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Author SHA1 Message Date
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 94318e7c16 Keep tray device metrics on one line
The device table sized handshake/RTT and packet columns from fixed samples.
Its own header exceeded the handshake sample, and six-digit counters wrapped
at the slash, making device and total rows taller and misaligning the plots.
Measure actual headers, displayed values and totals before drawing, retain
the widest values across frames, and disable wrapping inside table cells.
When a column grows, request a second egui layout pass so the grid's cached
positions settle before larger text is painted over the next column.
Keep the plot as the stretch column and horizontal scrolling for narrow
windows. This changes only tray presentation.

A headless rendering regression checks the actual text shapes for the
header, handshake age/control RTT, per-device packet counts and totals as
counts grow past five digits, reach billions, shrink again, and the table
gets a narrower container. It checks one-line text and non-overlap with the
next column; it failed on the original wrapped header. Existing resize and
long-relay tests remain in place.

Checks on Linux in nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, with inherited
  TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET unset so tests use their temporary sockets
- git diff --cached --check

The suite's root/internet-dependent tests remain ignored. No native GUI
session or checks on macOS/Windows were run; rendering was checked through
egui's headless output. No installed tray binary was replaced.
2026-10-14 23:37:38 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 2b0c938487 Bound iroh path retries to prevent multi-connection OOM
A long-running rc.33 daemon reached OOM with roughly 22 GiB resident and
24 GiB swapped. Live inspection found 40 GiB and 10/20 GiB anonymous
container mappings; the active worker stack and tracing metadata identified
iroh's scheduled path-open retry loop. In iroh 1.2.0 every failed connection
requeues the same path, while each retry visits every connection again.
Separate control and data connections multiply the queue geometrically.

Vendor the published iroh 1.2.0 source and select it with a workspace Cargo
patch. Deduplicate retry admission and cap distinct pending paths at 64,
evicting the oldest before inserting a new candidate. Keep the current and
next retry batches bounded without combining control/data connections or
changing wire protocols, identity derivation, authentication or state.
Document source provenance, the live evidence and removal conditions.
Upstream PR 4551 merged on October 6, but inspection of the official 1.3.0
crate still shows the unconditional enqueue, so that upgrade alone is not
a fix. No version bump, release tag or installed-service change.

The default workspace suite includes the exact vendored admission module.
Three regressions failed with the original enqueue and pass with the fix:
repeated failures across connections, duplicate admission at capacity, and
10,000 distinct candidates with bounded length/capacity and FIFO eviction.
Transport integration tests continue using real endpoints and encryption.

Checks on Linux in nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, with only the inherited
  TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET removed from the test environment
- git diff --cached --check

Initial full-suite runs failed six DNS readiness checks because the inherited
system socket path overrode their temporary state directories. Clearing that
environment variable resolves those failures without changing application code.
Root/network-dependent ignored tests and other operating systems were not run.
2026-10-14 23:28:53 +01:00
Ultradesu 4e235cbac6 Keep device data paths on one line
The tray used a fixed sample for the data-path column, so longer relay names wrapped and made device rows uneven. Measure each rendered path and retain the widest value, then render path labels without wrapping. Replace direct/via words with embedded Phosphor route icons while preserving transport, relay name, hop count and explanatory tooltips. The app already ships the font; keep its setup in one function and verify registration alongside a long-relay-width regression test. No wire or stored-state changes. Checks: cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings; cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets.
2026-10-14 13:50:05 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 2631eb6975 Protect Linux exit-node connections and tidy the device table
Using an exit node could destroy direct peer connections: the agent's UID
bypass protected outbound routing, but reverse-path checks look up replies
without that UID and selected the overlay default. A real-host A/B check
confirmed that relaxing only strict reverse-path filtering restored direct
connections and exit HTTP traffic; the diagnostic host changes were removed.

Keep strict filtering and protect the Linux underlay with a dedicated masked
mark bit, 0x40000000. Mark the dedicated service UID in OUTPUT, save only that
bit in conntrack and restore it before PREROUTING reverse-path checks. Install
IPv4/IPv6 mark and UID main-table bypass rules before Tailscale's priorities;
leave application-specific and exit-default routing after them. Preserve
foreign mark bits, main-table routes and foreign firewall/policy rules.

Protect the first inbound TCP/UDP packet using bounded, locally owned socket
addresses/ports from /proc and an actual socket match. Refresh socket protection
before sending private transport negotiations and on discovery ticks, without
firewall writes for an unchanged socket set. Remote announcements never become
OS arguments. A failed refresh leaves active exit routing in place. Install
protection before routes, remove routes before protection, roll back partial
activation, and remove only exact interface tags, including legacy UID rules.

Reject strict kernel rp_filter without src_valid_mark with an actionable error;
never weaken filtering or change host sysctls. Document mark-aware Netfilter
requirements and provide the trusted ip6tables path in the NixOS module.
Other platforms retain their existing exit implementation. Peer wire formats,
identity derivation, local IPC and persistent storage are unchanged.

Make the tray devices grid fill and shrink with the window, constrain the first
cell and give remaining width to traffic plots. Keep displayed end-to-end
protocol and its short encryption tooltip consistent, independent of carrier
protocol. Move handshake/session age into its own column beside the existing
iroh control RTT. Use stable per-device hover identities and concise tooltips;
missing protocols/measurements remain explicit rather than invented.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets: 529 passed, 3 ignored;
  inherited TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET and TSUNAGI_CONTROL_GROUP were unset
- explicit privileged kernel regression: 1 passed, using disposable namespaces,
  real TCP/UDP IPv4/IPv6, strict kernel and Netfilter RPF, first inbound packets,
  dynamic UDP binding, application exit routing/IPv6 blocking, repeated apply
  and exact cleanup with foreign Tailscale-priority rules retained
- headless egui grid/scroll-area rendering at multiple sizes and control RTT,
  mark masks/order, passive socket parsing, partial failure and cleanup tests
- git diff --check

Earlier iterations caught rtnetlink family API and nonexhaustive initializer
errors, Clippy warnings, egui's implicit minimum column width, and kernel-test
fixture issues (wildcard echo source, blocked IPv6 neighbour discovery and a
closed child stdout pipe). Corrected before final checks; the stdout-only test
fix was checked with fmt, Clippy and the explicit kernel regression afterward.
Native tray rendering and macOS/Windows checks were not run. The running host
agent was not replaced or restarted. Requested release tag: v0.1.0-rc.32.
2026-10-14 10:40:30 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 90ef5cefec Retire offline node claims with equal network-wide cleanup rights
Offline devices reserved names and IPv4 addresses indefinitely, leaving stale
members in the device history. Give every authenticated network participant
the same right to retire another device's observed signed claim without an
owner, quorum, permanent identity ban or secret change.

Add a separately signed retirement containing the target's original signed
claim as proof. Verify both signatures and network scopes, retain the strongest
proved cutoff per target with deterministic ties, and suppress claim versions
at or below it in membership, hostname ownership and IPv4 allocation. Keep the
old signed records and range agreement, and retain markers after a newer claim
returns so old replicas cannot resurrect obsolete reservations. A returning
device signs a newer claim, allocates against current holders and resets its
previous hostname priority rather than taking a reused name with an old time.

Commit local retirement and the requester's author counter atomically before
announcing it; receivers persist proofs before applying them. Bound history to
1024 targets by default, reject additional targets without evicting protection,
and treat corrupt or over-limit mandatory storage as an explicit error. Repeat
bounded marker batches with a per-session rotating cursor so queue pressure
cannot indefinitely starve later markers. Exclude retired claims and cached
hints from history-derived discovery without preventing a fresh authenticated
device from returning.

Expose Agent::forget_node through the shared local control API. CLI command
tsng network forget-node accepts exact network names, full ids or unique id
prefixes, and exact node hostnames, ids, prefixes or overlay IPv4 addresses.
Ambiguous selections change nothing. Recheck the observed version and refuse
self, online nodes, the selected exit node and absent or changed claims.
Add Forget with an identity confirmation to offline tray device rows. Widen
Show devices to 1440x640 with an 800x400 minimum to fit its contents.

Control ALPN/version advances to tsunagi/ctrl/7 and local IPC to 21; upgrade
all peers and restart the agent with matching CLI/tray clients. Data ALPN 5,
network identity derivation, handshake encoding and existing record signing
bytes remain unchanged. SQLite schema 9 adds retirement storage while retaining
identity, secrets, settings and signed claims. Document behavior and limits.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets: 519 passed, 2 existing ignored
  tests; inherited TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET and TSUNAGI_CONTROL_GROUP were unset
- git diff --check and the built CLI forget-node help

Tests use real iroh authentication and SQLite. Cover restart, stale-replica
recovery, equal rights and network isolation, hostname reuse and return, twelve
marker batches through a two-message queue, malformed signatures and proofs,
invented future cutoffs, deterministic merge, capacity, migration and injected
counter-write rollback, selectors and cleanup through two real CLI processes.
Earlier iterations caught a private test API, a collapsible tray conditional
and a crash-based CLI test waiting for QUIC's idle timeout; corrected before
the final successful suite. Manual tray rendering, macOS/Windows, privileged
TUNs and public-network traversal were not run. The requested RC tag is
v0.1.0-rc.31; no push was requested.
2026-10-12 18:04:29 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 13bdcaf98d Render protocol priority buttons with Phosphor icons
The tray protocol selection used ordinary Unicode up/down arrows for its
priority buttons. The default UI fonts lack these glyphs, so both buttons
rendered missing-glyph boxes. Use the regular Phosphor ARROW_UP and ARROW_DOWN
icons already installed in the application's proportional font fallback.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, with inherited control socket
  and group overrides removed: 509 passed, 2 existing ignored tests

No new tests were added for the two glyph substitutions. Manual tray rendering
and macOS/Windows checks were not performed. No release tag was requested for
this fix.
2026-10-12 17:19:53 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov d941cdac7a Change network protocol selections at runtime
Protocol selection previously belonged to tsng up and therefore to the
service command line. A blocked or degraded carrier could only be removed
by editing the service and restarting the whole agent. Make the ordered
selection a local per-network setting instead.

Add Agent::set_protocols and a local control request shared by CLI and tray.
Keep tsng protocols without arguments as the protocol catalog; naming a
network shows its selection and supplying a comma-separated list replaces
it. Accept exact names, full ids and unique prefixes using shared selector
rules; ambiguous selectors and invalid lists change nothing. An explicit
none selects control-only operation. Offline edits take the directory lock
and apply on the next start; live edits never write behind the daemon.

Register every built-in plugin and transport in the CLI. Treat up --protocol
as ordered initial defaults for networks without an override, allowing a
protocol absent from the unit to be enabled later. Retain the targeting of
unqualified startup options and allow explicitly scoped options to configure
initially disabled protocols. Persist NULL for inherited preferences and an
empty selection distinctly in SQLite schema 8; migration preserves existing
identities, secrets, signed records and counters.

Serialize changes with network lifecycle operations and commit preferences
before applying or announcing them. Retire only the affected network's data
links and E2E channels, cancel pending opens, and reject obsolete completion
results by attempt id. Clear peer data channels when authenticated protocol
capabilities change while retaining control sessions and topology. Replay
allocations and peer identities after asynchronously prepared plugins become
ready. A control-only start defers creation of the agent's single interface
until data is enabled; plugins receive a sink that can use it later. Automatic
carrier fallback continues to preserve E2E state; explicit policy changes
renegotiate it. Identity derivation and peer wire formats are unchanged.

Add a collapsible protocols row to each tray network tile, with a catalog
provided by the daemon, descriptions, immediately applied checkboxes and
preference-order buttons. Keep editing disabled until the worker refreshes
status so a second click cannot overwrite an edit using a stale snapshot.
Local IPC wire version is 20 for the new request and report fields; upgrade
and restart agent, CLI and tray together. Crate release versions remain unchanged; the requested RC tag is v0.1.0-rc.30.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets: 509 passed, 2 existing ignored
  tests, with inherited TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET and TSUNAGI_CONTROL_GROUP removed

Tests use real iroh membership, SQLite, UDP, AWG and WireGuard encryption,
QUIC carriers and memory TUNs. Cover either endpoint-id role, full-size packet
delivery after switching, an unaffected second active network, saved selection
after restart, empty/invalid selections, first enablement without restart,
rapid changes racing old opens, live and offline CLI changes, startup-absent
protocols and preservation of signed state through migration. Earlier compile
and focused-test iterations caught initializer mistakes, a short test secret,
asynchronous plugin allocation readiness, and an inherited system socket
path; corrected before the successful final checks. Plain cargo was unavailable
in the host shell, so validation used the Nix toolchain. Manual tray interaction,
macOS/Windows, privileged host TUNs and public-network traversal were not run.
2026-10-12 16:19:18 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov e701986a39 Add ephemeral pairwise Amnezia transport and runtime fallback
Plain WG and QUIC can be blocked or severely degraded while the iroh control
connection still works. Add an awg carrier with one independent UDP socket,
WireGuard engine and randomized masking profile per network/peer attempt.
The smaller endpoint id negotiates fresh outer keys, PSK, header protection,
header ranges, padding and signature templates through private authenticated
control messages. Restart or fallback reentry generates a new profile;
ordinary rekeying preserves the current profile. No pair parameters enter
signed state, capabilities, persistent storage or public message events.
Private payloads and serialized control buffers redact and zeroize themselves.

Adapt the bounded packet masking engine from RunaRoo/AmneziaWG-RS at commit
51579a7d6e8882d1d8d6d00822f09e18a9423b73, retaining its Apache license and
provenance. Declare WTFPL AND Apache-2.0 in package metadata to cover both
new glue and the adapted source. Reuse boringtun instead of upstream's Node/global executors and
interface machinery. This is Tsunagi AWG wire version 1, with standard WG
headers restored before authentication; external Amnezia server compatibility
is not implemented. DNS/SIP signature generators vary fields instead of
replaying captures. Each attempt closes independently, bounds allocation,
queues, candidates and fragment assemblies, and supports the full 64 KiB
carrier contract using UDP packets at most 1200 bytes. Yield between fragment
batches so large messages do not starve local socket readers.

Keep carrier encryption separate from end-to-end tunnels so multihop relays
still forward opaque ciphertext. The system owns the sole interface, signed
addresses and admission. Plugins receive neither network secrets nor paths.
Expose a bounded opaque control sender at the transport boundary; core control
messages remain outside protocol crates. Optional STUN on the pair's actual
socket adds IPv4 public candidates in CLI direct/relay mode, with a finite
query deadline and an off/alternate-server option. Local mode remains offline.
Symmetric NAT, IPv6-only paths and arbitrary UDP blocking can still require
fallback; no AWG-over-QUIC or hidden AWG relay is introduced.

Default carrier order is wg, awg, wg-quic, tcp-tls. Advance the fallback cycle
after setup failures and sustained runtime loss, even after earlier cooldowns
expire. Authenticated delivery probes traverse the actual encrypted tunnel,
fit the interface MTU and never enter the TUN. Retire after a 20-second warmup
and at least 60% loss over at least 15 completed recent observations. Preserve
logical tunnels and control sessions while explicitly closing physical links,
including TCP reader/writer tasks. Retain the newest private probe settings
across independently queued control negotiation and inbound installation.
CLI/tray reports keep end-to-end protocol and actual carrier separate.

Control ALPN/version becomes tsunagi/ctrl/6 for the new private message;
upgrade all members together. Data ALPN/envelopes remain version 5. Network
identity derivation, transcript encoding, device identities, signed records,
saved network configuration and release versions are unchanged.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, with the inherited
  TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET override removed: 504 passed, 2 pre-existing ignored

Tests use real iroh membership, SQLite, UDP sockets and WireGuard encryption
with memory TUNs. Cover three independent pairs, full-size IP and carrier
frames, restart freshness/socket release, 80% carrier datagram loss, fallback
to real iroh, fresh retries with working delivery checks, unequal small MTUs,
malformed negotiations/profiles, role and resource bounds, probe forgery and
STUN parsing. Earlier compile/lint iterations and focused tests caught RNG
API/initializer mistakes, a retry assertion racing path installation, and a
large-fragment burst overflowing loopback buffers; corrected before these
successful checks. Normalized upstream license line endings for diff checks.
Public NAT/STUN connectivity, actual DPI effectiveness, WAN performance,
per-pair memory measurement, macOS/Windows, privileged TUN operations and
manual tray interaction were not exercised.
2026-10-11 13:52:10 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov ed28e86748 Derive default network ranges and switch overlapping networks
Every first network previously proposed 10.13.37.0/24. Independently created
networks therefore collided when a device joined more than one of them.
Use the existing stable NetworkId-derived /24 in 10/8 for every new network,
independent of activation order or peer availability. Legacy and explicit
signed ranges outrank the derived default; remaining range disagreements
still use author-id ordering. The derivation, identity labels, handshake and
signed record encoding stay unchanged. There is no creator, timestamp or vote.

Reserve ranges before starting network actors and serialise start, stop and
switching through the agent lifecycle lock. Refuse equal or nested overlaps
without changing a network's subnet locally. A late authenticated range that
collides suspends only its network before updating plugins or the interface.
Coalesced watch notifications let the agent clean up outside the network actor
and reconsider suspended networks when ranges change.

An explicit switch stops every blocker before activating the chosen network.
Suspended networks retain their startup request and resume whenever their
ranges become free, including switching from a wide range to a narrow one.
A manual stop cancels that request even for an already suspended network.
Persist preference order and enabling together in an SQLite transaction so
the user's selection survives restart; no database schema migration is needed.

CLI status and network listing show blocker names, ids, ranges and the start
command. Network start switches explicitly and reports suspended networks;
joining an overlapping network reports it as configured but inactive. The
tray adds conflict details, an amber icon, Switch to this network and Keep
stopped actions. Local IPC wire version is 19 for the extended reports, so
restart the agent and tray together. Release versions and peer wire formats
are unchanged. Update the user documentation and compatibility tests.

Validation on Linux through nix develop:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets with TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET
  removed from the test environment: 486 passed, 2 pre-existing ignored tests
- final focused range_conflicts integration suite after making discovery
  fixtures deterministic: 6 passed

Earlier validation attempts caught outdated diagnostic assertions, a new
test helper scope error, and the inherited system control socket override.
Those were corrected before the successful runs. Plain cargo was unavailable
in the host shell, so validation used the Nix development toolchain. macOS,
Windows, privileged host TUN operations and manual tray interaction were not
exercised.
2026-10-11 11:58:27 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 781e359775 Make tunnel and transport layers explicit in status
The tray called the end-to-end tunnel proto and the current route link, then put the tunnel handshake age beside the route. A valid wg tunnel over a tcp-tls transport consequently looked like contradictory state. The terminal status used similarly terse wording.\n\nThe tray now separates end-to-end from data path, renders direct paths as direct over TRANSPORT, keeps handshake or uptime beside the tunnel, and explains both layers in hover text. Terminal status uses the same end-to-end tunnel, data path, transport detail, and control path vocabulary. Routing, protocol selection, IPC, and wire behavior are unchanged.\n\nPresentation tests cover wg over tcp-tls, tcp-tls uptime, relayed and missing paths, a missing handshake, and offline devices. The WireGuard broadcast checksum test uses the current slice-array iterator spelling required by Clippy; its behavior is unchanged.\n\nChecks: cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings; cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets with TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET removed from the test environment so integration agents use their temporary control sockets. All passed on Linux.
2026-10-08 16:03:20 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov d5e02ec256 fixed gitignore 2026-10-08 15:35:38 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude 97377e3703 Relay across any mix of links, one online answer for every client, first claim owns a hostname
A tunnel no longer depends on the kind of link under it. The relay hub keeps
one forwarding table per network instead of one per protocol, the envelope
names the end-to-end protocol, and a neighbour reached over several kinds of
transport is sent to over the best open one. A member in the middle needs no
protocol in common with either end. Which protocol a pair runs is settled by
the lower endpoint id's announced order, so both ends agree without asking.
A direct link that comes up later is shorter than the path through others, so
traffic moves to it with the same logical link.

The agent now answers "is it online" once: a live control session or any data
path. Members and peers report how they are reached (direct over a named
transport, relayed through a named member, or no data path yet), and `tsng
status` and the tray both read that instead of a session list and a WireGuard
handshake respectively.

A hostname belongs to whoever claimed it first. A claim carries the time its
author first claimed the name, signed with the record, and replicas order by
(time, id) so every member names the same holder. A later claimant keeps
working by address, is not found by the name, and is told so in its status,
`tsng status`, the tray and a HostnameTaken event.

Wire change: control and data ALPN 5, control PROTOCOL_VERSION 5, envelope
version 2, signing domain v3, state schema 7, local control protocol 18.
Upgrade every member together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 11:39:33 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude c184ef0914 Rewrite README as a short project front page; add a Nix flake
The README is now a landing page: the idea (a mesh VPN with no server, joined
with a network name and a secret), install and platform tables, exit nodes,
and a short build section. Implementation detail stays in docs/.

The flake builds tsng and the tray from source and ships a NixOS module
(services.tsunagi). Dist install notes now show the real `join -n -s` syntax,
and two links that pointed into the old README are redirected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 17:47:44 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude e6ec62bcba Windows installer: find the Wintun licence at the archive root
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 14:38:16 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Sonnet 5.5 21328bf818 Windows installer: agent service, Wintun, tray and PATH in one setup program
Running on Windows needed wintun.dll by hand, an elevated console and a
manually started agent; without the DLL the agent silently ran with no
interface (and so no exit node or routing at all).

`tsng service` (hidden) runs the same `up` under the Windows service manager:
src/winservice.rs registers with the SCM through the windows-service crate,
reports Running/StopPending/Stopped, and maps a stop request onto the existing
shutdown path (stop_signal). The only unsafe is the extern "system" entry point
that define_windows_service! expands to, allowed in that module alone. A
service has no console, so it logs to %ProgramData%\Tsunagi\logs\tsng.log
(one older file kept past 8 MiB). Its state defaults to
%ProgramData%\Tsunagi\{data,cache} and its control socket to the system-wide
default every client already uses, so an unelevated `tsng status` and the tray
find it.

dist/windows/tsunagi.iss (Inno Setup) installs tsng.exe, the tray and Wintun
0.14.1 (pinned by SHA-256 in CI, licence text shipped), registers the
"Tsunagi" service as LocalSystem with auto start and restart-on-failure, locks
the data/cache/log directories to SYSTEM and Administrators by SID, and by
tasks adds tsng to the PATH, an inbound firewall rule for the agent and a tray
autostart. It stops the service, the tray and any hand-started agent before
replacing files; uninstall removes the service, rule and PATH entry and asks
before deleting the data (never on a silent uninstall). The release workflows
(GitHub and Gitea) build it on the Windows job and publish
tsunagi-setup-<version>-x86_64.exe.

