instance.
const ERROR_PIPE_BUSY: i32 = 231;
/// RAII wrapper for Windows named pipe security attributes with permissive local ACL.
///
/// SDDL specification:
/// - `D:(A;;GRGW;;;WD)`: DACL allows Generic Read and Generic Write to Everyone (`WD`).
/// Full control (`GA`) remains reserved to Administrators and LocalSystem.
/// - `(A;;GA;;;BA)`: DACL allows Generic All to Builtin Administrators (`BA`).
/// - `(A;;GA;;;SY)`: DACL allows Generic All to LocalSystem (`SY`).
/// - `S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)`: SACL Mandatory Label with Medium Integrity (`ME`) and No Write Up (`NW`).
/// This allows unprivileged user-space processes (Medium Integrity) to write to the
/// named pipe even when the agent runs as an elevated Administrator (High Integrity).
struct PipeSecurityAttributes {
attrs: windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PipeSecurityAttributes {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("PipeSecurityAttributes")
.field("nLength", &self.attrs.nLength)
.field("lpSecurityDescriptor", &self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor)
.field("bInheritHandle", &self.attrs.bInheritHandle)
.finish()
}
}
impl PipeSecurityAttributes {
fn new() -> Result<Self> {
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt;
use windows_sys::Win32::Security::Authorization::{
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, SDDL_REVISION_1,
};
const SDDL: &str = "D:(A;;GRGW;;;WD)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GA;;;SY)S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)";
let wide: Vec<u16> = OsStr::new(SDDL)
.encode_wide()
.chain(std::iter::once(0))
.collect();
let mut p_sd = std::ptr::null_mut();
// SAFETY: We pass a valid null-terminated wide string, standard revision 1,
// and a valid pointer to receive the descriptor.
let success = unsafe {
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
wide.as_ptr(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
&mut p_sd,
std::ptr::null_mut(),
)
};
if success == 0 || p_sd.is_null() {
let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
return Err(Error::Storage(format!(
"cannot create pipe security descriptor: {err}"
)));
}
let attrs = windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
nLength: std::mem::size_of::<windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>()
as u32,
lpSecurityDescriptor: p_sd,
bInheritHandle: 0,
};
Ok(Self { attrs })
}
fn as_raw_mut(&mut self) -> *mut std::ffi::c_void {
&mut self.attrs as *mut _ as *mut std::ffi::c_void
}
}
impl Drop for PipeSecurityAttributes {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if !self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor.is_null() {
// SAFETY: The descriptor was allocated by ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW
// and must be freed with LocalFree.
unsafe {
windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::LocalFree(self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor);
}
self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor = std::ptr::null_mut();
}
}
}
/// Serves the local control interface on a named pipe.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ControlSocket {
@@ -67,11 +153,14 @@ impl ControlSocket {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
let name = pipe_name(&path);
let server = match ServerOptions::new()
.first_pipe_instance(true)
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create(&name)
{
let mut sec_attrs = PipeSecurityAttributes::new()?;
// SAFETY: sec_attrs points to valid initialized SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES.
let server = match unsafe {
ServerOptions::new()
.first_pipe_instance(true)
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create_with_security_attributes_raw(&name, sec_attrs.as_raw_mut())
} {
Ok(server) => server,
Err(err) if err.raw_os_error() == Some(ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) => {
return Err(Error::StateLocked { path });
@@ -155,10 +244,19 @@ async fn serve(
/// Creates the next pipe instance, or `None` if the name can no longer be
/// served.
fn next_instance(name: &str) -> Option<tokio::net::windows::named_pipe::NamedPipeServer> {
match ServerOptions::new()
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create(name)
{
let mut sec_attrs = match PipeSecurityAttributes::new() {
Ok(attrs) => attrs,
Err(err) => {
tracing::debug!(%err, "cannot build pipe security attributes for next instance");
return None;
}
};
// SAFETY: sec_attrs points to valid initialized SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES.
match unsafe {
ServerOptions::new()
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create_with_security_attributes_raw(name, sec_attrs.as_raw_mut())
} {
Ok(server) => Some(server),
Err(err) => {
tracing::debug!(%err, "cannot create the next control pipe instance");
+136
View File
@@ -240,6 +240,57 @@ impl EndpointAdapter {
TransportPolicy::N0Defaults => builder.preset(presets::N0),
};
if matches!(
config.transport,
TransportPolicy::N0Defaults | TransportPolicy::DirectOnly
) {
let filter = iroh::address_lookup::AddrFilter::new(|addrs| {
let mut overlay_ips = std::collections::HashSet::new();
for iface in netdev::get_interfaces() {
let name = iface.name.to_lowercase();
let friendly = iface
.friendly_name
.as_deref()
.map(str::to_lowercase)
.unwrap_or_default();
let desc = iface
.description
.as_deref()
.map(str::to_lowercase)
.unwrap_or_default();
if name.starts_with("tsun")
|| name.contains("tsunagi")
|| name.contains("wintun")
|| friendly.starts_with("tsun")
|| friendly.contains("tsunagi")
|| friendly.contains("wintun")
|| desc.contains("wintun")
|| desc.contains("tsunagi")
{
for ip in iface.ipv4 {
overlay_ips.insert(std::net::IpAddr::V4(ip.addr()));
}
for ip in iface.ipv6 {
overlay_ips.insert(std::net::IpAddr::V6(ip.addr()));
}
}
}
if overlay_ips.is_empty() {
return std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(addrs);
}
let filtered: Vec<iroh::TransportAddr> = addrs
.iter()
.filter(|addr| match addr {
iroh::TransportAddr::Ip(sock) => !overlay_ips.contains(&sock.ip()),
_ => true,
})
.cloned()
.collect();
std::borrow::Cow::Owned(filtered)
});
builder = builder.addr_filter(filter);
}
#[cfg(feature = "testing")]
if let Some(transport) = &config.test_quic_transport {
builder = builder.transport_config(transport.clone());
@@ -259,6 +310,91 @@ impl EndpointAdapter {
.await
.map_err(|err| Error::Endpoint(format!("cannot bind endpoint: {err}")))?;
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %endpoint.id().fmt_short(),
bound_sockets = ?endpoint.bound_sockets(),
"iroh endpoint bound locally"
);
let ep_id = endpoint.id();
let mut addr_watcher = endpoint.watch_addr();
let mut relay_watcher = endpoint.home_relay_status();
let close_token = endpoint.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
use iroh::Watcher;
let mut last_addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = Vec::new();
let mut last_relays: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let warn_timer = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(12));
tokio::pin!(warn_timer);
let mut warned = false;
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = close_token.closed() => {
break;
}
() = &mut warn_timer, if !warned => {
warned = true;
if last_addrs.is_empty() && !last_relays.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
relays = ?last_relays,
"No direct reflexive or UPnP addresses discovered after probe; communications will rely on relay servers"
);
} else if last_addrs.is_empty() && last_relays.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
"No reachability discovered (neither direct reflexive/UPnP addresses nor relay servers available)"
);
}
}
res = addr_watcher.updated() => {
let addr = match res {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(_) => break,
};
let addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = addr.ip_addrs().copied().collect();
let relays: Vec<String> = addr.relay_urls().map(|u| u.to_string()).collect();
if addrs != last_addrs || relays != last_relays {
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
direct_addrs = ?addrs,
relays = ?relays,
"Discovered endpoint reachability (STUN/UPnP/local/relay)"
);
last_addrs = addrs;
last_relays = relays;
}
}
res = relay_watcher.updated() => {
let relays = match res {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(_) => break,
};
for relay in &relays {
if relay.is_connected() {
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
relay = %relay.url(),
"Connected to home relay server"
);
} else if let Some(err) = relay.last_error() {
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
relay = %relay.url(),
error = %err,
"Relay connection attempt failed"
);
}
}
}
}
}
});
Ok(Self { endpoint })
}
+228
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
//! Scoped LAN discovery fanout at IP ingress. A domain is one logical network;
//! routed copies use ordinary encrypted peer links and are never reflooded.
//! Future subnet exporters must supply explicitly authorized ingress domains
//! here, not teach the encrypted transit router to inspect application bytes.
use super::router::{NetworkRoutes, Route};
use crate::NetworkId;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::Arc;
/// Local participation and the currently authenticated participants in a domain.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BroadcastPolicy {
/// Whether this agent originates and accepts LAN broadcasts in this network.
pub enabled: bool,
/// Live members explicitly advertising that they accept broadcasts.
pub peers: HashSet<EndpointId>,
}
impl Default for BroadcastPolicy {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
enabled: true,
peers: HashSet::new(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Domain {
network: NetworkId,
directed: Ipv4Addr,
enabled: bool,
recipients: Arc<[Route]>,
members: HashSet<EndpointId>,
}
/// Immutable ingress-domain index rebuilt with address/policy changes.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub(crate) struct BroadcastTable {
sources: HashMap<Ipv4Addr, Arc<Domain>>,
networks: HashMap<NetworkId, Arc<Domain>>,
destinations: HashSet<Ipv4Addr>,
}
impl BroadcastTable {
pub fn build(networks: &HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>) -> Self {
let mut table = Self::default();
for (&network, routes) in networks {
let (Some(range), Some(local)) = (routes.range, routes.local) else {
continue;
};
if range.prefix_len > 30 {
continue;
}
let directed = Ipv4Addr::from(u32::from(range.base) | (u32::MAX >> range.prefix_len));
let mut recipients: Vec<_> = routes
.peers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, peer)| routes.broadcast.peers.contains(peer))
.map(|(_, peer)| Route {
network,
peer: *peer,
})
.collect();
recipients.sort_by_key(|route| route.peer);
recipients.dedup();
let domain = Arc::new(Domain {
network,
directed,
enabled: routes.broadcast.enabled,
members: recipients.iter().map(|route| route.peer).collect(),
recipients: recipients.into(),
});
table.sources.insert(local, domain.clone());
table.networks.insert(network, domain);
table.destinations.insert(directed);
}
table
}
pub fn is_destination(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
destination.is_broadcast() || self.destinations.contains(&destination)
}
pub fn outgoing(&self, source: Ipv4Addr, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> Option<Arc<[Route]>> {
let domain = self.sources.get(&source)?;
(domain.enabled && (destination.is_broadcast() || destination == domain.directed))
.then(|| domain.recipients.clone())
}
pub fn accepts(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.networks.get(&network).is_some_and(|domain| {
domain.network == network
&& domain.enabled
&& domain.members.contains(&peer)
&& (destination.is_broadcast() || destination == domain.directed)
})
}
}
/// Validates IPv4/UDP lengths before broadcast fanout. No game-specific ports,
/// payload rewriting or checksum changes. IP fragments retain their bytes and
/// are reassembled by the destination OS; even later fragments have protocol 17.
pub(crate) fn valid_udp(packet: &[u8]) -> bool {
if packet.len() < 20 || packet[0] >> 4 != 4 || packet[9] != 17 {
return false;
}
let header = usize::from(packet[0] & 15) * 4;
let total = usize::from(u16::from_be_bytes([packet[2], packet[3]]));
if header < 20 || total <= header || total > packet.len() {
return false;
}
let fragment = u16::from_be_bytes([packet[6], packet[7]]);
if fragment & 0x1fff != 0 {
return true;
}
if total < header + 8 {
return false;
}
let udp = usize::from(u16::from_be_bytes([packet[header + 4], packet[header + 5]]));
udp >= 8
&& if fragment & 0x2000 != 0 {
udp >= total - header
} else {
udp == total - header
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
fn id(name: &str) -> NetworkId {
NetworkKeys::derive(
&NetworkName::new(name).unwrap(),
&NetworkSecret::from_bytes([4; 32]).unwrap(),
)
.network_id()
}
#[test]
fn limited_and_directed_broadcasts_never_cross_domains_or_target_disabled_peers() {
let peer = iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes(&[8; 32]).public();
let a = NetworkRoutes {
range: Some("10.0.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some("10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap()),
peers: vec![("10.0.0.2".parse().unwrap(), peer)],
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: true,
peers: HashSet::from([peer]),
},
};
let b = NetworkRoutes {
range: Some("10.1.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some("10.1.0.1".parse().unwrap()),
peers: vec![("10.1.0.2".parse().unwrap(), peer)],
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy::default(),
};
let table = BroadcastTable::build(&HashMap::from([(id("a"), a.clone()), (id("b"), b)]));
let routes = table
.outgoing(a.local.unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
&*routes,
&[Route {
network: id("a"),
peer
}]
);
assert!(
table
.outgoing(a.local.unwrap(), "10.1.0.255".parse().unwrap())
.is_none()
);
assert!(
table
.outgoing("192.168.1.2".parse().unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.is_none()
);
assert!(
table
.outgoing("10.1.0.1".parse().unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.unwrap()
.is_empty()
);
assert!(!table.accepts(id("a"), peer, "10.1.0.255".parse().unwrap()));
assert!(!table.accepts(id("b"), peer, Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST));
assert!(table.accepts(id("a"), peer, Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST));
let disabled = NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: false,
..a.broadcast.clone()
},
..a.clone()
};
let table = BroadcastTable::build(&HashMap::from([(id("a"), disabled)]));
assert!(
table
.outgoing(a.local.unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.is_none()
);
assert!(!table.accepts(id("a"), peer, Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST));
}
#[test]
fn malformed_udp_is_not_amplified_but_ipv4_fragments_are_supported() {
let mut packet = vec![0u8; 36];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[3] = 36;
packet[9] = 17;
packet[25] = 16;
assert!(valid_udp(&packet));
for length in 0..36 {
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet[..length]));
}
packet[9] = 6;
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet));
packet[9] = 17;
packet[0] = 0x44;
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet));
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[25] = 8;
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet));
packet[6] = 0x20;
packet[25] = 64;
assert!(valid_udp(&packet));
packet[6] = 0;
packet[7] = 2;
assert!(valid_udp(&packet));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,566 @@
//! Broadcast host rules on Linux: a netlink route and an `iptables` rule.
//!
//! The route is added by the netlink thread the interface provisioner already
//! owns (see [`super::super::provision`]), because that thread is the only one
//! that ever holds `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. It belongs to the interface and goes away
//! with it.
//!
//! The firewall allowance is a rule in the `INPUT` chain, inserted at the top
//! so a default-deny chain further down cannot drop discovery replies first:
//!
//! ```text
//! iptables -I INPUT 1 -i <if> -p udp -s <range> -m comment --comment tsunagi:<if> -j ACCEPT
//! ```
//!
//! `iptables` is a program, not a netlink call, so it is looked up in fixed
//! system directories rather than on `PATH`, and its arguments are built from
//! values this agent computed. It works with both the legacy backend and
//! `iptables-nft`. A host with only `nft` or `firewalld` has no `iptables`;
//! that is reported on the firewall half and the route is still installed.
//!
//! The rule carries a comment tag. That is how a rule left behind by a crashed
//! run is found and replaced, and why nothing else in the chain is ever
//! deleted.
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::provision::RouteHandle;
use super::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, RuleOutcome, tag_for};
const CHAIN: &str = "INPUT";
/// Fixed places `iptables` is installed. Never `PATH`: the agent is
/// privileged and a directory a user controls must not decide what it runs.
const IPTABLES_DIRECTORIES: [&str; 5] = [
"/usr/sbin/iptables",
"/sbin/iptables",
"/usr/bin/iptables",
"/bin/iptables",
"/usr/local/sbin/iptables",
];
/// The first candidate that exists.
fn pick_iptables(exists: impl Fn(&str) -> bool) -> Option<&'static str> {
IPTABLES_DIRECTORIES
.into_iter()
.find(|candidate| exists(candidate))
}
/// What running `iptables` produced.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Ran {
/// There is no `iptables` to run.
Missing,
/// It ran, and exited like this.
Exited {
success: bool,
stdout: String,
stderr: String,
},
}
/// Runs `iptables` with these arguments. A function value so the flow below
/// can be tested without touching the host.
type Run<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&[String]) -> Ran;
/// The match and target of the rule, without the chain or position.
fn rule_spec(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> Vec<String> {
[
"-i",
plan.interface.as_str(),
"-p",
"udp",
"-s",
&plan.range.to_string(),
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
&plan.tag(),
"-j",
"ACCEPT",
]
.into_iter()
.map(str::to_string)
.collect()
}
/// Waits briefly for the xtables lock instead of failing when another tool
/// holds it.
fn locked(args: impl IntoIterator<Item = String>) -> Vec<String> {
["-w", "5"]
.into_iter()
.map(str::to_string)
.chain(args)
.collect()
}
fn check_args(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
["-C".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string()]
.into_iter()
.chain(rule_spec(plan)),
)
}
fn insert_args(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
["-I".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string(), "1".to_string()]
.into_iter()
.chain(rule_spec(plan)),
)
}
fn list_args() -> Vec<String> {
locked(["-S".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string()])
}
/// Splits one `iptables -S` line into words, honouring double quotes, which
/// `iptables` puts around comments that need them.
fn split_rule_line(line: &str) -> Vec<String> {
let mut words = Vec::new();
let mut current = String::new();
let mut quoted = false;
let mut started = false;
for c in line.chars() {
match c {
'"' => {
quoted = !quoted;
started = true;
}
c if c.is_whitespace() && !quoted => {
if started {
words.push(std::mem::take(&mut current));
started = false;
}
}
c => {
current.push(c);
started = true;
}
}
}
if started {
words.push(current);
}
words
}
/// The delete commands for every rule in an `iptables -S INPUT` listing that
/// carries exactly this tag. Anything else in the chain is left alone.
fn tagged_deletions(listing: &str, tag: &str) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
listing
.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
let words = split_rule_line(line);
let [append, chain, rest @ ..] = words.as_slice() else {
return None;
};
if append != "-A" || chain != CHAIN {
return None;
}
let tagged = rest
.windows(2)
.any(|pair| pair[0] == "--comment" && pair[1] == tag);
tagged.then(|| {
locked(
["-D".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string()]
.into_iter()
.chain(rest.iter().cloned()),
)
})
})
.collect()
}
/// A failure message with the likely fix for the likely cause.
fn failure(stderr: &str) -> String {
let text = stderr.trim();
let lower = text.to_ascii_lowercase();
if lower.contains("permission denied") || lower.contains("must be root") {
format!("iptables needs root: {text}")
} else if text.is_empty() {
"iptables failed without saying why".to_string()
} else {
format!("iptables failed: {text}")
}
}
fn missing(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
format!(
"iptables not found; install it (the iptables-nft package is enough) or allow inbound \
UDP from {} on `{}` in your firewall",
plan.range, plan.interface
)
}
/// Makes the firewall hold exactly one rule for this interface, the planned one.
fn apply_firewall(run: Run<'_>, plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> RuleOutcome {
let present = match run(&check_args(plan)) {
Ran::Missing => return RuleOutcome::Failed(missing(plan)),
Ran::Exited { success, .. } => success,
};
let listing = match run(&list_args()) {
Ran::Missing => return RuleOutcome::Failed(missing(plan)),
Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} => stdout,
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => return RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr)),
};
let stale = tagged_deletions(&listing, &plan.tag());
// `-C` matched an identical rule and nothing else carries our tag, so
// there is nothing to do. Otherwise start from a clean slate for this
// interface: a rule from an earlier run may name another range.
if present && stale.len() == 1 {
return RuleOutcome::Applied;
}
for delete in &stale {
if let Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stderr,
..
} = run(delete)
{
return RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr));
}
}
match run(&insert_args(plan)) {
Ran::Missing => RuleOutcome::Failed(missing(plan)),
Ran::Exited { success: true, .. } => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr)),
}
}
/// Removes every rule tagged for this interface. Best effort.
fn clear_firewall(run: Run<'_>, interface: &str) {
let Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} = run(&list_args())
else {
return;
};
for delete in tagged_deletions(&stdout, &tag_for(interface)) {
if let Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stderr,
..