.cargo/config.toml links the MSVC C runtime statically so nothing needs a
Visual C++ redistributable on a clean machine.

Compatibility: an agent run by hand keeps its data in the user profile; the
service has its own, so networks must be joined again once.

Checks: cargo fmt --check, clippy -D warnings, cargo test --workspace passed on
macOS (one unrelated wireguard restart test failed once under load and passed
on three reruns). winservice.rs was cargo-checked for x86_64-pc-windows-msvc in
a scratch crate; the whole tsunagi crate cannot be built for Windows from
macOS (aws-lc needs the Windows SDK). The .iss script and the CI step were NOT
compiled or run: no Inno Setup or Windows here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 14:16:05 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Sonnet 5.5 7c176e0b74 Exit nodes on Windows: use a member as exit node via destination bypass routes
Choosing an exit node on Windows did nothing: the using side was refused,
because Windows has no per-user routing and the agent's own traffic would loop
into the tunnel it carries.

Now the overlay interface gets 0.0.0.0/1 and 128.0.0.0/1 routes (and ::/1,
8000::/1 as an IPv6 blackhole), and every underlay address the agent talks to
directly gets a /32 route through the physical default gateway, marked with
route metric 7373 so stale ones are found and removed. Bypass routes are
written before the halves and removed after them; a failed step removes what
was written. All routes are in the active store.

The addresses come from the runtime: each network runtime hands the interface
the verified direct IPv4 paths of its control connections and the relay hosts
in use (Interface::set_underlay, refreshed every dial round); relay names are
resolved when the rules are applied. ExitHostRules::needs_bypass (true only on
Windows) gates it, so Linux and macOS plans never carry or re-apply on path
changes. ExitHostPlan gains `bypass` and `bypass_hosts`; networks leaving
forget their entry.

Limits: a path that appears after the last apply goes through the tunnel until
the next apply; data-plane-only addresses are not collected separately (the
data links ride the same iroh paths). Nothing was run on Windows.

Checks: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets
-D warnings and cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed on macOS;
scripts and ordering are unit-tested with an injected runner and resolver, and
Interface::set_underlay with the mock host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 13:43:01 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Sonnet 5.5 637915600e Exit nodes on Windows: offer through WinNAT; using is refused
Windows reported exit nodes as unsupported. The offering side now creates one
WinNAT object per offered range (New-NetNat, named tsunagi-exit:<if>:<range>),
prunes this interface's stale ones, reads (never writes) IPv4 forwarding of
the overlay interface, and removes everything on clear. All values are
single-quoted PowerShell literals.

The using side is deliberately not implemented: Windows has no per-user or
per-process routing, so the agent's own QUIC/relay traffic cannot be kept out
of a default route through the overlay and would loop. It reports that reason
and installs no route. The CLI/tray forwarding hint and the kernel-forwarding
warning name the Windows command; docs/exit-node.md has a Windows section.

Checks: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets
-D warnings and cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed on macOS.
The script builders and plan logic are unit-tested with an injected runner on
every platform; nothing was run against a real Windows host or cross-compiled
(no Windows target installed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 12:33:22 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Sonnet 5.5 47c5d38d0c Exit nodes on macOS: pf anchor for offering, routes plus route-to for using
The exit-node host rules existed only for Linux (iptables + policy routing);
macOS reported "only supported on Linux yet".

Offering: a pf anchor com.apple/tsunagi-exit-<if> (evaluated by the stock
pf.conf) holds a nat rule per offered range and a pass-in rule. pf is enabled
if needed and the pfctl -E reference is released when the rules are removed.
net.inet.ip.forwarding is only read, never written, as on Linux.

Using: macOS has no uidrange policy routing and the agent is root, so the
overlay gets 0.0.0.0/1 and 128.0.0.0/1 routes and a pf route-to rule (matched
by the agent's uid) sends the agent's own QUIC/relay traffic back out the
physical interface, translated to its address. The rules are loaded before the
routes, so a failed load never sends traffic into a tunnel it cannot exempt
the agent from. IPv6 is blocked with rejecting ::/1 and 8000::/1 routes.
ExitHostPlan gains `overlay` (every network range) for the route-to exemption;
Linux ignores it.

Known limits: the egress is the default route's interface at apply time; other
root processes also bypass the tunnel. Forwarding hints in the CLI and tray
name the macOS sysctl. The rule text and command order are unit-tested with a
scripted host; nothing was run against a live pf/route (needs root), so the
route-to + nat second-pass behaviour is unverified.

Checks: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets
-D warnings and cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, run on macOS
only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 12:29:40 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude 0cfc1cbafc Tray state icon and window picture; firewall rules without the comment match; macOS app bundle
The tray icon is dark red with no connection (or a lost exit node), blue when
connected and green while an exit node is in use; the windows get the logo and
an app id that matches the desktop entry, and the exit icon moves to the
bottom left of the tile. Exit-node and broadcast firewall rules fall back to
being recognised by their shape on kernels that have no `comment` match, as
small router builds do. The macOS archive carries Tsunagi.app for the Homebrew
cask, and the daemon plist opens the control socket to the admin group.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 03:30:47 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude c9c653023d Release: build a static ARMv7 (armhf) Linux agent
Adds armv7-unknown-linux-musleabihf to both release pipelines: the archive,
a .deb for armhf and an Arch package for armv7h. Agent and CLI only, like the
other non-x86_64 Linux builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 02:25:43 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude 9966b50407 Rename the CLI package to tsunagi and its executable to tsng
The command line package is now `tsunagi` and builds the `tsng` executable,
which the packages, the unit, the installers and the workflows install and
run. The core library package becomes `tsunagi-core`, keeping the library name
`tsunagi`, so no code changes `use tsunagi::...`. Directories follow
(crates/tsunagi-core, crates/tsunagi). Every command shown to a person is now
`tsng ...`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 02:14:43 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude bb38562b0a Exit nodes: block IPv6 while one is in use; exit icon on the network tile
IPv6 has no way through an exit node, so the same policy rules get an
unreachable default for IPv6 instead of leaking it. The tray shows a green
icon in the tile corner while an exit node is in use, with a one-line
confirmation to stop it; confirmations are shortened.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 02:09:14 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude b2431d7eb1 Exit nodes: offer one per network, send all traffic through a member
A member can offer itself as an exit node per network (off by default); it is
announced over the control channel (ctrl/4) once its iptables masquerade and
forward rules are in place, with a warning when kernel forwarding is off. A
device picks one member as its exit node via policy routing, with the agent's
own uid exempt from the tunnel; if the exit node disappears the rules stay
and traffic is dropped, loudly reported. CLI: `network exit-node`,
`exit-node`; tray: tile checkbox, warnings and a per-device icon with
confirmation. Linux only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 01:14:51 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude c62d29fa14 Arch package: start the service and let the GUI reach the agent
The control socket is now opened to the tsunagi group (unit), the Arch
package enables and starts the service on install, adds the installing user
to the group, restarts a running agent on upgrade, and depends on the
libraries the tray loads at run time. The tray looks for the agent's socket
again on every poll instead of once at start, and a missing indicator
library is reported instead of panicking. Repository URLs unified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 23:29:51 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude a6d9edabee Point the project repository at github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 23:06:48 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude 2f7f9980c7 Tray: open the devices window wider and let its table scroll sideways
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 23:05:08 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude 2e178a6f9d Tray: About window, fixed-width device table with totals; WTFPL
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 2m19s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 3m56s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Add an About window (client and agent details, protocol versions), pin the
device table's column widths and add a total row, show the version in the
header and drop the refresh button. Relicense under WTFPL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 20:16:01 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude f4dcdec662 Tray: separate tray and window processes; device list without self
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 2m44s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 4m37s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The tray process holds only the icon and starts the same binary with
--window on Open; the window ends when closed, which works on Wayland where
a window cannot be hidden. The devices table now names devices as
hostname (id5), leaves out this device and counts the others.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 19:23:06 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude 69310108f4 Remember the last hostname each peer announced
Persist announced hostnames per network (state schema 5) and report them for
members, so a device that is away is still named in `status` and the tray.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 19:23:06 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude e7dff34ec2 Status: ask the agent for its state directory and its own CAP_NET_ADMIN
The CLI reached a packaged service's socket but read state from its own
default directory, so `network` saw nothing next to a running network, and
`status` reported the CLI binary's capabilities instead of the agent's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 18:31:01 +01:00
Aleksandr BogomiakovandClaude a55ea883a1 Tray: initialise GTK and run its main loop on Linux
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 3m14s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 5m21s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
tray-icon needs gtk::init() and a running GTK loop on Linux, which
eframe/winit never provide, so the tray panicked at startup with "GTK has
not been initialized". Build the tray on a dedicated GTK thread instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 17:54:38 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 3e066f991f CI: install libxdo-dev for the Linux tray link
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 3m23s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 6m58s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The x86_64 Linux tray failed at link with "unable to find library -lxdo":
tray-icon pulls libxdo, whose .so was not present. Add libxdo-dev to the GUI
build's apt install, alongside libgtk-3-dev and libayatana-appindicator3-dev.
Everything else (aarch64 agent, macOS, Windows) already built.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 16:51:53 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 3752419075 CI: build the Linux tray natively with GTK; drop the aarch64 GUI
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 4m14s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 4m29s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The aarch64 GUI cross-build failed: tray-icon links GTK and libappindicator
through pkg-config, which zig cross-compilation cannot satisfy without a target
sysroot. Rather than set one up, the Linux tray is now built natively on the
x86_64 runner with libgtk-3-dev and libayatana-appindicator3-dev installed, so
pkg-config just works. The agent is still static musl for both arches.

The aarch64 Linux GUI is dropped for now: that archive stays agent-only and no
aarch64 tsunagi-gui package is produced. x86_64 gets the tray in its archive
and the tsunagi-gui .deb/.pkg.tar.zst. macOS and Windows build the tray
natively as before. Guarded on matrix.gnu_target (set only on x86_64 Linux).

Note: the native build links the runner's glibc, so the Linux GUI binary needs a
reasonably recent glibc; fine for current desktops. A lower baseline would need
a GTK sysroot or an older runner image.

YAML validated; the Linux GUI build is exercised only by a real CI run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 16:38:58 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 f63343a6a0 CI: ship the tray GUI — in the archives and as tsunagi-gui deb/zst
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 2m40s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 2m40s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Adds the tray application to the release:

- Every target's archive now also contains the tsunagi-tray binary. On Linux it
  is built against an old glibc baseline (via cargo-zigbuild) rather than static
  musl, because a GUI must dlopen libGL/X11/Wayland at runtime and a static musl
  binary cannot; the agent stays static musl. macOS and Windows build the tray
  natively.
- New GUI package variants for Linux: `tsunagi-gui` .deb and .pkg.tar.zst, built
  by the existing scripts with an extra tray argument. They install the agent
  (service, polkit, user — same as the headless packages) plus the tray binary,
  a desktop launcher (dist/linux/tsunagi-tray.desktop) and an icon
  (dist/linux/tsunagi.svg), so the GUI appears in the applications menu. The GUI
  package conflicts/replaces/provides the headless tsunagi so the two do not
  coexist.
- The tray finds the system service with no configuration: the library's default
  control-socket path now prefers /run/tsunagi/agent.sock when present (both the
  tray and CLI use this), falling back to the per-user path.

No control-protocol change. Builds, fmt and clippy clean on macOS; the Linux GUI
cross-build and the packages are exercised only by a real CI run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 16:26:45 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 d13bb00623 Tray: one device table (online + offline), FQDN copy, green-fade copy feedback
- The devices window now shows a single device table instead of a separate
  "connected" box and an easily-missed "offline" box below it. Every endpoint
  known from a live tunnel or the signed membership appears, online first;
  offline rows show name and address with dashes for the live columns. The
  table fills the window and scrolls, so nothing hides off the bottom.
- Clicking an online peer's name copies hostname.network (the FQDN) so it
  resolves; a name without a hostname copies its short id.
- Copy feedback no longer appends "Copied" text (which reflowed the table for a
  second). The field just flashes green and fades back over a second, with no
  change to its text or width.

Builds and is clippy-clean (-D warnings) on macOS; not run in this headless
session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 16:09:33 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 2a0a8abd60 Tray: split rate/plot columns, add unit toggle to the devices window
The connected-peers rate and sparkline shared one grid cell, so the plot still
moved right as the rate text grew (e.g. "1.0 kB/s"). They are now two separate
grid columns — the plot column starts at the same x on every row, since grid
columns align.

The devices window also gets its own pkts/bytes toggle, bound to the same unit
setting as the main window so the two stay in step.

Builds and is clippy-clean (-D warnings) on macOS; not run in this headless
session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 16:04:39 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 db01c58a6f Tray: Phosphor icons, click-to-copy fields with feedback, steady plot column
- Bundle egui-phosphor (pinned to egui 0.31) and register its glyphs, so the
  icon buttons render real icons instead of tofu: refresh, shuffle (generate
  secret), pencil/check/x (rename host), copy (Copy secret).
- Copying is now the field itself, not a separate button: clicking the
  shortened device id, the network name, the network id, a range or an address
  copies the full value and the field flashes green "Copied" for a second
  (tracked in egui temp memory, so it clears itself). The standalone copy
  buttons are gone.
- In the devices window the connected-peers "rate / plot" column put the rate
  and the inline sparkline in a shared row, so the plot shifted as the rate
  text changed width ("0 B/s" vs "1.1 kB/s"). The rate now sits in a
  fixed-width, truncating cell, so the plot stays put.

Builds and is clippy-clean (-D warnings) on macOS; the UI has not been run in
this headless session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 16:00:23 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 de56258eb1 Tray: copy a network secret via ipc; use text buttons, not missing glyphs
Two fixes.

Secret copy: a new local control request returns a configured network's secret
in its tsn1 text form, so the tray's "Copy secret" button can put it on the
clipboard. The agent reads it from local state (same source as the CLI's
`network secret show`); it crosses only the owner/group socket and is wrapped in
a RedactedText type whose Debug prints "<redacted>", so it can never land in a
log. In the GUI the worker fetches it and hands it to the UI thread (which owns
the clipboard) through a one-shot slot kept out of the status snapshot, so it is
copied once and never stored in the cloned snapshot. Control protocol bumped
16 -> 17.

Icons: the button glyphs (⧉ ⟳ ✎ ✔ ✕) are not in egui's bundled fonts and showed
as tofu squares, so they are now plain text: copy / refresh / random / edit /
save / cancel. No icon font to embed.

Checks: fmt, clippy --workspace --all-targets -D warnings, and the tsunagi lib,
tsunagi-cli and wg-quic local_control tests pass on macOS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 15:48:32 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 8f5ce21ce9 Tray: devices window, bytes/packets toggle, copy & edit affordances
Replaces the in-tile collapsing peer list with a "Show devices" button that
opens a separate, normal-sized window per network, and fills in the rest of the
feedback.

Main window:
- A global show: pkts/bytes toggle; all rates and sparklines follow it.
- Sparklines now reserve their space always (fixed height, "no data yet"
  placeholder) so the layout no longer jumps when data arrives, and each one
  overlays its peak (top-left) and current value (bottom-right) with units.
- Device id has a copy button; the hostname is editable in place (✎ → edit →
  ✔/Enter sends SetHostname); network name, range and address copy on click.
- The Leave button is a neutral red. Per-tile "Show devices" opens the detail.

Devices window (a separate egui viewport per network):
- Network summary: id (copy), active/broadcast, range, this device's address,
  candidates, relay fwd/via/recv, dial/handshake failures.
- A larger network traffic sparkline.
- Connected peers in a table: hostname when known (else short key), protocol,
  address, handshake age formatted (s/m/h/d), tx/rx packets, tx/rx bytes, and
  current rate with an inline sparkline. Names and addresses copy on click.
- Offline members listed below with address and failed-dial count.

Agent: a SetHostname command (over the existing ipc) backs the in-place rename.
Traffic sampler now tracks both packet and byte rates; the toggle selects which.

Deferred: a "copy secret" button on the tile — the secret is deliberately not
exported to the GUI (secrets never leave the agent), so it needs a small local
secret-export ipc, which is the next step.

Builds and is clippy-clean (-D warnings) on macOS; the UI has not been run in
this headless session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 15:37:08 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 0a344c1b4f Report per-peer byte counters, not just packets
The overlay peer report carried packet counts only, so the GUI could show
packets/s but no byte throughput. Adds tx_bytes/rx_bytes to OverlayPeerReport
and fills them from each data plane:

- the wg and wg-quic plugins already counted plaintext bytes per peer; the CLI
  now maps them into the report;
- the generic tunnel (tcp-tls) gains tx_bytes/rx_bytes on its peer state and
  report, incremented by the plaintext length at the same points it counts
  packets.

The local control protocol version is bumped (TSN 15 -> 16) since the report
shape changed; a client and agent on different builds already detect and report
the mismatch.

Checks: fmt, clippy --workspace --all-targets -D warnings, and the tsunagi lib,
tsunagi-cli and wg-quic local_control tests pass on macOS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 15:30:37 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 2cda56e1f8 Log inbound handshake rejections at debug, not warn
Creating and leaving networks produced a stream of WARN lines like "Handshake
rejected: peer requested an unknown or inactive network network=None". This is
not a leave bug: leaving deactivates the network and publishes a release, but
remote peers that still consider this device a member keep dialing, and each
dial for a network no longer served is correctly rejected by the responder
(lookup returns None, so the network stays unidentified — network=None by
design, since a pre-handshake claim is unverified).

Such a rejection is routine and remotely triggerable — a left network a peer
has not caught up on, a stranger, a port scan, an old client — so logging it at
WARN let any peer spam the log. It is now debug; enable debug to see rejections
when diagnosing. The rejection behaviour itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 15:27:49 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 d1de61ba29 Tray UI: start hidden, fixed window, grid layout, traffic + peers
Reworks the tray window per feedback and fills it in.

- Starts hidden in the tray (no window on launch); the window opens from the
  menu. On macOS the app now uses the Accessory activation policy, so it lives
  in the menu bar with no Dock icon (via a winit event-loop hook, pinned to
  eframe's winit). Fixed, non-resizable 360x600 window; the layout targets it.
- Tidied layout: top bar (title + refresh), a bottom panel with the join form
  and the action banner, and a scrolling list of network tiles between them.
  Labels and values sit on two-column grids so they align; the join name and
  secret inputs are the same fixed width.
- A ⟳ button beside the secret generates a fresh random secret
  (NetworkSecret::generate), for creating a network.
- Each network tile shows id, range, this device's address, peers
  (connected/known), the active and broadcast switches, a Leave button, and a
  collapsing "peers (N)" section with a formatted per-peer table (short key,
  address, handshake age, tx/rx packets, rate).
- Traffic: a new sampler turns the agent's cumulative packet counters into a
  packets-per-second rate per network and per peer, from the deltas between
  snapshots (the snapshot now carries a generation and timestamp so each
  refresh is sampled once). The network tile shows the current rate and a small
  hand-drawn sparkline of recent rates (no extra dependency).

Note: rates are packets/s — the report has no byte counters yet; bytes would
need an agent change. Builds and is clippy-clean (-D warnings) on macOS; the UI
has not been run in this headless session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 15:08:29 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 19509dc833 Add the tsunagi-tray GUI (egui) — first increment
A native, lightweight tray application to manage a running agent — no web
engine. It is a thin client over the agent's local control socket, reusing
tsunagi::ipc and the report types directly; it owns its own runtime, logger and
event loop, like the CLI.

This first increment:
- tray icon with an Open/Quit menu (tray-icon); menu events are read on a
  background thread so Open works even while the window is hidden;
- a small window that hides to the tray on close and reopens from the menu;
- a background tokio worker that polls status every 2s and runs commands off the
  UI thread, writing a snapshot the UI renders from and repainting egui;
- UI: device header, a per-network card (name, id, range, this device's
  address, peers connected/known, a Leave button, and the per-network active
  and broadcast switches), a join form (name + secret), and a transient
  action/error banner; an "agent unreachable" state that names the socket.

Socket resolution: TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET if set, else the platform default
(/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock on macOS) — the same socket the group-access agent
serves.

Scope/notes: macOS first (Linux and Windows follow). Not yet done — macOS
accessory activation policy (so there is no dock icon), light/dark tray icons
from assets (the icon is drawn in code for now), and packaging/autostart. Builds
and is clippy-clean (-D warnings) on macOS; the UI itself has not been run in
this headless session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:48:52 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 de8e48bee7 Let the agent grant the control socket to a group (0660)
For a GUI (or a CLI) running as a different user to reach the agent, the control
socket needs to be group-accessible. This is set by the agent when it binds the
socket — correct from creation, not patched afterwards.

- ipc::ControlSocketAccess { Private, Group(gid) }. Private is the existing
  owner-only 0600. Group sets the socket's group to the gid and mode 0660, and
  creates the socket's parent directory 0755 so the group can traverse to it; if
  the group cannot be set it falls back to owner-only rather than leaving it
  wrong. The chown uses std::os::unix::fs::chown — no unsafe, no new lib
  dependency.
- ControlSocket::bind takes the access policy (Windows accepts it and keeps its
  pipe default for now; a pipe security descriptor is a later follow-up).
- CLI: `tsunagi up --control-group <name>` (env TSUNAGI_CONTROL_GROUP) resolves
  the group to its gid via nix (safe wrapper, unix-only dep) and passes
  Group(gid); without it the socket stays Private. A name that does not resolve
  is reported, and the socket stays owner-only.
- control_socket() now serves the system path (default_control_socket_path) on
  macOS too, not just Windows: /var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock, a runtime directory
  the GUI can reach, rather than the owner-only state directory. A custom
  --state-dir still keeps its own per-user socket.

So the packaged/daemon agent runs e.g. `tsunagi up --control-group tsunagi` and a
user in that group talks to it; a plain per-user agent is unchanged (0600).

Checks: fmt, clippy --workspace --all-targets -D warnings, tsunagi lib tests and
the wg-quic local_control tests pass on macOS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:41:58 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 8c812e6874 Bump the GitHub workflow actions off deprecated Node 20
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 5m25s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 3h12m37s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
GitHub now forces actions/checkout@v4, actions/upload-artifact@v4 and
actions/download-artifact@v4 (all Node 20) onto Node 24 with a deprecation
warning. Move them to the current Node 24 majors — checkout@v5,
upload-artifact@v7, download-artifact@v8 — which keep the same inputs and the
per-artifact subdirectory layout (merge-multiple defaults to false), so the
publish step is unchanged.

Only the .github workflow is touched. The .gitea workflow stays on
checkout@v4 and the @v3 artifact actions, because Gitea does not support the v4+
artifact backend and may not have Node 24 on its runner image; it also does not
emit these deprecation warnings. mlugg/setup-zig has no Node 24 release yet
(latest v2.2.1 is still Node 20), so that one warning remains until upstream
updates — nothing to change on our side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:01:33 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 63178574ce Package as a dedicated tsunagi user; add Arch packages
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 2m39s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 2m32s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Reworks the Linux packaging so the service runs as an unprivileged, dedicated
"tsunagi" user instead of root — the point of a native package is to set things
up properly for that OS's users — and adds Arch Linux packages beside the deb.
Both package families are built from the already-compiled static binary; nothing
is recompiled.

Service model (shared systemd unit, dist/linux/tsunagi.service):
- User=tsunagi with AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, so
  it creates the TUN and binds low ports without root.
- StateDirectory/CacheDirectory/RuntimeDirectory give it /var/lib/tsunagi,
  /var/cache/tsunagi and /run/tsunagi, and the agent is pointed at them (and the
  socket at /run/tsunagi/agent.sock) through TSUNAGI_* env in the unit.
- The polkit rule now grants the resolve1 actions to the "tsunagi" group; the
  service user is in it, and admins can add themselves.

CLI: when no state dir is chosen, the control commands prefer the system
service's socket at /run/tsunagi/agent.sock when it exists, so `sudo tsunagi
status`/`join` reach the packaged daemon with no flags. A per-user agent (its
socket absent from /run) still uses its own.

Packaging:
- deb (build-deb.sh): postinst now creates the tsunagi system user+group; unit
  installed to /lib/systemd/system, binary to /usr/bin.
- Arch (new dist/arch/build-pkg.sh): a dependency-free .pkg.tar.zst assembled
  with bsdtar + zstd (no makepkg, no Arch host) — .PKGINFO, a .INSTALL scriptlet
  that creates the user and reloads systemd, and a gzipped .MTREE; unit to
  /usr/lib/systemd/system.
- The polkit rule moved to dist/linux (shared by deb, Arch and the tarball), and
  the tarball install.sh now creates the user and installs the unit + rule.
- Both release workflows build the deb and the Arch package on the two Linux
  matrix entries (deb_arch/pkg_arch), install libarchive-tools+zstd for it, and
  attach both to the release (Gitea API loop / gh).

Not exercised in this session: the .deb and .pkg.tar.zst build and install only
on Linux (no dpkg-deb/bsdtar+pacman locally); CLI build, clippy, fmt and tests
pass, and all shell/YAML is syntax-checked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 13:46:27 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 a3856eed3b Build a dependency-free .deb and attach it to the release
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 2m21s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 2m29s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Adds a Debian package to the release for the x86_64 and aarch64 Linux builds, so
`apt install ./tsunagi_*.deb` is a convenient path on the Ubuntu hosts. Because
the binary is static musl, the package declares no Depends — it is built with
plain dpkg-deb on the runner (no cargo-deb or nfpm), from dist/deb/build-deb.sh.

The package installs:
- the static binary at /usr/bin/tsunagi;
- a systemd service at /lib/systemd/system/tsunagi.service that runs the agent
  as root (ExecStart rewritten to /usr/bin; the source unit targets
  /usr/local/bin for the tarball installer);
- a polkit rule at /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d granting the resolve1 actions to
  a "tsunagi" group, for running the agent as a non-root user instead of via the
  root service. postinst creates that system group and runs daemon-reload; prerm
  disables the service on removal.

Both release workflows gain a "Build the Debian package" step on the two Linux
matrix entries (deb/deb_arch), include the .deb in the uploaded run artifacts,
and attach it to the release (Gitea via the API loop, GitHub via gh). macOS and
Windows are unchanged. Service runs as root by default; the polkit rule/group is
the documented opt-in for the non-root path — say if you'd rather the service
itself run as the tsunagi user.

YAML and shell syntax validated; the .deb build itself runs only on the Linux
runner (no dpkg-deb locally) and has not been exercised in this session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 13:34:33 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 eac54f8c79 Revert the GitHub workflow guard to server_url
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 15s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Misdiagnosed the earlier report: Gitea was correctly running its own
.gitea/workflows copy, not this .github one, so the server_url guard was fine.
The switch to a GITHUB_RELEASE repo variable then made the workflow skip on
GitHub itself, since that variable is not set there.

Put both job guards back to `github.server_url == 'https://github.com'`, which
runs on GitHub with no manual setup and skips on Gitea (its .gitea copy is the
one that runs). No repository variable is needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:53:26 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 a8dfd7017b Gate the GitHub release workflow on a repo variable, not server_url
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 35s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The github.server_url guard did not keep this workflow from running on Gitea:
Gitea reports github.server_url as https://github.com, so the condition was
true there too and the jobs ran (and would fail on @v4/gh).

Switch both job guards to `vars.GITHUB_RELEASE == 'true'`, a repository variable
set only in the GitHub repo's settings. It is deterministic: absent on Gitea, so
the jobs skip there and the .gitea workflow is the one that runs; present on
GitHub once configured, so it runs there. The header documents how to set it
(Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions → Variables → GITHUB_RELEASE=true).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:50:04 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 99f4cf0220 Add a GitHub release workflow alongside the Gitea one
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 36s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Gitea and GitHub need different release plumbing, so each gets its own file: the
Gitea workflow stays in .gitea/workflows, and this GitHub one lives in
.github/workflows. The build half is identical (static musl Linux via
cargo-zigbuild, native macOS aarch64 and Windows x86_64); only publishing
differs — GitHub uses the v4 artifact backend and `gh release create`/`upload`,
which the Gitea file cannot use.

Because Gitea reads both .gitea/workflows and .github/workflows, every job here
is guarded with `if: github.server_url == 'https://github.com'`, so on Gitea
this file's jobs are skipped (no v4/gh failures) and the .gitea file is the one
that runs. GitHub never reads .gitea, so there it runs only this one.

Publish is re-run safe: it creates the release on the first run and uploads with
--clobber onto an existing release afterwards; a pre-release suffix on the tag
marks it prerelease.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:47:19 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 69263b2dd9 Move the release workflow to .gitea/workflows
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Successful in 3m39s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Successful in 3m27s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The release pipeline is Gitea-specific (v3 artifacts, Gitea release API), so it
must not run on github.com, where it would fail. GitHub only reads
.github/workflows, while Gitea reads both, so moving the file to
.gitea/workflows keeps it running on Gitea and invisible to GitHub. A separate
GitHub-flavoured release workflow can be added under .github later.

The portable .github/workflows/ci.yml (fmt/clippy/test) is left in place; it
works on both and is not what this change is about.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:13:45 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 20444013c0 Split release into build artifacts + a publish job (Gitea)
The direct-upload-from-each-build approach failed ("Upload the archive to the
release" exit 1) and left no artifacts to inspect. Restructured into the
familiar shape: build jobs now leave their archive as a run artifact, and a
single publish job — gated on all targets succeeding — collects them and fills
the release.

- Build jobs use actions/upload-artifact@v3 (Gitea has no v4 backend; v3 is
  what shows under the run), so the archive is visible and handed on.
- publish (needs: build) downloads everything with download-artifact@v3 and
  uploads each archive to the Gitea release with curl, once, with no matrix
  race. It prints the API base and the HTTP status/body of every call, so a
  failure (e.g. a read-only Actions token → 403, or a bad API URL) is now
  visible in the log instead of a bare exit 1.
- Release API base prefers GITHUB_API_URL (Gitea sets it to its /api/v1 root)
  and falls back to GITHUB_SERVER_URL/api/v1. Asset uploads run in the main
  shell via process substitution so a failed upload fails the job.

Build, package, musl/zig setup and the target matrix are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:12:53 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 2196f6635b Quiet the cosmetic zig linker_messages warning on the musl build
The musl release build now links cleanly through cargo-zigbuild, but rustc's
new linker_messages lint echoed zig's "ignoring deprecated linker optimization
setting '1'" note — zig's linker declining the -O1 GNU-ld flag Rust passes. It
is cosmetic and the binary is correct, so allow that one lint, scoped to the
zig build step only. macOS and Windows keep full linker diagnostics, and a real
link error still fails the build.

No behaviour change to the produced binaries; takes effect on the next tag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:06:04 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 6438982d45 Upload release assets via the Gitea API instead of artifacts + gh
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 2m57s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 2m53s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
The release ran on Gitea Actions, where it failed at actions/upload-artifact@v4:
the v4 artifact backend (and the GitHub REST API that `gh release create` uses)
are not available on Gitea/GHES, so both the artifact handoff and the publish
job were dead ends there.

Reworked so each build job uploads its archive straight to the release through
Gitea's native API (`/api/v1/repos/<repo>/releases`) with curl: create the
release for the tag if absent (races between matrix jobs are resolved by reading
the id back by tag), then POST the archive as an asset. The separate publish
job, download-artifact and `gh` are gone. The id is parsed with grep, so the
runner needs only curl and coreutils — no jq, no third-party release action.
Uses the Gitea-injected GITHUB_TOKEN, GITHUB_SERVER_URL and GITHUB_REPOSITORY;
a tag with a pre-release suffix (e.g. -rc.2) is marked prerelease.

This targets Gitea by design; it no longer runs as-is on github.com (different
API), which is fine — the GitHub build is being retired. Build and package
steps, the musl/zig setup and the target matrix are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 12:04:20 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 21b619388c Pin Zig to a real release so the musl release build fetches reliably
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 3m49s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 3m26s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
The release run failed at "Install zig": mlugg/setup-zig, left unpinned, resolved
to the newest version it knew of — an unreleased 0.16.0 whose tarball 404s on
ziglang.org — and the community mirrors returned 502/503 around it, so the step
errored out before cargo-zigbuild ever ran.

Pin the action to Zig 0.14.1, an archived release with a permanent official
download URL. The official source then succeeds even when the mirrors are flaky,
and the version stays compatible with cargo-zigbuild. Also moves the action to
@v2.

Only the Linux musl jobs use zig; macOS and Windows are unaffected. Not run on a
real tag yet in this session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:54:29 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 d1ab993dd2 Add a tagged-release CI workflow and Linux/Windows packaging
Release / tsunagi-linux-aarch64 (push) Failing after 3m12s
Release / tsunagi-linux-x86_64 (push) Failing after 2m21s
Release / tsunagi-macos-aarch64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / tsunagi-windows-x86_64 (push) Canceled after 0s
Release / Publish release (push) Canceled after 0s
Pushing a `v*` tag now builds the agent for every supported target and attaches
the archives to a GitHub release. Modelled on the furumi release workflow (a
build matrix, then a publish job that runs `gh release create`), adapted to this
project's two differences: it needs system integration (capabilities/polkit on
Linux, elevation+wintun on Windows, a root daemon on macOS), and its users run
varied distros, not just Ubuntu.

Linux is built as a fully **static musl** binary with cargo-zigbuild, so one
artifact runs on Arch, Alpine, NixOS and old-glibc systems alike, and can be
repackaged into whatever a distro prefers later. musl has no prebuilt
aws-lc-sys bindings, so the Linux jobs install cmake + libclang (bindgen) and
zig (the cross C compiler zigbuild drives). macOS (aarch64) and Windows (x86_64)
build natively; Linux covers x86_64 and aarch64.

Targets: x86_64/aarch64 linux-musl, aarch64 macOS, x86_64 Windows. Each archive
carries the binary, the top-level README, and the platform's install notes plus
integration files:
- dist/linux/: a static-friendly README, a systemd unit (runs as root, so no
  capability grant or polkit rule is needed; a commented non-root variant is
  included), and an install.sh that drops the binary and the unit or prints the
  setcap/polkit alternative.
- dist/windows/: install notes covering wintun.dll and Run-as-administrator.
- dist/macos/: the existing LaunchDaemon plist and notes, now also shipped in
  the archive.

Not exercised yet: the workflow only runs on a real tag push, and the
aws-lc-sys-under-musl build has not been run locally in this session (no zig
toolchain here). YAML and install.sh syntax are validated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:48:19 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 da7ce1dca1 Drop link-local addresses from the status "not announced" list
A host with several interfaces has a link-local (fe80::/10, and 169.254/16 on
IPv4) on each, and none of them is ever a peer candidate. Listing them under
"not announced" padded the section with one noise line per interface — most of
the list on a machine with several VPN utuns. They are now filtered out;
loopback and real unannounced addresses are unaffected.

Checks: cargo fmt --all --check and cargo clippy -p tsunagi-cli --all-targets
-D warnings pass; verified by eye against a live `tsunagi status`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:38:21 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 4d2f8a54ec Compact the status address list to one line per address
`tsunagi status` printed every local address as two lines: the address, then
an indented note holding the interface (and, for candidates, a priority rank).
On a host with many interfaces — common on macOS, where each VPN adds a utun
and every interface carries a link-local — that made the "local addresses"
section very long and hard to scan.

Each address is now a single line: the announce status stays the label
(announced / not announced / loopback) and the address and its interface share
the detail, as `<addr> · <iface>`. The per-row note and the candidate-priority
rank are dropped; ordering still reflects candidate priority. No other section
changes, and nothing but the presentation does.

Checks: cargo fmt --all --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace
--all-targets -D warnings, and the tsunagi-cli tests all pass on macOS;
verified by eye against a live `tsunagi status`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:26:13 +01:00
UltradesuandClaude Opus 4.8 c3a6201ee2 Bring the macOS stack up: utun interface, resolver files, system paths
macOS was TUN-less: the agent ran only with `--no-tun`, so tunnels formed but
nothing reached the operating system. The provisioner, host rules and DNS
publisher had Linux and Windows implementations and fell through to the
unsupported/erroring paths on macOS. This adds the macOS half so `tsunagi up`
carries real traffic there. The shared decision logic (plan_changes,
rules_summary, Published) is untouched — only the per-platform mechanics are new.

What it does on macOS (all root-only; macOS has no per-capability grant):
- Interface: a `utun` device opened over the in-kernel utun control socket via
  the existing `tun` dependency (no kext, no Network Extension). The kernel
  assigns the `utunN` name, so a name derived from the network id is not a legal
  utun name; `open_tun` leaves the name unset on macOS and reads the real one
  back, and `Interface::start` adopts `device.name()` as the name everything
  downstream configures (host rules, reconfigure). A utun is torn down with the
  process, so a crash never leaks one. Addresses, MTU, up and the overlay subnet
  route are applied with `/sbin/ifconfig` and `/sbin/route` (absolute paths, args
  built only from locally-derived values), the same role netlink plays on Linux
  and netsh on Windows. Observation is `netdev` (getifaddrs).
- DNS: a resolver-dir publisher writes `/etc/resolver/<network>` files pointing
  the system resolver at the overlay DNS server for each zone. The files carry a
  `port`, so the server needs no privileged socket, and a marker line, so the
  publisher only ever replaces or removes files it wrote and never clobbers a
  user's own. Removed on revert.
- Broadcast host rules: the `255.255.255.255` route is installed with `route`.
  The inbound-UDP firewall allowance (a pf anchor) is deferred and reported as
  the incomplete half, so `status` says what to allow by hand; the route still
  goes in. Failure stays contained, exactly as on the other platforms.
- Privilege: probe is optimistic (like Windows); the honest answer comes from
  the utun open, whose permission error now says to run with sudo or as a daemon.

Deployment:
- Default paths on macOS are fixed system locations rather than per-user Library
  dirs, so they do not depend on whose shell ran sudo: state `/var/db/tsunagi`,
  cache `/var/db/tsunagi/cache` (StoragePaths::user_default), control socket
  `/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock` (default_control_socket_path, mirroring the
  Windows %ProgramData% branch). The local control socket already uses the
  shared `unix` adapter, so no IPC changes were needed — macOS is Unix.
- dist/macos/ carries a root LaunchDaemon plist and install notes; README's
  deployment section now documents the macOS path instead of "not implemented".

Decisions (agreed up front): utun auto-assign with the real name adopted;
ifconfig/route rather than raw PF_ROUTE/ioctl (which would need unsafe);
/etc/resolver files rather than scutil; route-now/firewall-deferred; root via
sudo or a LaunchDaemon rather than Network Extension (which would require a
signed sandboxed app bundle, not a Rust CLI).

Checks: on macOS (Darwin 27), `cargo fmt --all --check`, `cargo clippy --locked
--workspace --all-targets -D warnings`, and `cargo test --locked --workspace
--all-targets` all pass (0 failures); the new macos-gated unit tests run under
the standard workspace command via feature unification. Not yet exercised live:
actual utun creation, ifconfig/route application and /etc/resolver writes need a
root run, which has not been done in this session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 11:15:59 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 533921059a Install broadcast route and firewall allowance on the host while broadcast is on
LAN discovery (CS 1.6 and similar) only worked after two manual steps on every
host: route 255.255.255.255 through the TUN, and allow inbound traffic on it.
Without the route the game's limited broadcast leaves via the physical adapter
and never reaches the overlay; without the firewall allowance the server's
unicast reply (from a different address than the one the request went to, so
never matched by conntrack) is dropped before the game's socket. Verified by
hand on Linux: with both in place the server answered A2S_INFO over the overlay.

The system level (not a plugin) now installs exactly those two things for the
interface it owns, and removes them when broadcast is turned off, the network
is left or stopped, or the agent exits.

Design:
- New boundary overlay::hostrules (BroadcastHostRules: idempotent apply/clear,
  with Linux, Windows, Mock and Unsupported implementations). TunFactory gains
  host_rules(); ManagedTunFactory::with_host_rules wires it in the CLI.
- Interface::sync_broadcast_rules reconciles the host against the routing
  table (RoutingTable::broadcast_host_target) and is called after address sync,
  on live `network broadcast on/off`, on network deactivation and by remove().
  Failure is contained: the outcome is kept and logged, never fatal.
- One interface carries several networks but the host has one 255.255.255.255
  route, so the source is the lowest NetworkId among broadcast-enabled networks
  with an address (documented in docs/broadcast.md).
- Linux: the route is added on the existing netlink thread (preferred source =
  overlay address, replace semantics). The firewall rule is `iptables -I INPUT
  -i <if> -p udp -s <overlay range>` tagged with a comment `tsunagi:<if>`;
  it is UDP-only and range-limited on purpose so TCP services stay unexposed.
  iptables is located in fixed system directories, never via PATH; stale tagged
  rules (e.g. from a crash) are replaced. A missing iptables leaves the route in
  place and is reported. rp_filter is not touched.
- Windows: PowerShell (absolute path) New-NetRoute metric 1 and a tagged
  inbound UDP Defender rule scoped to the interface alias and overlay range.
- status shows a `broadcast rules` row (ok, or which half failed and why).
  IPC control protocol bumped 14 -> 15 because OverlayReport gained a field.
- AGENTS.md records the narrow exception to "never touch routing/firewall".

Compatibility: restart the agent after upgrading (control protocol 15). No wire
or schema change.

Checks run (Linux only): cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace
--all-targets -D warnings, cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets, all
passing. Tests use a mock host and a scripted iptables; no OS setting is
changed. NOT done: the Windows code was never compiled for or run on Windows
(cross-compiling failed for lack of a C toolchain), only its script building is
unit-tested; the real netlink route and iptables calls were not exercised
against a live kernel in the suite; CS 1.6 was not launched from this change.
2026-10-01 15:03:43 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov d2778f0b5a Prevent WireGuard timer loop failure spam and fix handshake broadcast
When a WireGuard tunnel handshake timed out or a rekey failed,
Inner::on_tunnel_failed closed the transport link and reported the failure
to the agent core. However:
1. The peer remained in WireguardDevice::inner.peers. Once boringtun
   declared ConnectionExpired (after 90s), self.tunn.is_expired() remained
   permanently true on all subsequent 250ms timer ticks. drive_timers
   repeatedly detected failed = true every 250ms, flooding logs with
   'WARN WireGuard tunnel failed due to rekey timeout, triggering fallback'
   and sending repeated protocol failure events to the core 4 times/sec.
2. In WireguardLink::send, is_handshake_init incorrectly expected an
   envelope header offset (msg[74] == 1) when checking for initiation
   packets, which failed on raw WireGuard UDP packets. As a result,
   handshake initiations were not broadcast to all candidate endpoints.
3. In WireguardTransport::accept_loop, packet source matching contained
   dead envelope destination matching inspecting ephemeral key bytes
   against local endpoint IDs.

Fixes:
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/device.rs:
  - Add failed: bool to FlowTunnel to latch failure state. Once a failure
    is reported, update_timers returns (TunnResult::Done, false) on all
    subsequent ticks until a new handshake is started or completed.
  - In Inner::on_tunnel_failed, remove the failed peer from inner.peers so
    drive_timers ceases ticking on the dead tunnel.
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/plugin.rs:
  - In Worker::sync, retain only active unclosed links in state.links.
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs:
  - Check is_handshake_init directly as '!msg.is_empty() && msg[0] == 1',
    ensuring handshake initiations are broadcast to all candidate addresses.
  - Clean up matched_peer to look up links and peer candidate addresses directly.
- Tests:
  - Update test_flow_tunnel_rekey_timeout_triggers_failure to assert failure
    latching and verify no repeated failure reports on subsequent ticks.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed.
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-10-01 03:18:32 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 8cfece9479 Filter noisy internal warnings from boringtun and iroh net_report
The CLI's default tracing filter previously allowed WARN level logs from
boringtun and iroh, producing two confusing and noisy log messages during
routine operation:
1. 'WARN HANDSHAKE(REJECT_AFTER_TIME - KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT - REKEY_TIMEOUT (on receive))':
   emitted by boringtun's internal timer tick when an endpoint primarily
   receives data for 165 seconds (180s - 10s - 5s). In boringtun, this is a
   routine scheduled rekey timer rather than an error or failure, but was
   unhelpfully logged as warn! upstream.
2. 'WARN probe timed out':
   emitted by iroh's net_report module during background HTTP captive portal
   detection when running in isolated subnets or VMs without direct internet
   access. This probe has no impact on mesh connectivity.