} = run(&delete)
{
tracing::warn!(
interface,
"cannot remove the broadcast firewall rule: {}",
failure(&stderr)
);
}
}
}
/// Runs the real `iptables`.
fn run_iptables(args: &[String]) -> Ran {
let Some(program) = pick_iptables(|path| std::path::Path::new(path).is_file()) else {
return Ran::Missing;
};
match std::process::Command::new(program).args(args).output() {
Ok(output) => Ran::Exited {
success: output.status.success(),
stdout: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).into_owned(),
stderr: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).into_owned(),
},
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ran::Missing,
Err(err) => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: err.to_string(),
},
}
}
/// The Linux implementation: netlink for the route, `iptables` for the rule.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct LinuxHostRules {
route: RouteHandle,
}
impl LinuxHostRules {
pub(crate) fn new(route: RouteHandle) -> Self {
Self { route }
}
async fn set_route(&self, interface: String, source: Ipv4Addr) -> RuleOutcome {
let route = self.route.clone();
match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || route.set(&interface, source)).await {
Ok(Ok(())) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ok(Err(err)) => RuleOutcome::Failed(err.to_string()),
Err(err) => RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("the route task failed: {err}")),
}
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for LinuxHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"netlink+iptables"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = self.set_route(plan.interface.clone(), plan.source).await;
let owned = plan.clone();
let firewall =
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || apply_firewall(&run_iptables, &owned))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| {
RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("the firewall task failed: {err}"))
});
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route,
firewall,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = self.route.clone();
let name = interface.to_string();
let route_name = name.clone();
if let Ok(Err(err)) =
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || route.clear(&route_name)).await
{
tracing::warn!(interface = %name, %err, "cannot remove the broadcast route");
}
let name = interface.to_string();
let _ = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || clear_firewall(&run_iptables, &name)).await;
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use std::cell::RefCell;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
fn words(args: &[String]) -> String {
args.join(" ")
}
#[test]
fn the_rule_is_udp_only_from_the_overlay_range_on_this_interface() {
let spec = words(&rule_spec(&plan()));
assert_eq!(
spec,
"-i tsun0 -p udp -s 10.13.37.0/24 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT"
);
// Nothing here may widen to other protocols or every source.
assert!(spec.contains("-p udp"));
assert!(!spec.contains("0.0.0.0/0"));
assert!(words(&insert_args(&plan())).starts_with("-w 5 -I INPUT 1 -i tsun0"));
assert!(words(&check_args(&plan())).starts_with("-w 5 -C INPUT -i tsun0"));
}
#[test]
fn iptables_is_found_in_fixed_directories_never_on_path() {
assert_eq!(pick_iptables(|_| false), None);
assert_eq!(
pick_iptables(|p| p == "/sbin/iptables"),
Some("/sbin/iptables")
);
assert_eq!(pick_iptables(|_| true), Some("/usr/sbin/iptables"));
}
#[test]
fn only_rules_with_our_exact_tag_are_selected_for_deletion() {
let listing = "\
-P INPUT DROP
-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment \"tsunagi:tsun0\" -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i tsun1 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun1 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -m comment --comment \"allow ssh tsunagi:tsun0\" -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -i tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
";
let deletions = tagged_deletions(listing, "tsunagi:tsun0");
assert_eq!(deletions.len(), 2, "{deletions:?}");
assert_eq!(
words(&deletions[0]),
"-w 5 -D INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT"
);
assert!(words(&deletions[1]).contains("-D INPUT -i tsun0 -m comment"));
assert!(tagged_deletions("", "tsunagi:tsun0").is_empty());
}
/// A scripted `iptables`: answers by the leading verb, records every call.
struct Fake {
calls: RefCell<Vec<String>>,
check_ok: bool,
listing: String,
insert_stderr: Option<&'static str>,
missing: bool,
}
impl Fake {
fn new(check_ok: bool, listing: &str) -> Self {
Self {
calls: RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
check_ok,
listing: listing.to_string(),
insert_stderr: None,
missing: false,
}
}
fn run(&self, args: &[String]) -> Ran {
self.calls.borrow_mut().push(words(args));
if self.missing {
return Ran::Missing;
}
let ok = |stdout: &str| Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout: stdout.to_string(),
stderr: String::new(),
};
match args.get(2).map(String::as_str) {
Some("-C") if self.check_ok => ok(""),
Some("-C") => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: "Bad rule".into(),
},
Some("-S") => ok(&self.listing),
Some("-I") => match self.insert_stderr {
Some(stderr) => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: stderr.into(),
},
None => ok(""),
},
_ => ok(""),
}
}
fn verbs(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.calls
.borrow()
.iter()
.map(|call| call.split(' ').nth(2).unwrap().to_string())
.collect()
}
}
const ONE_OURS: &str =
"-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT\n";
#[test]
fn an_identical_rule_already_in_place_is_left_alone() {
let fake = Fake::new(true, ONE_OURS);
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S"], "no insert, no delete");
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_rule_is_inserted_once() {
let fake = Fake::new(false, "-P INPUT ACCEPT\n");
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S", "-I"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_stale_rule_for_another_range_is_replaced_not_stacked() {
// A crashed run left a rule for an old range under our tag.
let stale = "-A INPUT -s 10.99.0.0/16 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT\n";
let fake = Fake::new(false, stale);
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S", "-D", "-I"]);
}
#[test]
fn duplicates_of_the_rule_collapse_to_one() {
let doubled = format!("{ONE_OURS}{ONE_OURS}");
let fake = Fake::new(true, &doubled);
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S", "-D", "-D", "-I"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_iptables_says_what_to_install_and_what_to_allow() {
let mut fake = Fake::new(false, "");
fake.missing = true;
let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()) else {
panic!("expected a failure");
};
assert!(reason.contains("iptables not found"), "{reason}");
assert!(reason.contains("10.13.37.0/24"), "{reason}");
assert!(reason.contains("tsun0"), "{reason}");
}
#[test]
fn a_refused_insert_is_reported_with_the_cause() {
let mut fake = Fake::new(false, "");
fake.insert_stderr = Some(
"iptables v1.8.10: can't initialize iptables table `filter': Permission denied (you must be root)",
);
let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()) else {
panic!("expected a failure");
};
assert!(reason.starts_with("iptables needs root"), "{reason}");
}
#[test]
fn clearing_removes_only_tagged_rules_and_ignores_a_missing_iptables() {
let listing = format!(
"-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT\n{ONE_OURS}-A INPUT -i tsun1 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun1 -j ACCEPT\n"
);
let fake = Fake::new(true, &listing);
clear_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), "tsun0");
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-S", "-D"]);
let mut gone = Fake::new(true, "");
gone.missing = true;
clear_firewall(&|a| gone.run(a), "tsun0");
assert_eq!(gone.verbs(), ["-S"]);
}
#[test]
fn rule_listing_words_honour_quotes() {
assert_eq!(
split_rule_line("-A INPUT -m comment --comment \"a b\" -j ACCEPT"),
[
"-A",
"INPUT",
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
"a b",
"-j",
"ACCEPT"
]
);
assert!(split_rule_line(" ").is_empty());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
//! Broadcast host rules on macOS: a `route` entry; the firewall is deferred.
//!
//! The limited-broadcast route is installed with `/sbin/route`, so a game's
//! LAN discovery packet leaves through the overlay interface. It belongs to
//! the interface and is removed when broadcast is turned off, the network
//! leaves, or the agent stops — and, because a utun is torn down with the
//! process, it also goes away on its own if the agent is killed.
//!
//! The inbound-UDP firewall allowance is **not** implemented here. On macOS
//! that means a `pf` anchor, which is a good deal more machinery; until it is
//! written the firewall half reports itself as missing with what to allow by
//! hand, and the route is still installed. Failure is contained: neither half
//! can stop the agent, and `status` shows exactly which is in place.
//!
//! `route` is a program, not a system call, so it is run by absolute path from
//! `/sbin` rather than off `PATH`, and its arguments are built from values
//! this agent computed — the interface name the kernel assigned, nothing a
//! peer said.
use crate::BoxFuture;
use super::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, RuleOutcome};
/// The limited-broadcast destination routed through the overlay interface.
const LIMITED_BROADCAST: &str = "255.255.255.255";
/// The `route` arguments that direct the limited broadcast out an interface.
fn route_add_args(interface: &str) -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"add".into(),
"-host".into(),
LIMITED_BROADCAST.into(),
"-interface".into(),
interface.into(),
]
}
/// The `route` arguments that remove it again.
fn route_del_args(interface: &str) -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"delete".into(),
"-host".into(),
LIMITED_BROADCAST.into(),
"-interface".into(),
interface.into(),
]
}
/// What to do by hand while the `pf` allowance is unimplemented.
fn firewall_todo(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
format!(
"the inbound-UDP firewall allowance is not implemented on macOS yet; if the host \
firewall drops discovery replies, allow inbound UDP from {} on `{}` with a pf rule \
yourself",
plan.range, plan.interface
)
}
/// The macOS implementation: `route` for the route, no firewall yet.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct MacosHostRules;
impl MacosHostRules {
/// Creates the host rules.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self
}
/// Installs the route, replacing one this agent added earlier so the call
/// can be repeated. The delete is best effort: a route that is not there
/// is the state the add then reaches anyway.
async fn set_route(&self, interface: String) -> RuleOutcome {
let _ = run(route_del_args(&interface)).await;
match run(route_add_args(&interface)).await {
Ok(()) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Err(reason) => RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
}
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for MacosHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"route"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = self.set_route(plan.interface.clone()).await;
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route,
firewall: RuleOutcome::Failed(firewall_todo(plan)),
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
if let Err(reason) = run(route_del_args(interface)).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %interface, %reason, "cannot remove the broadcast route");
}
})
}
}
/// Runs `/sbin/route`, turning a non-zero exit into the message it printed.
async fn run(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), String> {
let display = format!("route {}", args.join(" "));
let output = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
std::process::Command::new("/sbin/route")
.args(&args)
.output()
})
.await
.map_err(|err| format!("could not run {display}: {err}"))?
.map_err(|err| format!("could not run {display}: {err}"))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(());
}
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let text = stderr.trim();
if text.is_empty() {
Err(format!("{display} failed with {}", output.status))
} else {
Err(format!("{display} failed: {text}"))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use super::*;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "utun5".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
#[test]
fn the_route_is_the_limited_broadcast_out_the_interface() {
assert_eq!(
route_add_args("utun5"),
vec![
"-q",
"-n",
"add",
"-host",
"255.255.255.255",
"-interface",
"utun5"
]
);
assert_eq!(
route_del_args("utun5"),
vec![
"-q",
"-n",
"delete",
"-host",
"255.255.255.255",
"-interface",
"utun5"
]
);
}
#[test]
fn the_firewall_todo_names_the_range_and_interface() {
let todo = firewall_todo(&plan());
assert!(todo.contains("10.13.37.0/24"), "{todo}");
assert!(todo.contains("utun5"), "{todo}");
assert!(todo.contains("pf"), "{todo}");
// Deferred, so the firewall half is always reported as not in place;
// the route runs for real and so is left to an on-host check. Running
// `route` here would need root and would change the host routing
// table, which the default test suite must never do.
}
}
+330
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
//! Host rules that let a game's LAN discovery reach the overlay interface.
//!
//! Broadcast fanout happens at local TUN ingress (see [`super::broadcast`]),
//! so a limited broadcast only reaches Tsunagi if the operating system routes
//! it through the overlay interface, and a discovery *reply* only reaches the
//! game if the host firewall lets it in. Left to the user that is two manual
//! steps per host that nobody remembers, so when a network's broadcast is on
//! the agent installs exactly these two things for the interface it owns:
//!
//! * a `255.255.255.255/32` route through the overlay interface, with the
//! overlay address as its preferred source, so the game's discovery packet
//! leaves with a source address the router recognises;
//! * an inbound firewall allowance for **UDP only**, from the overlay range
//! only, on that interface only. Replies to a broadcast come from a
//! different address than the one the request was sent to, so a stateful
//! firewall never matches them to the request. Opening every protocol
//! would expose services such as SSH to every member of the network, which
//! is not what a game needs.
//!
//! # Why this is allowed here
//!
//! The architecture says plugins never touch routing or firewall settings,
//! and nothing a peer announces becomes an OS setting. This is neither: it is
//! the system level, which owns the interface, configuring that interface from
//! values it computed itself (the interface name is derived locally, the
//! address and range come from signed state it already verified). Every object
//! is tagged `tsunagi:<interface>`, reversible, and removed when broadcast is
//! turned off, the network leaves, or the agent stops. A crash can leave a
//! firewall rule behind; the next apply for the same interface removes it.
//!
//! # Failure is contained
//!
//! Neither step can stop the agent. Each reports its own outcome, so a missing
//! firewall tool still leaves the route in place and says what is missing.
//!
//! # Why a trait
//!
//! Linux, Windows and the tests do this very differently, while *what* to
//! install is the same everywhere and lives in [`BroadcastRulesPlan`] and
//! [`rules_summary`], tested on every platform.
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
mod linux;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use linux::LinuxHostRules;
// Compiled everywhere so the scripts it builds are tested everywhere; only
// the type that runs them is exported on Windows.
mod windows;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows::WindowsHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos::MacosHostRules;
/// What the host should be told for one interface.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BroadcastRulesPlan {
/// The overlay interface. Derived locally from the network id, never from
/// anything a peer said.
pub interface: String,
/// This agent's overlay address, the route's preferred source.
pub source: Ipv4Addr,
/// The overlay range inbound UDP is admitted from.
pub range: Ipv4Range,
}
impl BroadcastRulesPlan {
/// The tag every object carries, so it can be found again and nothing
/// else is ever touched.
pub fn tag(&self) -> String {
tag_for(&self.interface)
}
}
/// The tag for an interface's objects.
pub fn tag_for(interface: &str) -> String {
format!("tsunagi:{interface}")
}
/// What happened to one of the two host objects.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RuleOutcome {
/// It is in place.
Applied,
/// It is not, with a reason a person can act on.
Failed(String),
}
impl RuleOutcome {
/// Whether the object is in place.
pub fn is_applied(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::Applied)
}
}
/// What applying a plan achieved.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BroadcastRulesReport {
/// What was asked for.
pub plan: BroadcastRulesPlan,
/// The `255.255.255.255` route.
pub route: RuleOutcome,
/// The inbound firewall allowance.
pub firewall: RuleOutcome,
}
impl BroadcastRulesReport {
/// Whether both objects are in place.
pub fn is_ok(&self) -> bool {
self.route.is_applied() && self.firewall.is_applied()
}
/// One line for `status`.
pub fn summary(&self) -> String {
rules_summary(&self.route, &self.firewall)
}
}
/// The status line for a pair of outcomes.
pub fn rules_summary(route: &RuleOutcome, firewall: &RuleOutcome) -> String {
match (route, firewall) {
(RuleOutcome::Applied, RuleOutcome::Applied) => "ok (route + firewall)".to_string(),
(route, firewall) => {
let part = |what: &str, outcome: &RuleOutcome| match outcome {
RuleOutcome::Applied => format!("{what} ok"),
RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) => format!("{what} failed: {reason}"),
};
format!(
"incomplete; {}; {}",
part("route", route),
part("firewall", firewall)
)
}
}
}
/// Installs and removes the host rules for an overlay interface.
///
/// Both calls are idempotent. Neither can fail as a whole: a step that cannot
/// be done is reported in the [`BroadcastRulesReport`], because the caller's
/// only useful response is to say so.
pub trait BroadcastHostRules: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// A short name used in diagnostics.
fn name(&self) -> &str;
/// Makes the host match the plan, replacing whatever this agent put there
/// for the same interface before.
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport>;
/// Removes what this agent put there for the interface. Succeeds when
/// nothing is there: it runs on the shutdown path.
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()>;
}
/// The platform has no implementation, which is said rather than pretended.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct UnsupportedHostRules;
impl BroadcastHostRules for UnsupportedHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"unsupported"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let reason = "host rules are not implemented on this platform; route \
255.255.255.255 through the overlay interface and allow inbound \
UDP from the overlay range yourself"
.to_string();
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route: RuleOutcome::Failed(reason.clone()),
firewall: RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, _interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {})
}
}
/// What a [`MockHostRules`] currently holds, per interface.
pub type MockRulesState = std::collections::BTreeMap<String, BroadcastRulesPlan>;
/// An in-memory host, for tests: nothing is touched.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct MockHostRules {
state: Arc<Mutex<MockRulesState>>,
calls: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
firewall_failure: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
}
impl MockHostRules {
/// An empty host.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Makes the firewall step fail with this reason from now on.
pub fn fail_firewall(&self, reason: impl Into<String>) {
*lock(&self.firewall_failure) = Some(reason.into());
}
/// What is installed now.
pub fn installed(&self) -> MockRulesState {
lock(&self.state).clone()
}
/// Every `apply:<interface>` / `clear:<interface>` call, in order.
pub fn calls(&self) -> Vec<String> {
lock(&self.calls).clone()
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for MockHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"mock"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
lock(&self.calls).push(format!("apply:{}", plan.interface));
lock(&self.state).insert(plan.interface.clone(), plan.clone());
let firewall = match lock(&self.firewall_failure).clone() {
Some(reason) => RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
None => RuleOutcome::Applied,
};
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route: RuleOutcome::Applied,
firewall,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
lock(&self.calls).push(format!("clear:{interface}"));
lock(&self.state).remove(interface);
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
#[test]
fn every_object_is_tagged_with_its_interface() {
assert_eq!(plan().tag(), "tsunagi:tsun0");
assert_eq!(tag_for("tsun7"), "tsunagi:tsun7");
}
#[test]
fn the_summary_says_which_half_is_missing() {
assert_eq!(
rules_summary(&RuleOutcome::Applied, &RuleOutcome::Applied),
"ok (route + firewall)"
);
let line = rules_summary(
&RuleOutcome::Applied,
&RuleOutcome::Failed("iptables not found".into()),
);
assert!(line.contains("route ok"), "{line}");
assert!(
line.contains("firewall failed: iptables not found"),
"{line}"
);
let report = BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan(),
route: RuleOutcome::Failed("denied".into()),
firewall: RuleOutcome::Applied,
};
assert!(!report.is_ok());
assert!(report.summary().contains("route failed: denied"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_mock_applies_replaces_and_clears_idempotently() {
let rules = MockHostRules::new();
let first = rules.apply(&plan()).await;
assert!(first.is_ok());
assert_eq!(rules.installed().len(), 1);
let mut moved = plan();
moved.source = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 7);
rules.apply(&moved).await;
assert_eq!(rules.installed()["tsun0"].source, moved.source);
rules.clear("tsun0").await;
rules.clear("tsun0").await;
assert!(rules.installed().is_empty());
assert_eq!(rules.calls().len(), 4);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_unsupported_platform_reports_both_steps_failed() {
let report = UnsupportedHostRules.apply(&plan()).await;
assert!(!report.route.is_applied());
assert!(!report.firewall.is_applied());
UnsupportedHostRules.clear("tsun0").await;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
//! Broadcast host rules on Windows: a route and a Defender Firewall rule.
//!
//! Both are written with the `NetTCPIP` and `NetSecurity` PowerShell modules,
//! run by absolute path from `%SystemRoot%` like the DNS publisher does: the
//! in-process alternatives are `unsafe` IP Helper calls this crate forbids.
//!
//! * The route is `255.255.255.255/32` on the overlay interface, on-link, with
//! metric 1, written to the active store only so it cannot outlive a reboot.
//! Windows picks the interface's own address as the source of a packet sent
//! along it; with several networks on one interface that is whichever
//! address Windows treats as primary, which this cannot choose.
//! * The firewall rule allows inbound UDP on that interface alias from the
//! overlay range only, in every profile. Wintun adapters are usually
//! classified as a public network, where inbound UDP is otherwise dropped.
//! Its display name is the tag `tsunagi:<interface>`, which is how it is
//! found again, replaced and removed.
//!
//! Every value in a script is one this agent produced: the interface name is
//! derived from the network id and the range comes from signed state. They are
//! still single-quoted and escaped, so nothing could be read as PowerShell
//! rather than as data. Changing routes and firewall rules needs an elevated
//! process, which is reported as its own cause.
//!
//! This module is compiled everywhere so its script building is tested
//! everywhere. It could not be run against a real Windows host while it was
//! written.
#![cfg_attr(not(target_os = "windows"), allow(dead_code))]
use crate::BoxFuture;
use super::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, RuleOutcome, tag_for};
/// A PowerShell single-quoted literal, with any embedded quote doubled.
fn ps_literal(value: &str) -> String {
format!("'{}'", value.replace('\'', "''"))
}
/// The step that makes the route match the plan.
///
/// A leftover route (from a crashed run, or for an old interface index) is
/// removed first so the result is exactly one route.
fn route_script(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(&plan.interface);
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '255.255.255.255/32' -InterfaceAlias $alias \
-PolicyStore ActiveStore -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | \
Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '255.255.255.255/32' -InterfaceAlias $alias \
-NextHop '0.0.0.0' -RouteMetric 1 -PolicyStore ActiveStore | Out-Null\n"
)
}
/// The step that makes the firewall hold exactly one rule for the interface.
fn firewall_script(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(&plan.interface);
let tag = ps_literal(&plan.tag());
let range = ps_literal(&plan.range.to_string());
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
$tag = {tag}\n\
Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName $tag -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | \
Remove-NetFirewallRule -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName $tag -Direction Inbound -Action Allow -Protocol UDP \
-InterfaceAlias $alias -RemoteAddress {range} -Profile Any | Out-Null\n"
)
}
/// The script that removes both, ignoring what is not there.
fn clear_script(interface: &str) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(interface);
let tag = ps_literal(&tag_for(interface));
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '255.255.255.255/32' -InterfaceAlias {alias} \
-PolicyStore ActiveStore | Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false\n\
Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName {tag} | Remove-NetFirewallRule\n\
exit 0\n"
)
}
/// Turns what PowerShell said into a cause a person can act on.
fn classify(what: &str, text: &str) -> String {
let lower = text.to_ascii_lowercase();
if lower.contains("access is denied")
|| lower.contains("requires elevation")
|| lower.contains("run as administrator")
|| lower.contains("permissiondenied")
{
format!("{what}: Windows refused; run tsunagi from an elevated (administrator) process")
} else if lower.contains("is not recognized") || lower.contains("commandnotfound") {
format!("{what}: the NetTCPIP/NetSecurity PowerShell modules are not available: {text}")
} else if text.is_empty() {
format!("{what}: failed without saying why")
} else {
format!("{what}: {text}")
}
}
/// The absolute path to Windows PowerShell, so nothing on `PATH` can stand in
/// for it.
fn powershell_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
let root = std::env::var_os("SystemRoot").unwrap_or_else(|| r"C:\Windows".into());
std::path::Path::new(&root)
.join("System32")
.join("WindowsPowerShell")
.join("v1.0")
.join("powershell.exe")
}
/// Runs a script and returns what it said on failure.
fn run_powershell(script: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let output = std::process::Command::new(powershell_path())
.args([
"-NoProfile",
"-NonInteractive",
"-ExecutionPolicy",
"Bypass",
"-Command",
script,
])
.output()
.map_err(|err| format!("could not run PowerShell: {err}"))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(());
}
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let text = if stderr.trim().is_empty() {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string()
} else {
stderr.trim().to_string()
};
Err(text)
}
async fn step(what: &'static str, script: String) -> RuleOutcome {
match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || run_powershell(&script)).await {
Ok(Ok(())) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ok(Err(text)) => RuleOutcome::Failed(classify(what, &text)),
Err(err) => RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("{what}: the task failed: {err}")),
}
}
/// The Windows implementation, through PowerShell.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct WindowsHostRules;
impl WindowsHostRules {
/// Creates it. Nothing is run until [`BroadcastHostRules::apply`].
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for WindowsHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"windows-netsecurity"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = step("route", route_script(plan)).await;
let firewall = step("firewall", firewall_script(plan)).await;
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route,
firewall,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
if let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = step("clear", clear_script(interface)).await {
tracing::warn!(
interface,
"cannot remove the broadcast host rules: {reason}"
);
}
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
#[test]
fn a_quote_in_a_value_cannot_escape_the_literal() {
assert_eq!(ps_literal("a'b"), "'a''b'");
let mut hostile = plan();
hostile.interface = "x'; Remove-Item C:\\ #".into();
let script = route_script(&hostile);
assert!(
script.contains("$alias = 'x''; Remove-Item C:\\ #'"),
"{script}"
);
assert!(firewall_script(&hostile).contains("'x''; Remove-Item C:\\ #'"));
}
#[test]
fn the_route_is_on_link_metric_one_in_the_active_store_and_replaces_its_own() {
let script = route_script(&plan());
assert!(script.contains("'255.255.255.255/32'"));
assert!(script.contains("-NextHop '0.0.0.0'"));
assert!(script.contains("-RouteMetric 1"));
assert!(script.contains("-PolicyStore ActiveStore"));
assert!(
script.find("Remove-NetRoute").unwrap() < script.find("New-NetRoute").unwrap(),
"a stale route goes before the new one:\n{script}"
);
}
#[test]
fn the_firewall_rule_is_udp_only_from_the_overlay_range_on_this_interface() {
let script = firewall_script(&plan());
assert!(script.contains("-Protocol UDP"));
assert!(script.contains("-Direction Inbound -Action Allow"));
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceAlias $alias"));
assert!(script.contains("-RemoteAddress '10.13.37.0/24'"));
assert!(script.contains("$tag = 'tsunagi:tsun0'"));
assert!(!script.contains("-Protocol Any") && !script.contains("-Protocol TCP"));
assert!(
script.find("Remove-NetFirewallRule").unwrap()
< script.find("New-NetFirewallRule").unwrap(),
"{script}"
);
}
#[test]
fn clearing_touches_only_our_route_and_our_tagged_rule() {
let script = clear_script("tsun0");
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceAlias 'tsun0'"));
assert!(script.contains("Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'tsunagi:tsun0'"));
assert!(script.contains("exit 0"));
}
#[test]
fn a_refusal_names_elevation_and_a_missing_module_names_the_module() {
assert!(classify("route", "Access is denied").contains("elevated"));
assert!(
classify(
"firewall",
"The term 'New-NetFirewallRule' is not recognized"
)
.contains("modules are not available")
);
assert_eq!(classify("route", "boom"), "route: boom");
assert!(classify("route", "").contains("without saying why"));
}
#[test]
fn powershell_is_found_by_absolute_path() {
let path = powershell_path();
assert!(path.ends_with("powershell.exe"));
assert!(path.to_string_lossy().contains("System32"), "{path:?}");
}
}
+369 -4
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
use super::hostrules::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport};
use super::packet::IpHeader;
use super::router::{Route, RoutingTable};
use super::tun::{TunDevice, TunFactory, TunRequest};
@@ -53,6 +54,10 @@ pub enum Rejected {
WrongFamily,
/// The sending peer does not hold the source address it used.
WrongSource,
/// Broadcast disabled, outside this domain, or malformed/non-UDP.
BroadcastDenied,
/// The packet terminates outside this host's network address/domain.
WrongDestination,
}
/// Counters for one interface.
@@ -60,6 +65,12 @@ pub enum Rejected {
pub struct Counters {
/// Packets handed to a protocol.
pub sent: u64,
/// Broadcast copies handed to recipient tunnels.
pub broadcast_sent: u64,
/// Broadcast packets admitted to this host.
pub broadcast_received: u64,
/// Broadcasts refused by domain policy or packet validation.
pub broadcast_dropped: u64,
/// Packets written to the operating system.
pub received: u64,
/// Packets for an address nobody in any network holds.
@@ -68,10 +79,12 @@ pub struct Counters {
pub unroutable_sample: Option<IpAddr>,
/// Packets nothing could carry, though their destination was known.
pub undeliverable: u64,
/// Multicast and broadcast packets, which the overlay does not carry.
/// Unsupported multicast or unspecified-destination packets.
pub multicast: u64,
/// Packets from a peer that does not hold the source address used.
pub wrong_source: u64,
/// Decrypted packets addressed outside the receiving network's local host.
pub wrong_destination: u64,
/// Packets that could not be read at all.
pub malformed: u64,
}
@@ -79,11 +92,15 @@ pub struct Counters {
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Tally {
sent: AtomicU64,
broadcast_sent: AtomicU64,
broadcast_received: AtomicU64,
broadcast_dropped: AtomicU64,
received: AtomicU64,
unroutable: AtomicU64,
undeliverable: AtomicU64,
multicast: AtomicU64,
wrong_source: AtomicU64,
wrong_destination: AtomicU64,
malformed: AtomicU64,
sample: std::sync::Mutex<Option<IpAddr>>,
}
@@ -92,6 +109,9 @@ impl Tally {
fn snapshot(&self) -> Counters {
Counters {
sent: self.sent.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
broadcast_sent: self.broadcast_sent.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
broadcast_received: self.broadcast_received.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
broadcast_dropped: self.broadcast_dropped.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
received: self.received.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
unroutable: self.unroutable.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
unroutable_sample: match self.sample.lock() {
@@ -101,6 +121,7 @@ impl Tally {
undeliverable: self.undeliverable.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
multicast: self.multicast.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
wrong_source: self.wrong_source.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
wrong_destination: self.wrong_destination.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
malformed: self.malformed.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
}
}
@@ -132,6 +153,11 @@ pub struct Interface {
/// re-applied on every pass.
applied: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<Cidr>>,
task: std::sync::Mutex<Option<JoinHandle<()>>>,
sync_lock: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<()>>,
/// The host rules for this interface, when the factory manages the host.
host_rules: Option<Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>>,
/// What those rules last reported, `None` while none are installed.
rules_report: std::sync::Mutex<Option<BroadcastRulesReport>>,
}
impl Interface {
@@ -144,7 +170,15 @@ impl Interface {
carrier: Arc<dyn PacketCarrier>,
) -> Result<Self, OverlayError> {
let name = name.into();
let host_rules = factory.host_rules();
let device = factory.create(TunRequest::bare(name.clone(), mtu)).await?;
// The name the operating system actually gave the interface. On Linux
// and Windows that is the one we asked for; on macOS the kernel assigns
// the utun unit, so the real name differs and everything that
// configures the host for this interface afterwards — the broadcast
// route and firewall, the reconfigure on an address change — has to use
// the real one, not the requested `tsun…`.
let name = device.name().to_string();
let tally = Arc::new(Tally::default());
let task = {
@@ -158,6 +192,27 @@ impl Interface {
continue;
};
let destination = header.destination();
if let (IpAddr::V4(source), IpAddr::V4(destination)) =
(header.source(), destination)
&& routes.is_broadcast(destination)
{
let recipients = super::broadcast::valid_udp(&packet)
.then(|| routes.broadcast_recipients(source, destination))
.flatten();
if let Some(recipients) = recipients {
for &route in recipients.iter() {
if carrier.carry(route, packet.clone()) {
tally.sent.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
tally.broadcast_sent.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
} else {
tally.undeliverable.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
} else {
tally.broadcast_dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
continue;
}
if is_multicast_or_broadcast(destination) {
// The operating system emits these on any interface.
// The overlay is a set of point-to-point tunnels and
@@ -187,15 +242,89 @@ impl Interface {
tally,
applied: std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
task: std::sync::Mutex::new(Some(task)),
sync_lock: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(())),
host_rules,
rules_report: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
})
}
/// Brings the broadcast route and firewall allowance in line with the
/// routing table: installed while some network has broadcast on and an
/// address, removed when none does.
///
/// Called after the addresses are synced, because the route's preferred
/// source has to be on the interface already. A plan that has not changed
/// is not re-applied, so this is cheap to call whenever the table moves.
/// It never fails: the outcome is kept for [`Self::broadcast_rules`].
pub async fn sync_broadcast_rules(&self) {
let Some(rules) = &self.host_rules else {
return;
};
let _guard = self.sync_lock.lock().await;
let desired =
self.routes
.broadcast_host_target()
.map(|(source, range)| BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: self.name.clone(),
source,
range,
});
let current = self.current_rules_report();
match (desired, current) {
(None, None) => {}
(None, Some(_)) => {
rules.clear(&self.name).await;
self.store_rules_report(None);
tracing::info!(interface = %self.name, "broadcast host rules removed");
}
(Some(plan), Some(report)) if report.plan == plan => {}
(Some(plan), _) => {
let report = rules.apply(&plan).await;
if report.is_ok() {
tracing::info!(
interface = %self.name,
source = %plan.source,
"broadcast host rules applied"
);
} else {
tracing::warn!(
interface = %self.name,
"broadcast host rules are incomplete: {}",
report.summary()
);
}
self.store_rules_report(Some(report));
}
}
}
/// What the broadcast host rules achieved, `None` when none are installed
/// or this interface has no host to configure.
pub fn broadcast_rules(&self) -> Option<BroadcastRulesReport> {
self.current_rules_report()
}
fn current_rules_report(&self) -> Option<BroadcastRulesReport> {
match self.rules_report.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard.clone(),
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner().clone(),
}
}
fn store_rules_report(&self, report: Option<BroadcastRulesReport>) {
match self.rules_report.lock() {
Ok(mut guard) => *guard = report,
Err(poisoned) => *poisoned.into_inner() = report,
}
}
/// Brings the addresses on the host in line with the routing table.
///
/// Called whenever a network agrees a different address for this agent.
/// The interface is never recreated for it: that would drop every tunnel
/// riding on it for the sake of one address.
pub async fn sync_addresses(&self) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
let _guard = self.sync_lock.lock().await;
let wanted = self.wanted_addresses();
{
let applied = match self.applied.lock() {
@@ -245,17 +374,24 @@ impl Interface {
/// Removes the interface from the host.
pub async fn remove(&self) {
// The route goes with the interface; the firewall rule does not, so
// it is taken out explicitly while the interface is still known.
if let Some(rules) = &self.host_rules {
rules.clear(&self.name).await;
self.store_rules_report(None);
}
// The packet loop holds the device open, and it ends only when the
// device reports end of stream — which a real interface never does
// while it exists. So it is stopped here, not left to notice.
// while it exists. Stop it directly before destroying the interface.
let task = match self.task.lock() {
Ok(mut guard) => guard.take(),
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner().take(),
};
self.factory.destroy(self.device.name()).await;
if let Some(task) = task {
crate::task::wind_down(task, crate::task::TASK_GRACE, "overlay packet loop").await;
task.abort();
let _ = task.await;
}
self.factory.destroy(self.device.name()).await;
}
/// The counters as they stand.
@@ -286,7 +422,31 @@ impl Interface {
self.tally.wrong_source.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Err(Rejected::WrongSource);
}
let broadcast = match header.destination() {
IpAddr::V4(destination) if self.routes.is_broadcast(destination) => {
if !super::broadcast::valid_udp(&packet)
|| !self.routes.accepts_broadcast(network, peer, destination)
{
self.tally.broadcast_dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Err(Rejected::BroadcastDenied);
}
true
}
IpAddr::V4(destination) if self.routes.is_local_destination(network, destination) => {
false
}
_ => {
self.tally.wrong_destination.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Err(Rejected::WrongDestination);
}
};
// Remote broadcasts terminate here. Only local TUN ingress can fan out.
if self.device.send(packet).await.is_ok() {
if broadcast {
self.tally
.broadcast_received
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
self.tally.received.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
Ok(())
@@ -362,6 +522,9 @@ mod tests {
interface.remove().await;
}
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
use crate::overlay::broadcast::BroadcastPolicy;
use crate::overlay::hostrules::{MockHostRules, RuleOutcome};
use crate::overlay::provision::{ManagedTunFactory, MockProvisioner};
use crate::overlay::router::NetworkRoutes;
use crate::overlay::tun::{MemoryTun, MemoryTunFactory};
@@ -393,6 +556,73 @@ mod tests {
Bytes::from(packet)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn broadcast_ingress_is_validated_and_remote_delivery_never_refloods() {
use super::super::broadcast::BroadcastPolicy;
use std::collections::HashSet;
let (interface, device, routes, carrier, id) = interface(false).await;
let enabled = BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: true,
peers: HashSet::from([peer(2)]),
};
routes.set_broadcast(id, enabled.clone());
let packet = ipv4(addr(2), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST, &[0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 8, 0, 0]);
interface
.deliver(id, peer(2), packet.clone())
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(device.pop_to_os().await.unwrap(), packet);
assert!(
carrier.carried().is_empty(),
"remote ingress never originates a fanout"
);
assert_eq!(
interface.deliver(id, peer(3), packet.clone()).await,
Err(Rejected::WrongSource)
);
assert_eq!(
interface
.deliver(id, peer(2), ipv4(addr(2), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST, b"bad"))
.await,
Err(Rejected::BroadcastDenied)
);
routes.set_broadcast(
id,
BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: false,
..enabled
},
);
assert_eq!(
interface.deliver(id, peer(2), packet).await,
Err(Rejected::BroadcastDenied)
);
// An authenticated sender cannot use TUN as a gateway to a physical LAN.
assert_eq!(
interface
.deliver(
id,
peer(2),
ipv4(
addr(2),
"192.168.1.255".parse().unwrap(),
&[0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 8, 0, 0]
)
)
.await,
Err(Rejected::WrongDestination)
);
device.push_from_os(ipv4(
addr(1),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
&[0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 8, 0, 0],
));
wait_for(&interface, |c| c.broadcast_dropped.saturating_sub(2)).await;
assert!(carrier.carried().is_empty());
assert_eq!(interface.counters().received, 1);
interface.remove().await;
}
/// Records what it was asked to carry, and can refuse.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Recorder {
@@ -437,6 +667,7 @@ mod tests {
.set_network(
id,
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(1)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2)), (addr(3), peer(3))],
@@ -602,6 +833,7 @@ mod tests {
.set_network(
id,
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(9)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2))],
@@ -613,4 +845,137 @@ mod tests {
vec![Cidr::new(addr(9).into(), 24).unwrap()]
);
}
async fn managed_interface(
rules: &MockHostRules,
broadcast_enabled: bool,
) -> (Interface, Arc<RoutingTable>, NetworkId) {
let id = network("rules");
let routes = Arc::new(RoutingTable::new());
routes
.set_network(
id,
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: broadcast_enabled,
..Default::default()
},
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(1)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2))],
},
)
.unwrap();
let factory = Arc::new(
ManagedTunFactory::new(Arc::new(MockProvisioner::default()))
.with_host_rules(Arc::new(rules.clone())),
);
let interface = Interface::start(
factory as Arc<dyn TunFactory>,
"tsunrules",
1280,
Arc::clone(&routes),
Arc::new(Recorder::default()) as Arc<dyn PacketCarrier>,
)
.await
.unwrap();
(interface, routes, id)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn host_rules_follow_broadcast_policy_address_and_interface_lifetime() {
let rules = MockHostRules::new();
let (interface, routes, id) = managed_interface(&rules, true).await;
assert!(
interface.broadcast_rules().is_none(),
"nothing before a sync"
);
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
let installed = rules.installed();
assert_eq!(installed["tsunrules"].source, addr(1));
assert_eq!(
installed["tsunrules"].range,
"10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()
);
assert!(interface.broadcast_rules().unwrap().is_ok());
// Unchanged: not applied a second time.
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert_eq!(rules.calls(), ["apply:tsunrules"]);
// A new address replaces the plan, it does not stack a second one.
routes
.set_network(
id,
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(9)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2))],
},
)
.unwrap();
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert_eq!(rules.installed()["tsunrules"].source, addr(9));
assert_eq!(rules.installed().len(), 1);
// Turning broadcast off takes the rules away.
routes.set_broadcast(
id,
BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: false,
..Default::default()
},
);
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert!(rules.installed().is_empty());
assert!(interface.broadcast_rules().is_none());
// And on again puts them back; leaving the agent removes them once more.
routes.set_broadcast(id, BroadcastPolicy::default());
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert_eq!(rules.installed().len(), 1);
interface.remove().await;
assert!(rules.installed().is_empty(), "shutdown clears the host");
assert!(interface.broadcast_rules().is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn host_rules_are_not_installed_while_broadcast_is_off() {
let rules = MockHostRules::new();
let (interface, _routes, _id) = managed_interface(&rules, false).await;
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert!(rules.installed().is_empty());
assert!(rules.calls().is_empty(), "the host was not even asked");
interface.remove().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_failed_firewall_step_is_reported_and_does_not_undo_the_route() {
let rules = MockHostRules::new();
rules.fail_firewall("iptables not found");
let (interface, _routes, _id) = managed_interface(&rules, true).await;
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
let report = interface.broadcast_rules().unwrap();
assert!(report.route.is_applied());
assert_eq!(
report.firewall,
RuleOutcome::Failed("iptables not found".into())
);
assert!(!report.is_ok());
// Not retried on every sync: the plan is the same.
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert_eq!(rules.calls(), ["apply:tsunrules"]);
interface.remove().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_interface_without_a_host_has_no_host_rules() {
let (interface, _device, _routes, _carrier, _id) = interface(false).await;
interface.sync_broadcast_rules().await;
assert!(interface.broadcast_rules().is_none());
interface.remove().await;
}
}
+17
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
//!
//! * [`provision`] creates the interface and configures it, and removes it
//! again. Platform mechanics behind one decision function.
//! * [`hostrules`] installs the route and firewall allowance that let a
//! game's LAN discovery reach the interface, while broadcast is on.
//! * [`tun`] is the packet interface itself, real or in memory.
//! * [`packet`] reads just enough of an IP header to route by it.
//! * [`config`] names interfaces and describes addresses.
@@ -36,7 +38,9 @@ pub enum OverlayError {
Other(String),
}
pub mod broadcast;
pub mod config;
pub mod hostrules;
pub mod interface;
pub mod packet;
pub mod provision;
@@ -44,6 +48,10 @@ pub mod router;
pub mod tun;
pub use config::{Cidr, DEFAULT_INTERFACE_PREFIX, MAX_INTERFACE_NAME_LEN, interface_name};
pub use hostrules::{
BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, MockHostRules, RuleOutcome,
UnsupportedHostRules,
};
pub use interface::{Counters, Interface, PacketCarrier, Rejected};
pub use packet::IpHeader;
pub use provision::{
@@ -54,8 +62,17 @@ pub use provision::{
pub use router::{NetworkRoutes, Route, RouteError, RoutingTable};
pub use tun::{MemoryTun, MemoryTunFactory, TunDevice, TunFactory, TunRequest, address_is_local};
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use hostrules::LinuxHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use hostrules::MacosHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use hostrules::WindowsHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use provision::NetlinkProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use provision::UtunProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use provision::WintunProvisioner;
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::OverlayError;
use super::super::hostrules::BroadcastHostRules;
use super::super::tun::{TunDevice, TunFactory, TunRequest};
use super::{InterfacePlan, InterfaceProvisioner};
@@ -30,12 +31,23 @@ fn plan_for(request: &TunRequest) -> Result<InterfacePlan, OverlayError> {
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ManagedTunFactory {
provisioner: Arc<dyn InterfaceProvisioner>,
host_rules: Option<Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>>,
}
impl ManagedTunFactory {
/// Wraps a provisioner.
pub fn new(provisioner: Arc<dyn InterfaceProvisioner>) -> Self {
Self { provisioner }
Self {
provisioner,
host_rules: None,
}
}
/// Lets the agent install the broadcast route and firewall allowance for
/// the interface this factory manages.
pub fn with_host_rules(mut self, rules: Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>) -> Self {
self.host_rules = Some(rules);
self
}
/// The provisioner underneath.
@@ -54,6 +66,10 @@ impl TunFactory for ManagedTunFactory {
true
}
fn host_rules(&self) -> Option<Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>> {
self.host_rules.clone()
}
fn create<'a>(
&'a self,
request: TunRequest,
+160 -16
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
//! capability is raised immediately before that call and lowered immediately
//! after, and the connection task lives and dies inside it.
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, mpsc};
use futures_util::TryStreamExt;
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ use futures_util::TryStreamExt;
// of step with the client that sends them.
use rtnetlink::packet_route::address::{AddressAttribute, AddressMessage};
use rtnetlink::packet_route::link::{InfoKind, LinkAttribute, LinkFlags, LinkInfo, LinkMessage};
use rtnetlink::{LinkMessageBuilder, LinkUnspec};
use rtnetlink::packet_route::route::RouteScope;
use rtnetlink::{LinkMessageBuilder, LinkUnspec, RouteMessageBuilder};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::OverlayError;
@@ -67,6 +68,10 @@ enum Command {
Delete(String, Reply<()>),
/// Apply MTU, link state and addresses.
Configure(Box<Configure>, Reply<()>),
/// Route `255.255.255.255/32` through this interface from this address.
SetBroadcastRoute(String, Ipv4Addr, Reply<()>),
/// Remove that route from this interface.
DelBroadcastRoute(String, Reply<()>),
/// Stop the thread.
Stop,
}
@@ -133,13 +138,18 @@ impl NetlinkProvisioner {
&self,
make: impl FnOnce(Reply<T>) -> Command,
) -> Result<T, OverlayError> {
let (reply_tx, reply_rx) = mpsc::channel();
self.commands
.send(make(reply_tx))
.map_err(|_| OverlayError::Unavailable("the netlink thread has stopped".to_string()))?;
reply_rx.recv().map_err(|_| {
OverlayError::Unavailable("the netlink thread stopped mid-request".to_string())
})?
call_thread(&self.commands, make)
}
/// The broadcast host rules for this host.
///
/// The route is added by this provisioner's netlink thread, because it is
/// the only one that ever holds `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, and only for the duration
/// of a call. Keep the provisioner alive for as long as the rules are used.
pub fn host_rules(&self) -> crate::overlay::hostrules::LinuxHostRules {
crate::overlay::hostrules::LinuxHostRules::new(RouteHandle {
commands: self.commands.clone(),
})
}
fn is_ours(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
@@ -157,6 +167,44 @@ impl NetlinkProvisioner {
}
}
fn call_thread<T: Send + 'static>(
commands: &mpsc::Sender<Command>,
make: impl FnOnce(Reply<T>) -> Command,
) -> Result<T, OverlayError> {
let (reply_tx, reply_rx) = mpsc::channel();
commands
.send(make(reply_tx))
.map_err(|_| OverlayError::Unavailable("the netlink thread has stopped".to_string()))?;
reply_rx.recv().map_err(|_| {
OverlayError::Unavailable("the netlink thread stopped mid-request".to_string())
})?
}
/// Adds and removes the limited-broadcast route on the netlink thread.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub(crate) struct RouteHandle {
commands: mpsc::Sender<Command>,
}
impl RouteHandle {
/// Routes `255.255.255.255/32` through `interface`, preferring `source`.
/// Replaces a route this agent added earlier, so it can be repeated.
pub(crate) fn set(&self, interface: &str, source: Ipv4Addr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
let interface = interface.to_string();
call_thread(&self.commands, |reply| {
Command::SetBroadcastRoute(interface, source, reply)
})
}
/// Removes the route. Succeeds when it, or the interface, is gone.
pub(crate) fn clear(&self, interface: &str) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
let interface = interface.to_string();
call_thread(&self.commands, |reply| {
Command::DelBroadcastRoute(interface, reply)
})
}
}
impl Drop for NetlinkProvisioner {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.commands.send(Command::Stop);
@@ -273,7 +321,10 @@ fn netlink_thread(requests: mpsc::Receiver<Command>) {
Command::Observe(_, reply) => {
let _ = reply.send(Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(message)));
}
Command::Delete(_, reply) | Command::Configure(_, reply) => {
Command::Delete(_, reply)
| Command::Configure(_, reply)
| Command::SetBroadcastRoute(_, _, reply)
| Command::DelBroadcastRoute(_, reply) => {
let _ = reply.send(Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(message)));
}
Command::Stop => return,
@@ -306,6 +357,22 @@ fn netlink_thread(requests: mpsc::Receiver<Command>) {
});
let _ = reply.send(result);
}
Command::SetBroadcastRoute(name, source, reply) => {
let result = NetAdmin::acquire().and_then(|guard| {
let result = runtime.block_on(set_broadcast_route(&name, source));
drop(guard);
result
});
let _ = reply.send(result);
}
Command::DelBroadcastRoute(name, reply) => {
let result = NetAdmin::acquire().and_then(|guard| {
let result = runtime.block_on(del_broadcast_route(&name));
drop(guard);
result
});
let _ = reply.send(result);
}
}
}
}
@@ -455,6 +522,80 @@ async fn delete_link(name: &str) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
.await
}
/// The message that names the limited-broadcast route on an interface.