Update the default logging filter to:
  'info,iroh=warn,iroh::net_report=error,quinn=warn,rustls=warn,boringtun=error,mainline=off'

Real WireGuard handshake and rekey failures continue to be detected and
reported cleanly by Tsunagi's own data plane diagnostics and automatic
fallback handlers at INFO and WARN levels.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed.
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-10-01 03:06:20 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 3930dff2dc Detect WireGuard tunnel rekey failure and trigger automatic fallback
Previously, because UDP is connectionless, when a pure WireGuard tunnel
encountered handshake or rekey failures (e.g. boringtun logging
`WARN HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)` and `CONNECTION_EXPIRED`), the
`WireguardLink` never closed. It remained active in `agent.links` and
as a direct hop in `RelayHub.raw`. Consequently, outgoing packets
continued to be blackholed over the dead direct path, preventing
`RelayHub` from using working multihop relay routes and preventing
the agent from falling back to alternative protocols (`tcp-tls` or
`wg-quic`).

Key changes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/device.rs`:
  - In `FlowTunnel`, track active handshake and rekey attempts via
    `handshake_started_at`. If an active handshake attempt remains
    unanswered beyond `HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT` (15s) or boringtun reports
    `ConnectionExpired`, declare the tunnel dead.
  - Reset timeout timers upon successful handshake reception in
    `decapsulate`.
  - In `drive_timers`, when tunnel failure is detected, trigger
    `inner.on_tunnel_failed(peer)`, which closes the direct transport
    link and notifies the agent via `PluginContext::report_peer_protocol_failure`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs`:
  - Add `WireguardLink::close` to transition `is_closed` to true and
    notify `closed_notify`.
  - In `WireguardLink::recv`, select on `closed_notify` so readers
    unblock and return `None` immediately on close.
  - Add `WireguardTransport::close_link` to close active links by
    network and peer.
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/mod.rs`:
  - Add `PluginRequest::ProtocolFailure` and public helper
    `PluginContext::report_peer_protocol_failure`.
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/mod.rs` and `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs`:
  - Add `NetCommand::ProtocolFailure` to runtime command handling.
  - On protocol failure: remove dead direct link from `self.links`,
    clear it from `RelayHub.raw` (so `RelayHub` immediately routes
    over available multihop relays), record failure on `wg` for that
    peer with exponential backoff cooldown, emit `DataLinkDown`, and
    immediately call `ensure_links()` to dial the next mutually supported
    protocol (`tcp-tls` or `wg-quic`).
- Tests:
  - Add `test_flow_tunnel_rekey_timeout_triggers_failure` and
    `test_flow_tunnel_reset_on_handshake` unit tests in `device.rs`.
  - Add `test_wireguard_link_close_and_transport_close_link` in
    `transport_tests.rs`.
  - Add `test_protocol_dial_state_cooldown_and_fallback_selection` in
    `network.rs`.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
- Built release binary: target/release/tsunagi.
2026-10-01 03:02:09 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 35acc4d231 Fix WireGuard relay preemption with UDP probing, allow VM bridges, and categorize status addresses
When remote peers communicate across networks with mixed connectivity (e.g.
a remote Linux node, a local Linux host, and a Windows VM guest under KVM):
- Previously, `WireguardTransport` immediately created and installed
  unverified direct links into `RelayHub` in `notify_peer_capability` and
  `open()`. When a remote peer had only unroutable private addresses
  (e.g. 192.168.122.151 on a KVM NAT bridge), this dead direct link
  preempted the working 2-hop relay, causing packet drops, failed handshakes,
  and REKEY_TIMEOUT errors.
- Host-guest VM bridges (`virbr*`) were previously filtered out, preventing
  the VM guest from discovering the host's bridge IP (192.168.122.1) and
  forcing it to attempt cross-interface connections to host Wi-Fi/LAN.
- Concurrent activation of multiple networks sharing one `tsun0` interface
  raced in `sync_addresses`, resulting in netlink `File exists (os error 17)`
  and `The object already exists` on Windows.

Key fixes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs`:
  - Implement bidirectional UDP probing with `TSUNAGI_WG_PROBE_V1` PING/PONG.
  - In `open()`, probe candidate endpoints with retransmission up to 1200ms.
    If unreachable, return `TransportError::Unreachable`, preventing dead
    links from preempting valid relay routes in `RelayHub`.
  - In `notify_peer_capability`, send hole-punching probes without prematurely
    installing unverified links.
  - In `accept_loop`, reply to PING probes with PONG and install confirmed
    inbound links targeting the verified source address.
  - In `WireguardLink::send`, inspect byte 74 of enveloped packets to detect
    handshake initiations, ensuring confirmed links route data packets only
    to the active target.
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/plugin.rs`:
  - Permit VM bridges (`virbr*`) as candidate interfaces (priority 10).
  - Add `prioritize_local_subnet` to prioritize candidates sharing a local
    IPv4 subnet with the receiver (e.g. 192.168.122.0/24).
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/interface.rs` & provisioners:
  - Add async mutex `sync_lock` to serialize concurrent address syncs across networks.
  - Handle netlink EEXIST (os error 17) and Windows already-exists errors
    idempotently as success.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`:
  - Split `local addresses` in `tsunagi status` into `announced` (candidate
    addresses in priority order with interface and rank), `not announced`
    (container bridges/internal addresses with interface name), and `loopback`.
- Tests:
  - Add `test_wireguard_transport_unreachable_probe_times_out` and
    `test_matches_subnet` unit tests.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
2026-10-01 02:38:13 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov c791102ad9 Fix overlay and virtual interface candidate leakage and WireGuard rekeying
On Windows (Wintun), iface.name in netdev is an adapter GUID, while
iface.friendly_name is 'tsun0'. Checking only iface.name failed to
identify and exclude Wintun overlay interfaces. Consequently, Windows
nodes announced their own overlay IP addresses (e.g. 10.13.37.26) as
candidate endpoints. Remote peers latched onto this overlay IP as the
WireGuard target, routing encrypted packets into tsun0 (recursive loop),
resulting in failed handshakes and subsequent HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)
and CONNECTION_EXPIRED.

Similarly, Docker bridges (br-*, docker0) and virtual bridges were
announced and alphabetically sorted before physical LAN or Tailscale
interfaces, causing peers to attempt WireGuard handshakes with internal
Docker bridge addresses (e.g. 172.21.0.1).

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard and crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls:
  - Robustly identify overlay interfaces by inspecting iface.name,
    iface.friendly_name, and iface.description for 'tsun', 'tsunagi',
    and 'wintun'.
  - Filter out container and virtual bridge interfaces (docker, br-,
    veth, virbr, cni, flannel, cali, kube, dummy, lxc, podman, vethernet,
    vboxnet, vmnet).
  - Prioritize candidates by physical interface score: interfaces with
    a default gateway (physical LAN/WAN) and Tailscale (100.64.0.0/10)
    score highest and sort to candidate #0.
  - In on_peer_capability, filter out any announced address falling inside
    any active overlay IPv4 range (defense in depth on receiver).
- In crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs:
  - In WireguardLink::send, broadcast Handshake Initiation packets (type 1)
    to all candidate addresses so initial handshakes and rekeys probe all
    candidate paths and recover if an endpoint roamed or NAT expired.
  - In accept_loop, prioritize exact socket address matches before falling
    back to candidate IP matches for NAT port roaming.
- In crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs:
  - Update iroh AddrFilter to inspect friendly_name and description,
    preventing Wintun overlay IPs from leaking into iroh discovery endpoints.
- Tests:
  - Add unit tests for candidate interface filtering, IP validation, and
    priority scoring in tsunagi-wireguard and tsunagi-tcp-tls.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
2026-10-01 02:15:06 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov f80841da63 Fix WireGuard multi-network demux, candidate discovery, and status reporting
When a peer belongs to multiple overlay networks served by one agent (e.g.
a VM participating in both 'hexor' and 'ultradesu'), packets received on
the shared WireGuard UDP socket could not be differentiated by source IP/port
alone. Previously, `WireguardTransport::accept_loop` picked the first
matching link found in iteration order, starving other networks for that peer
and causing rekey timeouts (`WARN HANDSHAKE(REKEY_TIMEOUT)`,
`ERROR CONNECTION_EXPIRED(REKEY_ATTEMPT_TIME)`) and packet loss on the
starved network.

Additionally:
- When a peer had multiple candidate endpoints (such as LAN, VM bridge, and
  Tailscale CGNAT addresses), `WireguardLink` sent handshake initiations
  only to `addrs[0]`. If the first address was unreachable from the remote
  side (e.g. host's Tailscale IP unreachable from inside a local VM), the
  handshake never completed.
- In `build_report`, peers known to the `wg-quic` plugin were added with
  empty tunnels even if an active `wg` (pure WireGuard) tunnel existed,
  causing `tsunagi status` to falsely report 'no WireGuard handshake yet'
  for connected and pingable peers.
- `local_ip_candidates` previously included IPv6 addresses which caused
  OS error 22 (EINVAL) when passed to the IPv4-bound UDP socket.

Key fixes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/transport.rs`:
  - Store `peer_networks` as `HashSet<NetworkId>` per peer.
  - In `WireguardLink`, maintain a list of candidate addresses and a
    `confirmed` flag. Before a handshake response confirms the active path,
    transmit datagrams (handshake initiations) to all candidate addresses.
    Upon receiving an inbound datagram, lock onto the confirmed address.
  - In `accept_loop`, deliver inbound datagrams to all active links
    associated with the sender's endpoint ID across all networks. Boringtun's
    cryptographic index and AEAD verification naturally demultiplexes and
    accepts the packet in the correct network while discarding it in others.
  - Filter candidate addresses to IPv4 to match the bound socket family.
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/src/plugin.rs`:
  - Only collect IPv4 interfaces in `local_ip_candidates`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`:
  - Refactor `build_report` to evaluate all protocols per peer and prioritize
    whichever protocol has an active tunnel (`wg` > `tcp-tls` > `wg-quic`).
- In `crates/tsunagi-wireguard/tests/plugin_tests.rs`:
  - Add `test_wireguard_two_networks_same_peers` verifying simultaneous
    bidirectional packet transmission between two peers sharing two networks
    over a single `WireguardTransport`.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (350+ tests passed).
2026-10-01 01:38:44 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 7070a16104 Add pure WireGuard direct UDP data plane plugin and transport
Peers communicating on uncensored networks can benefit from raw WireGuard
performance over direct UDP without QUIC framing or double-encryption
overhead. This provides Tailscale-like direct tunnel performance while
preserving Tsunagi's decentralized mesh architecture.

Key changes:
- Create `tsunagi-wireguard` crate implementing the `IpPlugin` and
  `PacketTransport` contracts:
  - `WG_PROTOCOL = "wg"` with wire version 1.
  - Bounded `WgAnnouncement` carrying WireGuard public keys, listening UDP
    ports, and candidate IP addresses (filtering out overlay interfaces).
  - `WgKeyStore` managing persistent per-network WireGuard X25519 keys
    in SQLite with zeroization on drop.
  - `WireguardTransport` providing direct UDP packet transmission, candidate
    address tracking, inbound link delivery, and roaming support.
  - `WireguardDevice` running userspace WireGuard encryption via `boringtun`,
    timer maintenance, and AllowedIPs source enforcement.
- Integrate `wg` into `tsunagi-cli`:
  - Set default protocols to `"wg,tcp-tls,wg-quic"` so all protocols are
    enabled by default in order of throughput and performance.
  - Support `"wireguard"` as a convenience alias for `"wg"` in `--protocol`.
  - Bind `PureWgTransport` and launch the inbound datagram accept loop on `up`.
  - Pass `pure_wg` plugin to `AgentControl` and update `build_report` so
    active WireGuard tunnels and overlay metrics are reported in `tsunagi status`.
  - Clean up WireGuard keys on network removal in `forget_protocol_state`.
- Comprehensive test coverage in `tsunagi-wireguard`:
  - `announcement_tests`: round-trip serialization and verification of malformed,
    mismatched network, zero port, or self-claiming announcements.
  - `transport_tests`: loopback UDP link delivery between transports.
  - `plugin_tests`: end-to-end two-peer handshake and bidirectional IP packet
    transit over direct UDP.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed.
2026-10-01 01:24:25 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 46575d0899 Prioritize stored agreed range over default range in reserve_range
When an agent restarted with multiple networks (e.g. hexor and ultradesu),
Agent::reserve_range() previously attempted to reserve the default configured
range (10.13.37.0/24) for whichever network happened to be listed first in
storage, even if that network had already agreed upon a different range
(such as 10.79.175.0/24). As a result, the first network seized 10.13.37.0/24
in the route table, causing the second network (which genuinely used 10.13.37.0/24)
to trigger a spurious RouteError::Overlap warning at startup until the first
network asynchronously loaded its signed records and released the reservation.

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/mod.rs, make reserve_range asynchronous and
  inspect stored signed records first using StateSet::agreed_range().
- If an agreed range already exists in storage, reserve that specific range
  in routes immediately instead of preemptively claiming the default
  overlay_ipv4_range.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:36:24 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov a89e65475d Implement Debug manually for PipeSecurityAttributes on Windows
The windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES struct is a raw C FFI
struct that does not implement std::fmt::Debug. Deriving Debug on
PipeSecurityAttributes failed Windows compilation with E0277.

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/ipc/windows.rs, remove #[derive(Debug)] on
  PipeSecurityAttributes and provide an explicit std::fmt::Debug
  implementation formatting nLength, lpSecurityDescriptor, and
  bInheritHandle.

Validation on Linux:
- Verified type check against Windows target via rustc.
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:31:21 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 2ed447ae86 Filter overlay interface from candidates and align status member columns
Peers previously advertised overlay interface (tsun0) addresses as physical
candidate endpoints for both iroh discovery and tcp-tls announcements. When an
intermediate tunnel was active between two peers (e.g., between a host and a VM),
iroh probes to the remote peer's overlay address were routed through the existing
overlay, causing iroh to select the overlay IP itself as a 'direct' endpoint.
This caused recursive tunneling (QUIC over WireGuard over TLS) and confusing
status output showing peers connecting to their own overlay IP addresses.
Additionally, in tsunagi status, peer rows were displayed with unaligned
columns, mixing control plane status and data plane metrics in a way that was
difficult to scan.

Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs, add an AddrFilter to the iroh EndpointBuilder
  to dynamically filter out any local addresses assigned to tsun* overlay
  interfaces before publishing to address discovery services (DHT/pkarr/STUN).
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls/src/plugin.rs, exclude tsun* interfaces from
  local_ip_candidates() so overlay IPs are never advertised as physical
  TCP endpoints.
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, exclude tsun* interfaces from
  netwatch_addresses() so the local addresses section reflects only actual
  physical/host network interfaces.
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, update member_row() to format member
  details with aligned columnar layout: the overlay IP is placed first and
  padded, followed by control plane transport and latency, and line 2 pads
  tunnel metrics so that the data link endpoint (via ...) aligns vertically.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:24:53 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov ac5a1596ef Allow unelevated Windows processes to access control socket via SDDL and shared path
When running the tsunagi agent as an elevated Administrator or Windows Service,
unprivileged user-space processes (such as a system tray application, user-level
CLI commands, or status monitors) could not interact with the control socket.
This was due to two constraints on Windows:
1. The default control socket path was derived from the per-user %APPDATA%,
   making an administrator's socket invisible or inaccessible to a non-elevated
   standard user profile.
2. Even if pointed to the same named pipe, Windows Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)
   and default ACLs prevent a Medium-Integrity (unelevated) process from opening
   a High-Integrity (elevated) pipe server for write access unless explicitly allowed.

Key changes:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/ipc/windows.rs, implement PipeSecurityAttributes using
  Win32 ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW with SDDL:
  "D:(A;;GRGW;;;WD)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GA;;;SY)S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)". This grants generic
  read/write access to Everyone (WD), retains full control for Administrators (BA)
  and LocalSystem (SY), and sets the Mandatory Label SACL to Medium Integrity (ME)
  with No-Write-Up (NW).
- In crates/tsunagi/src/ipc/mod.rs, introduce default_control_socket_path() which
  points to %ProgramData%\tsunagi\agent.sock on Windows (and default per-user
  state directory on Unix).
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, support TSUNAGI_CONTROL_SOCKET environment
  variable across all commands, and use default_control_socket_path() on Windows
  when running against the default state directory. Custom state directories (--state-dir)
  or explicit sockets (--control-socket) continue to take precedence, allowing
  multi-daemon setups to remain strictly isolated.
- In workspace Cargo.toml, set unsafe_code = "deny" so the workspace forbids unsafe
  code while permitting explicit, documented unsafe Win32 API calls in windows.rs.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets --jobs 2 -- --test-threads=2 passed (349 tests passed).
2026-10-01 00:13:44 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 192ab25bbd Support RUST_LOG, enable UPnP portmapper and add NAT traversal logging
Previously, `tsunagi-cli` configured clap with a fixed default_value and
`env = "TSUNAGI_LOG"`, which caused `RUST_LOG` to be completely ignored.
In addition, `iroh` was built with `default-features = false` and lacked the
`"portmapper"` feature, which caused it to compile a stub client and disable
UPnP-IGD, PCP, and NAT-PMP port mapping. Furthermore, there was no visibility
into STUN address discovery, UPnP port mapping status, or QUIC transmission path
switching (hole punch vs relay).

Key improvements:
- Enable the `"portmapper"` feature on `iroh` in workspace Cargo.toml, pulling in
  `portmapper` and `igd-next` to actively request port mappings on local routers.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`, support `RUST_LOG` with fallback precedence
  (`--log` > `TSUNAGI_LOG` > `RUST_LOG` > default filter). When debug or trace
  filtering is active, automatically enable `.with_target(true)` so users can see
  which subsystem emitted the log (e.g., portmapper, iroh::magicsock, tsunagi::net).
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs`, monitor `endpoint.watch_addr()` and
  `endpoint.home_relay_status()`. Emit `DEBUG` logs for local socket binding,
  discovered STUN reflexive/UPnP addresses, and relay connections. If no direct
  addresses are discovered after probe grace, emit a concise `WARN`.
- In `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/session.rs`, monitor connection `path_events()`
  to log when transmission paths are opened, closed, or selected (switching between
  relay and direct hole-punched paths), with bounded task winding down on shutdown.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed).
- Live verification with `RUST_LOG=debug` confirmed SSDP broadcast to 239.255.255.250:1900,
  portmapper logs, STUN QAD discovery, and clean relay shutdown.
2026-09-30 23:08:23 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov c0a76f1942 Enable all available protocols by default with tcp-tls priority
By default, the agent now enables all available data plane protocols
starting with `tcp-tls,wg-quic`, removing the need to manually pass `--protocol`
to enable HTTPS-camouflage transport. The `--protocol` option remains available
to explicitly restrict or select specific protocols (or reorder their priority).

Furthermore, in `crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls`, if default port 443 is unavailable
(e.g., due to permission constraints or address in use), the transport now
attempts fallback port 8443, and if 8443 is also unavailable, gracefully falls
back to an ephemeral port rather than failing agent startup.

Key changes:
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`, update `UpArgs::protocols` default_value
  to `"tcp-tls,wg-quic"`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs`, reorder `PROTOCOLS` registry with `tcp-tls`
  first, followed by `wg-quic`.
- In `crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls/src/transport.rs`, add multi-tier fallback
  (443 -> 8443 -> ephemeral) for unconstrained port bindings.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 22:56:08 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 510116afb9 Add automatic protocol fallback with backoff and silence DHT bootstrap error
When multiple data plane protocols (such as tcp-tls and wg-quic) are configured,
the agent previously attempted only the first mutually supported protocol in
served order. If that protocol failed to connect or dropped (due to NAT, firewall,
or handshake failure), ensure_links retried the exact same failed protocol
on every tick without ever falling back to alternative supported protocols.
Additionally, tcp-tls mistakenly included 127.0.0.1 in peer candidate lists,
causing peers to connect to their own local listener and fail certificate
verification (NotValidForName). Finally, BitTorrent DHT bootstrap failures
in the third-party mainline crate were logged as noisy ERRORs despite overlay
connectivity operating normally.

Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs, implement ProtocolDialState with
  exponential backoff (3s, 6s, 12s, 24s, 48s, capped at 60s).
- In ensure_links, select the highest-priority mutually supported protocol
  that is not currently on backoff cooldown. If a protocol fails, immediately
  record the failure and fall back to alternative mutually supported protocols
  without waiting for the periodic ticker.
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls, remove localhost loopback from local_ip_candidates
  and capability announcements, and prevent open() from connecting to our own
  listening port.
- In crates/tsunagi-cli/src/main.rs, set mainline=off in the default tracing
  filter so benign BitTorrent DHT routing table bootstrap errors do not alarm users.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (349 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 22:51:08 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov e24548b3b0 Fix Windows address allocation check and add custom SNI for tcp-tls
When running on Windows with Wintun, assigning an overlay IPv4 address
via netsh triggers Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). During this tentative
window, binding a UDP socket to the address returns WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL
(os error 10049), causing the agent to prematurely log a false-positive
PluginError ('allocated ... but the address is not on any interface').

Furthermore, Russian TSPU / DPI filters block unrecognized SNIs and
non-standard ALPNs on TCP port 443 with TCP RST injection (os error 10054).
The default 'tsunagi.local' SNI and 'tsunagi-tls/1' ALPN were trivially
fingerprinted.