///
/// On-link scope is what the kernel requires of a route with no gateway, and
/// what `ip route add 255.255.255.255/32 dev <if>` produces. Deleting needs the
/// same scope or the kernel finds no match.
fn broadcast_route_message(
index: u32,
source: Option<Ipv4Addr>,
) -> rtnetlink::packet_route::route::RouteMessage {
let mut builder = RouteMessageBuilder::<Ipv4Addr>::new()
.destination_prefix(Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST, 32)
.output_interface(index)
.scope(RouteScope::Link);
if let Some(source) = source {
builder = builder.pref_source(source);
}
builder.build()
}
async fn link_index(handle: &rtnetlink::Handle, name: &str) -> Option<u32> {
let mut links = handle.link().get().match_name(name.to_string()).execute();
links
.try_next()
.await
.ok()
.flatten()
.map(|message| message.header.index)
}
async fn set_broadcast_route(name: &str, source: Ipv4Addr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
with_netlink(|handle| async move {
let index = link_index(&handle, name).await.ok_or_else(|| {
OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"interface `{name}` disappeared before its broadcast route could be added"
))
})?;
handle
.route()
.add(broadcast_route_message(index, Some(source)))
.replace()
.execute()
.await
.map_err(|err| {
OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"cannot route 255.255.255.255 through `{name}` from {source}: {err}"
))
})
})
.await
}
async fn del_broadcast_route(name: &str) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
with_netlink(|handle| async move {
// An interface that is gone took its routes with it.
let Some(index) = link_index(&handle, name).await else {
return Ok(());
};
match handle
.route()
.del(broadcast_route_message(index, None))
.execute()
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// "No such process": there was no such route, which is the goal.
Err(err) if err.to_string().contains("No such process") => Ok(()),
Err(err) => Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"cannot remove the 255.255.255.255 route from `{name}`: {err}"
))),
}
})
.await
}
async fn configure_link(configure: &Configure) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
let name = configure.name.as_str();
with_netlink(|handle| async move {
@@ -520,16 +661,19 @@ async fn configure_link(configure: &Configure) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
}
for cidr in &configure.add {
handle
let res = handle
.address()
.add(index, cidr.addr, cidr.prefix_len)
.execute()
.await
.map_err(|err| {
OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
.await;
if let Err(err) = res {
let err_str = err.to_string();
if !err_str.contains("File exists") && !err_str.contains("os error 17") {
return Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"cannot add {cidr} to interface `{name}`: {err}"
))
})?;
)));
}
}
}
Ok(())
@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
//! Managing the overlay interface on macOS, through utun and `ifconfig`/`route`.
//!
//! The shape is the same as the Linux and Windows provisioners: observe what
//! is there, [`plan_changes`](super::plan_changes) to decide what to do, apply
//! the difference. Only the mechanisms differ.
//!
//! # Creating the interface
//!
//! The interface is a `utun` device, created through the `tun` dependency's
//! safe wrapper — [`open_tun`](super::super::tun) — over the in-kernel
//! `com.apple.net.utun_control` control socket. No kernel extension and no
//! Network Extension entitlement is involved; what it needs is root. The
//! device is not made persistent, so closing the last file descriptor removes
//! the interface — it goes away when the agent does, however the agent ends.
//!
//! # The kernel names the interface, not us
//!
//! Unlike Linux and Windows, a utun interface cannot be given an arbitrary
//! name: it is always `utunN`, and the unit number is assigned by the kernel.
//! So the name derived from the network id (`tsun…`) is only ever a *request*;
//! the real name is read back off the device after it is opened, and
//! everything downstream — the host rules, the resolver publication — uses the
//! real one. The agent adopts it as soon as the device is created (see
//! [`Interface`](crate::overlay::Interface)).
//!
//! # Configuring it
//!
//! Addresses, MTU and routes are applied with `ifconfig` and `route`. On Linux
//! the same work is done in process over a netlink socket; here there is no
//! equivalent this crate may call, because the in-process route is raw `ioctl`
//! and `PF_ROUTE` and that is `unsafe`. The tools are invoked by absolute path
//! from `/sbin`, so nothing on `PATH` can stand in for them, and every value
//! handed to them is one this agent derived — an interface name chosen by the
//! kernel, an address it allocated — never anything a peer said.
//!
//! # Observing it
//!
//! The interface table is read through `netdev`, a safe wrapper over
//! `getifaddrs`. An interface is matched by its real `utunN` name, which only
//! matters on reconfiguration: the first create always makes a fresh device.
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::OverlayError;
use super::super::config::Cidr;
use super::super::tun::{TunDevice, TunRequest, open_tun};
use super::privilege::{Privilege, probe_net_admin};
use super::{
InterfacePlan, InterfaceProvisioner, InterfaceState, LinkKind, Provisioned, plan_changes,
};
/// Manages the overlay interface with utun and `ifconfig`/`route`.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct UtunProvisioner {
/// Interfaces this process created, by their real `utunN` name, so a
/// reconfiguration adjusts them rather than trying to create them again.
ours: Mutex<Vec<String>>,
/// Devices kept alive for as long as the interface should exist. Dropping
/// one closes the last descriptor, which removes the utin interface.
held: Mutex<Vec<(String, Arc<dyn TunDevice>)>>,
}
impl UtunProvisioner {
/// Creates the provisioner, after checking the platform supports one.
///
/// Whether the process is actually root is not checked here — reading the
/// effective uid needs a libc call this crate forbids — so a missing
/// privilege surfaces at utun creation with a precise message, the same
/// way the Linux and Windows paths treat the open itself as the honest
/// answer.
pub fn new() -> Result<Self, OverlayError> {
match probe_net_admin() {
Privilege::Available => {}
Privilege::Missing(reason) => return Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(reason)),
Privilege::Unsupported => {
return Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(
"interface management is not compiled in".to_string(),
));
}
}
Ok(Self {
ours: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
held: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
})
}
fn is_ours(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
lock(&self.ours).iter().any(|owned| owned == name)
}
/// Opens the utun device, which is what creates it. The kernel assigns the
/// name, so the returned device reports a `utunN` that is not `plan.name`.
fn create_device(&self, plan: &InterfacePlan) -> Result<Arc<dyn TunDevice>, OverlayError> {
let request = TunRequest::bare(plan.name.clone(), plan.mtu);
open_tun(&request)
}
}
impl InterfaceProvisioner for UtunProvisioner {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"utun"
}
fn reconcile<'a>(
&'a self,
plan: &'a InterfacePlan,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<Provisioned, OverlayError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
// A reconfiguration: the plan carries the real `utunN` name the
// agent adopted after the first create, so the interface is there
// and only the addresses and MTU need bringing into line.
if self.is_ours(&plan.name) {
let current = observe(&plan.name).await;
let changes = plan_changes(&current, plan, true)?;
configure(&plan.name, &changes).await?;
return Ok(Provisioned {
changes,
device: None,
});
}
// The first create. The kernel assigns the unit, so the device is
// opened first and its real name used for everything after.
let device = self.create_device(plan)?;
let real = device.name().to_string();
// A fresh interface starts with nothing on it, so the whole plan is
// applied. `plan_changes` against an absent interface is exactly
// that decision; its `create_link` flag is already satisfied by the
// open above, so `configure` ignores it and only applies the rest.
let changes = plan_changes(&InterfaceState::absent(), plan, false)?;
// A failure here leaves an interface that exists but cannot carry
// traffic. Drop the device so the utun closes, and report, rather
// than leave a trap behind.
if let Err(err) = configure(&real, &changes).await {
drop(device);
return Err(err);
}
lock(&self.ours).push(real.clone());
lock(&self.held).push((real, Arc::clone(&device)));
Ok(Provisioned {
changes,
device: Some(device),
})
})
}
fn remove<'a>(&'a self, name: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<(), OverlayError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
// Dropping the device closes the last descriptor, which removes the
// utun interface and the routes that were bound to it. There is
// nothing to flush: a utun never outlives the process that holds it.
lock(&self.held).retain(|(held, _)| held != name);
lock(&self.ours).retain(|owned| owned != name);
Ok(())
})
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
/// `fe80::/10` and `169.254.0.0/16`, which macOS assigns on its own.
fn is_link_local(addr: IpAddr) -> bool {
match addr {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => addr.is_link_local(),
IpAddr::V6(addr) => (addr.segments()[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80,
}
}
/// What the interface named `name` currently looks like.
///
/// Never fails: a name nothing is using reads as [`InterfaceState::absent`],
/// which is what the plan then acts on.
async fn observe(name: &str) -> InterfaceState {
let name = name.to_string();
let found = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
netdev::get_interfaces()
.into_iter()
.find(|iface| iface.name == name)
})
.await
.ok()
.flatten();
let Some(iface) = found else {
return InterfaceState::absent();
};
let mut addresses: Vec<Cidr> = Vec::new();
for net in &iface.ipv4 {
if let Ok(cidr) = Cidr::new(IpAddr::V4(net.addr()), net.prefix_len())
&& !is_link_local(cidr.addr)
{
addresses.push(cidr);
}
}
for net in &iface.ipv6 {
if let Ok(cidr) = Cidr::new(IpAddr::V6(net.addr()), net.prefix_len())
&& !is_link_local(cidr.addr)
{
addresses.push(cidr);
}
}
addresses.sort();
InterfaceState {
// Only ever reached for an interface this agent created (see
// `reconcile`), so it is ours and a TUN by construction.
kind: LinkKind::Tun,
attached: iface.is_up(),
up: iface.is_up(),
mtu: iface.mtu.unwrap_or(0),
addresses,
}
}
/// Applies MTU, link state, addresses and the on-link routes they imply.
async fn configure(name: &str, changes: &super::Changes) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
if let Some(mtu) = changes.set_mtu {
set_mtu(name, mtu).await?;
}
for cidr in &changes.remove {
// Best effort: an address that is already gone is the outcome wanted.
if let Err(err) = address_del(name, *cidr).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %cidr, %err, "could not remove address");
}
if let Err(err) = route_del(name, *cidr).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %cidr, %err, "could not remove route");
}
}
for cidr in &changes.add {
address_add(name, *cidr).await?;
// The subnet route makes the whole overlay range reach the interface;
// a point-to-point utun does not install one from the address alone. A
// host address (/32 or /128) needs none. Best effort: a route that is
// already there is the outcome wanted.
if let Err(err) = route_add(name, *cidr).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %cidr, %err, "could not add route");
}
}
if changes.bring_up {
// Best effort: a utun with a descriptor open is up already, and a
// failure to nudge it is not a reason to fail the whole reconcile.
if let Err(err) = set_up(name).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %err, "could not enable the interface");
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// The network address of a CIDR, with the host bits cleared.
fn network_of(cidr: Cidr) -> IpAddr {
match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => {
let bits = u32::from(addr);
let mask = if cidr.prefix_len == 0 {
0
} else {
u32::MAX << (32 - u32::from(cidr.prefix_len))
};
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(bits & mask))
}
IpAddr::V6(addr) => {
let bits = u128::from(addr);
let mask = if cidr.prefix_len == 0 {
0
} else {
u128::MAX << (128 - u32::from(cidr.prefix_len))
};
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(bits & mask))
}
}
}
/// Whether a CIDR is a single host address, which needs no subnet route.
fn is_host_route(cidr: Cidr) -> bool {
match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => cidr.prefix_len >= 32,
IpAddr::V6(_) => cidr.prefix_len >= 128,
}
}
/// The `ifconfig` arguments that add an address to a utun interface.
///
/// A utun is point-to-point, so the IPv4 form names the address as its own
/// peer; `alias` lets several coexist on the one interface.
fn address_add_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => vec![
name.into(),
"inet".into(),
format!("{addr}/{}", cidr.prefix_len),
addr.to_string(),
"alias".into(),
],
IpAddr::V6(addr) => vec![
name.into(),
"inet6".into(),
format!("{addr}/{}", cidr.prefix_len),
"alias".into(),
],
}
}
/// The `ifconfig` arguments that remove an address from a utun interface.
fn address_del_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
let family = match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => "inet",
IpAddr::V6(_) => "inet6",
};
vec![
name.into(),
family.into(),
cidr.addr.to_string(),
"-alias".into(),
]
}
/// The `route` arguments that point a CIDR's subnet at the interface.
fn route_add_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
let family = match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => "-inet",
IpAddr::V6(_) => "-inet6",
};
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"add".into(),
family.into(),
"-net".into(),
format!("{}/{}", network_of(cidr), cidr.prefix_len),
"-interface".into(),
name.into(),
]
}
/// The `route` arguments that remove that subnet route.
fn route_del_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
let family = match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => "-inet",
IpAddr::V6(_) => "-inet6",
};
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"delete".into(),
family.into(),
"-net".into(),
format!("{}/{}", network_of(cidr), cidr.prefix_len),
"-interface".into(),
name.into(),
]
}
async fn address_add(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(address_add_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn address_del(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(address_del_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn route_add(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
if is_host_route(cidr) {
return Ok(());
}
route(route_add_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn route_del(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
if is_host_route(cidr) {
return Ok(());
}
route(route_del_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn set_mtu(name: &str, mtu: u32) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(vec![name.into(), "mtu".into(), mtu.to_string()]).await
}
async fn set_up(name: &str) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(vec![name.into(), "up".into()]).await
}
/// Runs `/sbin/ifconfig`, turning a non-zero exit into an error with its text.
async fn ifconfig(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
run("/sbin/ifconfig", args).await
}
/// Runs `/sbin/route`, turning a non-zero exit into an error with its text.
async fn route(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
run("/sbin/route", args).await
}
/// Runs a system tool by absolute path, so nothing on `PATH` can stand in for
/// it, and turns a non-zero exit into an error carrying what it said.
async fn run(program: &'static str, args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
let display = format!("{program} {}", args.join(" "));
let output = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
std::process::Command::new(program).args(&args).output()
})
.await
.map_err(|err| OverlayError::Other(format!("could not run {display}: {err}")))?
.map_err(|err| OverlayError::Unavailable(format!("could not run {display}: {err}")))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(());
}
let message = {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let text = if stderr.trim().is_empty() {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string()
} else {
stderr.trim().to_string()
};
if text.is_empty() {
format!("exit code {}", output.status)
} else {
text
}
};
Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"{display} failed: {message}"
)))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn v4(last: u8, prefix: u8) -> Cidr {
Cidr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, last)), prefix).unwrap()
}
fn v6(last: u16, prefix: u8) -> Cidr {
Cidr::new(
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfd00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, last)),
prefix,
)
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn a_v4_address_is_added_point_to_point_with_an_alias() {
let args = address_add_args("utun5", v4(69, 24));
assert_eq!(
args,
vec!["utun5", "inet", "10.13.37.69/24", "10.13.37.69", "alias"]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_v6_address_is_added_with_a_prefix_and_an_alias() {
let args = address_add_args("utun5", v6(1, 128));
assert_eq!(args, vec!["utun5", "inet6", "fd00::1/128", "alias"]);
}
#[test]
fn deleting_an_address_names_the_family_and_removes_the_alias() {
let args = address_del_args("utun5", v4(69, 24));
assert_eq!(args, vec!["utun5", "inet", "10.13.37.69", "-alias"]);
let args = address_del_args("utun5", v6(1, 128));
assert_eq!(args, vec!["utun5", "inet6", "fd00::1", "-alias"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_subnet_route_points_the_masked_network_at_the_interface() {
let args = route_add_args("utun5", v4(69, 24));
assert_eq!(
args,
vec![
"-q",
"-n",
"add",
"-inet",
"-net",
"10.13.37.0/24",
"-interface",
"utun5"
]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_host_address_installs_no_subnet_route() {
assert!(is_host_route(v4(69, 32)));
assert!(is_host_route(v6(1, 128)));
assert!(!is_host_route(v4(69, 24)));
assert!(!is_host_route(v6(1, 64)));
}
#[test]
fn the_network_address_clears_the_host_bits() {
assert_eq!(
network_of(v4(69, 24)),
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 0))
);
assert_eq!(
network_of(Cidr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 69)), 16).unwrap()),
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 0, 0))
);
assert_eq!(
network_of(v6(0x1234, 64)),
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfd00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0))
);
}
#[test]
fn link_local_addresses_are_not_ours_to_manage() {
assert!(is_link_local(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(
0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
))));
assert!(is_link_local(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 1, 1))));
assert!(!is_link_local(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 1))));
assert!(!is_link_local(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(
0xfd00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
))));
}
}
+10 -1
View File
@@ -20,11 +20,13 @@
//! pure and tested on every platform, and only the execution is behind
//! [`InterfaceProvisioner`].
//!
//! Four implementations:
//! Five implementations:
//!
//! * `NetlinkProvisioner` on Linux, which needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`.
//! * `WintunProvisioner` on Windows, a Wintun adapter configured with `netsh`,
//! which needs an elevated process.
//! * `UtunProvisioner` on macOS, a utun interface configured with `ifconfig`
//! and `route`, which needs root.
//! * [`MockProvisioner`], an in-memory host used by the tests.
//! * [`UnsupportedProvisioner`] elsewhere, which fails with an explanation
//! and a pointer at the manual route rather than pretending to work.
@@ -52,12 +54,19 @@ pub use mock::{MockHost, MockProvisioner};
mod linux;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use linux::NetlinkProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub(crate) use linux::RouteHandle;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
mod windows;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows::WintunProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos::UtunProvisioner;
mod privilege;
pub use privilege::{Privilege, probe_net_admin};
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
//! Grant it with:
//!
//! ```text
//! sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
//! sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
//! ```
//!
//! `+p` rather than `+ep`: with `+p` the capability is permitted but not
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ impl Privilege {
/// How to obtain it, for a diagnostic.
pub fn how_to_grant(program: &str) -> String {
format!(
"Grant it once with `sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p {program}` \
"Grant it once with `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p {program}` \
and the agent manages its own interface. Without it, run with \
`--no-tun`: the tunnels still form, they just do not reach the \
operating system."
@@ -63,15 +63,20 @@ pub use linux_impl::{NetAdmin, probe_net_admin};
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows_impl::probe_net_admin;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos_impl::probe_net_admin;
#[cfg(not(any(
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows")
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos")
)))]
pub use other_impl::probe_net_admin;
#[cfg(not(any(
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows")
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos")
)))]
mod other_impl {
use super::Privilege;
@@ -101,6 +106,25 @@ mod windows_impl {
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos_impl {
use super::Privilege;
/// Whether this process can configure interfaces.
///
/// macOS has no capability to hold and lower the way Linux does: creating
/// a utun interface simply needs the process to be root. Reading the
/// effective uid means a libc call this crate forbids, so the probe is
/// deliberately optimistic — it reports that the platform can manage
/// interfaces — and the real check is left to the utun open, which fails
/// with a precise "run with sudo" message when the process is not root.
/// This matches how the Linux path treats the open itself as the honest
/// answer.
pub fn probe_net_admin() -> Privilege {
Privilege::Available
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
mod linux_impl {
use caps::{CapSet, Capability};
@@ -181,7 +205,9 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn the_grant_instructions_name_the_program() {
let text = Privilege::how_to_grant("/usr/local/bin/tsunagi");
assert!(text.contains("setcap cap_net_admin+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi"));
assert!(
text.contains("setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi")
);
assert!(text.contains("--no-tun"), "the fallback is offered too");
}
@@ -262,7 +262,12 @@ async fn configure(plan: &InterfacePlan, changes: &super::Changes) -> Result<(),
set_mtu(&plan.name, mtu).await?;
}
for cidr in &changes.add {
address_add(&plan.name, *cidr).await?;
if let Err(err) = address_add(&plan.name, *cidr).await {
let err_str = err.to_string();
if !err_str.contains("already exists") && !err_str.contains("0x80071392") {
return Err(err);
}
}
}
if changes.bring_up {
// Best effort: a Wintun adapter with a session is up already, and a
+138 -2
View File
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@
//! carries traffic for the same addresses and the table is the same whichever
//! one is in use.
use super::broadcast::{BroadcastPolicy, BroadcastTable};
use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::RwLock;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use iroh::EndpointId;
@@ -41,6 +43,8 @@ pub struct Route {
/// What one network contributes to the table.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NetworkRoutes {
/// Local broadcast policy and authenticated willing recipients.
pub broadcast: BroadcastPolicy,
/// The range this network allocates from, once it has agreed one.
pub range: Option<Ipv4Range>,
/// This agent's own address in the network.
@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ pub enum RouteError {
/// Address ownership across every network this agent is in.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct RoutingTable {
broadcast: ArcSwap<BroadcastTable>,
networks: RwLock<HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>>,
}
@@ -122,12 +127,54 @@ impl RoutingTable {
}
}
networks.insert(network, routes);
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
Ok(())
}
/// Forgets a network.
pub fn remove_network(&self, network: NetworkId) {
self.write().remove(&network);
let mut networks = self.write();
networks.remove(&network);
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
}
/// Replaces only a network's broadcast participation, without changing addresses.
pub fn set_broadcast(&self, network: NetworkId, policy: BroadcastPolicy) {
let mut networks = self.write();
if let Some(routes) = networks.get_mut(&network) {
if routes.broadcast == policy {
return;
}
routes.broadcast = policy;
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
}
}
/// Recognizes limited and configured subnet broadcasts before unicast lookup.
pub fn is_broadcast(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.broadcast.load().is_destination(destination)
}
/// A precomputed domain-scoped recipient list; no per-packet graph search.
pub fn broadcast_recipients(
&self,
source: Ipv4Addr,
destination: Ipv4Addr,
) -> Option<Arc<[Route]>> {
self.broadcast.load().outgoing(source, destination)
}
/// Local admission after the plugin authenticated and decrypted the sender.
pub fn accepts_broadcast(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
destination: Ipv4Addr,
) -> bool {
self.broadcast.load().accepts(network, peer, destination)
}
/// The peer that holds a destination address, if anybody does.
@@ -164,6 +211,14 @@ impl RoutingTable {
})
}
/// Whether an ordinary packet terminates on this host in this network.
/// Exported LAN subnets must extend this admission policy explicitly later.
pub fn is_local_destination(&self, network: NetworkId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.read()
.get(&network)
.is_some_and(|routes| routes.local == Some(destination))
}
/// Every address this agent should answer to, with its prefix length.
pub fn local_addresses(&self) -> Vec<(Ipv4Addr, u8)> {
let mut addresses: Vec<(Ipv4Addr, u8)> = self
@@ -175,6 +230,23 @@ impl RoutingTable {
addresses
}
/// The one network whose address the limited broadcast route is bound to.
///
/// The host has a single `255.255.255.255` route per interface, and one
/// interface carries every network, so only one overlay address can be its
/// source. The choice is the lowest [`NetworkId`] among networks that have
/// broadcast enabled, a range and a local address: deterministic, so two
/// runs with the same networks pick the same one.
pub fn broadcast_host_target(&self) -> Option<(Ipv4Addr, Ipv4Range)> {
let networks = self.read();
networks
.iter()
.filter(|(_, routes)| routes.broadcast.enabled)
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.local?, routes.range?)))
.min_by_key(|(network, _, _)| *network)
.map(|(_, local, range)| (local, range))
}
/// Whether a range would collide with one another network already uses.
///
/// Asked before proposing a range rather than after: with one interface
@@ -236,6 +308,7 @@ mod tests {
fn routes() -> NetworkRoutes {
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(1)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2)), (addr(3), peer(3))],
@@ -318,6 +391,7 @@ mod tests {
.set_network(
second,
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
peers: vec![(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 2), peer(4))],
@@ -336,6 +410,65 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)).map(|route| route.network), Some(first));
}
#[test]
fn the_host_broadcast_target_is_the_lowest_enabled_network_with_an_address() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
assert_eq!(table.broadcast_host_target(), None);
let (low, high) = {
let (a, b) = (network("first"), network("second"));
if a < b { (a, b) } else { (b, a) }
};
let mk = |enabled: bool, base: [u8; 4], local: Option<Ipv4Addr>| NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled,
..Default::default()
},
range: Some(
format!("{}.{}.{}.0/24", base[0], base[1], base[2])
.parse()
.unwrap(),
),
local,
peers: Vec::new(),
};
let a = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 1, 0, 1);
let b = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 2, 0, 1);
// The lower id has broadcast off, so the higher one is chosen.
table
.set_network(low, mk(false, [10, 1, 0, 0], Some(a)))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(high, mk(true, [10, 2, 0, 0], Some(b)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((b, "10.2.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
// Both enabled: the lowest id wins, whatever the insertion order.
table
.set_network(low, mk(true, [10, 1, 0, 0], Some(a)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((a, "10.1.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
// No local address yet: it cannot be the route's source.
table
.set_network(low, mk(true, [10, 1, 0, 0], None))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((b, "10.2.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
table.remove_network(high);
assert_eq!(table.broadcast_host_target(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_range_can_be_asked_about_before_it_is_proposed() {
// The point of asking first: an agent that claims an address it
@@ -362,6 +495,7 @@ mod tests {
.set_network(
network("wide"),
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.0.0.0/8".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
},
@@ -373,6 +507,7 @@ mod tests {
.set_network(
network("narrow"),
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
}
@@ -414,6 +549,7 @@ mod tests {
.set_network(
network("two"),
NetworkRoutes {
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
peers: Vec::new(),
+64 -5
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ pub trait TunFactory: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
Box::pin(async move { Ok(()) })
}
/// The host rules for this factory's interface, when it manages the host.
///
/// `None` for an in-memory device or an interface somebody else prepared:
/// there is nothing of ours to route or to open in a firewall.
fn host_rules(&self) -> Option<Arc<dyn super::hostrules::BroadcastHostRules>> {
None
}
/// Removes an interface this factory created.
///
/// Runs on the teardown path, so it reports rather than fails: there is
@@ -221,7 +229,31 @@ impl TunDevice for MemoryTun {
/// enough here: the agent chose the address, so anything else holding it is a
/// problem in its own right.
pub fn address_is_local(address: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
std::net::UdpSocket::bind((address, 0)).is_ok()
if std::net::UdpSocket::bind((address, 0)).is_ok() {
return true;
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
{
if let Ok(interfaces) = std::panic::catch_unwind(netdev::get_interfaces) {
for iface in interfaces {
if iface.is_up() {
match address {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
if iface.ipv4.iter().any(|ip| ip.addr() == v4) {
return true;
}
}
std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
if iface.ipv6.iter().any(|ip| ip.addr() == v6) {
return true;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
false
}
/// Creates [`MemoryTun`] devices.
@@ -385,7 +417,15 @@ mod system {
/// across this call, and such a guard must not span an `await` because
/// Linux capabilities are per thread.
pub(crate) fn open_tun(request: &TunRequest) -> Result<Arc<dyn TunDevice>, OverlayError> {
// macOS mutates neither field below (it neither names the interface nor
// sets a platform config), so `mut` is unused only there.
#[cfg_attr(target_os = "macos", allow(unused_mut))]
let mut config = tun::Configuration::default();
// macOS names its tunnels `utunN` and assigns the unit number itself.
// A name derived from the network id (`tsun…`) is not a legal utun
// name, so there the kernel is left to choose and the real name is read
// back below. Linux and Windows take the requested name verbatim.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
config.tun_name(&request.name);
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
config.platform_config(|platform| {
@@ -403,9 +443,20 @@ mod system {
let device = tun::create_as_async(&config).map_err(|err| open_error(&request.name, err))?;
// The interface name the operating system actually gave us: the
// requested one everywhere except macOS, where the kernel chose the
// utun unit and so the real name has to be read back off the device.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
let name = {
use tun::AbstractDevice;
device.tun_name().unwrap_or_else(|_| request.name.clone())
};
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
let name = request.name.clone();
let (reader, writer) = tokio::io::split(device);
Ok(Arc::new(SystemTun {
name: request.name.clone(),
name,
mtu: request.mtu,
reader: Mutex::new(reader),
writer: Mutex::new(writer),
@@ -435,7 +486,10 @@ mod system {
start `tsunagi up` there."
} else if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
"Start `tsunagi up` as root or grant CAP_NET_ADMIN with \
`sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p /path/to/tsunagi`."
`sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /path/to/tsunagi`."
} else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
"Creating a utun interface needs root on macOS; start `tsunagi up` \
with `sudo`, or install it as a root LaunchDaemon."
} else {
"Start `tsunagi up` with the privileges required to create a TUN interface."
};
@@ -455,7 +509,7 @@ mod system {
fn open_hint() -> &'static str {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
"Creating one needs CAP_NET_ADMIN; grant it with `setcap cap_net_admin+p`, \
"Creating one needs CAP_NET_ADMIN; grant it with `setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p`, \
or run with `--no-tun` to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@@ -464,7 +518,12 @@ mod system {
run as Administrator with the DLL beside the executable, or run with `--no-tun` \
to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "windows")))]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
"Creating a utun interface needs root; start the agent with `sudo` or as a root \
LaunchDaemon, or run with `--no-tun` to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "windows", target_os = "macos")))]
{
"Run with `--no-tun` to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
+31 -13
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use crate::error::ProtocolError;
/// The version in the ALPN is the wire-compatibility version of the control
/// protocol. It is independent of the network identity scheme version, so
/// bumping it must not change any existing [`crate::NetworkId`].
pub const ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/ctrl/1";
pub const ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/ctrl/3";
/// ALPN of the tsunagi data plane.
///
@@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ pub const ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/ctrl/1";
/// saturated or broken data plane cannot disturb control traffic, and the
/// transport underneath can be replaced without touching the control protocol.
///
/// Version 3 fragments logical datagrams below the peer-relay envelope, so
/// the overlay's MTU is independent of the current QUIC path MTU. Older data
/// versions cannot form a data link; control and persistent identities remain
/// compatible. Both ends, including any intermediate peer, must be upgraded.
pub const DATA_ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/data/3";
/// Version 4 adds source, destination, hop limit and stable flow id above
/// transport fragmentation. All members must upgrade together. Persistent
/// identities and network configuration do not change.
pub const DATA_ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/data/4";
/// Largest plugin protocol identifier accepted when opening a data channel.
pub const MAX_DATA_PROTOCOL_LEN: usize = 32;
@@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ pub const MAX_DATA_PROTOCOL_LEN: usize = 32;
pub const MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN: usize = 64;
/// Control protocol version carried inside the handshake.
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u16 = 1;
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u16 = 3;
/// First message of the handshake, sent by the initiator.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -74,6 +73,8 @@ pub struct AuthProof {
/// What this agent tells a peer about itself.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Announcement {
/// Local opt-in to receive LAN broadcasts in this network.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// Human-readable hostname. A mutable binding, not an identity.
pub hostname: String,
/// Announced IP plugin capabilities. Opaque to the core.
@@ -154,8 +155,8 @@ pub enum ControlMessage {
/// and repairs itself; and volatile, so it lives here and not in
/// signed state, which is for what has to survive a member being away.
Reachable {
/// The peers, as raw endpoint keys.
peers: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
/// Direct links, scoped to the plugin protocol they actually carry.
links: Vec<ReachableLink>,
},
/// Graceful goodbye.
///
@@ -183,6 +184,15 @@ pub struct PeerHint {
pub addrs: Vec<String>,
}
/// One directly observed edge, advertised only by its authenticated source.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ReachableLink {
/// The other end of this transport link.
pub peer: [u8; 32],
/// Protocol carried by the link.
pub protocol: String,
}
/// Longest address text accepted in a hint.
pub const MAX_HINT_ADDR_LEN: usize = 128;
@@ -256,10 +266,18 @@ pub fn validate(message: &ControlMessage, limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), Protoco
}
}
}
ControlMessage::Reachable { peers } => {
// One entry per member at most; a sender claiming more than a
// network can hold is not describing this network.
check_len("reachable.peers", peers.len(), limits.max_state_records)?;
ControlMessage::Reachable { links } => {
check_len("reachable.links", links.len(), limits.max_state_records)?;
for link in links {
if link.protocol.is_empty() {
return Err(ProtocolError::Malformed("empty routing protocol"));
}
check_len(
"reachable.protocol",
link.protocol.len(),
MAX_PROTOCOL_ID_LEN,
)?;
}
}
ControlMessage::Announce(announcement) => {
check_len(
+6
View File
@@ -248,6 +248,12 @@ impl Storage {
.await
}
/// Persists local broadcast participation for one configured network.
pub async fn set_broadcast(&self, network_id: NetworkId, enabled: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_broadcast(network_id, enabled))
.await
}
/// Updates the auto-start flag of a network.
pub async fn set_auto_start(&self, network_id: NetworkId, auto_start: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_auto_start(network_id, auto_start))
+83 -4
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ use crate::identity::{DeviceIdentity, NetworkId, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
use crate::state::{RecordBody, SignedRecord};
/// Schema version written by this build.
pub const SCHEMA_VERSION: i64 = 3;
pub const SCHEMA_VERSION: i64 = 4;
/// Key of the stored hostname setting.
const SETTING_HOSTNAME: &str = "hostname";
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ pub struct StoredNetwork {
pub secret: NetworkSecret,
/// Whether the network is activated automatically at agent startup.
pub auto_start: bool,
/// Local broadcast participation, enabled unless explicitly disabled.
pub broadcast: bool,
}
/// The mandatory state store.
@@ -183,6 +185,12 @@ impl StateStore {
.execute_batch(SIGNED_RECORDS_SCHEMA)
.map_err(|err| self.corrupt(format!("cannot create schema: {err}")))?;
}
if found < 4 {
self.conn.execute_batch("BEGIN;
ALTER TABLE networks ADD COLUMN broadcast INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (broadcast IN (0,1));
PRAGMA user_version = 4;
COMMIT;").map_err(|err| self.corrupt(format!("cannot migrate schema to 4: {err}")))?;
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -396,6 +404,21 @@ impl StateStore {
Ok(())
}
/// Saves local participation without changing identity, membership or auto-start.
pub fn set_broadcast(&self, network_id: NetworkId, enabled: bool) -> Result<()> {
let changed = self
.conn
.execute(
"UPDATE networks SET broadcast = ?2 WHERE network_id = ?1",
params![network_id.as_bytes().as_slice(), enabled as i64],
)
.map_err(|err| Error::Storage(format!("cannot update broadcast policy: {err}")))?;
if changed == 0 {
return Err(Error::NetworkUnknown(network_id));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Removes a network configuration entirely.
pub fn remove_network(&self, network_id: NetworkId) -> Result<()> {
self.conn
@@ -411,7 +434,7 @@ impl StateStore {
pub fn list_networks(&self) -> Result<Vec<StoredNetwork>> {
let mut stmt = self
.conn
.prepare("SELECT network_id, name, secret, auto_start FROM networks ORDER BY name")
.prepare("SELECT network_id, name, secret, auto_start, broadcast FROM networks ORDER BY name")
.map_err(|err| Error::Storage(format!("cannot list networks: {err}")))?;
let rows = stmt
.query_map([], |row| {
@@ -419,13 +442,13 @@ impl StateStore {
let name: String = row.get(1)?;
let secret: Vec<u8> = row.get(2)?;
let auto_start: i64 = row.get(3)?;
Ok((id, name, secret, auto_start != 0))
Ok((id, name, secret, auto_start != 0, row.get::<_, bool>(4)?))
})
.map_err(|err| Error::Storage(format!("cannot list networks: {err}")))?;
let mut out = Vec::new();
for row in rows {
let (id, name, secret, auto_start) =
let (id, name, secret, auto_start, broadcast) =
row.map_err(|err| Error::Storage(format!("cannot read network row: {err}")))?;
let id: [u8; 32] = id
.as_slice()
@@ -436,6 +459,7 @@ impl StateStore {
name: NetworkName::new(name)?,
secret: NetworkSecret::from_bytes(secret)?,
auto_start,
broadcast,
});
}
Ok(out)
@@ -668,3 +692,58 @@ pub(crate) fn now_unix() -> i64 {
.map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
.unwrap_or(0)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod broadcast_storage_tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::NetworkKeys;
#[test]
fn v3_migration_preserves_identity_and_networks_and_defaults_broadcast_on() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("state.sqlite");
let name = NetworkName::new("migration-broadcast").unwrap();
let secret = NetworkSecret::from_bytes([7; 32]).unwrap();
let id = NetworkKeys::derive(&name, &secret).network_id();
let store = StateStore::open(&path).unwrap();
let identity = store
.load_or_create_device_identity()
.unwrap()
.endpoint_id();
store.upsert_network(id, &name, &secret, false).unwrap();
store.set_hostname("old-host").unwrap();
store
.conn
.execute_batch("ALTER TABLE networks DROP COLUMN broadcast; PRAGMA user_version=3;")
.unwrap();
drop(store);
let store = StateStore::open(&path).unwrap();
let networks = store.list_networks().unwrap();
assert_eq!(networks.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(networks[0].network_id, id);
assert!(!networks[0].auto_start);
assert!(networks[0].broadcast);
assert_eq!(store.hostname().unwrap().as_deref(), Some("old-host"));
assert_eq!(
store
.load_or_create_device_identity()
.unwrap()
.endpoint_id(),
identity
);
store.set_broadcast(id, false).unwrap();
store.upsert_network(id, &name, &secret, true).unwrap();
drop(store);
let store = StateStore::open(&path).unwrap();
assert!(
!store.list_networks().unwrap()[0].broadcast,
"rejoin and restart preserve opt-out"
);
store.remove_network(id).unwrap();
store.upsert_network(id, &name, &secret, true).unwrap();
assert!(
store.list_networks().unwrap()[0].broadcast,
"forgotten network gets defaults"
);
}
}
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
//! The real Mainline UDP receive loop must be quiet while idle on Windows too.
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::time::Duration;
use tracing_subscriber::layer::SubscriberExt;
struct SocketWarnings(Arc<AtomicUsize>);
impl<S: tracing::Subscriber> tracing_subscriber::Layer<S> for SocketWarnings {
fn on_event(&self, event: &tracing::Event<'_>, _: tracing_subscriber::layer::Context<'_, S>) {
if event.metadata().target() == "mainline::rpc::socket"
&& *event.metadata().level() <= tracing::Level::WARN
{
self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_idle_dht_socket_stays_quiet_and_still_answers_packets() {
// Mainline owns an OS thread, so a thread-local subscriber cannot see its
// events. This integration-test binary has just this test and installs
// its own subscriber; it cannot affect the application or other binaries.
let warnings = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(
tracing_subscriber::registry().with(SocketWarnings(Arc::clone(&warnings))),
)
.unwrap();
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), async {
let dht = mainline::Dht::builder()
.no_bootstrap()
.server_mode()
.bind_address(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST)
.port(0)
.build()
.unwrap()
.as_async();
let address = dht.info().await.local_addr();
// Each info response comes from the actor after another receive-loop
// iteration. With no peers or packets, these exercise real socket
// read timeouts, without an arbitrary sleep or public bootstrap.
for _ in 0..8 {
assert_eq!(dht.info().await.local_addr(), address);
}
assert_eq!(warnings.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 0, "idle receive warnings");
let client = tokio::net::UdpSocket::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0))
.await
.unwrap();
let ping = b"d1:ad2:id20:abcdefghijklmnopqrste1:q4:ping1:t4:ping1:y1:qe";
client.send_to(ping, address).await.unwrap();
let mut response = [0u8; 2048];
let (len, from) = client.recv_from(&mut response).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(from, std::net::SocketAddr::V4(address));
let response = &response[..len];
assert!(response.windows(9).any(|field| field == b"1:t4:ping"));
assert!(response.windows(6).any(|field| field == b"1:y1:r"));
assert_eq!(warnings.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 0);
})
.await
.expect("the DHT receive loop keeps making progress");
}
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# Running tsunagi on Arch Linux
Install the package built for your architecture:
```sh
sudo pacman -U tsunagi-*-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst
```
It drops a static, dependency-free binary at `/usr/bin/tsunagi`, a systemd
service, and a polkit rule, and creates a dedicated system user `tsunagi` the
service runs as.
Start it:
```sh
sudo systemctl enable --now tsunagi
```
Control it with `sudo` (the agent's control socket is private to the service
user; `sudo` reaches it with no extra flags, because the CLI finds the running
service's socket at `/run/tsunagi/agent.sock`):
```sh
sudo tsunagi status
sudo tsunagi join <network-name> <tsn1…secret>
```
## How it runs
The service runs as the unprivileged `tsunagi` user with just two capabilities
(`CAP_NET_ADMIN`, `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`) granted by systemd — no root. systemd
creates and owns its directories:
| what | path |
|---|---|
| state | `/var/lib/tsunagi` |
| cache | `/var/cache/tsunagi` |
| control socket | `/run/tsunagi/agent.sock` |
The polkit rule lets anyone in the `tsunagi` group configure systemd-resolved
for the overlay zones (the service user is in that group). To run the agent as
your own user as well, add yourself to the group: `sudo usermod -aG tsunagi
"$USER"`.
## Removal
```sh
sudo pacman -R tsunagi
```
stops and disables the service. The `tsunagi` user and `/var/lib/tsunagi` are
left in place; remove them by hand if you want them gone.
Vendored Executable
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Assemble an Arch Linux package (.pkg.tar.zst) from a prebuilt static tsunagi
# binary, using only bsdtar + zstd on a non-Arch host — no makepkg, no Arch
# container. The binary is static, so the package has no dependencies.
#
# Usage: build-pkg.sh <binary> <arch> <version> <output.pkg.tar.zst>
# <binary> path to the built tsunagi executable
# <arch> pacman architecture: x86_64 or aarch64
# <version> package version (the tag without its leading v)
# <output> path to write the package to
#
# Needs bsdtar (libarchive-tools) and zstd on the builder.
set -euo pipefail
binary="$1"
arch="$2"
version="$3"
output="$4"
here="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
root="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$root"' EXIT
# pacman pkgver may not contain '-', so a prerelease tag like 0.1.0-rc.9 becomes
# 0.1.0_rc.9.
pkgver="$(printf '%s' "$version" | tr '-' '_')"
pkgrel=1
# Payload. Arch keeps units under /usr/lib/systemd/system and installs to
# /usr/bin, so the service's ExecStart is rewritten to match.
install -D -m 0755 "$binary" "$root/usr/bin/tsunagi"
mkdir -p "$root/usr/lib/systemd/system"
sed 's#/usr/local/bin/tsunagi#/usr/bin/tsunagi#' \
"$here/../linux/tsunagi.service" > "$root/usr/lib/systemd/system/tsunagi.service"
chmod 0644 "$root/usr/lib/systemd/system/tsunagi.service"
install -D -m 0644 "$here/../linux/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules" \
"$root/usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules"
install -D -m 0644 "$here/../../README.md" "$root/usr/share/doc/tsunagi/README.md"
install -D -m 0644 "$here/../linux/README.md" "$root/usr/share/doc/tsunagi/INSTALL.md"
# Installed size (payload only), before the metadata files are written.
size="$(du -sb "$root" | cut -f1)"
cat > "$root/.PKGINFO" <<PKGINFO
pkgname = tsunagi
pkgver = ${pkgver}-${pkgrel}
pkgdesc = Serverless private mesh networking agent
url = https://github.com/Ultradesu/tsunagi
builddate = $(date +%s)
packager = AB <ab@hexor.cy>
size = ${size}
arch = ${arch}
license = MIT
license = Apache
PKGINFO
# Scriptlet: create the dedicated system user the service runs as, and keep
# systemd in step. The "tsunagi" user is in the "tsunagi" group, which the
# polkit rule grants the resolver actions.
cat > "$root/.INSTALL" <<'INSTALL'
post_install() {
getent group tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1 || groupadd -r tsunagi
getent passwd tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
useradd -r -g tsunagi -d /var/lib/tsunagi -s /usr/bin/nologin -c "tsunagi agent" tsunagi
systemctl daemon-reload >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
post_upgrade() {
post_install
}
pre_remove() {
systemctl disable --now tsunagi.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
post_remove() {
systemctl daemon-reload >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
INSTALL
# .MTREE over the metadata and payload (not over itself), gzip-compressed, as
# pacman expects.
(
cd "$root"
LANG=C bsdtar -czf .MTREE --format=mtree \
--options='!all,use-set,type,uid,gid,mode,time,size,md5,sha256,link' \
.PKGINFO .INSTALL usr
)
# Pack with .PKGINFO first, then the rest, and zstd-compress.
(
cd "$root"
bsdtar -cf - .PKGINFO .MTREE .INSTALL usr
) | zstd -c -19 -T0 > "$output"
echo "built $output"
Vendored Executable
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@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Assemble a dependency-free Debian package from a prebuilt static tsunagi
# binary, using only dpkg-deb (no cargo-deb, no nfpm). The binary is statically
# linked, so the package declares no Depends and runs on any Debian/Ubuntu.
#
# Usage: build-deb.sh <binary> <deb_arch> <version> <output.deb>
# <binary> path to the built tsunagi executable
# <deb_arch> Debian architecture: amd64 or arm64
# <version> package version (the tag without its leading v)
# <output> path to write the .deb to
set -euo pipefail
binary="$1"
arch="$2"
version="$3"
output="$4"
here="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
root="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$root"' EXIT
# Payload. Debian installs to /usr/bin (not /usr/local), so the service's
# ExecStart is rewritten to match; the source unit targets /usr/local/bin for
# the tarball installer.
install -D -m 0755 "$binary" "$root/usr/bin/tsunagi"
mkdir -p "$root/lib/systemd/system"
sed 's#/usr/local/bin/tsunagi#/usr/bin/tsunagi#' \
"$here/../linux/tsunagi.service" > "$root/lib/systemd/system/tsunagi.service"
chmod 0644 "$root/lib/systemd/system/tsunagi.service"
install -D -m 0644 "$here/../linux/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules" \
"$root/usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules"
install -D -m 0644 "$here/../../README.md" "$root/usr/share/doc/tsunagi/README.md"
install -D -m 0644 "$here/../linux/README.md" "$root/usr/share/doc/tsunagi/INSTALL.md"
mkdir -p "$root/DEBIAN"
cat > "$root/DEBIAN/control" <<CTRL
Package: tsunagi
Version: ${version}
Architecture: ${arch}
Maintainer: AB <ab@hexor.cy>
Section: net
Priority: optional
Homepage: https://github.com/Ultradesu/tsunagi
Description: Serverless private mesh networking agent
tsunagi forms small private mesh IP networks between peers, with NAT
traversal and no central server. This package installs a static,
dependency-free binary, a systemd service that runs the agent as a dedicated
unprivileged "tsunagi" user with only CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
and a polkit rule for the local DNS resolver.