Key improvements:
- In crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/tun.rs, enhance address_is_local on Windows
  to inspect active OS interfaces via netdev::get_interfaces() if UDP
  bind fails.
- In crates/tsunagi/src/agent/network.rs, introduce an asynchronous retry
  loop in publish_allocations on Windows (up to 1.5s in 150ms intervals)
  to gracefully allow DAD and IP helper updates to complete before
  reporting missing addresses.
- In crates/tsunagi-tcp-tls, add support for custom SNI domain via
  protocol options (-o sni=<domain>), defaulting to 'cloudflare.com'
  instead of 'tsunagi.local'.
- Switch TLS ALPN in tsunagi-tcp-tls from 'tsunagi-tls/1' to 'http/1.1'
  to camouflage handshake traffic as standard HTTPS web traffic.
- Update tests to verify custom and default SNI behavior.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (348 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 20:38:16 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov a4e341cd66 Report peer tunnel protocols accurately and eliminate overlay shutdown timeout
The status output previously reported all overlay peers under WireGuard
diagnostics: when a non-WireGuard protocol (like tcp-tls) was actively
carrying traffic, the report still complained that there was 'no WireGuard
handshake yet; the tunnel cannot carry traffic' and marked peer health as
degraded (warn). Furthermore, during agent shutdown or interface removal,
the overlay packet loop waited on device.recv() for the full 5-second
TASK_GRACE period, producing a spurious warning: 'task did not wind down in
time; aborting it task="overlay packet loop"'.

Key improvements:
- Add 'protocol' field to OverlayPeerReport in tsunagi::ipc.
- Track per-peer packet metrics (tx, rx, dropped) and uptime in
  GenericTunnelPlugin via TunnelPeerReport.
- Update build_report to accurately inspect and populate active tunnel
  protocols (tcp-tls, wg-quic) and their real traffic counters.
- Format member rows in CLI status with the actual protocol name, uptime,
  and real traffic metrics; mark health as Good when an active tunnel exists.
- In Interface::remove(), abort the overlay packet loop task immediately
  before destroying the device to remove the 5s hang and spurious timeout warning.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (348 tests passed).
- cargo build --release passed.
2026-09-30 17:31:17 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 41990c9934 Refactor agent logging and report active tcp-tls tunnels
Previous agent logging suffered from noisy repetitive '--- status ---'
dumps to stdout every 15 seconds, intermingled with raw println! event lines
and lacking structured log levels. Furthermore, the status report only
inspected WireguardPlugin tunnels; when tcp-tls took precedence and established
a link, the status falsely showed wg-quic as '0/1 tunnels established, waiting
for a data link' without mentioning the active tcp-tls link.

Key changes:
- Adopt compact, clean tracing output: initialize tracing_subscriber with
  .with_target(false).compact() and default filter
  'info,iroh=warn,quinn=warn,rustls=warn,boringtun=warn,mainline=warn'
  to keep standard agent events at INFO while silencing noisy internals.
- Route agent events through structured tracing (log_event):
  emit INFO for peer connect/disconnect, data link up/down, and network
  activation; WARN for rejections and plugin errors; DEBUG for dials.
- Disable periodic status dump by default (set status_interval default to 0),
  and re-route periodic ticks to tracing::debug! (log_status_summary).
- Add active_peers() to GenericTunnelPlugin and update build_report to
  include active tcp-tls tunnels in OverlayReport alongside WireGuard peers.
- Display enabled protocol priority on agent startup.

Validation on Linux:
- cargo fmt --all -- --check passed.
- cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings passed.
- cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets passed (347 tests passed).
2026-09-30 17:16:02 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 254a25ebd6 Display supported protocols in status report host section
The `host` section in `tsunagi status` previously hardcoded
`implementation: userspace WireGuard (boringtun); no kernel module needed`
and omitted information about data plane protocols supported by the build.

Changes:
- Add `protocols` row to `host_section` listing supported protocols
  and their wire versions (`wg-quic (wire v4), tcp-tls (wire v1)`) with a note
  directing to `tsunagi protocols` for detailed options.
- Update `implementation` row to reflect the multi-protocol userspace
  data plane (`userspace overlay (boringtun WireGuard, TCP TLS 1.3); no kernel module needed`).

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed.
2026-09-30 17:00:39 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov 5495cb5b34 Support CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE raising for privileged TCP TLS ports
When file capabilities are granted with `sudo setcap ...+p`, capabilities
are placed into the thread's permitted set rather than its effective set.
While TUN interface provisioning in `tsunagi` properly acquired and dropped
CAP_NET_ADMIN using `caps::raise`, `tsunagi-tcp-tls` attempted to bind port 443
directly without activating CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, resulting in EACCES
(os error 13 Permission denied).

Fixes and improvements:
- Add `caps` dependency to `tsunagi-tcp-tls` on Linux.
- Implement `NetBindServiceGuard` to temporarily raise CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
  into the effective set for the synchronous `TcpListener::bind` invocation
  and immediately drop it afterwards.
- Clarify diagnostic warnings to distinguish between default port 443 fallback
  and explicitly requested port failure.
- Update all privilege diagnostics and error hints across the codebase
  to uniformly recommend granting both capabilities:
  `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p <path>`.

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed (all workspace unit,
  integration, and protocol tests passed).
2026-09-30 16:53:33 +01:00
Aleksandr Bogomiakov fac3bd7bb9 Add tcp-tls transport and tunnel protocol disguised as HTTPS
Implement the `tcp-tls` protocol crate and generic tunnel codec abstractions
alongside `wg-quic` to circumvent deep packet inspection (DPI/TSPU), UDP
blocking, and QUIC throttling. Traffic uses standard TCP on port 443 with
TLS 1.3 framing, looking identical to regular HTTPS traffic to network
observers.

Architectural highlights:
- TunnelCodec & GenericTunnelPlugin: Provide an extensible plugin abstraction
  in `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/tunnel.rs` that encapsulates background task
  lifecycles, per-peer channels, and sink dispatch, so new transport plugins
  only define cryptographic transformations and handshake payloads.
- MultiPacketTransport & Protocol Priority Selection: Support multiple
  simultaneous transports in `AgentConfig` and dynamically dispatch `open()`
  calls by protocol identifier. In `ensure_links`, choose the highest-priority
  mutually supported protocol per peer to avoid duplicate links.
- TLS 1.3 & Certificate Pinning: Generate self-signed Ed25519 X.509 certificates
  derived from the persistent `DeviceIdentity` secret. Clients pin peer
  certificates using `PinnedEndpointVerifier` against `iroh::EndpointId`.
- End-to-end Encryption: `PeerCipher` uses X25519 static-static ECDH, HKDF-SHA256,
  and ChaCha20-Poly1305 with incrementing 64-bit nonces. Relayed traffic across
  intermediate nodes remains confidential and tamper-proof.
- Privilege handling: Default to TCP port 443 with fallback to 8443 on
  `PermissionDenied`, providing an actionable message recommending:
  `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p <path>`.

Validation on Linux:
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed.
- `cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed.
- `cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets` passed (all workspace unit,
  integration, CLI, and new `tsunagi-tcp-tls` tests passed).
2026-09-30 16:41:51 +01:00
ab db9015b26c Allow network commands to select stored names
Leaving a configured network required copying its opaque id even when its
name identified exactly one saved network. Resolve exact, case-sensitive
names from the existing local state alongside full ids and unique id prefixes.
Use the shared resolver for leave, stop, start, secret and broadcast so the
same selector has the same meaning throughout the CLI. IPC and storage still
operate on the resolved id; release and offline-removal behavior are unchanged.

Refuse ambiguous names and name/id-prefix collisions before any mutation,
listing matching names and full ids without secrets. Full ids take precedence
to provide a definitive escape from ambiguity. Preserve copied id ellipses
without stripping literal ellipses from network names.

Update help and examples. Make administrator-friendly, predictable CLI behavior
a core requirement in AGENTS.md, including actionable errors and no guessing
which resource a destructive command should affect.

Validation on Windows: cargo fmt --all -- --check and workspace/all-target
Clippy with -D warnings passed. Release workspace/all-target tests: 318 passed,
including real-process online/offline leave-by-name, preservation of other
networks, ambiguous/unknown selectors, and consistent name selection across
commands. Two existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were explicitly skipped
(a_wipe_removes_everything_and_the_next_start_is_a_stranger and
wiping_twice_is_as_ordinary_as_wiping_once). The public-DHT smoke test and
forwarding benchmark remain ignored by default. Tests use isolated state;
the user's running agent and configured networks were not changed.
2026-09-22 19:00:08 +03:00
ab c724981bfd Added per-network LAN broadcast relay
LAN game discovery previously dropped IPv4 broadcasts at TUN ingress. Carry
limited and subnet-directed UDP broadcasts to authenticated, opted-in members
of the source network, including destinations reached through mesh relays.
Preserve the original IP/UDP bytes and deliver received broadcasts only to the
local TUN; never reflood them or expose another pair's plaintext at transit.

Build immutable recipient snapshots on address and participation changes. The
origin sends one ordinary end-to-end encrypted copy per recipient; the existing
fast, bounded-hop transport router remains unchanged. Validate UDP framing,
source ownership and destination admission without game-specific port rules.
Keep network domains isolated and refuse implicit gateways to physical LANs.
The separate broadcast policy/domain layer is the extension point for future
authorized subnet exports; physical capture, bridging and LAN deduplication
are deliberately not implemented yet.

Persist default-on participation independently for each local network. Add
join --no-broadcast/--broadcast and network broadcast <id> [on|off], including
live updates and authenticated announcements. Joining without a flag preserves
the saved choice. Opt-out stops local origination and delivery, while opaque
unicast transit for other members keeps working.

Migrate SQLite schema 3 to 4 without replacing identities or signed state.
Use control ALPN 3 and local IPC protocol 14 for the new announcement/request
shapes; update peers and restart running agents together. The data ALPN 4
envelope remains unchanged. No release version bump, tag or push is included.

Document agent-owned commits in AGENTS.md: short English subjects, explanatory
bodies, scoped staging, honest validation, and repository-local fallback author
AB <ab@hexor.cy> only when an effective name/email is missing. Release actions
remain the user's responsibility.

Validation on Windows: cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo check --locked
--workspace --all-targets; cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets --
-D warnings; release workspace/all-target tests: 313 passed. The two existing
SQLite wipe failures (a_wipe_removes_everything_and_the_next_start_is_a_stranger
and wiping_twice_is_as_ordinary_as_wiping_once) were explicitly skipped; the
public-DHT smoke test and forwarding benchmark remain ignored by default.
New coverage exercises real iroh/WireGuard multihop fanout, single delivery,
runtime opt-out, unicast replies, domain isolation, malformed input and schema
migration. TUNs are in-memory; actual games and OS adapter selection were not
tested.
2026-09-22 18:33:52 +03:00
ab b4f3e57c8d Implement fast userspace multihop mesh routing
Replace the one-intermediate-peer relay with protocol-scoped connectivity
graphs and precomputed shortest-path/ECMP forwarding snapshots. Independent
transport readers forward opaque transit frames without a plugin or TUN
round trip. Carry source, destination, a bounded hop limit and stable flow
tags; preserve end-to-end WireGuard links across topology changes.

Classify IP flows before encryption and preserve their tags through the
WireGuard pending queue. Add offline four-agent path-change coverage, loop
and isolation tests, and an opt-in release forwarding microbenchmark. Bump
control/data ALPNs while preserving persistent network identities and state.

Also include the pending Windows Mainline idle-timeout fix and its regression
test, using a reproducible vendored dependency patch.

Validation: fmt, workspace Clippy with warnings denied, and 307 release tests
passed. Two pre-existing Windows SQLite wipe failures were excluded; public
DHT and the manual benchmark remain ignored by default. The forwarding
microbenchmark measured 103 ns (64 B) and 202 ns (1280 B) per transit packet,
excluding encryption and socket I/O.
2026-09-22 18:08:26 +03:00
312 changed files with 88302 additions and 5744 deletions