CTRL
# The dedicated system user the service runs as. It is in the "tsunagi" group,
# which the polkit rule grants the resolve1 actions. systemd creates the state,
# cache and runtime directories for it on first start.
cat > "$root/DEBIAN/postinst" <<'POSTINST'
#!/bin/sh
set -e
if ! getent group tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1; then
addgroup --system tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
if ! getent passwd tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1; then
adduser --system --ingroup tsunagi --home /var/lib/tsunagi --no-create-home \
--gecos "tsunagi agent" --disabled-login tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
exit 0
POSTINST
cat > "$root/DEBIAN/prerm" <<'PRERM'
#!/bin/sh
set -e
if [ "$1" = remove ] || [ "$1" = purge ]; then
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl disable --now tsunagi.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
fi
exit 0
PRERM
cat > "$root/DEBIAN/postrm" <<'POSTRM'
#!/bin/sh
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
exit 0
POSTRM
chmod 0755 "$root/DEBIAN/postinst" "$root/DEBIAN/prerm" "$root/DEBIAN/postrm"
# --root-owner-group writes the payload as root:root without needing fakeroot.
dpkg-deb --root-owner-group --build "$root" "$output"
echo "built $output"
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
// Installed by the tsunagi packages.
//
// polkit decides who may configure systemd-resolved by user/group id, not by
// capability, so the agent needs this even though it holds CAP_NET_ADMIN. It
// grants exactly the four resolve1 actions the agent calls, and nothing else,
// to anyone in the "tsunagi" group.
//
// The packaged service runs as the "tsunagi" user (which is in that group), so
// its resolver configuration is allowed. To also run the agent as your own
// user, add yourself to the group:
//
// sudo usermod -aG tsunagi "$USER"
polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
var allowed = [
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-dns-servers",
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-domains",
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-default-route",
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.revert"
];
if (allowed.indexOf(action.id) >= 0 && subject.isInGroup("tsunagi")) {
return polkit.Result.YES;
}
});
+67
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# Running tsunagi on Linux
This archive holds a **static** `tsunagi` binary (musl), so it runs on any
distribution — Arch, Alpine, NixOS, old glibc systems — with no shared-library
dependencies. Alongside it are a systemd unit, a polkit rule, and an installer.
Creating the TUN interface needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, and configuring
systemd-resolved is decided by polkit. There are three ways to run it; pick one.
> On Debian/Ubuntu and Arch, prefer the native package (`.deb` / `.pkg.tar.zst`)
> from the release — it does all of the below for you.
## Quick install — systemd service as a dedicated user
```sh
sudo ./install.sh
sudo systemctl enable --now tsunagi
```
The service runs as an unprivileged `tsunagi` user with just `CAP_NET_ADMIN`
and `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` (granted by systemd), not root. systemd creates its
state (`/var/lib/tsunagi`), cache (`/var/cache/tsunagi`) and runtime
(`/run/tsunagi`) directories, and the polkit rule lets it configure the
resolver. Control it with `sudo` — the CLI finds the running service's socket at
`/run/tsunagi/agent.sock` with no flags:
```sh
sudo tsunagi status
sudo tsunagi join <network-name> <tsn1…secret>
```
## As your own user — one capability, no service
```sh
sudo install -m 0755 tsunagi /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
sudo usermod -aG tsunagi "$USER" # so the resolver works; log in again after
tsunagi up
```
Nothing runs as root. The capability is lost on every rebuild or copy of the
binary, so re-run `setcap` after replacing it. The agent uses your per-user
state directory and socket, so plain `tsunagi status` (no sudo) reaches it.
## Without touching the OS
```sh
tsunagi up --no-tun
```
Tunnels form and handshake between agents, but no interface, address or route is
created, so traffic never reaches the operating system. Needs no privileges.
## What the agent installs
Everything is tagged to its own interface, computed from local state, and
reversible — removed when a network leaves, broadcast is turned off, or the
agent stops:
- a TUN interface configured over netlink (addresses, MTU, up);
- while broadcast is on, a `255.255.255.255` route through the interface and an
inbound-UDP firewall allowance from the overlay range (`iptables`, tagged);
- the systemd-resolved setting that sends the overlay zones' questions to the
local resolver.
Nothing taken from a remote peer ever becomes a path, a command argument or an
OS setting.
Vendored Executable
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#!/usr/bin/env sh
# Installs the static tsunagi binary and, where systemd is present, a service
# that runs the agent as a dedicated unprivileged "tsunagi" user. Run as root:
#
# sudo ./install.sh
#
# PREFIX overrides the install prefix (default /usr/local); if you change it,
# edit ExecStart in tsunagi.service to match.
set -eu
PREFIX="${PREFIX:-/usr/local}"
here="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "This installer writes to ${PREFIX}/bin and /etc; re-run it as root (sudo)." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Installing tsunagi to ${PREFIX}/bin"
install -d "${PREFIX}/bin"
install -m 0755 "${here}/tsunagi" "${PREFIX}/bin/tsunagi"
# The dedicated system user the service runs as (works with either shadow's
# useradd or Debian's adduser).
if ! getent group tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1; then
groupadd -r tsunagi 2>/dev/null || addgroup --system tsunagi 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if ! getent passwd tsunagi >/dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -g tsunagi -d /var/lib/tsunagi -s /usr/sbin/nologin -c "tsunagi agent" tsunagi 2>/dev/null \
|| adduser --system --ingroup tsunagi --home /var/lib/tsunagi --no-create-home \
--gecos "tsunagi agent" --disabled-login tsunagi 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# polkit rule so the agent (as the tsunagi user) may configure systemd-resolved.
install -d /etc/polkit-1/rules.d
install -m 0644 "${here}/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules" /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules
if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Installing the systemd service (runs as the tsunagi user)"
install -m 0644 "${here}/tsunagi.service" /etc/systemd/system/tsunagi.service
systemctl daemon-reload
cat <<EOF
Done. Start the agent with:
sudo systemctl enable --now tsunagi
Control it with sudo (the CLI finds the service's socket automatically):
sudo tsunagi status
sudo tsunagi join <network-name> <tsn1…secret>
EOF
else
cat <<EOF
Installed the binary; no systemd found, so no service was set up. Either:
* run it as root: sudo ${PREFIX}/bin/tsunagi up
* or as your own user: sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p ${PREFIX}/bin/tsunagi
tsunagi up
(add yourself to the tsunagi group so the resolver works:
sudo usermod -aG tsunagi "\$USER")
* or without touching the OS: tsunagi up --no-tun
EOF
fi
+36
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
[Unit]
Description=tsunagi mesh agent
Documentation=https://github.com/Ultradesu/tsunagi
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
# Runs as a dedicated unprivileged user, not root. The two capabilities are all
# it needs: CAP_NET_ADMIN to create and configure the TUN interface, and
# CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for low ports. The packages create the `tsunagi` user.
User=tsunagi
Group=tsunagi
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
# systemd creates and owns these for the service user, and the agent is pointed
# at them: state in /var/lib/tsunagi, cache in /var/cache/tsunagi, and the
# control socket in /run/tsunagi, which stays private to the service user.
StateDirectory=tsunagi
StateDirectoryMode=0700
CacheDirectory=tsunagi
RuntimeDirectory=tsunagi
RuntimeDirectoryMode=0755
Environment=TSUNAGI_STATE_DIR=%S/tsunagi
Environment=TSUNAGI_CACHE_DIR=%C/tsunagi
Environment=TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET=%t/tsunagi/agent.sock
# The tarball installer puts the binary here; the deb and the Arch package
# rewrite this to /usr/bin where they install it.
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/tsunagi up
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+82
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@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
# Running tsunagi on macOS
The agent needs **root** on macOS: creating a `utun` interface and writing
`/etc/resolver` are both root-only, and macOS has no per-capability grant like
Linux. There are two ways to run it.
## Quick start — `sudo`
```sh
sudo tsunagi up
```
In another terminal, the control commands talk to it over the system control
socket and do **not** need `sudo`:
```sh
tsunagi status
tsunagi join <network-name> <tsn1…secret>
```
The agent uses fixed system paths, so the commands find it regardless of whose
shell started `sudo`:
| what | path |
|---|---|
| mandatory state | `/var/db/tsunagi` |
| disposable cache | `/var/db/tsunagi/cache` |
| control socket | `/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock` |
## Native deployment — root LaunchDaemon
For an always-on agent that starts at boot, install the bundled
[`cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist`](cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist).
```sh
# Put the binary where the plist expects it (edit the plist for another path).
sudo install -m 0755 target/release/tsunagi /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
# Install the daemon. launchd refuses a daemon plist that is not owned by
# root:wheel or that is group/world-writable.
sudo install -m 0644 -o root -g wheel \
dist/macos/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist \
/Library/LaunchDaemons/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist
# Load and start it.
sudo launchctl bootstrap system /Library/LaunchDaemons/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist
sudo launchctl enable system/cy.hexor.tsunagi
```
Manage it afterwards with:
```sh
sudo launchctl kickstart -k system/cy.hexor.tsunagi # restart
sudo launchctl bootout system/cy.hexor.tsunagi # stop and unload
tail -f /var/log/tsunagi.log # logs
```
The control commands (`status`, `join`, `network`, `dns`) work the same against
the daemon as against a `sudo tsunagi up`, over the same socket.
## What the agent does to the system
Everything it installs is tagged to its own interface, computed from local
state, and reversible — it is removed when a network leaves, broadcast is turned
off, or the agent stops:
- a **`utun` interface**, configured with `ifconfig` (addresses, MTU, up) and a
subnet `route` for the overlay range. The kernel assigns the `utunN` name; the
agent adopts whatever it is given. A `utun` is torn down with the process, so
a crash never leaves one behind.
- `/etc/resolver/<network>` files pointing the system resolver at the overlay
DNS server for each network's zone, with a `port` so the server stays off 53.
Each file carries a marker line; the agent only ever replaces or removes files
it wrote, never one you created by hand.
- while broadcast is on, a `255.255.255.255` **route** through the overlay
interface. The matching inbound-UDP firewall allowance is **not** implemented
yet (it needs a `pf` anchor); `tsunagi status` reports that half as incomplete
and names what to allow by hand if your host firewall drops discovery replies.
Nothing taken from a remote peer ever becomes a path, a command argument or an
OS setting: the interface name comes from the kernel, addresses and ranges from
signed state the agent already verified.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<!--
LaunchDaemon for the tsunagi agent.
A daemon, so it runs as root (creating a utun interface and writing
/etc/resolver both need it) and comes up at boot before anyone logs in.
Install it at /Library/LaunchDaemons/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist, owned by
root:wheel with mode 0644 — launchd refuses a daemon plist that is
group- or world-writable. See README.md in this directory.
Edit the binary path if tsunagi is not at /usr/local/bin/tsunagi.
-->
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>Label</key>
<string>cy.hexor.tsunagi</string>
<!-- `up` starts the agent and keeps it in the foreground, which is what a
launchd daemon expects: launchd owns the lifecycle, so the process
must not daemonise itself. -->
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array>
<string>/usr/local/bin/tsunagi</string>
<string>up</string>
</array>
<!-- Start at boot and bring it back if it ever exits. -->
<key>RunAtLoad</key>
<true/>
<key>KeepAlive</key>
<true/>
<!-- Back off rather than spin if it fails to start repeatedly. -->
<key>ThrottleInterval</key>
<integer>10</integer>
<!-- Logs. launchd creates these as root; rotate them with newsyslog if you
keep the daemon around. -->
<key>StandardOutPath</key>
<string>/var/log/tsunagi.log</string>
<key>StandardErrorPath</key>
<string>/var/log/tsunagi.log</string>
<!-- The agent uses the fixed macOS system paths by default:
state /var/db/tsunagi
socket /var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock
so nothing here has to point at a user's home directory. -->
</dict>
</plist>
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# Running tsunagi on Windows
This archive holds `tsunagi.exe`. The overlay interface is a Wintun adapter, so
the agent needs two things to carry real traffic:
1. **`wintun.dll` beside the executable.** Download it from
<https://www.wintun.net>, take the DLL for your architecture (`amd64`), and
put it in the same folder as `tsunagi.exe`.
2. **An elevated process.** Creating the adapter requires Administrator rights.
Open PowerShell or Command Prompt with **Run as administrator** and start the
agent there:
```powershell
.\tsunagi.exe up
```
Run the commands that control it (`join`, `status`, `dns`, `network`) as the
same user with the same elevation. The agent serves its control interface on a
named pipe under `%ProgramData%\tsunagi`, so an elevated client finds it
regardless of which account started the agent.
## Without touching the OS
```powershell
.\tsunagi.exe up --no-tun
```
Tunnels form and handshake between agents, but no adapter, address or route is
created, so traffic never reaches the operating system. Needs no Wintun and no
elevation.
## What the agent installs
Everything is tagged to its own adapter, computed from local state, and
reversible — removed when a network leaves, broadcast is turned off, or the
agent stops:
- a Wintun adapter configured with `netsh` (addresses, MTU);
- while broadcast is on, a `255.255.255.255` route through the adapter and an
inbound-UDP firewall allowance from the overlay range;
- the Name Resolution Policy Table entry that sends the overlay zones' questions
to the local resolver.
Nothing taken from a remote peer ever becomes a path, a command argument or an
OS setting.
+14 -1
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@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ a `PluginContext` for re-announcements and error reports, and a bounded
A data plane failure never stops the daemon: the control plane keeps running
and the agent stays manageable.
## Userspace routing
The routing engine builds shortest paths over opaque peer identifiers, with no
WireGuard or iroh dependency. The relay adapter binds those next hops to
`PacketLink` handles and publishes an immutable table per network and protocol.
One reader per raw transport forwards transit without entering the plugin or
TUN. End-to-end plugin links survive physical link changes. The existing
authenticated control mesh supplies first-hand topology; the data router does
not tunnel control sessions. See [routing.md](routing.md).
## Module responsibilities
| component | responsibility |
@@ -47,7 +57,10 @@ and the agent stays manageable.
| `storage` | mandatory state and the separately recoverable cache |
| `state` | signed records that outlive a session, merged between replicas |
| `dataplane::transport` | authenticated datagram links to peers; where reachability lives |
| `dataplane` | the contract a protocol implements, and nothing else |
| `dataplane::routing` | transport-independent graph, shortest paths and opaque flow identifiers |
| `dataplane::relay` | immutable forwarding snapshots and transport-to-transport transit |
| `dataplane` | the contract an IP protocol implements |
| `overlay::broadcast` | domain-scoped IPv4 UDP discovery fanout and receive admission |
| `overlay` | the one interface an agent owns: provisioning, the TUN, whose packet is whose |
| `dns` | the DNS view of a network, and telling the system resolver about it |
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# LAN discovery broadcasts
Broadcast participation is a **local setting of each network**, enabled by
default. Different networks on the same agent can have different settings;
each member advertises whether it accepts broadcasts over its authenticated
control session. It is not a network-wide vote or signed shared configuration.
```sh
tsunagi join -n games --no-broadcast
tsunagi join -n games --broadcast
tsunagi network broadcast games off
tsunagi network broadcast games on
tsunagi network broadcast games
```
Joining without either flag preserves the saved choice. The `network broadcast`
command can change a running network immediately or configure it while the
agent is stopped. It accepts the exact network name, full id or a unique id
prefix; ambiguous selectors list candidates without changing anything.
`status` reports the local setting. There is no global `up`
override: starting the agent preserves every network's independent policy.
## Delivery
At local TUN ingress, the IP router recognizes IPv4 UDP addressed to the limited
broadcast `255.255.255.255` or the configured overlay subnet's directed broadcast
(for example `10.13.37.255` for `/24`). These address forms follow
[RFC 1122 section 3.3.6](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1122#section-3.3.6).
There is no port allowlist: discovery requests and server announcements on
game-specific UDP ports use the same mechanism. IPv4/UDP lengths are checked
before fanout, including handling IP fragments. IPv6 multicast, mDNS, DHCP
bridging, Ethernet/IPX and physical LAN capture are outside this feature.
The local source address selects exactly one broadcast domain. A limited
broadcast is never copied into all networks merely because they share a TUN.
A directed broadcast must belong to that source's network. Unspecified sources
and physical LAN sources have no authorized domain yet. Recipients are live,
authenticated, opted-in members with signed overlay address ownership. The
immutable recipient list is rebuilt with address/policy changes, not per packet.
The origin creates **one encrypted unicast copy per eligible peer** and hands it
to the existing shortest-path router. Each can travel through several transport
links. Transit handles opaque ciphertext with the existing hop limit and does
not create another fanout. The original IP source, destination, TTL, UDP ports,
checksum and payload remain unchanged. Reply packets use ordinary unicast.
There is no broadcast retransmission timer or application-payload deduplication:
games may legitimately repeat the same discovery query. WireGuard replay checks
reject duplicated encrypted packets delivered by the transport.
At the destination, the usual authenticated-source ownership check still runs.
Broadcast admission also checks the receiving network's setting, the sender's
announced participation, the destination domain and UDP framing. Disabling it
takes effect locally even while a remote sender still has an older announcement.
Received broadcasts terminate in the local TUN and never enter the fanout path.
An ordinary decrypted packet must target this host's address in that network;
the TUN is not a transit gateway to another overlay or physical subnet.
Opt-out disables originating and accepting broadcasts on that host/network.
It does not disable opaque unicast transit for other members: intermediate
routers cannot inspect another pair's encrypted IP payload.
## Host behavior and verification
A game's discovery packet only reaches Tsunagi if the operating system sends it
through the Tsunagi interface, and its reply only reaches the game if the host
firewall admits it. While a network has broadcast on, the agent installs
exactly two things for the interface it owns, and removes them when broadcast
is turned off, the network is left or stopped, or the agent exits:
- **Route** `255.255.255.255/32` through the overlay interface, with the
overlay address as its source (Linux: netlink, `ip route add 255.255.255.255/32
dev tsun0 src <overlay-ip>`; Windows: `New-NetRoute`, metric 1, active store).
Limited broadcasts from every program then go to the overlay and not to the
physical LAN while this is installed; this is the price of the feature.
- **Firewall allowance** for inbound **UDP only**, from the overlay range only,
on that interface only (Linux: an `iptables -I INPUT` rule tagged
`tsunagi:<interface>`; Windows: a Defender rule of that name). Replies to a
broadcast come from another address than the request went to, so a stateful
firewall never matches them to it. TCP services such as SSH stay unexposed.
Both are tagged, idempotent and reversible, and are never derived from a remote
announcement. A rule left by a crashed run is replaced on the next apply. If
`iptables` is missing (for example a host with only `nft`) or the process is not
privileged, the route is still installed and `status` prints a
`broadcast rules` line saying which half is missing and why. To undo it all,
turn broadcast off for the network: `tsunagi network broadcast <network> off`.
**One interface, several networks.** The host has one `255.255.255.255` route
per interface, so only one overlay address can be its source. The lowest network
id among broadcast-enabled networks with an address is used; `status` says when
that is not the network being shown. Directed broadcasts (`10.13.37.255`) follow
the ordinary connected route and are not affected.
**What it cannot fix.** A game that binds its socket to a physical address or
device, or sends to the physical subnet's broadcast address, still bypasses the
TUN. The Windows implementation could not be run while it was written; its
scripts are unit-tested only.
The suite tests real agents, authenticated iroh links and WireGuard encryption
with memory TUNs: limited/directed UDP discovery, multihop fanout, single-copy
delivery, opt-out, unicast replies, malformed input, source validation and
network isolation. Host rules are tested through a mock host and a scripted
`iptables`; the default suite changes no OS setting. It does not launch CS 1.6 or
Warcraft III.
## Future exported LANs
`overlay::broadcast` owns domain selection and recipient policy separately from
IP parsing, encryption and encrypted transit. A future LAN adapter should feed
an explicitly authorized ingress domain into this layer, and export routes
through the corresponding source/destination admission policy. It must not
relax address checks globally or reinterpret all `.255` addresses as broadcasts.
Multiple gateways to the same LAN will need origin identifiers and bounded
duplicate suppression at LAN ingress/egress before physical rebroadcast is
enabled. No subnet export or host forwarding configuration is added here.
## Compatibility
Control ALPN is `tsunagi/ctrl/3` because `Announce` now carries participation.
The encrypted transit envelope and data ALPN `tsunagi/data/4` stay unchanged.
Local control protocol 14 rejects commands from mismatched running binaries
with a restart message instead of decoding a different request shape.
Upgrade all members and restart the agent before using the new CLI.
SQLite schema 4 adds `networks.broadcast` with default `1`. Existing network
names, secrets, identity keys and signed records are retained. The old binary
does not understand schema 4; the migration is not a downgrade mechanism.
+39 -6
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Two versions exist and are independent:
- **Identity scheme**, `tsunagi-network-id-v1`. Frozen. Changing it creates a
different network space for the same name and secret.
- **Control protocol**, ALPN `tsunagi/ctrl/1`, `PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1`.
- **Control protocol**, ALPN `tsunagi/ctrl/3`, `PROTOCOL_VERSION = 3`.
Upgrading the crate or bumping the control protocol must never change an
existing `NetworkId`.
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ event does not report a network id.
## The data plane protocol
IP plugin packets never travel on a control connection. They use their own
ALPN, `tsunagi/data/3`, on their own iroh connection:
ALPN, `tsunagi/data/4`, on their own iroh connection:
```text
initiator -> responder : (the same membership handshake as above)
@@ -172,9 +172,35 @@ holding up subsequent packets. Packet IDs are scoped to a QUIC connection;
reassembly is created only after the membership handshake. All limits live in
`config.rs`. There is no transport-layer retransmission added by this framing.
Version 3 is incompatible with previous data ALPNs. Upgrade both endpoints
and intermediate peers together. The control protocol, network secret,
device identity and stored network configuration are unchanged.
Version 4 adds a routing envelope inside the transport fragmentation framing:
| field | bytes | encoding |
|---|---:|---|
| envelope version | 1 | `1` |
| remaining hops | 1 | initially `16`; transit decrements, drops at `1` |
| source peer | 32 | original endpoint public key |
| destination peer | 32 | final endpoint public key |
| flow id | 8 | big endian opaque stable hash supplied by the plugin |
| payload | remaining | end-to-end encrypted plugin bytes |
The fixed header is 74 bytes. Zero/oversized hop limits, unknown versions,
short frames, oversized datagrams and unknown sources are rejected. A frame
addressed here is delivered to its source's protocol inbox; transit goes straight
to its next transport. The network and protocol are bound to the authenticated
transport connection, not supplied by the frame. Intermediate nodes cannot
decrypt or authenticate the inner WireGuard payload; the destination does that.
Flow ids are routing hints, not authorization proofs.
Control ALPN 3 carries `Reachable { links: [{ peer, protocol }] }`. Each row
belongs to the authenticated sender and is replaced atomically, expires after
90 seconds, and is withdrawn on session closure. Only compatible authenticated
members enter a protocol's graph; local edges always come from actual links.
Announcements refresh on the existing control maintenance interval and are
sent immediately on link changes. Topology stays volatile, outside signed state.
Upgrade both endpoints and intermediate peers together. Older control and data
ALPNs cannot interoperate. The network secret, device identity, identity
derivation, transcript encoding and stored network configuration are unchanged.
Separate connections mean separate congestion control, so a saturated data
plane cannot delay control messages, and a data plane failure cannot take the
@@ -189,12 +215,19 @@ not affect other networks.
| message | meaning |
|---|---|
| `Announce { hostname, capabilities }` | this agent's hostname and IP-plugin capabilities |
| `Announce { hostname, capabilities, broadcast }` | this agent's hostname, IP-plugin capabilities and local broadcast participation |
| `Ping { seq, payload }` | small request used to verify the exchange |
| `Pong { seq, payload }` | the echoed reply |
| `State { records }` | a snapshot of signed records, merged into what the receiver holds |
| `Peers { peers }` | unverified member address hints, requiring their own handshake |
| `Reachable { links }` | sender's current direct data links, scoped by protocol |
| `Bye { reason }` | graceful goodbye; not a revocation of anything |
`broadcast` is a per-network local opt-in, enabled by default and treated as
false until an authenticated announcement arrives. It governs IP broadcast
fanout and local admission; encrypted transit still uses the existing envelope.
See [broadcast.md](broadcast.md) for scope and persistence.
A `State` snapshot is merged, never substituted: an author missing from it is
left untouched. Each record carries its own signature, so a peer forwarding
somebody else's record cannot alter it, and a record that fails verification
+90
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# Userspace mesh routing
```text
local OS → TUN → IP plugin (encrypt) → router → transport peer link
transport peer link → router → transport peer link (transit)
transport peer link → router → IP plugin (decrypt) → TUN → local OS
```
The TUN is the boundary of the local host. The kernel sees one overlay route;
it never forwards transit traffic. WireGuard encryption remains end to end.
The core router sees only an opaque payload and routing metadata. iroh is the
current transport adapter, with fragmentation below the routing envelope so
the default 1280-byte interface MTU also works on small QUIC paths.
## Graph and lifecycle
Each authenticated control session advertises that peer's own direct data
links, including the plugin protocol. Tables are separate for each network
and protocol; only members offering a matching enabled protocol version enter
the graph. A snapshot refreshes on the maintenance interval, expires after
90 seconds, and is withdrawn when the session ends. Link arrival, closure and
changed announcements rebuild routes immediately. Unchanged announcements
refresh their age without republishing the forwarding snapshot.
Breadth-first search computes the shortest directed paths and every equal-cost
first hop in sorted order. An actual direct link always wins. The first row is
always supplied by local transport state, never by a remote claim. Routes stop
at 16 links. A packet also carries a decreasing hop limit, bounding temporary
loops if different nodes have not yet received the same topology update.
The existing control plane still forms authenticated pairwise sessions.
Routing provides multihop **data** paths among these members; it does not add
control-plane flooding or carry control sessions through the data plane.
Announcements are volatile, not durable membership or availability guarantees.
## Packet path
The control loop binds next hops to transport handles in an immutable table
and publishes it through `ArcSwap`. Readers do not acquire the topology mutex.
The transit routine validates the fixed 74-byte envelope, looks up the source
and destination, selects a cached next hop, decrements one byte, and calls the
transport's synchronous datagram send. It never searches the graph, formats an
endpoint string, validates an Ed25519 key, decrypts, or touches TUN.
An exclusively owned receive buffer is reused when decrementing the hop limit.
Shared buffers require a copy through the safe `bytes` API. There is no added
transit queue or timer; every raw transport has its own reader. Readers yield
after 64 ready packets to avoid starving other runtime tasks. Local delivery
uses a bounded 256-datagram inbox and drops a new packet when full. Transport
queues and fragment reassembly retain their own limits.
`PacketLink::send_flow` accepts an opaque 64-bit flow identifier. IP plugins
derive it before encryption from source/destination addresses, protocol and
TCP/UDP ports. WireGuard keeps tags alongside its bounded pending queue, so
the first application packets retain their flow identity after a handshake.
Transit preserves the tag; it never hashes changing ciphertext. Handshake and
keepalive frames use flow zero. Fragmented IP traffic uses a coarse address/
protocol hash because later fragments lack ports; fragmented flows between
the same addresses coalesce. A transition between fragmented and unfragmented
traffic can change its path. The default overlay MTU avoids needing IP
fragmentation for ordinary host TCP traffic.
ECMP is deterministic for a source and flow while the table is unchanged.
Closed next hops are skipped until the control loop replaces the table. A
topology change can move a flow; datagrams remain unreliable and unordered,
and there is no promise to preserve order across a physical path failure.
Logical peer links and end-to-end encryption state survive these changes.
## Verification and measurement
The default offline suite exercises four real agents, iroh transports and
WireGuard tunnels with memory TUNs, plus graph/forwarder unit tests. It needs
neither administrative rights nor public relays/DHT.
Run the forwarding microbenchmark explicitly:
```sh
cargo test --release -p tsunagi --lib forwarding_benchmark -- --ignored --nocapture
```
It processes one million 64-byte frames and one million 1280-byte frames with
two equal next hops. Frame construction is outside the timed section; the
actual ingress routine, header validation, snapshot lookup, ECMP, TTL update,
buffer release and mock transport submission are inside. The mock transport
counts sends without storing frames. Results are CPU forwarding cost, **not**
end-to-end network latency or VPN throughput; encryption, fragmentation,
sockets, congestion and scheduling contribute separately.
Wire compatibility: control ALPN `tsunagi/ctrl/3`, data ALPN `tsunagi/data/4`.
Upgrade every participant together; saved identities and network state persist.
+34 -9
View File
@@ -63,15 +63,31 @@ intermediate peer. Fragment tests cover reordering, duplicates, loss, changing
fragment sizes, malformed input, timeout and memory bounds. These are packet
transport checks, not a claim to have run an SSH server or a host TCP stack.
`crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/relay.rs` has its own tests for the way
through a peer in the middle: the wrapping and what a malformed one does, a
direct path being preferred over a hop, the middle passing a datagram on
without being handed it, what arrives through somebody reaching the peer it
came from rather than the one that carried it, a link outliving the paths
under it, and the datagram size not changing when the path does.
`tests/wireguard.rs` proves it end to end — two agents that can each reach a
third and not each other, with a real WireGuard packet crossing through the
middle.
Routing tests cover shortest paths, direct preference, deterministic per-flow
ECMP, link loss, protocol isolation, malformed/unknown frames, bounded local
queues, zero-copy transit of an owned buffer, and deliberately inconsistent
tables whose loop terminates at the hop limit. A transit reader is exercised
without any plugin reader, so forwarding cannot accidentally depend on one.
WireGuard tests also cover flow tags queued before a handshake, queue overflow,
and their preservation through encryption.
`tests/wireguard.rs` includes a four-agent chain A—B—C—D with only adjacent data
links. Real encrypted 1280-byte TCP packets travel in both directions while the
middle TUNs remain empty. A direct A—D link is enabled, then removed; the route
switches back to the chain without replacing end-to-end tunnels.
Broadcast tests use limited and directed UDP game discovery packets over real
WireGuard tunnels, including a missing direct link. Each willing peer gets one
copy; disabling reception/origination works at runtime and unicast still works.
IP-router tests cover source/destination domain checks, malformed UDP and the
absence of reflection into outgoing fanout. SQLite migration tests preserve v3
identity/settings and check opt-out after reopen/rejoin. CLI tests cover default
on, per-network opt-out, runtime updates and conflicting flags. Actual games and
host adapter selection are not simulated by these tests.
The ignored `forwarding_benchmark` measures the synchronous transit routine in
release mode, excluding crypto and socket I/O. Run it explicitly as described
in [routing.md](routing.md); it has no timing threshold in the default suite.
Unit tests in `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` cover the signed record model directly: tampering
with any field breaks verification, a newer version wins while an older one
@@ -92,6 +108,11 @@ with no secret invents one, prints it in full and prints a line the other
side can paste unchanged; a bare name this device already knows resumes
that network instead of inventing another of the same name; and a network
can be stopped and started again with its secret and its place intact.
Network selection accepts exact names consistently across commands. Leave-by-name
is tested with a live agent and with offline state, preserving other networks;
duplicate and unknown names change nothing and full ids resolve ambiguity.
Selector unit tests cover case-sensitive names, Unicode/ellipsis names, copied
id prefixes and collisions between names and ids without revealing secrets.
`crates/tsunagi-cli/tests/dns_service.rs` runs the real binary: the resolver
comes up with no interface to attach it to, the listener is not rebuilt on
@@ -123,6 +144,10 @@ What the default suite does **not** cover is the real TUN interface, because
that needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. Everything above it does run.
Mainline discovery tests use an isolated loopback `mainline::Testnet`.
`tests/mainline_socket.rs` checks that idle UDP receive timeouts do not emit
warnings (including Windows error 10060) and that the same node still answers
a real KRPC ping afterwards. The local dependency correction is documented in
[`vendor/mainline/PATCHES.md`](../vendor/mainline/PATCHES.md).
`tests/mainline.rs` restores two agents after their DHT and disposable cache
have disappeared. `tests/discovery_lifecycle.rs` checks that publication
continues while connected, lookup resumes after isolation, and a hung backend
+1 -1
View File
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ QUIC DATAGRAM frames themselves cannot fragment.
Reassembly is bounded and expires incomplete packets; one lost fragment loses
one packet, without blocking unrelated traffic. The logical data payload limit
is 64 KiB, with the relay envelope subtracted before it reaches the plugin.
The new framing uses data ALPN `tsunagi/data/3`; both ends and intermediate
The new framing uses data ALPN `tsunagi/data/4`; both ends and intermediate
peers need the updated binary. Network identities and saved state do not change.
See [protocol.md](protocol.md#the-data-plane-protocol) for the wire format.
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# THIS FILE IS AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED BY CARGO
#
# When uploading crates to the registry Cargo will automatically
# "normalize" Cargo.toml files for maximal compatibility
# with all versions of Cargo and also rewrite `path` dependencies
# to registry (e.g., crates.io) dependencies.
#
# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml
# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable).
# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents.
[package]
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.85"
name = "mainline"
version = "8.0.0"
authors = [
"nuh.dev",
"SeverinAlexB <severin@synonym.to>",
"SHAcollision <shacollision@synonym.to>",
"dzdidi <denys@synonym.to>",
"Kevin Karsopawiro <kevin@synonym.to>",
]
build = false
exclude = [
"/docs/*",
"/examples/*",
]
autolib = false
autobins = false
autoexamples = false
autotests = false
autobenches = false
description = "Simple, robust, BitTorrent's Mainline DHT implementation"
homepage = "https://github.com/pubky/mainline"
readme = "README.md"
keywords = [
"bittorrent",
"torrent",
"dht",
"kademlia",
"mainline",
]
categories = ["network-programming"]
license = "MIT"
repository = "https://github.com/pubky/mainline"
[package.metadata.docs.rs]
all-features = true
[features]
async = [
"node",
"flume/async",
"dep:futures-lite",
]
default = ["full"]
full = ["async"]
node = ["dep:flume"]
[lib]
name = "mainline"
path = "src/lib.rs"
[dependencies.crc]
version = "3.4.0"
default-features = false
[dependencies.document-features]
version = "0.2.12"
[dependencies.dyn-clone]
version = "1.0.20"
default-features = false
[dependencies.ed25519-dalek]
version = "3.0.0-pre.1"
default-features = false
[dependencies.flume]
version = "0.12.0"
optional = true
default-features = false
[dependencies.futures-lite]
version = "2.6.1"
optional = true
default-features = false
[dependencies.getrandom]
version = "0.4"
default-features = false
[dependencies.lru]
version = "0.16.2"
default-features = false
[dependencies.serde]
version = "1.0.228"
features = ["derive"]
[dependencies.serde_bencode]
version = "0.2.4"
default-features = false
[dependencies.serde_bytes]
version = "0.11.19"
[dependencies.sha1_smol]
version = "1.0.1"
default-features = false
[dependencies.thiserror]
version = "2.0.18"
default-features = false
[dependencies.tracing]
version = "0.1.44"
[dev-dependencies.clap]
version = "4.5.57"
features = ["derive"]
[dev-dependencies.colored]
version = "3.1.1"
[dev-dependencies.ctrlc]
version = "3.5.1"
[dev-dependencies.dashmap]
version = "6.1"
[dev-dependencies.flume]
version = "0.12.0"
default-features = false
[dev-dependencies.futures]
version = "0.3.31"
[dev-dependencies.histo]
version = "1.0.0"
[dev-dependencies.rayon]
version = "1.11.0"
[dev-dependencies.tracing-subscriber]
version = "0.3"
+64
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@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
[package]
name = "mainline"
version = "8.0.0"
authors = [
"nuh.dev",
"SeverinAlexB <severin@synonym.to>",
"SHAcollision <shacollision@synonym.to>",
"dzdidi <denys@synonym.to>",
"Kevin Karsopawiro <kevin@synonym.to>"
]
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.85"
description = "Simple, robust, BitTorrent's Mainline DHT implementation"
homepage = "https://github.com/pubky/mainline"
license = "MIT"
keywords = ["bittorrent", "torrent", "dht", "kademlia", "mainline"]
categories = ["network-programming"]
repository = "https://github.com/pubky/mainline"
exclude = ["/docs/*", "/examples/*"]
[dependencies]
getrandom = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
serde_bencode = { version = "0.2.4", default-features = false }
serde = { version = "1.0.228", features = ["derive"] }
serde_bytes = "0.11.19"
thiserror = { version = "2.0.18", default-features = false }
crc = { version = "3.4.0", default-features = false }
sha1_smol = { version = "1.0.1", default-features = false }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.1", default-features = false }
tracing = "0.1.44"
lru = { version = "0.16.2", default-features = false }
dyn-clone = { version = "1.0.20", default-features = false }
document-features = "0.2.12"
# `node` dependencies
flume = { version = "0.12.0", default-features = false, optional = true }
# `async` dependencies
futures-lite = { version = "2.6.1", default-features = false, optional = true }
[dev-dependencies]
clap = { version = "4.5.57", features = ["derive"] }
futures = "0.3.31"
tracing-subscriber = "0.3"
ctrlc = "3.5.1"
histo = "1.0.0"
rayon = "1.11.0"
dashmap = "6.1"
flume = { version = "0.12.0", default-features = false }
colored = "3.1.1"
[features]
## Include [Dht] node.
node = ["dep:flume"]
## Enable [Dht::as_async()] to use [async_dht::AsyncDht].
async = ["node", "flume/async", "dep:futures-lite"]
full = ["async"]
default = ["full"]
[package.metadata.docs.rs]
all-features = true
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
MIT License
Copyright (c) 2021 raptorswing
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Mainline 8.0.0: Windows receive timeout correction
This directory contains the published `mainline` 8.0.0 sources, manifest and
MIT license. The workspace selects this copy through `[patch.crates-io]`.
- Upstream: https://github.com/pubky/mainline
- Published source commit: `b0cabe684f310004c6dcfe8099b91f0d239b11e3`
- Crates.io archive SHA-256:
`d32eaee3dcba6e0bbbefe8bd896a8bd6039d5e74b199c0fe248e9feb547c2a26`
- The upstream manifest is retained, including its development dependencies;
the crate is excluded from the application workspace.
The only source change is in `src/rpc/socket.rs`: `KrpcSocket::recv_from`
treats `ErrorKind::TimedOut` like `WouldBlock`. Its 50 ms socket read timeout
is a normal idle tick, not a failed DHT operation. Windows reports this as
WSAETIMEDOUT (10060), producing approximately 16 warnings per second with
the unmodified crate. Other receive errors still emit the original warning.
Request deadlines, DHT routing, publication and lookup behavior are unchanged.
Rust documents the platform difference here:
https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/net/struct.UdpSocket.html#method.set_read_timeout
Regression coverage is part of the regular workspace suite:
```sh
cargo test --locked -p tsunagi --test mainline_socket
```
It drives the actual DHT actor through idle receive ticks on loopback, checks
that no socket warnings were emitted, then exchanges a real KRPC ping. The
existing Mainline Testnet tests also cover publication, lookup and recovery.
No public DHT, privileged interface or changes to host settings are needed.
When upstream releases this correction, upgrade the dependency and remove
this directory, the patch entry and its workspace exclusion. Keep the
regression test. Do not patch Cargo's global registry cache.
+69
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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# Mainline
Simple, robust, BitTorrent's [Mainline](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainline_DHT) DHT implementation.
This library is focused on being the best and simplest Rust client for Mainline, especially focused on reliable and fast time-to-first-response.
It should work as a routing / storing node (server mode) as well, and has been running in production for many months without an issue.
However if you are concerned about spam or DoS, you should consider implementing [rate limiting](#rate-limiting).
**[API Docs](https://docs.rs/mainline/latest/mainline/)**
## Getting started
Check the [Examples](https://github.com/Pubky/mainline/tree/main/examples).
## Features
### Client
Running as a client, means you can store and query for values on the DHT, but not accept any incoming requests.
```rust
use mainline::Dht;
let dht = Dht::client().unwrap();
```
Supported BEPs:
- [x] [BEP_0005 DHT Protocol](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0005.html)
- [x] [BEP_0042 DHT Security extension](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html)
- [x] [BEP_0043 Read-only DHT Nodes](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0043.html)
- [x] [BEP_0044 Storing arbitrary data in the DHT](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0044.html)
This implementation also includes [measures against Vertical Sybil Attacks](./docs/sybil-resistance.md).
### Server
Running as a server is the same as a client, but you also respond to incoming requests and serve as a routing and storing node, supporting the general routing of the DHT, and contributing to the storage capacity of the DHT.
```rust
use mainline::Dht;
let dht = Dht::server().unwrap(); // or `Dht::builder::server_mode().build();`
```
Supported BEPs:
- [x] [BEP_0005 DHT Protocol](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0005.html)
- [x] [BEP_0042 DHT Security extension](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html)
- [x] [BEP_0043 Read-only DHT Nodes](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0043.html)
- [x] [BEP_0044 Storing arbitrary data in the DHT](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0044.html)
#### Rate limiting
The server implementation has no rate-limiting, you can run your own [request filter](./examples/request_filter.rs) and apply your custom rate-limiting.
However, that limit/block will only apply _after_ parsing incoming messages, and it won't affect handling incoming responses.
### Adaptive mode
The default Adaptive mode will start the node in client mode, and after 15 minutes of running with a publicly accessible address,
it will switch to server mode. This way nodes that can serve as routing nodes (accessible and less likely to churn), serve as such.
If you want to explicitly start in Server mode, because you know you are not running behind firewall,
you can call `Dht::builder().server_mode().build()`, and you can optionally add your known public ip so the node doesn't have to depend on,
votes from responding nodes: `Dht::builder().server_mode().public_ip().build()`.
## Acknowledgment
This implementation was possible thanks to [Webtorrent's Bittorrent-dht](https://github.com/webtorrent/bittorrent-dht) as a reference,
and [Rustydht-lib](https://github.com/raptorswing/rustydht-lib) that saved me a lot of time, especially at the serialization and deserialization of Bencode messages.