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# Windows: link the C runtime statically, so the agent and the tray start on a
# machine that has no Visual C++ redistributable installed. The installer ships
# nothing but our own files and Wintun.
[target.x86_64-pc-windows-msvc]
rustflags = ["-C", "target-feature=+crt-static"]
+350
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name: Release
# Build the agent for every supported target on a version tag, leave each build
# as a run artifact, and then — only after every target has built — attach the
# archives to the release. Linux is a fully static musl binary (built with
# cargo-zigbuild) so one artifact runs on any distro and can be repackaged
# however a distro prefers.
#
# Targeted at Gitea Actions: artifacts use @v3 (the v4 backend is not available
# on Gitea/GHES), and the release is filled through Gitea's own API with curl
# rather than `gh`, which speaks only to github.com.
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
permissions:
contents: write
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_NET_RETRY: "10"
jobs:
build:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-x86_64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: amd64
pkg_arch: x86_64
gnu_target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: arm64
pkg_arch: aarch64
# 32-bit ARM with hardware float (ARMv7, `v7l`): single-board and edge
# devices. Statically linked like the others.
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: armv7-unknown-linux-musleabihf
asset: tsunagi-linux-armv7
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: armhf
pkg_arch: armv7h
- os: macos-latest
target: aarch64-apple-darwin
asset: tsunagi-macos-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: false
- os: windows-latest
target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
asset: tsunagi-windows-x86_64
archive: zip
zig: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
with:
key: ${{ matrix.target }}
# aws-lc-sys (iroh's rustls backend) and the bundled sqlite are C, and the
# musl targets have no prebuilt bindings, so bindgen needs libclang and the
# C build needs cmake. zig is the cross C compiler cargo-zigbuild drives.
- name: Install musl build and packaging tooling
if: matrix.zig
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends cmake clang libclang-dev libarchive-tools zstd
- name: Install zig
if: matrix.zig
uses: mlugg/setup-zig@v2
with:
# Pin a real, archived Zig release. Left unpinned the action resolves
# to the newest version it knows of (a yet-unreleased 0.16.0-dev),
# whose tarball 404s on ziglang.org while the community mirrors flake.
version: 0.14.1
- name: Install cargo-zigbuild
if: matrix.zig
uses: taiki-e/install-action@v2
with:
tool: cargo-zigbuild
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "${{ matrix.zig }}" == "true" ]]; then
# zig's linker ignores the `-O1` GNU-ld optimization flag Rust passes
# and says so on stderr, which rustc now surfaces as a linker_messages
# warning. It is cosmetic — the binary is correct — so quiet just that
# one lint to keep the musl build log clean. A real link error still
# fails the build.
export RUSTFLAGS="${RUSTFLAGS:-} -A linker_messages"
cargo zigbuild --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsng
else
cargo build --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsng
fi
# The tray GUI. On Linux it is built against glibc (an old baseline for
# portability), not musl: a GUI must dlopen libGL/X11/Wayland at runtime,
# which a static musl binary cannot. macOS and Windows build it natively.
- name: Build the tray GUI
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Linux" ]]; then
if [[ -n "${{ matrix.gnu_target }}" ]]; then
# tray-icon links GTK and libappindicator through pkg-config, which
# has no cross story under zig, so the Linux GUI is built natively
# (x86_64 only) against the runner's glibc.
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
libgtk-3-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev libxdo-dev
cargo build --release --locked \
--target "${{ matrix.gnu_target }}" --bin tsunagi-tray
else
echo "no GUI build for ${{ matrix.target }}"
fi
else
cargo build --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsunagi-tray
fi
- name: Package
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
stage="dist/pkg/${{ matrix.asset }}"
mkdir -p "$stage"
bin="tsng"
[[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Windows" ]] && bin="tsng.exe"
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${bin}" "$stage/"
# The tray GUI alongside it, where it was built (Linux: x86_64 only).
tray="tsunagi-tray"
[[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Windows" ]] && tray="tsunagi-tray.exe"
if [[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Linux" ]]; then
if [[ -n "${{ matrix.gnu_target }}" ]]; then
cp "target/${{ matrix.gnu_target }}/release/${tray}" "$stage/"
fi
else
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${tray}" "$stage/"
fi
# The top-level README, plus the per-OS install notes and integration
# files, so the archive carries what the platform needs to set up.
cp README.md "$stage/"
case "${{ runner.os }}" in
Linux)
cp dist/linux/tsunagi.service dist/linux/install.sh \
dist/linux/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules "$stage/"
cp dist/linux/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
macOS)
cp dist/macos/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist "$stage/"
cp dist/macos/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
# The tray as an application bundle, for the Homebrew cask.
bash dist/macos/build-app.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsunagi-tray" \
"$version" "$stage/Tsunagi.app"
;;
Windows)
cp dist/windows/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
esac
archive="${{ matrix.asset }}-${version}.${{ matrix.archive }}"
if [[ "${{ matrix.archive }}" == "zip" ]]; then
(cd dist/pkg && 7z a "../../${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}")
else
tar -C dist/pkg -czf "${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}"
fi
# The Windows installer: the agent as a service, Wintun, the tray and the
# PATH entry in one setup program. Wintun is the signed library from
# wintun.net, pinned by hash so a changed download fails the build.
- name: Build the Windows installer
if: runner.os == 'Windows'
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$version = $env:GITHUB_REF_NAME.TrimStart('v')
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://www.wintun.net/builds/wintun-0.14.1.zip -OutFile wintun.zip
$hash = (Get-FileHash wintun.zip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash
if ($hash -ne '07C256185D6EE3652E09FA55C0B673E2624B565E02C4B9091C79CA7D2F24EF51') {
throw "wintun.zip has an unexpected hash: $hash"
}
Expand-Archive wintun.zip -DestinationPath wintun-dl
choco install innosetup -y --no-progress
$iscc = Join-Path ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} 'Inno Setup 6\ISCC.exe'
$stage = Join-Path $PWD 'dist/pkg/${{ matrix.asset }}'
& $iscc "/DAppVersion=$version" "/DSourceDir=$stage" `
"/DWintunDir=$(Join-Path $PWD 'wintun-dl/wintun/bin/amd64')" `
"/O$PWD" dist/windows/tsunagi.iss
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "ISCC failed with $LASTEXITCODE" }
# A dependency-free .deb for the x86_64 and aarch64 Linux builds: it drops
# the static binary, the systemd service and the polkit rule. Built with
# dpkg-deb (present on the runner); see dist/deb/build-deb.sh.
- name: Build the Debian package
if: matrix.deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
bash dist/deb/build-deb.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.deb_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi_${version}_${{ matrix.deb_arch }}.deb"
# A dependency-free Arch package (.pkg.tar.zst), assembled with bsdtar and
# zstd (no makepkg); same binary, service and polkit rule. See
# dist/arch/build-pkg.sh.
- name: Build the Arch package
if: matrix.pkg_arch
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
pkgver="${version//-/_}"
bash dist/arch/build-pkg.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi-${pkgver}-1-${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}.pkg.tar.zst"
# The GUI variants: the same agent plus the tray binary and a desktop
# launcher, named tsunagi-gui (conflicting with the headless packages).
- name: Build the GUI packages
if: matrix.gnu_target
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
pkgver="${version//-/_}"
tray="target/${{ matrix.gnu_target }}/release/tsunagi-tray"
bash dist/deb/build-deb.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.deb_arch }}" "$version" \
"tsunagi-gui_${version}_${{ matrix.deb_arch }}.deb" "$tray"
bash dist/arch/build-pkg.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}" "$version" \
"tsunagi-gui-${pkgver}-1-${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}.pkg.tar.zst" "$tray"
# @v3 on purpose: Gitea does not support the v4 artifact backend. This is
# what makes the archive (and the .deb, where built) show up under the run
# and hands it to `publish`.
- name: Upload the build outputs as run artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
path: |
${{ matrix.asset }}-*.*
*.deb
*.pkg.tar.zst
tsunagi-setup-*.exe
if-no-files-found: error
publish:
name: Publish release
needs: build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Download every build artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
path: artifacts
- name: Show what was collected
run: find artifacts -type f
- name: Create the release and upload the archives
shell: bash
env:
# Gitea injects this with access to the current repository. If the
# release calls below return 403, the repo/runner is configured to
# hand Actions a read-only token — grant it write access to releases.
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -u
tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
# Gitea sets GITHUB_API_URL to its own API root (…/api/v1); fall back
# to building it from the server URL if it is absent.
base="${GITHUB_API_URL:-${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/v1}"
api="${base}/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
auth="Authorization: token ${TOKEN}"
echo "release API: $api"
prerelease=false
case "$tag" in *-*) prerelease=true ;; esac
# The release id for this tag, if it already exists.
code=$(curl -sS -o resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -H "$auth" "$api/releases/tags/$tag" || true)
echo "get release by tag: HTTP $code"
id=$(grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' resp.json 2>/dev/null | head -n1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
if [ -z "$id" ]; then
code=$(curl -sS -o resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST -H "$auth" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"tag_name\":\"$tag\",\"name\":\"tsunagi $tag\",\"prerelease\":$prerelease}" \
"$api/releases" || true)
echo "create release: HTTP $code"
id=$(grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' resp.json 2>/dev/null | head -n1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
if [ -z "$id" ]; then
echo "could not create the release; response was:" >&2
cat resp.json >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
fi
echo "release id: $id"
# download-artifact@v3 nests each artifact in a directory named after
# its upload, with the single archive inside. The read loop runs in
# this shell (process substitution, not a pipe) so a failed upload
# actually fails the job.
rc=0
while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
name=$(basename "$f")
code=$(curl -sS -o up.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST -H "$auth" \
-F "attachment=@${f}" \
"$api/releases/$id/assets?name=${name}" || true)
echo "upload $name: HTTP $code"
if [ "$code" -lt 200 ] || [ "$code" -ge 300 ]; then
cat up.json >&2 || true
rc=1
fi
done < <(find artifacts -type f \( -name '*.tar.gz' -o -name '*.zip' -o -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.pkg.tar.zst' -o -name 'tsunagi-setup-*.exe' \) -print0)
exit "$rc"
+322
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@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
name: Release
# GitHub version of the release pipeline. The build half mirrors the Gitea one
# in .gitea/workflows/release.yml (static musl Linux via cargo-zigbuild, native
# macOS and Windows); only the publish half differs: it uses the current
# artifact actions (Node 24) and fills the release with `gh`.
#
# Every job is gated on `github.server_url == 'https://github.com'`, so this file
# runs only on GitHub. Gitea runs its own copy in .gitea/workflows (which pins
# the older @v3 artifact actions it supports); should a Gitea instance also read
# .github/workflows, the guard skips these jobs there so they never fail on the
# artifact backend or `gh`.
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
permissions:
contents: write
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_NET_RETRY: "10"
jobs:
build:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
if: ${{ github.server_url == 'https://github.com' }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-x86_64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: amd64
pkg_arch: x86_64
gnu_target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: tsunagi-linux-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: arm64
pkg_arch: aarch64
# 32-bit ARM with hardware float (ARMv7, `v7l`): single-board and edge
# devices. Statically linked like the others.
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: armv7-unknown-linux-musleabihf
asset: tsunagi-linux-armv7
archive: tar.gz
zig: true
deb: true
deb_arch: armhf
pkg_arch: armv7h
- os: macos-latest
target: aarch64-apple-darwin
asset: tsunagi-macos-aarch64
archive: tar.gz
zig: false
- os: windows-latest
target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
asset: tsunagi-windows-x86_64
archive: zip
zig: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
with:
key: ${{ matrix.target }}
# aws-lc-sys (iroh's rustls backend) and the bundled sqlite are C, and the
# musl targets have no prebuilt bindings, so bindgen needs libclang and the
# C build needs cmake. zig is the cross C compiler cargo-zigbuild drives.
- name: Install musl build and packaging tooling
if: matrix.zig
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends cmake clang libclang-dev libarchive-tools zstd
- name: Install zig
if: matrix.zig
uses: mlugg/setup-zig@v2
with:
# Pin a real, archived Zig release. Left unpinned the action resolves
# to the newest version it knows of (a yet-unreleased 0.16.0-dev),
# whose tarball 404s on ziglang.org while the community mirrors flake.
version: 0.14.1
- name: Install cargo-zigbuild
if: matrix.zig
uses: taiki-e/install-action@v2
with:
tool: cargo-zigbuild
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "${{ matrix.zig }}" == "true" ]]; then
# zig's linker ignores the `-O1` GNU-ld optimization flag Rust passes
# and says so on stderr, which rustc now surfaces as a linker_messages
# warning. It is cosmetic — the binary is correct — so quiet just that
# one lint to keep the musl build log clean. A real link error still
# fails the build.
export RUSTFLAGS="${RUSTFLAGS:-} -A linker_messages"
cargo zigbuild --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsng
else
cargo build --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsng
fi
# The tray GUI. On Linux it is built against glibc (an old baseline for
# portability), not musl: a GUI must dlopen libGL/X11/Wayland at runtime,
# which a static musl binary cannot. macOS and Windows build it natively.
- name: Build the tray GUI
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Linux" ]]; then
if [[ -n "${{ matrix.gnu_target }}" ]]; then
# tray-icon links GTK and libappindicator through pkg-config, which
# has no cross story under zig, so the Linux GUI is built natively
# (x86_64 only) against the runner's glibc.
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
libgtk-3-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev libxdo-dev
cargo build --release --locked \
--target "${{ matrix.gnu_target }}" --bin tsunagi-tray
else
echo "no GUI build for ${{ matrix.target }}"
fi
else
cargo build --release --locked --target "${{ matrix.target }}" --bin tsunagi-tray
fi
- name: Package
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
stage="dist/pkg/${{ matrix.asset }}"
mkdir -p "$stage"
bin="tsng"
[[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Windows" ]] && bin="tsng.exe"
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${bin}" "$stage/"
# The tray GUI alongside it, where it was built (Linux: x86_64 only).
tray="tsunagi-tray"
[[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Windows" ]] && tray="tsunagi-tray.exe"
if [[ "${{ runner.os }}" == "Linux" ]]; then
if [[ -n "${{ matrix.gnu_target }}" ]]; then
cp "target/${{ matrix.gnu_target }}/release/${tray}" "$stage/"
fi
else
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${tray}" "$stage/"
fi
# The top-level README, plus the per-OS install notes and integration
# files, so the archive carries what the platform needs to set up.
cp README.md "$stage/"
case "${{ runner.os }}" in
Linux)
cp dist/linux/tsunagi.service dist/linux/install.sh \
dist/linux/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules "$stage/"
cp dist/linux/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
macOS)
cp dist/macos/cy.hexor.tsunagi.plist "$stage/"
cp dist/macos/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
# The tray as an application bundle, for the Homebrew cask.
bash dist/macos/build-app.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsunagi-tray" \
"$version" "$stage/Tsunagi.app"
;;
Windows)
cp dist/windows/README.md "$stage/INSTALL.md"
;;
esac
archive="${{ matrix.asset }}-${version}.${{ matrix.archive }}"
if [[ "${{ matrix.archive }}" == "zip" ]]; then
(cd dist/pkg && 7z a "../../${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}")
else
tar -C dist/pkg -czf "${archive}" "${{ matrix.asset }}"
fi
# The Windows installer: the agent as a service, Wintun, the tray and the
# PATH entry in one setup program. Wintun is the signed library from
# wintun.net, pinned by hash so a changed download fails the build.
- name: Build the Windows installer
if: runner.os == 'Windows'
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$version = $env:GITHUB_REF_NAME.TrimStart('v')
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://www.wintun.net/builds/wintun-0.14.1.zip -OutFile wintun.zip
$hash = (Get-FileHash wintun.zip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash
if ($hash -ne '07C256185D6EE3652E09FA55C0B673E2624B565E02C4B9091C79CA7D2F24EF51') {
throw "wintun.zip has an unexpected hash: $hash"
}
Expand-Archive wintun.zip -DestinationPath wintun-dl
choco install innosetup -y --no-progress
$iscc = Join-Path ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} 'Inno Setup 6\ISCC.exe'
$stage = Join-Path $PWD 'dist/pkg/${{ matrix.asset }}'
& $iscc "/DAppVersion=$version" "/DSourceDir=$stage" `
"/DWintunDir=$(Join-Path $PWD 'wintun-dl/wintun/bin/amd64')" `
"/O$PWD" dist/windows/tsunagi.iss
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "ISCC failed with $LASTEXITCODE" }
# A dependency-free .deb for the x86_64 and aarch64 Linux builds: it drops
# the static binary, the systemd service and the polkit rule. Built with
# dpkg-deb (present on the runner); see dist/deb/build-deb.sh.
- name: Build the Debian package
if: matrix.deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
bash dist/deb/build-deb.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.deb_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi_${version}_${{ matrix.deb_arch }}.deb"
# A dependency-free Arch package (.pkg.tar.zst), assembled with bsdtar and
# zstd (no makepkg); same binary, service and polkit rule. See
# dist/arch/build-pkg.sh.
- name: Build the Arch package
if: matrix.pkg_arch
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
pkgver="${version//-/_}"
bash dist/arch/build-pkg.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}" \
"$version" \
"tsunagi-${pkgver}-1-${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}.pkg.tar.zst"
# The GUI variants: the same agent plus the tray binary and a desktop
# launcher, named tsunagi-gui (conflicting with the headless packages).
- name: Build the GUI packages
if: matrix.gnu_target
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
pkgver="${version//-/_}"
tray="target/${{ matrix.gnu_target }}/release/tsunagi-tray"
bash dist/deb/build-deb.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.deb_arch }}" "$version" \
"tsunagi-gui_${version}_${{ matrix.deb_arch }}.deb" "$tray"
bash dist/arch/build-pkg.sh \
"target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/tsng" \
"${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}" "$version" \
"tsunagi-gui-${pkgver}-1-${{ matrix.pkg_arch }}.pkg.tar.zst" "$tray"
- name: Upload the build outputs as run artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
path: |
${{ matrix.asset }}-*.*
*.deb
*.pkg.tar.zst
tsunagi-setup-*.exe
if-no-files-found: error
publish:
name: Publish release
needs: build
if: ${{ github.server_url == 'https://github.com' }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- name: Download every build artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
with:
path: artifacts
- name: Show what was collected
run: find artifacts -type f
- name: Create the release and upload the archives
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# download-artifact nests each artifact under its own directory, so
# the archives are artifacts/<asset>/<file>.
mapfile -t files < <(find artifacts -type f \( -name '*.tar.gz' -o -name '*.zip' -o -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.pkg.tar.zst' -o -name 'tsunagi-setup-*.exe' \))
printf 'asset: %s\n' "${files[@]}"
prerelease=()
case "$TAG" in *-*) prerelease=(--prerelease) ;; esac
# Create the release on the first run; on a re-run, add/replace assets
# on the release that is already there.
if gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
gh release upload "$TAG" "${files[@]}" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
else
gh release create "$TAG" "${files[@]}" \
--repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
--title "tsunagi $TAG" \
--generate-notes \
--verify-tag \
"${prerelease[@]}"
fi
+1
View File
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
/target
/.claude
+71 -23
View File
@@ -8,17 +8,29 @@ before touching the code. Do not restate the full design here; follow the links.
A proof-of-concept agent library for small private mesh networks. A user
supplies a network name and one shared secret; agents derive the same network
space independently, find each other, prove membership and exchange control
messages. Scope and non-scope are in [README.md](README.md).
messages. What it does and does not do is in [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) and [docs/threat-model.md](docs/threat-model.md).
There is no central server, no owner, no registration and no majority vote.
Design accordingly: a majority is not a root of trust.
## User experience
User convenience is a core requirement. The CLI should feel logical and
predictable to an experienced administrator: use consistent selectors and
flags, sensible defaults, and actionable errors. Let users refer to configured
networks by their exact name as well as by id or a unique id prefix; do not
make them copy an opaque identifier when the stored name identifies one network.
When a selector is ambiguous, list the matching names and ids and change
nothing. Never guess which resource a destructive command should affect.
Keep help text and examples in sync with behavior, and preserve existing
scripts when improving the interactive workflow.
## Architectural boundaries
Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
- **Control plane vs data plane.** The separation is **logical, not physical**.
The control protocol in `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/` knows nothing about
The control protocol in `crates/tsunagi-core/src/proto/` knows nothing about
packets, and a protocol crate knows nothing about the control protocol;
either can be replaced on its own. Both may ride on iroh — refusing to
would throw away iroh's NAT traversal and force the data plane to
@@ -45,14 +57,24 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
is why the authenticated transport does too.
- **A relay carries bytes, never packets.** A datagram passed on for two
other peers goes link in, link out: it is never written to the middle's
interface, never decrypted there, and never relayed twice. Reachability
that decides a route is first-hand and volatile — a live announcement
over the control plane, never a signed record and never second-hand.
interface or decrypted there. Multihop routing has a bounded hop limit;
equal-cost next hops are chosen per flow. Reachability is first-hand and
volatile: each authenticated member advertises its own direct links, of
whatever kind. A link is a way to reach a neighbour and a protocol is an
end-to-end tunnel to a peer; the two meet only in the envelope, so a
tunnel never depends on which transports carry it. Build routing tables on topology changes, never per packet. Transit
must not acquire a routing mutex or wait for a protocol/TUN reader.
- **Broadcast fanout belongs at local IP ingress.** Participation is local to
each network, enabled by default, persisted and advertised to authenticated
peers. Resolve one source domain and target only its willing members. Remote
delivery never triggers another fanout. Physical LAN exports must extend
explicit ingress and source/destination admission policies; never bypass
ownership checks or add broadcast flooding to encrypted transit.
- **Plugins never learn reachability.** An `IpPlugin` is handed a `PacketLink`
per peer and moves datagrams over it. Addresses, hole punching and relays
belong to `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/transport/`. A plugin announcement says *who*, never
belong to `crates/tsunagi-core/src/dataplane/transport/`. A plugin announcement says *who*, never
*where*.
- **The core never parses a plugin payload.** See `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/mod.rs`. Only
- **The core never parses a plugin payload.** See `crates/tsunagi-core/src/dataplane/mod.rs`. Only
`crates/tsunagi-wg-quic/src/announcement.rs` interprets `wg-quic` payloads, and
only after bounding every field. A data plane failure must never stop the
control plane.
@@ -61,7 +83,7 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
inbound packets are dropped unless their source is the address derived for
the peer that sent them. Never trust an address a peer announces.
- **Signed state is the only durable agreement.** A fact that must survive a
participant being away goes in `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` as a record signed by its
participant being away goes in `crates/tsunagi-core/src/state/` as a record signed by its
author, never in a session. Merging is deterministic, an older version never
rolls back a newer one, and absence from a snapshot is not deletion. Never
add a vote or a quorum: a majority is not a trust root here, and it would
@@ -70,6 +92,12 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
transaction, **before** the record is announced.
- **Plugins own their system objects.** A plugin creates and removes its own
interface and nothing else. Never touch routing, DNS or firewall settings.
The one exception is the system level, not a plugin: while a network's
broadcast is on, `overlay::hostrules` may install exactly a
`255.255.255.255/32` route and an inbound UDP firewall allowance (overlay range
only) for the interface the agent owns. Both are tagged `tsunagi:<interface>`,
reversible, removed on broadcast off, leave and shutdown, and computed from
local state, never from a remote announcement.
- **Device identity vs network identity.** The iroh endpoint id is the device's
public key. `NetworkId` is derived from name + secret only. Never conflate
them, and never let one change the other.
@@ -89,7 +117,7 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
normal path *and* the important failures. See [docs/testing.md](docs/testing.md).
Do not add tests for getters or to move a coverage number.
2. **Never change `IDENTITY_SCHEME`, the derivation labels, or the transcript
encoding** in `crates/tsunagi/src/identity/network.rs` and `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/handshake.rs` without
encoding** in `crates/tsunagi-core/src/identity/network.rs` and `crates/tsunagi-core/src/proto/handshake.rs` without
treating it as an incompatible protocol change. Bumping the crate version or
the control protocol version must not change an existing `NetworkId`.
3. **Secrets never leak.** Not into logs, not into `Debug`, not into status
@@ -100,7 +128,7 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
the library; tests opt out explicitly at the top of each file.
5. **Bounds before allocation.** Frame lengths are checked against
`Limits::max_frame_len` before a buffer is allocated. Every string, list and
queue has a limit in `crates/tsunagi/src/config.rs`.
queue has a limit in `crates/tsunagi-core/src/config.rs`.
6. **Failure is contained.** A bad signature, wrong secret, malformed packet or
unknown version rejects one message or one session. It never stops another
network and never stops the agent. There is no irreversible global error
@@ -117,24 +145,25 @@ Keep these separate. Crossing them is the main thing to review for.
up shutdown. Wind tasks down with a grace period and then abort.
10. **Nothing from a remote announcement becomes a shell command, a filesystem
path or an OS setting.** The agent never touches interfaces or OS settings
it did not create.
it did not create (the tagged broadcast host rules above are for its own
interface).
## Where things live
| path | responsibility |
|---------------------|----------------|
| `crates/tsunagi/src/identity/` | device identity; deterministic network space identity and derived keys |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/storage/` | `state.sqlite`, `cache.sqlite`, directory ownership lock |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/discovery.rs` | candidate sources; test and static backends |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/proto/` | framing, message formats, membership handshake |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/net.rs` | iroh endpoint adapter and observability snapshots |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/agent/` | agent lifecycle, per-network runtimes, sessions, events, status |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/state/` | signed records that outlive a session, their merge rules and address allocation |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/overlay/` | the one interface an agent owns: provisioning, the TUN, routing, source checks |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/dataplane/` | the protocol contract and the authenticated packet transport |
| `crates/tsunagi/src/dns/` | the DNS view of a network: zone, server, resolver publication |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/identity/` | device identity; deterministic network space identity and derived keys |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/storage/` | `state.sqlite`, `cache.sqlite`, directory ownership lock |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/discovery.rs` | candidate sources; test and static backends |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/proto/` | framing, message formats, membership handshake |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/net.rs` | iroh endpoint adapter and observability snapshots |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/agent/` | agent lifecycle, per-network runtimes, sessions, events, status |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/state/` | signed records that outlive a session, their merge rules and address allocation |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/overlay/` | the one interface an agent owns: provisioning, the TUN, routing, source checks, broadcast host rules |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/dataplane/` | the protocol contract and the authenticated packet transport |
| `crates/tsunagi-core/src/dns/` | the DNS view of a network: zone, server, resolver publication |
| `crates/tsunagi-wg-quic/` | the `wg-quic` protocol: its keys, its announcement, its tunnels |
| `crates/tsunagi-cli/` | the command line agent; the only place that owns a runtime, a logger and signals |
| `crates/tsunagi/` | the command line agent, built as `tsng`; the only place that owns a runtime, a logger and signals |
| `tests/` | integration tests; `tests/common/` is the shared harness |
Add abstractions only at real substitution or testing boundaries. Do not add a
@@ -166,7 +195,26 @@ kind.
- Running several library instances in one process is not a test of several
system processes; do not describe it as one.
## Before you open a change
## Commit every completed change
Agents must create a Git commit before finishing any task that changes this
repository. Do not leave the user to make the commit. Inspect recent commit
messages and follow their style: a short English subject stating the change,
then a useful body explaining the problem, final behavior, architectural
decisions, compatibility/migration effects, and checks actually performed.
Write enough context for a future maintainer or LLM to understand why the code
exists. Record failed or skipped checks honestly; never claim unrun tests.
Before committing, inspect the diff and stage only this task's changes. Preserve
unrelated user changes and never commit secrets or generated build artifacts.
If Git has no effective author name or email, set only the missing repository-
local values to `AB` and `ab@hexor.cy`. Do not override an existing identity or
change global Git configuration. Report the resulting commit hash.
Version bumps, release tags, and pushing commits/tags belong to the user unless
they explicitly ask the agent to do them. Read-only tasks need no empty commit.
## Required validation
```bash
cargo fmt --all -- --check
Generated
+3171 -105
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+12 -4
View File
@@ -4,16 +4,24 @@
[workspace]
resolver = "3"
members = ["crates/*"]
exclude = ["vendor/mainline", "vendor/iroh"]
# Mainline 8.0.0 treats Windows UDP read timeouts as socket failures.
# Keep the small receive-loop correction reproducible until an upstream fix.
[patch.crates-io]
mainline = { path = "vendor/mainline" }
# Backport bounded path retries until an iroh release includes the OOM fix.
iroh = { path = "vendor/iroh" }
[workspace.package]
edition = "2024"
rust-version = "1.91"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/tsunagi-net/tsunagi"
license = "WTFPL"
repository = "https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi"
[workspace.lints.rust]
missing_docs = "warn"
unsafe_code = "forbid"
unsafe_code = "deny"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
unwrap_used = "warn"
@@ -21,7 +29,7 @@ expect_used = "warn"
panic = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
iroh = { version = "1.2", default-features = false, features = ["tls-ring"] }
iroh = { version = "1.2", default-features = false, features = ["tls-ring", "portmapper"] }
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros"] }
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
postcard = { version = "1.1", default-features = false, features = ["use-std"] }
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
DO WHAT THE FUCK YOU WANT TO PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 2, December 2004
Copyright (C) 2004 Sam Hocevar <sam@hocevar.net>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim or modified
copies of this license document, and changing it is allowed as long
as the name is changed.
DO WHAT THE FUCK YOU WANT TO PUBLIC LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
0. You just DO WHAT THE FUCK YOU WANT TO.
+188 -672
View File
@@ -1,719 +1,235 @@
# tsunagi
A proof-of-concept Rust library for **small private mesh networks** — a handful
of friends, home machines, a few servers. Units to dozens of participants, not
thousands.
The end user configures exactly two things:
```text
network_name
secret # one shared secret; "password" and "secret" mean the same value
```
From those, every agent independently derives the same network space. There is
no central server, no network owner with special powers, no registration and no
majority vote. Anyone who knows the parameters can join; nobody has to trust
anybody else.
## What this proof of concept actually does
A working library with **real iroh connections** and integration tests:
- persistent device identity stored in SQLite, stable across restarts;
- several independent networks at once in one agent;
- deterministic network identity derived from name + secret;
- candidates supplied by a replaceable discovery component;
- automatic first contact through the public Mainline DHT (BEP44);
- real iroh connections plus an explicit mutual proof of network membership;
- a small versioned control protocol: handshake, hostname/capability
announcement, ping/pong;
- automatic reconnect with bounded exponential backoff and jitter;
- status snapshots, an event stream and honest diagnostics;
- configuration restored after a restart;
- correct behaviour when the disposable cache is missing or corrupt;
- a **WireGuard data plane**, in userspace: its own key per network, an IPv6
overlay with deterministically derived addresses and optional IPv4, real
tunnels carried over iroh, and address ownership enforced rather than
believed;
- a **command line agent**, `tsunagi`, with a local control socket.
### What it deliberately does **not** do
Not implemented, and not pretended to be: DNS, routing through
intermediate participants, a full CRDT, dynamically loaded plugins, a system
service, a complete CLI, or a local control socket. Snapshot synchronisation
and signed revocations are designed for but not implemented — see
[docs/sync-model.md](docs/sync-model.md). The WireGuard plugin's own limits,
including that its system backend is Linux-only, are in
[docs/wireguard.md](docs/wireguard.md#limits-and-future-work).
**Control and data are separated logically, not physically.** Both ride on
iroh, on different ALPNs and different connections, so the data plane inherits
iroh's hole punching and relay fallback instead of reimplementing them — while
the control protocol still knows nothing about packets and can keep a different
transport underneath it later. Filtering user traffic remains the operating
system's and the user's responsibility, not this library's.
## Requirements
- Rust 1.91 or newer (iroh 1.2 requires it), edition 2024. Pinned dependencies
in `Cargo.lock`.
- No internet, no public DHT, no public relay, no administrator rights and no changes
to OS network settings are needed to build or test.
- WireGuard runs in userspace (boringtun): **no kernel module and no `wg`
tool**. Only creating a real network interface needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, and
`--no-tun` skips even that.
## Trying it on two machines
On the first machine:
```bash
cargo build --release
./target/release/tsunagi status # this device, the agent, and this host
./target/release/tsunagi network # the networks this device belongs to
```
Two commands do the work, and they are separate on purpose: `up` runs the
agent — one per device, for as long as you want it — and `join` decides
what it belongs to, at any time, while it runs.
```bash
# Terminal one: the agent. It prints its endpoint id and then serves.
./target/release/tsunagi up
# Terminal two: make a network. With no --secret it invents one and prints
# it, along with the line to send the other machine.
./target/release/tsunagi join --network lab
```
On the second machine, start its agent and join the same network with the
secret that was printed:
```bash
./target/release/tsunagi up
./target/release/tsunagi join --network lab --secret tsn1...
```
**Name and secret are enough for the first meeting.** Mainline DHT discovery
is enabled by default. Each active network publishes this device's endpoint
and searches until the first authenticated connection. While connected it
only republishes; after 60 seconds without any authenticated connection it
searches again. Publication is approximately every five minutes, and records
older than 15 minutes are ignored. DHT storage nodes may retain them longer.
Use `--no-dht` to disable DHT, or `--peer <endpoint-id>` for optional manual
bootstrap. `--reach local` disables public DHT regardless of the DHT flag.
Endpoint records are public, signed, and contain no network secret. Discovery
is not authentication: every connection must still prove network membership.
Details and failure behavior are in [docs/mainline-dht.md](docs/mainline-dht.md).
**One introduction is enough for the whole network.** Members tell each
other about the members they know, and every author of a signed record is
somebody to try, so a device pointed at one member ends up talking to all
of them rather than to the one that happened to be on its command line.
What travels is a candidate — an address somebody has seen — and it is
authenticated by the handshake like any other; being introduced grants
nothing. It is deliberately the same shape a lookup in a distributed hash
table would return, so that is a source to add beside this one rather than
a redesign.
An agent with nobody to contact says so in `status` rather than sitting
there looking patient.
Within a few seconds both print something like:
```text
+ peer b47c958462 connected over direct rtt=Some(4.5ms)
+ data link to b47c958462 for wg-quic: direct via 192.0.2.7:41234, datagram 1382
--- status ---
control: 1 peer(s), 0 dial failure(s), 0 handshake failure(s)
wg-quic: tsun0 on 10.13.37.69/24 mtu 1280, 1/1 tunnel(s) established
4jO4kx9Z 10.13.37.237 handshake 3s ago tx=0 rx=0 dropped=0 path=direct via 192.0.2.7:41234
```
`1/1 tunnel(s) established` means a real WireGuard handshake completed.
## Checking that it works
From another shell on either machine:
```bash
tsunagi status
```
```text
endpoint 7d76ccbbc21bf30767e14422c0494740a2cecc02aa9f82d5b8d57bdae350e7fc
hostname tsunagi-7d76ccbbc2
bound 0.0.0.0:41641
network lab (z2o4qwrvnj3zb6st2aoqg4abf342j662q2ujttqrsmz22argk2ba) active
peer b345d5271b tsunagi-b345d5271b Direct rtt 24ms
overlay tsunz2o4qwrvnj3 fd09:…:c1c6/64 and 100.110.49.177 mtu 1280 1/1 tunnel(s) up
SDsEb/WF fd09:…:c4b / 100.65.243.53 handshake 4s ago tx 0 rx 0 Direct via Ip(…)
```
`1/1 tunnel(s) up` and a recent handshake mean the tunnel is live. Then send
real traffic to the peer's overlay address:
```bash
ping6 fd09:…:c4b # or
ping 100.65.243.53
```
`tx` and `rx` in the status should start moving.
**Addresses are allocated and then remembered.** The default range is
`10.13.37.0/24`; the first member to join settles it and later members adopt
what they find, so `--ipv4-range` only matters for whoever starts the network:
```bash
tsunagi up --ipv4-range 10.44.0.0/16
tsunagi up --ipv4-range none # no data plane at all
```
One agent has one interface, so two of its networks cannot both use that
range. The second takes the range **derived from its own network id**: not
picked locally — every member derives the same one from something they all
already have — so it is an agreement rather than a guess, and a device in
several networks gets an address in each.
An address is claimed with a record signed by that member's persistent device
key, stored, and merged between every replica. A member that disappears for a
month comes back to the same address, because the claim outlived the session.
No vote is involved — see
[docs/wireguard.md](docs/wireguard.md#ipv4-allocated-signed-and-kept) and
[docs/sync-model.md](docs/sync-model.md).
Because the address is allocated at run time rather than derived, it is not
known until the agent has started and agreed with its peers. The agent then
assigns it to the interface itself.
## Levels
The command line is split the way the design is. A bare `tsunagi up` needs
only a network name and a secret; everything else sits under the level it
belongs to, which `--help` shows as two sections:
* **System** — what the agent itself does: how it reaches peers (`--reach`),
the one overlay interface it owns (`--interface`, `--mtu`, `--no-tun`), the
address range (`--ipv4-range`), and the local resolver (`--no-dns` to disable).
* **Transport** — which protocols carry packets (`--protocol`, a list) and
their own settings (`-o key=value`, or `-o protocol:key=value`).
```bash
tsunagi protocols # what this build can carry packets with
```
```text
wg-quic (wire version 4)
what WireGuard's cryptography carried in iroh's QUIC datagrams
-o keepalive=SECONDS keeps a tunnel and its link warm through a NAT
-o mtu=BYTES largest packet a tunnel will carry, at least 576
```
Each protocol declares its own settings, so the agent can list them without
knowing anything about the protocol, and a setting no selected protocol takes
is refused rather than ignored. `--protocol none` runs the control plane by
itself.
A pair of peers uses a protocol they both have **at the same wire version**.
That is not the software version: two peers on different builds carry traffic
for each other for as long as the bytes between them have not changed. A peer
with nothing in common keeps its control plane — messages and signed state
still flow — and simply has no data plane, which `tsunagi status` shows as a
session with no agreed protocol.
## Names
DNS is enabled by default and serves a local zone for **every network this device is in**,
each named after the network, so members can be reached by name instead of
by address:
```bash
tsunagi up # DNS is already enabled
dig @127.0.0.1 -p 5354 music.lab
```
An explicit choice is remembered across restarts. `--no-dns` or `tsunagi dns off`
disables it; `--dns` or `tsunagi dns on` enables it again. Existing saved opt-outs
remain respected. The `dns on` and `dns off` commands also take effect immediately
on a running agent. `--dns` and `--no-dns` cannot be combined.
The zone of a network is its name — `--dns-zone` is gone, because with
several networks there is no single zone to name. A network name may contain
dots, so `--network lab.internal` is how you get `music.lab.internal`.
Names come from signed state, which is the point: **a member that is
switched off still resolves**, because its claim outlived the session.
The answers are IPv4 addresses, because that is what the overlay is. The
*questions* are taken on `127.0.0.1` and `[::1]`, over UDP and TCP, so a
resolver reaches it over whichever family it uses; both are published to the
system resolver together. Loopback and nothing else: the zones are a view
for the host running the agent, and binding an overlay address would put
them in front of the whole mesh — an agent in two networks would then answer
one network's questions about the other's names.
The zone is the network name, and it is yours to choose. A name that
shadows a real public domain is reported and then used: a network called
`ru` warns that every public `.ru` name becomes unreachable from this host,
and then does it. Anything that collides with nothing — which is most names
— is said nothing about, because a warning that fires on every private name
anybody picks is how people learn to ignore warnings.
On Linux the agent tells systemd-resolved to send questions for that suffix
here, over D-Bus, scoped to the overlay interface and as a *routing* domain
so it never becomes the resolver for anything else. resolved drops the whole
setting when the interface goes, and the interface goes with the agent.
Only an interface the agent created, though. Under `--no-tun` there is no
host interface at all, and the agent says so and serves the zone on
loopback rather than configuring whatever else on the host happens to share
the name.
That last step needs permission that `CAP_NET_ADMIN` does not give:
systemd-resolved asks polkit, and polkit decides by **user**, not by
capability, so there is no way for the agent to arrange it from inside. On
a desktop the refusal reads `Interactive authentication required`.
Running as a system service is enough. Otherwise the agent prints the rule
that grants it — the four actions it calls and nothing else — ready to
paste:
```bash
sudo tee /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/50-tsunagi-resolved.rules > /dev/null <<'RULE'
polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
var allowed = [
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-dns-servers",
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-domains",
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-default-route",
"org.freedesktop.resolve1.revert"
];
if (allowed.indexOf(action.id) >= 0 && subject.user == "YOUR-USER") {
return polkit.Result.YES;
}
});
RULE
```
**Without it the server still runs** — `tsunagi status` prints where it is
listening and the exact `dig` line — so the automatic part is missing, not
the feature. The refusal is said once rather than on every pass, and retried
slowly, because nothing but a person will change it.
The server is authoritative for its zone and nothing else. No recursion, no
forwarding, no cache: pointing a resolver at it can never make it a route to
the outside.
## Privileges
On Linux the agent **manages its own overlay interface**. It creates the TUN
interface, sets the MTU, brings it up and assigns both overlay addresses, all
over netlink in process — no `ip` invocation, no shell, nothing that a
remote peer could influence.
That needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, granted once:
```bash
sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
```
`+p` rather than `+ep`: the capability is then *permitted* but not
*effective*, and the agent raises it only around the handful of netlink calls
that need it — a few milliseconds at startup, and again if its address
allocation changes. Everything else, including every byte from the network,
is handled with it lowered. `+ep` works too; the agent lowers it on the way
in.
`tsunagi status` says which of these applies on the host it runs on, along
with what the agent is doing. It grades each finding: **ok** for what works,
**warn** for what the agent runs without and you can fix from the line it
prints, **FAIL** for what it cannot work around. The words carry the grade as
well as the colour, so the report reads the same piped to a file or on a
terminal without colour, and it honours `NO_COLOR`.
Members are listed online first, then the ones that are away. A member that
is away is reported plainly rather than flagged: in a mesh of laptops it is
the ordinary condition, not a fault. The signed state is what makes that
sayable — it remembers who belongs while they are gone, so the report can say
"offline, 10.13.37.99 still reserved for it" instead of leaving a
dial-failure counter to imply it. Counters are history and are never graded:
a peer that left and came back should not leave the report looking broken.
The other two commands split along the line the system itself draws. `id` is
this **device**: the key it signs with and the name it answers to. `network`
is what it **belongs to**: which networks, their secrets, joining and
leaving. A device outlives every network it is in, and a network outlives
any device in it, so a command that mixed them had to be read twice.
Every item takes the same shape, so there is nothing to remember: name it to
see it, name it with a value to change it.
```
tsunagi id everything about this device
tsunagi id hostname the name it answers to
tsunagi id hostname mango change it
tsunagi id key the key it signs with
tsunagi id key rotate replace that key
tsunagi network the networks this device belongs to
tsunagi network join -n lab -s tsn1… join one; adds it to a running agent
tsunagi network join -n lab resume one this device has, or make it on the spot
tsunagi network stop <id> stop serving it, keeping everything
tsunagi network start <id> serve it again, from where it left off
tsunagi network leave <id> give up the address and name, then forget it
tsunagi network secret the secret of each joined network
tsunagi network secret <id> just that one, for copying
tsunagi network secret generate a fresh secret for a network that does not exist yet
tsunagi dns whether the local resolver is serving, and what
tsunagi dns on start it, now and after every restart
tsunagi dns off stop it, now and after every restart
```
**A network without a secret makes one.** `tsunagi join --network lab`
resolves a bare name in the obvious way: if this device is already in
exactly one network called `lab`, that one — so the name alone resumes what
you have; if it is in none, a fresh random secret, printed in full with the
line to send the other machine:
```
joined `lab` (k2on43wadbi5x267vp6z3ogkm7nbjedfdoxyauxhtxhwqrprylba)
<p align="center">
<img src="dist/linux/tsunagi.svg" width="96" alt="">
</p>
<h1 align="center">tsunagi</h1>
<p align="center">
<b>A mesh VPN with no server.</b><br>
Pick a network name, share a secret, and your machines are on one private network.
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/releases/latest"><img alt="release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/house-of-vanity/tsunagi?include_prereleases"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img alt="CI" src="https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg"></a>
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-WTFPL-blue"></a>
</p>
```console
laptop$ tsng join -n home
joined `home`
secret tsn1u7c…
Run this on the other machine:
server$ tsng join -n home -s tsn1u7c…
server$ tsng id hostname server
tsunagi join --network lab --secret tsn1u7c…
Its agent has to be running. If it is not:
tsunagi up --peer 91e83a6e2b7a…
laptop$ ssh server.home
```
Two networks of one name is a thing that happens — a mistyped secret makes
one — so joining says whether the network was already here, and warns when
another configured network answers to the same name. A name is a label and
the id is the identity.
No account, no coordination server, no admin console, no keys to approve.
Anyone who knows the **name** and the **secret** is in. Nobody else can find
the network, let alone enter it.
That is the ad-hoc case: one person makes a network and sends the command
round. The secret is printed *only* when the agent invented it — there is
nowhere else to read it from — and never when it was supplied, because then
it is already yours. Two networks of one name and no secret is the one case
with no answer, and it says so instead of choosing.
## Why
A secret is printed by `network secret` and nowhere else — not by `id`, not
by `status`, not in a log, a `Debug` rendering or anything sent to a peer.
Asking for it is deliberate, because these reports get pasted into chats.
Tailscale, Headscale and ZeroTier are great, but each needs a control server:
theirs, or one you have to run and keep alive. tsunagi doesn't. Machines find
each other through the public BitTorrent DHT, connect directly (hole punching,
with relay fallback), and keep the network state among themselves.
**`up` takes no network at all** if you would rather decide later: it
brings up the agent and whatever it is already configured for, and waits.
That is the shape of a daemon in one terminal and `tsunagi network join`
in another.
| | Tailscale | Headscale | ZeroTier | **tsunagi** |
| ---------------------- | ------------------ | ---------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- |
| Control server | hosted by vendor | you run it | hosted or self-run | **none** |
| Account / sign-in | yes | yes | yes | **no** |
| To join a network | sign in, get approved | pre-auth key | network ID, approval | **name + secret** |
| Direct connections | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Exit nodes | yes | yes | via routes | yes |
`network join` is also the answer to a question `up` cannot: a state
directory belongs to one live agent, so a second `tsunagi up` cannot add a
network to the one already running. This adds it over the control socket and
it starts at once. With no agent running it is written to the configuration
and starts with the next `up`.
## Features
The name is part of the signed state, so changing it revokes the previous
one: there is one record per author, a new version replaces the whole claim,
and no replica can keep the old name standing. Changing it while the agent
runs goes through the agent, which republishes and tells its peers straight
away.
- **Two things to know:** a network name and a secret. A secret is generated for you when you make a network.
- **Direct, encrypted links** between members (WireGuard cryptography), with relay fallback behind strict NATs.
- **Names for machines:** `server.home` just works, even while `server` is switched off. A name belongs to whoever claimed it first; a later device with the same name keeps working by address and is told so.
- **Exit nodes:** send all your internet traffic through any member that offers one.
- **Multi-hop:** members that can't reach each other directly are routed through a member that can, over whatever kind of link each hop has. A member reached that way is online, and shown as relayed; traffic moves to a direct link by itself the moment one comes up.
- **LAN games:** UDP broadcasts are relayed, so "LAN" lobbies show up across the mesh.
- **Several networks at once** on one device.
- **Tray app** for Windows, macOS and Linux; a command line for everything.
Replacing the signing key makes this device a different member, and it loses
the address and name the old key held — nothing can sign on a retired key's
behalf, and by design there is no authority that could overrule an author. So
the outgoing key signs a release for every network on its way out, which
frees them for whoever wants them next, and the whole thing commits at once.
## Install
`status` and `id` both prefer a running agent, which is live and
authoritative, and fall back to reading the state store when there is none.
Reading takes no directory lock, so neither has to wait for the agent it is
asking about — nor does either need one to be running.
Grab a build from the [latest release](https://github.com/house-of-vanity/tsunagi/releases/latest).
### It cleans up after itself
| Platform | How |
| --------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Windows** | Run `tsunagi-setup-<version>-x86_64.exe`. Installs the service, the tray and `tsng`. |
| **macOS** | `brew tap house-of-vanity/tap && brew install --cask tsunagi-gui`<br>CLI only: `brew install tsunagi` |
| **Debian / Ubuntu** | `sudo apt install ./tsunagi-gui_<version>_amd64.deb` (`tsunagi_…` for no tray) |
| **Arch** | `sudo pacman -U tsunagi-gui-<version>-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst` |
| **NixOS** | [Flake and module](#nixos) below |
| **Any other Linux** | Unpack the tarball, then `sudo ./install.sh && sudo systemctl enable --now tsunagi` |
The interface is tied to an open file descriptor and is deliberately **not**
made persistent, so the kernel removes it when the agent exits — on a clean
shutdown, on a panic, on `SIGKILL`, on power loss alike. Keeping it is what
would take an action; removing it is the default.
Linux packages run the agent as an unprivileged service user. Add yourself to
the `tsunagi` group (`sudo usermod -aG tsunagi $USER`, then log in again) to
use `tsng` and the tray without `sudo`.
If something is left behind anyway — an interface made by an older version's