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//! Miscellaneous common structs used throughout the library.
mod id;
mod immutable;
pub mod messages;
mod mutable;
mod node;
mod routing_table;
pub use id::*;
pub use immutable::*;
pub use messages::*;
pub(crate) use mutable::most_recent_mutable_item;
pub use mutable::*;
pub use node::*;
pub use routing_table::*;
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//! Kademlia node Id or a lookup target
use crc::{Crc, CRC_32_ISCSI};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::convert::TryInto;
use std::{
fmt::{self, Debug, Display, Formatter},
net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr},
str::FromStr,
};
/// The size of node IDs in bits.
pub const ID_SIZE: usize = 20;
pub const MAX_DISTANCE: u8 = ID_SIZE as u8 * 8;
const IPV4_MASK: u32 = 0x030f3fff;
const CASTAGNOLI: Crc<u32> = Crc::<u32>::new(&CRC_32_ISCSI);
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// Kademlia node Id or a lookup target
pub struct Id([u8; ID_SIZE]);
impl Id {
/// Generate a random Id
pub fn random() -> Id {
let mut bytes: [u8; 20] = [0; 20];
getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).expect("getrandom");
Id(bytes)
}
/// Create a new Id from some bytes. Returns Err if the input is not 20 bytes long.
pub fn from_bytes<T: AsRef<[u8]>>(bytes: T) -> Result<Id, InvalidIdSize> {
let bytes = bytes.as_ref();
if bytes.len() != ID_SIZE {
return Err(InvalidIdSize(bytes.len()));
}
let mut tmp: [u8; ID_SIZE] = [0; ID_SIZE];
tmp[..ID_SIZE].clone_from_slice(&bytes[..ID_SIZE]);
Ok(Id(tmp))
}
/// Simplified XOR distance between this Id and a target Id.
///
/// The distance is the number of trailing non zero bits in the XOR result.
///
/// Distance to self is 0
/// Distance to the furthest Id is 160
/// Distance to an Id with 5 leading matching bits is 155
pub fn distance(&self, other: &Id) -> u8 {
MAX_DISTANCE - self.xor(other).leading_zeros()
}
/// Returns the number of leading zeros in the binary representation of `self`.
pub fn leading_zeros(&self) -> u8 {
for (i, byte) in self.0.iter().enumerate() {
if *byte != 0 {
// leading zeros so far + laedinge zeros of this byte
return (i as u32 * 8 + byte.leading_zeros()) as u8;
}
}
160
}
/// Performs bitwise XOR between two Ids
pub fn xor(&self, other: &Id) -> Id {
let mut result = [0_u8; 20];
for (i, (a, b)) in self.0.iter().zip(other.0).enumerate() {
result[i] = a ^ b;
}
result.into()
}
/// Returns a byte slice of this Id.
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 20] {
&self.0
}
/// Create a new Id according to [BEP_0042](http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html).
pub fn from_addr(addr: &SocketAddr) -> Id {
let ip = addr.ip();
Id::from_ip(ip)
}
/// Create a new Id from an Ipv4 address according to [BEP_0042](http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html).
pub fn from_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> Id {
match ip {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => Id::from_ipv4(addr),
IpAddr::V6(_addr) => unimplemented!("Ipv6 is not supported"),
}
}
/// Create a new Id from an Ipv4 address according to [BEP_0042](http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html).
pub fn from_ipv4(ipv4: Ipv4Addr) -> Id {
let mut bytes = [0_u8; 21];
getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).expect("getrandom");
from_ipv4_and_r(bytes[1..].try_into().expect("infallible"), ipv4, bytes[0])
}
/// Validate that this Id is valid with respect to [BEP_0042](http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0042.html).
pub fn is_valid_for_ip(&self, ipv4: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
if ipv4.is_private() || ipv4.is_link_local() || ipv4.is_loopback() {
return true;
}
let expected = first_21_bits(&id_prefix_ipv4(ipv4, self.0[ID_SIZE - 1]));
self.first_21_bits() == expected
}
pub(crate) fn first_21_bits(&self) -> [u8; 3] {
first_21_bits(&self.0)
}
}
fn first_21_bits(bytes: &[u8]) -> [u8; 3] {
[bytes[0], bytes[1], bytes[2] & 0xf8]
}
fn from_ipv4_and_r(bytes: [u8; 20], ip: Ipv4Addr, r: u8) -> Id {
let mut bytes = bytes;
let prefix = id_prefix_ipv4(ip, r);
// Set first 21 bits to the prefix
bytes[0] = prefix[0];
bytes[1] = prefix[1];
// set the first 5 bits of the 3rd byte to the remaining 5 bits of the prefix
bytes[2] = (prefix[2] & 0xf8) | (bytes[2] & 0x7);
// Set the last byte to the random r
bytes[ID_SIZE - 1] = r;
Id(bytes)
}
fn id_prefix_ipv4(ip: Ipv4Addr, r: u8) -> [u8; 3] {
let r32: u32 = r.into();
let ip_int: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(ip.octets());
let masked_ip: u32 = (ip_int & IPV4_MASK) | (r32 << 29);
let mut digest = CASTAGNOLI.digest();
digest.update(&masked_ip.to_be_bytes());
let crc = digest.finalize();
crc.to_be_bytes()[..3]
.try_into()
.expect("Failed to convert bytes 0-2 of the crc into a 3-byte array")
}
impl Display for Id {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
#[allow(clippy::format_collect)]
let hex_chars: String = self.0.iter().map(|byte| format!("{:02x}", byte)).collect();
write!(f, "{}", hex_chars)
}
}
impl From<[u8; ID_SIZE]> for Id {
fn from(bytes: [u8; ID_SIZE]) -> Id {
Id(bytes)
}
}
impl From<&[u8; ID_SIZE]> for Id {
fn from(bytes: &[u8; ID_SIZE]) -> Id {
Id(*bytes)
}
}
impl From<Id> for [u8; ID_SIZE] {
fn from(value: Id) -> Self {
value.0
}
}
impl FromStr for Id {
type Err = DecodeIdError;
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Id, DecodeIdError> {
if s.len() % 2 != 0 {
return Err(DecodeIdError::OddNumberOfCharacters);
}
let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(s.len() / 2);
for i in 0..s.len() / 2 {
let byte_str = &s[i * 2..(i * 2) + 2];
if let Ok(byte) = u8::from_str_radix(byte_str, 16) {
bytes.push(byte);
} else {
return Err(DecodeIdError::InvalidHexCharacter(byte_str.into()));
}
}
Ok(Id::from_bytes(bytes)?)
}
}
impl Debug for Id {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Id({})", self)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InvalidIdSize(usize);
impl std::error::Error for InvalidIdSize {}
impl std::fmt::Display for InvalidIdSize {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Invalid Id size, expected 20, got {0}", self.0)
}
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
/// Mainline crate error enum.
pub enum DecodeIdError {
/// Id is expected to by 20 bytes.
#[error(transparent)]
InvalidIdSize(#[from] InvalidIdSize),
#[error("Hex encoding should contain an even number of hex characters")]
/// Hex encoding should contain an even number of hex characters
OddNumberOfCharacters,
/// Invalid hex character
#[error("Invalid Id encoding: {0}")]
InvalidHexCharacter(String),
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn distance_to_self() {
let id = Id::random();
let distance = id.distance(&id);
assert_eq!(distance, 0)
}
#[test]
fn distance_to_id() {
let id = Id::from_str("0639A1E24FBB8AB277DF033476AB0DE10FAB3BDC").unwrap();
let target = Id::from_str("035b1aeb9737ade1a80933594f405d3f772aa08e").unwrap();
let distance = id.distance(&target);
assert_eq!(distance, 155)
}
#[test]
fn distance_to_random_id() {
let id = Id::random();
let target = Id::random();
let distance = id.distance(&target);
assert_ne!(distance, 0)
}
#[test]
fn distance_to_furthest() {
let id = Id::random();
let mut opposite = [0_u8; 20];
for (i, &value) in id.as_bytes().iter().enumerate() {
opposite[i] = value ^ 0xff;
}
let target = Id::from_bytes(opposite).unwrap();
let distance = id.distance(&target);
assert_eq!(distance, MAX_DISTANCE)
}
#[test]
fn from_u8_20() {
let bytes = [8; 20];
let id: Id = bytes.into();
assert_eq!(*id.as_bytes(), bytes);
}
#[test]
fn from_ipv4() {
let vectors = vec![
(Ipv4Addr::new(124, 31, 75, 21), 1, [0x5f, 0xbf, 0xbf]),
(Ipv4Addr::new(21, 75, 31, 124), 86, [0x5a, 0x3c, 0xe9]),
(Ipv4Addr::new(65, 23, 51, 170), 22, [0xa5, 0xd4, 0x32]),
(Ipv4Addr::new(84, 124, 73, 14), 65, [0x1b, 0x03, 0x21]),
(Ipv4Addr::new(43, 213, 53, 83), 90, [0xe5, 0x6f, 0x6c]),
];
for vector in vectors {
test(vector.0, vector.1, vector.2);
}
fn test(ip: Ipv4Addr, r: u8, expected_prefix: [u8; 3]) {
let id = Id::random();
let result = from_ipv4_and_r(*id.as_bytes(), ip, r);
let prefix = first_21_bits(result.as_bytes());
assert_eq!(prefix, first_21_bits(&expected_prefix));
assert_eq!(result.as_bytes()[ID_SIZE - 1], r);
}
}
#[test]
fn is_valid_for_ipv4() {
let valid_vectors = vec![
(
Ipv4Addr::new(124, 31, 75, 21),
"5fbfbff10c5d6a4ec8a88e4c6ab4c28b95eee401",
),
(
Ipv4Addr::new(21, 75, 31, 124),
"5a3ce9c14e7a08645677bbd1cfe7d8f956d53256",
),
(
Ipv4Addr::new(65, 23, 51, 170),
"a5d43220bc8f112a3d426c84764f8c2a1150e616",
),
(
Ipv4Addr::new(84, 124, 73, 14),
"1b0321dd1bb1fe518101ceef99462b947a01ff41",
),
(
Ipv4Addr::new(43, 213, 53, 83),
"e56f6cbf5b7c4be0237986d5243b87aa6d51305a",
),
];
for vector in valid_vectors {
test(vector.0, vector.1);
}
fn test(ip: Ipv4Addr, hex: &str) {
let id = Id::from_str(hex).unwrap();
assert!(id.is_valid_for_ip(ip));
}
}
}
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//! Helper functions for immutable items.
use sha1_smol::Sha1;
use super::ID_SIZE;
use crate::Id;
pub fn validate_immutable(v: &[u8], target: Id) -> bool {
hash_immutable(v) == *target.as_bytes()
}
pub fn hash_immutable(v: &[u8]) -> [u8; ID_SIZE] {
let mut encoded = Vec::with_capacity(v.len() + 3);
encoded.extend(format!("{}:", v.len()).bytes());
encoded.extend_from_slice(v);
let mut hasher = Sha1::new();
hasher.update(&encoded);
hasher.digest().bytes()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use super::*;
use std::str::FromStr;
#[test]
fn test_validate_immutable() {
let v = vec![
171, 118, 111, 111, 174, 109, 195, 32, 138, 140, 113, 176, 76, 135, 116, 132, 156, 126,
75, 173,
];
let target = Id::from_bytes([
2, 23, 113, 43, 67, 11, 185, 26, 26, 30, 204, 238, 204, 1, 13, 84, 52, 40, 86, 231,
])
.unwrap();
assert!(validate_immutable(&v, target));
assert!(!validate_immutable(&v[1..], target));
}
#[test]
fn test_hash_immutable() {
let v = b"From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free";
let target = Id::from_str("4238af8aff56cf6e0007d9d2003bf23d33eea7c3").unwrap();
assert_eq!(hash_immutable(v), *target.as_bytes());
}
}
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_bytes::ByteBuf;
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTMessage {
#[serde(rename = "t", with = "serde_bytes")]
// Only few messages received seems to not use exactly 2 bytes,
// and they don't seem to have a version.
pub transaction_id: [u8; 4],
#[serde(default)]
#[serde(rename = "v", with = "serde_bytes")]
pub version: Option<[u8; 4]>,
#[serde(flatten)]
pub variant: DHTMessageVariant,
#[serde(default)]
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
// Ipv6 is not supported anyways.
pub ip: Option<[u8; 6]>,
#[serde(default)]
#[serde(rename = "ro")]
pub read_only: Option<i32>,
}
impl DHTMessage {
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<DHTMessage, serde_bencode::Error> {
let obj = serde_bencode::from_bytes(bytes)?;
Ok(obj)
}
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, serde_bencode::Error> {
serde_bencode::to_bytes(self)
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
#[serde(tag = "y")]
pub enum DHTMessageVariant {
#[serde(rename = "q")]
Request(DHTRequestSpecific),
#[serde(rename = "r")]
Response(DHTResponseSpecific),
#[serde(rename = "e")]
Error(DHTErrorSpecific),
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
#[serde(tag = "q")]
pub enum DHTRequestSpecific {
#[serde(rename = "ping")]
Ping {
#[serde(rename = "a")]
arguments: DHTPingRequestArguments,
},
#[serde(rename = "find_node")]
FindNode {
#[serde(rename = "a")]
arguments: DHTFindNodeRequestArguments,
},
#[serde(rename = "get_peers")]
GetPeers {
#[serde(rename = "a")]
arguments: DHTGetPeersRequestArguments,
},
#[serde(rename = "announce_peer")]
AnnouncePeer {
#[serde(rename = "a")]
arguments: DHTAnnouncePeerRequestArguments,
},
#[serde(rename = "get")]
GetValue {
#[serde(rename = "a")]
arguments: DHTGetValueRequestArguments,
},
#[serde(rename = "put")]
PutValue {
#[serde(rename = "a")]
arguments: DHTPutValueRequestArguments,
},
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
#[serde(untagged)] // This means order matters! Order these from most to least detailed
pub enum DHTResponseSpecific {
GetMutable {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTGetMutableResponseArguments,
},
NoMoreRecentValue {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTNoMoreRecentValueResponseArguments,
},
GetImmutable {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTGetImmutableResponseArguments,
},
GetPeers {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTGetPeersResponseArguments,
},
NoValues {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTNoValuesResponseArguments,
},
FindNode {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTFindNodeResponseArguments,
},
Ping {
#[serde(rename = "r")]
arguments: DHTPingResponseArguments,
},
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTErrorSpecific {
#[serde(rename = "e")]
pub error_info: (i32, String),
}
// === PING ===
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTPingRequestArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTPingResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
}
// === FIND NODE ===
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTFindNodeRequestArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub target: [u8; 20],
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTFindNodeResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub nodes: Box<[u8]>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTNoValuesResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub nodes: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
}
// === Get Peers ===
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTGetPeersRequestArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub info_hash: [u8; 20],
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTGetPeersResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub nodes: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
// values are not optional, because if they are missing this missing
// we can just treat this as DHTNoValuesResponseArguments
pub values: Vec<ByteBuf>,
}
// === Announce Peer ===
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTAnnouncePeerRequestArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub info_hash: [u8; 20],
pub port: u16,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(default)]
pub implied_port: Option<u8>,
}
// === Get Value ===
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTGetValueRequestArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub target: [u8; 20],
#[serde(default)]
pub seq: Option<i64>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTGetImmutableResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub nodes: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub v: Box<[u8]>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTNoMoreRecentValueResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub nodes: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
pub seq: i64,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTGetMutableResponseArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub nodes: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub v: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub k: [u8; 32],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub sig: [u8; 64],
pub seq: i64,
}
// === Put Value ===
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DHTPutValueRequestArguments {
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub id: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub target: [u8; 20],
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub token: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
pub v: Box<[u8]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub k: Option<[u8; 32]>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub sig: Option<[u8; 64]>,
#[serde(default)]
pub seq: Option<i64>,
#[serde(default)]
pub cas: Option<i64>,
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
#[serde(default)]
pub salt: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
}
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//! Helper functions and structs for mutable items.
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha1_smol::Sha1;
use std::convert::TryFrom;
use crate::Id;
use super::PutMutableRequestArguments;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// [BEP_0044](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0044.html)'s Mutable item.
pub struct MutableItem {
/// hash of the key and optional salt
target: Id,
/// ed25519 public key
key: [u8; 32],
/// sequence number
pub(crate) seq: i64,
/// mutable value
pub(crate) value: Box<[u8]>,
/// ed25519 signature
#[serde(with = "serde_bytes")]
signature: [u8; 64],
/// Optional salt
salt: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
}
impl MutableItem {
/// Create a new mutable item from a signing key, value, sequence number and optional salt.
pub fn new(signer: SigningKey, value: &[u8], seq: i64, salt: Option<&[u8]>) -> Self {
let signable = encode_signable(seq, value, salt);
let signature = signer.sign(&signable);
Self::new_signed_unchecked(
signer.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
signature.into(),
value,
seq,
salt,
)
}
/// Return the target of a [MutableItem] by hashing its `public_key` and an optional `salt`
pub fn target_from_key(public_key: &[u8; 32], salt: Option<&[u8]>) -> Id {
let mut encoded = vec![];
encoded.extend(public_key);
if let Some(salt) = salt {
encoded.extend(salt);
}
let mut hasher = Sha1::new();
hasher.update(&encoded);
let bytes = hasher.digest().bytes();
bytes.into()
}
/// Create a new mutable item from an already signed value.
pub fn new_signed_unchecked(
key: [u8; 32],
signature: [u8; 64],
value: &[u8],
seq: i64,
salt: Option<&[u8]>,
) -> Self {
Self {
target: MutableItem::target_from_key(&key, salt),
key,
value: value.into(),
seq,
signature,
salt: salt.map(|s| s.into()),
}
}
pub(crate) fn from_dht_message(
target: Id,
key: &[u8],
v: Box<[u8]>,
seq: i64,
signature: &[u8],
salt: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
) -> Result<Self, MutableError> {
let key = VerifyingKey::try_from(key).map_err(|_| MutableError::InvalidMutablePublicKey)?;
let signature =
Signature::from_slice(signature).map_err(|_| MutableError::InvalidMutableSignature)?;
key.verify(&encode_signable(seq, &v, salt.as_deref()), &signature)
.map_err(|_| MutableError::InvalidMutableSignature)?;
if Self::target_from_key(&key.to_bytes(), salt.as_deref()) != target {
return Err(MutableError::InvalidMutableTarget);
}
Ok(Self {
target,
key: key.to_bytes(),
value: v,
seq,
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
salt,
})
}
// === Getters ===
/// Returns the target (info hash) of this item.
pub fn target(&self) -> &Id {
&self.target
}
/// Returns a reference to the 32 bytes Ed25519 public key of this item.
pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.key
}
/// Returns a byte slice of the value of this item.
pub fn value(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.value
}
/// Returns the `seq` (sequence) number of this item.
pub fn seq(&self) -> i64 {
self.seq
}
/// Returns the signature over this item.
pub fn signature(&self) -> &[u8; 64] {
&self.signature
}
/// Returns the `Salt` value used for generating the
/// [Self::target] if any.
pub fn salt(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
self.salt.as_deref()
}
}
pub fn encode_signable(seq: i64, value: &[u8], salt: Option<&[u8]>) -> Box<[u8]> {
let mut signable = vec![];
if let Some(salt) = salt {
signable.extend(format!("4:salt{}:", salt.len()).into_bytes());
signable.extend(salt);
}
signable.extend(format!("3:seqi{}e1:v{}:", seq, value.len()).into_bytes());
signable.extend(value);
signable.into()
}
pub(crate) fn most_recent_mutable_item(
most_recent: Option<MutableItem>,
item: MutableItem,
) -> Option<MutableItem> {
match most_recent {
Some(mr)
if mr.seq() > item.seq() || (mr.seq() == item.seq() && mr.value() >= item.value()) =>
{
Some(mr)
}
_ => Some(item),
}
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
/// Mainline crate error enum.
pub enum MutableError {
#[error("Invalid mutable item signature")]
/// Invalid mutable item signature
InvalidMutableSignature,
#[error("Invalid mutable item public key")]
/// Invalid mutable item public key
InvalidMutablePublicKey,
#[error("Mutable item target does not match its public key and salt")]
/// Mutable item target does not match its public key and salt
InvalidMutableTarget,
}
impl PutMutableRequestArguments {
/// Create a [PutMutableRequestArguments] from a [MutableItem],
/// and an optional CAS condition, which is usually the [MutableItem::seq]
/// of the most recent known [MutableItem]
pub fn from(item: MutableItem, cas: Option<i64>) -> Self {
Self {
target: item.target,
v: item.value,
k: item.key,
seq: item.seq,
sig: item.signature,
salt: item.salt,
cas,
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
#[test]
fn signable_without_salt() {
let signable = encode_signable(4, b"Hello world!", None);
assert_eq!(&*signable, b"3:seqi4e1:v12:Hello world!");
}
#[test]
fn signable_with_salt() {
let signable = encode_signable(4, b"Hello world!", Some(b"foobar"));
assert_eq!(&*signable, b"4:salt6:foobar3:seqi4e1:v12:Hello world!");
}
#[test]
fn most_recent_mutable_item_selects_by_seq_then_value() {
let signer = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[
56, 171, 62, 85, 105, 58, 155, 209, 189, 8, 59, 109, 137, 84, 84, 201, 221, 115, 7,
228, 127, 70, 4, 204, 182, 64, 77, 98, 92, 215, 27, 103,
]);
let lower_seq = MutableItem::new(signer.clone(), b"lower-seq", 999, None);
let current = MutableItem::new(signer.clone(), b"current1", 1000, None);
let higher_seq = MutableItem::new(signer.clone(), b"higher-seq", 1001, None);
let same_seq_lower_value = MutableItem::new(signer.clone(), b"current0", 1000, None);
let same_seq_higher_value = MutableItem::new(signer, b"current2", 1000, None);
assert_eq!(
most_recent_mutable_item(None, current.clone()),
Some(current.clone())
);
assert_eq!(
most_recent_mutable_item(Some(current.clone()), higher_seq.clone()),
Some(higher_seq)
);
assert_eq!(
most_recent_mutable_item(Some(current.clone()), lower_seq),
Some(current.clone())
);
assert_eq!(
most_recent_mutable_item(Some(current.clone()), same_seq_higher_value.clone()),
Some(same_seq_higher_value)
);
assert_eq!(
most_recent_mutable_item(Some(current.clone()), same_seq_lower_value),
Some(current.clone())
);
assert_eq!(
most_recent_mutable_item(Some(current.clone()), current.clone()),
Some(current)
);
}
#[test]
fn from_dht_message_rejects_a_signed_item_for_a_different_target() {
let signer = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[42; 32]);
let item = MutableItem::new(signer, b"value", 1, Some(b"salt"));
let mut wrong_target = *item.target().as_bytes();
wrong_target[0] ^= 1;
let result = MutableItem::from_dht_message(
wrong_target.into(),
item.key(),
item.value().into(),
item.seq(),
item.signature(),
item.salt().map(Into::into),
);
assert!(matches!(result, Err(MutableError::InvalidMutableTarget)));
}
}
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