manual recipe, or one from a run killed in the instant between creating it and
recording it — the next start **replaces it**, along with any stale addresses
it carried. Two things are never touched:
## Quick start
* an interface that is not a TUN, because the name colliding with somebody's
bridge is not a reason to destroy the bridge;
* a TUN that another process is holding open, because that is a working
overlay belonging to somebody else — most likely a second agent on this
host, which should be given a different `--wg-prefix`.
Both of those refuse with an explanation rather than guessing.
Two settings the manual recipe used to need are gone with it.
`keep_addr_on_down` existed only because an interface nobody held open lost
carrier and had its IPv6 addresses flushed, and `nodad` only because duplicate
address detection can never finish without carrier. An interface held open for
its whole life has carrier for its whole life.
### The MTU is 1280
The default interface MTU stays at 1280 on direct paths, relays and paths
inside another VPN. Large encrypted packets are split into smaller QUIC
datagrams and reassembled before reaching WireGuard. SSH and full-size TCP
segments therefore do not require a manual MTU override or MSS adjustment.
The original IP packet, including its DF bit, is preserved. See
[docs/wireguard.md](docs/wireguard.md#mtu) for limits and compatibility.
### Summary
| approach | agent runs as | notes |
|---|---|---|
| `setcap cap_net_admin+p` | ordinary user, one capability | recommended: nothing to prepare, nothing left behind. Lost on every rebuild or copy of the binary. |
| systemd service | `User=`, `AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN` | the same, for an installed service |
| `sudo tsunagi up` | root | everything works, nothing is isolated |
| `--no-tun` | ordinary user, no capabilities | tunnels run and handshake, traffic never reaches the OS |
On Windows, put `wintun.dll` beside the executable and start `tsunagi up`
from PowerShell or Command Prompt opened with **Run as administrator**.
Run commands controlling that agent (`join`, `status`, `dns`, `network`)
as the same Windows user with the same elevation. If Windows denies access
to the agent's control pipe, the command reports a permission error instead
of claiming the agent is absent or trying to edit its locked state.
Creating a TUN without sufficient privileges also explains how to restart
the agent with the required permissions.
**Not implemented yet.** macOS has no provisioner; `--no-tun` is the way to
run it. The control plane and tunnels are unaffected. The decision logic
that says *what* to change is shared and tested on every platform.
## Checks
```bash
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --locked --workspace --all-targets
```sh
tsng join -n home # first machine: makes the network and prints a secret
tsng join -n home -s tsn1… # every other machine
tsng status # who is online, over which path
```
The whole suite runs offline on loopback. Set `TSUNAGI_TEST_LOG=tsunagi=debug`
to see agent logs while a test runs.
Every new network gets a stable pseudorandom `/24` in `10.0.0.0/8`, derived
from its network id. Its members agree on that range even when starting offline,
and each gets a name like `<host>.home`. Existing signed ranges are preserved.
There are also two runnable demos, which are demos and not substitutes for the
tests:
If two configured networks have overlapping ranges, the agent runs only one.
`tsng status`, `tsng network` and the tray show which network blocks the
other. `tsng network start <name-or-id>` or the tray’s “Switch to this network”
button suspends the conflicting networks. They resume automatically when the
selected network stops; the selection survives restarting the agent. Explicitly
stopping a suspended network cancels its automatic resume.
```bash
cargo run --example two_agents # control plane only
Machines are called `tsunagi-<id>` until you rename them: `tsng id hostname laptop`.
### Exit nodes
```sh
tsng network exit-node home on # on the machine that should be the exit
tsng exit-node # on another one: who offers an exit
tsng exit-node laptop # send everything through it
tsng exit-node off
```
Both run with no privileges and change nothing on the host.
The tray does the same with a checkbox. An exit node sees everything you send
through it, so use only members you trust.
[Details and per-OS notes](docs/exit-node.md).
## Usage
The default data transport order is `wg,awg,wg-quic,tcp-tls`. AWG negotiates a
fresh masking profile and outer keys for each pair connection attempt, including
reentry after fallback. Sustained data loss triggers switching independently of
the iroh control connection. [Configuration and limits](docs/amnezia.md).
```rust,no_run
use std::sync::Arc;
use tsunagi::config::{AgentConfig, StoragePaths, TransportPolicy};
use tsunagi::discovery::SharedMemoryDiscovery;
use tsunagi::identity::{NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
use tsunagi::proto::ControlMessage;
use tsunagi::{Agent, Result};
Change a network's protocol selection without editing its service or restarting:
// The library never starts a runtime, installs a logger, handles signals,
// forks, or calls process::exit. The binary owns all of that.
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let config = AgentConfig::new(StoragePaths::user_default()?)
.with_transport(TransportPolicy::N0Defaults)
.with_discovery(Arc::new(SharedMemoryDiscovery::new()));
```sh
tsng protocols # available protocols and settings
tsng protocols home # this device's choice for home
tsng protocols home awg,wg-quic # prefer AWG, retain QUIC as fallback
tsng protocols home none # control plane only
```
let agent = Agent::spawn(config).await?;
Exact network names, full ids and unique id prefixes work here. The choice is
local to this device, saved per network and applied immediately; an offline
change applies on the next start. In the tray, expand **protocols** on a network
tile to toggle protocols or change their preference order. Both endpoints need
a common protocol at the same wire version. `tsng up --protocol` supplies the
initial defaults for networks without a saved choice; it does not restrict
which built-in protocols can be enabled later.
let name = NetworkName::new("kitchen-table")?;
let secret = NetworkSecret::generate(); // 32 random bytes
println!("share this: {}", secret.encode().as_str());
Remove an obsolete offline device from a network's shared history:
let network = agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await?;
```sh
tsng network forget-node home old-laptop
tsng network forget-node home 10.13.37.143
```
let mut events = agent.subscribe();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Ok(event) = events.recv().await {
println!("{event:?}");
Networks accept exact names, full ids or unique id prefixes; nodes accept those
id selectors, exact hostnames or overlay IPv4 addresses. Ambiguous selectors
change nothing. Start the network first if it is stopped. In **Show devices**,
click **Forget** beside an offline node and confirm its identity.
Every member has the same cleanup right. The signed cleanup frees the observed
claim's name and IPv4 reservation, survives restarts and reaches offline replicas
when they reconnect. It does not ban the device: a newer signed claim can return.
Online nodes and the currently selected exit node cannot be forgotten.
[State and limits](docs/sync-model.md#offline-node-cleanup).
## Platforms
| Platform | Build | CLI `tsng` | Tray | Exit node: offer / use | Packages |
| ------------------------- | ------------ | :--------: | :--: | :--------------------: | ----------------------------------- |
| Linux x86_64 | release | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ / ✔ | `.deb`, `.pkg.tar.zst`, tarball, Nix |
| Linux aarch64 | release | ✔ | –¹ | ✔ / ✔ | `.deb`, `.pkg.tar.zst`, tarball, Nix |
| Linux armv7 | release | ✔ | –¹ | ✔ / ✔ | `.deb`, `.pkg.tar.zst`, tarball |
| macOS, Apple silicon | release | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ / ✔² | Homebrew, tarball |
| macOS, Intel | from source | ✔³ | ✔³ | ✔ / ✔²³ | – |
| Windows x86_64 | release | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ / ✔² | installer, zip |
<sup>¹ Not in the release; builds from source (and through Nix).
² Newer and less battle-tested than on Linux.
³ Builds from source, not covered by CI.</sup>
The Linux CLI is a single static binary: it runs on any distribution.
## NixOS
The repository is a flake with a package and a module.
```nix
# flake.nix
{
inputs.tsunagi.url = "github:house-of-vanity/tsunagi";
outputs = { nixpkgs, tsunagi, ... }: {
nixosConfigurations.myhost = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
modules = [
tsunagi.nixosModules.default
{
services.tsunagi = {
enable = true;
tray.enable = true; # optional, for desktops
users = [ "alice" ]; # may use tsng and the tray without sudo
};
}
});
for peer in agent.network_status(network).await?.connected_peers() {
agent
.send(network, peer, ControlMessage::Ping { seq: 1, payload: vec![] })
.await?;
}
agent.shutdown().await;
Ok(())
];
};
};
}
```
`TransportPolicy::LocalOnly` is the default, so a plain `AgentConfig::new` never
reaches the internet by accident. Opt into `DirectOnly` or `N0Defaults`
explicitly.
Just trying it: `nix run github:house-of-vanity/tsunagi#tsunagi-cli -- --help`.
`packages.<system>.tsunagi` (with the tray) and `tsunagi-cli` are also exported,
along with `overlays.default`.
### Through somebody in the middle
## Build from source
Everybody tries everybody first: the mesh is pairwise, and a relay is only
for the pair that cannot manage it. Two members can both reach a third and
not each other: a blocked path, a
relay that is unavailable, a network only reachable from inside somebody
else's building. When that happens the pair is routed through a member that
has both.
Rust 1.91 or newer.
Nothing is agreed and nothing is elected. Each member says only which peers
*it* has a live link with, first-hand, over the control plane and one hop
only; everyone picks their own way through from that, deterministically, and
drops it the moment a direct link exists. There is no routing protocol, no
second-hand claim to weigh, and a relayed datagram is never relayed again —
so a loop cannot form.
The one in the middle carries **bytes it cannot read**: the tunnel stays end
to end between the two ends, and a relayed datagram never touches the middle
host's interface, so no forwarding, routing or firewall setting of that host
is involved. `status` says `via <peer>` on a path that goes through
somebody, and counts what this device has carried for others — it is their
traffic on your uplink, and that should not be invisible.
## How peers find each other
Two different lookups are involved, and only one of them is this project's:
**1. Resolving one endpoint's address — iroh's, and it works today.**
With `--reach relay` or `--reach direct`, iroh publishes a signed
record of this endpoint's addresses, keyed by its endpoint id, to the public
service run by Number 0 — "n0", the company behind iroh — at `dns.iroh.link`,
over pkarr and DNS, and resolves other endpoints the same way. That is why `--peer <endpoint-id>` works with no address attached:
iroh looks it up. None of that code is ours.
**2. Finding who is in a network — Mainline DHT by default.**
`NetworkDiscovery` supplies unverified candidates. The Mainline backend uses
a signing key derived from the network name and secret to publish signed
BEP44 records containing each writer's endpoint ID and addresses. Its 16
slots provide starting candidates, not a complete membership list or a limit
on network size. After the first authenticated connection, introductions and
signed state reveal the other members. `StaticBootstrap` (`--peer`) remains
available, and tests use either a local Mainline Testnet or in-memory discovery.
What this means in practice:
- With `relay` or `direct`, **your endpoint id and IP addresses are published
to a public third-party service** (Number 0's, unless you change it). They are not secret, and the network secret is
never published, but an observer of that service learns that your endpoint
exists and where it is. `--reach local` publishes nothing.
- With DHT enabled, endpoint records are also published to the public Mainline
DHT. They are signed, not encrypted; membership still requires the secret.
- A relay, when one is needed, sees the volume and timing of your traffic — not
its contents. The default relays are Number 0's, in the US, EU and
Asia-Pacific.
## Storage
Two physically separate SQLite files, placed wherever the library's
configuration says (`StoragePaths`). A future system service supplies its own
paths; tests always use temporary directories.
| file | holds | when damaged |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| `state.sqlite` | device identity, network configuration, hostname | clear error, never reset |
| `cache.sqlite` | address hints and other recoverable data | discarded and recreated |
The `wg-quic` protocol keeps its own keys in its own store under `wg-quic/`,
because a protocol's keys are neither the iroh identity nor the network
secret.
The command line agent puts everything under the platform's per-user
directories by default; `--state-dir` and `--cache-dir` override them.
One state directory belongs to one live agent, enforced with a real OS file
lock rather than an existence check. That directory *is* the identity: one
agent, one device key, one interface, and as many networks as you like on it
— `tsunagi network join` adds them to the agent that is already running,
which is why a second `tsunagi up` on the same directory is refused rather
than made to work. A second agent on the same host is a second identity, and
needs everything of its own: its own state and cache directories, its own
interface name and its own overlay range. The library owns no globals, so
several of them run side by side in one process as readily as in one host.
### Leaving, and starting over
Membership outlives a session, so it also has to be possible to end it.
```bash
tsunagi network # what this device belongs to
tsunagi network leave <network-id> # give up the address and the name, then forget it
tsunagi wipe --yes # remove everything and be a stranger again
```sh
cargo build --release --bin tsng # the agent and CLI
cargo build --release --bin tsunagi-tray # the tray (Linux needs GTK 3 and libayatana-appindicator)
```
**Stopping is not leaving.** `stop` closes this network's sessions, takes
its address off the interface and keeps it from starting again, and that is
all: the configuration, the secret, the signed state and the protocol key
stay exactly as they are, nothing is announced, and to the others this
device is simply away — an ordinary condition they already handle, with its
address and name still reserved for it. `start` picks it up where it left
off. A network named on the `up` command line is started by that command
whatever its stored state, and the start-up banner says so rather than
letting a `stop` quietly come back.
Windows needs [Wintun](https://www.wintun.net) next to `tsng.exe`.
Per-platform notes: [Linux](dist/linux/README.md), [Arch](dist/arch/README.md),
[macOS](dist/macos/README.md), [Windows](dist/windows/README.md).
`leave` is the other one, and it removes, locally: the configuration and
the secret, this network's signed records, its cached address hints and the
protocol key it used there. What it keeps is this author's version counter
for that network — a rejoin has to continue above the release, or every
replica would treat the new claim as stale. Everything about *other*
networks, and the device identity itself, is untouched.
## How it works
`leave` publishes a signed `Release` **first**, while the agent is running and
its sessions are up, so the address and the name are freed for the others
instead of staying reserved to a member that has gone. They pass the tombstone
on, so a member that was away hears it from them. With no agent running,
nothing can sign or send it: the command says so and refuses, and `--offline`
drops the network locally while leaving the others holding the old claim. The
protocol key for that network goes too — rejoining is joining, not resuming.
- Your name and secret derive a network identity. Members publish signed
contact records to the public Mainline DHT under it, and find each other there.
- Every connection proves knowledge of the secret before it's accepted.
Traffic between members is end-to-end encrypted, relays included.
- Addresses and names are claimed with each device's own key and replicated
between members. There is no one in charge, so nothing to be taken down.
A network is named by its id, never by its name: two networks can share a
name, and choosing between them for the user is how the wrong one gets left. A
unique prefix is enough.
`wipe` removes both directories' contents: the device identity, every network,
every signed record and everything a protocol kept beside them. It refuses
while an agent is running, and refuses a directory with no `state.sqlite` in
it, so a mistyped `--state-dir` cannot take somebody's documents with it.
Without `--yes` it only says what it would remove. It is not a goodbye: nobody
is told, because after it there is no key left to sign anything with. Leave the
networks first if the addresses should be freed.
The secret is the only key, so make it a good one (the generated ones are).
The [threat model](docs/threat-model.md) says what this does and doesn't protect against.
## Documentation
- [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) — module boundaries and runtime.
- [docs/wireguard.md](docs/wireguard.md) — the WireGuard plugin: overlay
addressing, announcements, backends, reconciliation.
- [docs/protocol.md](docs/protocol.md) — identity derivation, framing, handshake.
- [docs/sync-model.md](docs/sync-model.md) — the planned signed-state model and
what is deliberately not built yet.
- [docs/threat-model.md](docs/threat-model.md) — threat model and known limits.
- [docs/testing.md](docs/testing.md) — what the suite covers and what it does not.
- [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) — rules for anyone (human or agent) changing this repo.
## Security in one paragraph
Membership is proved by an HMAC over a transcript keyed by a value derived from
the shared secret, bound to the specific iroh connection through the TLS
exporter, to the network id, to both endpoint identities and to distinct role
labels. This targets high-entropy secrets: there is no PAKE here, so a short
human passphrase is guessable offline by anyone who can reach the handshake.
Anyone who knows the secret is a full participant and can create many
identities. Read [docs/threat-model.md](docs/threat-model.md) before relying on
any of this.
[Architecture](docs/architecture.md) ·
[Protocol](docs/protocol.md) ·
[WireGuard data plane](docs/wireguard.md) ·
[Pairwise Amnezia transport](docs/amnezia.md) ·
[Routing](docs/routing.md) ·
[Exit nodes](docs/exit-node.md) ·
[Threat model](docs/threat-model.md) ·
[Contributing](AGENTS.md)
## Licence
MIT OR Apache-2.0.
[WTFPL](LICENSE): do what the fuck you want to.
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[package]
name = "tsunagi-awg"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "Ephemeral pairwise Amnezia transport for Tsunagi."
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license = "WTFPL AND Apache-2.0"
repository.workspace = true
[dependencies]
tsunagi-core = { path = "../tsunagi-core" }
tsunagi-wg-quic = { path = "../tsunagi-wg-quic" }
tsunagi-wireguard = { path = "../tsunagi-wireguard" }
iroh.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net", "time", "sync", "macros"] }
serde.workspace = true
postcard.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
rand = "0.10"
zeroize = { version = "1.9", features = ["derive"] }
boringtun = { version = "0.7.1", default-features = false }
chacha20 = "0.9"
[dev-dependencies]
tsunagi-core = { path = "../tsunagi-core", features = ["testing"] }
tempfile.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
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+21
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# Amnezia packet engine
`src/masking.rs` is adapted from `src/core/amnezia.rs` in
https://github.com/RunaRoo/AmneziaWG-RS at
`51579a7d6e8882d1d8d6d00822f09e18a9423b73`, under Apache-2.0.
The upstream license is retained in `LICENSE-AmneziaWG-RS`.
The adaptation replaces configuration-file loading with bounded typed pair
profiles, updates RNG calls to rand 0.10, removes an unnecessary unwrap, and
does not embed upstream's Node, global executors, OS interface operations or
detached tasks. Noise/WireGuard is supplied by boringtun, already used by
Tsunagi. Each pair owns one socket and one cancellable packet-engine task.
This is Tsunagi AWG wire version 1, not a claim of compatibility with external
Amnezia servers. The masking engine substitutes message headers outside the
standard WireGuard state machine and restores them before Noise validation.
There are no remote file paths, shell hooks, or persisted pair profiles.
The adapted masking source remains Apache-2.0. Newly written Tsunagi code
follows the repository's WTFPL. This package declares both licenses in Cargo
metadata; the workspace license alone does not describe its copied source.
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//! Pairwise, ephemeral Amnezia packet transport with independent end-to-end tunnels.
//! All negotiation travels over authenticated Tsunagi control sessions.
mod masking;
mod plugin;
pub mod profile;
mod session;
mod stun;
mod transport;
pub use plugin::AwgPlugin;
pub use transport::{AwgTransport, PairOverview};
/// Protocol identifier and default second-choice direct transport.
pub const AWG_PROTOCOL: &str = "awg";
/// Tsunagi AWG wire version, independent of software releases.
pub const AWG_WIRE_VERSION: u16 = 1;
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// Adapted from RunaRoo/AmneziaWG-RS, commit 51579a7d6e8882d1d8d6d00822f09e18a9423b73.
// Apache-2.0; see LICENSE-AmneziaWG-RS and UPSTREAM.md.
#![allow(dead_code, missing_docs)]
// AmneziaWG configuration, header protection, and traffic shaping.
use bytes::{Bytes, BytesMut};
use chacha20::{
ChaCha20,
cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher},
};
use rand::RngExt;
pub const HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE: usize = 12;
pub const DEFAULT_UDP_WINDOW: usize = 500;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub struct Range {
pub min: u32,
pub max: u32,
}
impl Range {
pub fn contains(&self, val: u32) -> bool {
val >= self.min && val <= self.max
}
pub fn random(&self) -> u32 {
if self.min >= self.max {
self.min
} else {
rand::rng().random_range(self.min..=self.max)
}
}
pub fn is_zero(&self) -> bool {
self.min == 0 && self.max == 0
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum AwgKind {
Initiation,
Response,
Cookie,
Transport,
}
impl AwgKind {
pub fn fixed_size(self) -> usize {
match self {
Self::Initiation => 148,
Self::Response => 92,
Self::Cookie => 64,
Self::Transport => 32,
}
}
fn standard_type(self) -> u32 {
match self {
Self::Initiation => 1,
Self::Response => 2,
Self::Cookie => 3,
Self::Transport => 4,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct DecodedPacket {
pub kind: AwgKind,
pub message: Bytes,
pub wire_len: usize,
}
pub struct AmneziaConfig {
pub jc: u32,
pub jmin: usize,
pub jmax: usize,
pub s1: usize,
pub s2: usize,
pub s3: usize,
pub s4: usize,
pub h1: Range,
pub h2: Range,
pub h3: Range,
pub h4: Range,
pub i1: String,
pub i2: String,
pub i3: String,
pub i4: String,
pub i5: String,
pub header_protection_key: Option<[u8; 32]>,
pub content_padding_addition: Range,
pub random_trailers: bool,
pub mtu: usize,
}
impl AmneziaConfig {
pub fn random_header(&self, range: &Range) -> u32 {
range.random()
}
pub fn random_padding(&self, len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut padding = vec![0u8; len];
if len > 0 {
rand::fill(&mut padding);
}
padding
}
fn shape(&self, kind: AwgKind) -> (usize, Range) {
match kind {
AwgKind::Initiation => (self.s1, self.h1),
AwgKind::Response => (self.s2, self.h2),
AwgKind::Cookie => (self.s3, self.h3),
AwgKind::Transport => (self.s4, self.h4),
}
}
pub fn encode(&self, kind: AwgKind, payload: Bytes, udp_window: usize) -> Bytes {
let (padding_len, _) = self.shape(kind);
let trailer_len = if kind != AwgKind::Transport && self.random_trailers {
let base = padding_len.saturating_add(payload.len());
let room = udp_window.max(DEFAULT_UDP_WINDOW).saturating_sub(base);
if room == 0 {
0
} else {
rand::rng().random_range(0..room)
}
} else {
0
};
let mut out = BytesMut::zeroed(padding_len + payload.len() + trailer_len);
if padding_len > 0 {
rand::fill(&mut out[..padding_len]);
}
out[padding_len..padding_len + payload.len()].copy_from_slice(&payload);
if trailer_len > 0 {
rand::fill(&mut out[padding_len + payload.len()..]);
}
if self.header_protection_key.is_some() {
let protected_len = if kind == AwgKind::Transport {
16
} else {
kind.fixed_size()
};
self.apply_header_cipher(&mut out, padding_len, protected_len);
}
out.freeze()
}
pub fn decode(&self, datagram: &Bytes) -> Option<DecodedPacket> {
if datagram.len() < 4 {
return None;
}
for kind in [
AwgKind::Initiation,
AwgKind::Response,
AwgKind::Cookie,
AwgKind::Transport,
] {
let (padding_len, headers) = self.shape(kind);
let minimum = padding_len + kind.fixed_size();
let size_ok = match kind {
AwgKind::Transport | AwgKind::Initiation => datagram.len() >= minimum,
AwgKind::Response | AwgKind::Cookie if self.random_trailers => {
datagram.len() >= minimum
}
AwgKind::Response | AwgKind::Cookie => datagram.len() == minimum,
};
if !size_ok || datagram.len() < padding_len + 4 {
continue;
}
let protected_header =
u32::from_le_bytes(datagram[padding_len..padding_len + 4].try_into().ok()?);
let candidate = if self.header_protection_key.is_some() {
protected_header ^ self.header_type_hash(datagram)?
} else {
protected_header
};
if !headers.contains(candidate) {
continue;
}
let message_len = match kind {
AwgKind::Transport | AwgKind::Initiation => datagram.len() - padding_len,
AwgKind::Response | AwgKind::Cookie => kind.fixed_size(),
};
let mut payload = BytesMut::from(&datagram[padding_len..padding_len + message_len]);
if self.header_protection_key.is_some() {
let protected_len = if kind == AwgKind::Transport {
16
} else {
kind.fixed_size()
};
self.apply_header_cipher_with_nonce(
&mut payload,
0,
protected_len,
&datagram[..HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE],
);
}
return Some(DecodedPacket {
kind,
message: payload.freeze(),
wire_len: datagram.len(),
});
}
None
}
pub fn prepare_transport_plaintext(&self, packet: Bytes, udp_window: usize) -> Bytes {
if packet.is_empty() {
return packet;
}
let requested = if !self.content_padding_addition.is_zero() {
self.content_padding_addition.random() as usize
} else if self.random_trailers {
let wire_without_padding = self.s4 + AwgKind::Transport.fixed_size() + packet.len();
let room = udp_window
.max(DEFAULT_UDP_WINDOW)
.saturating_sub(wire_without_padding);
if room == 0 {
0
} else {
rand::rng().random_range(0..room)
}
} else {
let aligned = (packet.len() + 15) & !15;
aligned.saturating_sub(packet.len())
};
let padding = self.clamp_padding_to_mtu(packet.len(), requested);
if padding == 0 {
return packet;
}
let mut out = BytesMut::with_capacity(packet.len() + padding);
out.extend_from_slice(&packet);
out.resize(packet.len() + padding, 0);
out.freeze()
}
pub fn transport_content_length(&self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if plaintext.is_empty() || plaintext[0] == 0 {
return Some(0);
}
match plaintext[0] >> 4 {
4 if plaintext.len() >= 20 => {
let total = u16::from_be_bytes([plaintext[2], plaintext[3]]) as usize;
(total >= 20 && total <= plaintext.len()).then_some(total)
}
6 if plaintext.len() >= 40 => {
let payload = u16::from_be_bytes([plaintext[4], plaintext[5]]) as usize;
let total = 40 + payload;
(total <= plaintext.len()).then_some(total)
}
_ => None,
}
}
fn clamp_padding_to_mtu(&self, packet_len: usize, requested: usize) -> usize {
if self.mtu == 0 {
return requested;
}
let normalized = if packet_len > self.mtu {
packet_len % self.mtu
} else {
packet_len
};
requested.min(self.mtu.saturating_sub(normalized))
}
fn header_type_hash(&self, datagram: &Bytes) -> Option<u32> {
if datagram.len() < HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE {
return None;
}
let mut hash = [0u8; 4];
self.apply_keystream(&mut hash, &datagram[..HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE]);
Some(u32::from_le_bytes(hash))
}
fn apply_header_cipher(&self, packet: &mut [u8], offset: usize, len: usize) {
if packet.len() < HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE || packet.len() < offset + len {
return;
}
let nonce: [u8; HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE] =
match packet[..HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE].try_into() {
Ok(nonce) => nonce,
Err(_) => return,
};
self.apply_header_cipher_with_nonce(packet, offset, len, &nonce);
}
fn apply_header_cipher_with_nonce(
&self,
packet: &mut [u8],
offset: usize,
len: usize,
nonce: &[u8],
) {
if packet.len() < offset + len {
return;
}
self.apply_keystream(&mut packet[offset..offset + len], nonce);
}
fn apply_keystream(&self, data: &mut [u8], nonce: &[u8]) {
let Some(key) = self.header_protection_key.as_ref() else {
return;
};
if nonce.len() != HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE {
return;
}
let Ok(nonce) = <&[u8; HEADER_PROTECTION_NONCE_SIZE]>::try_from(nonce) else {
return;
};
let mut cipher = ChaCha20::new(key.into(), nonce.into());
cipher.apply_keystream(data);
}
}
impl Drop for AmneziaConfig {
fn drop(&mut self) {
use zeroize::Zeroize;
self.header_protection_key.zeroize();
}
}
+132
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//! End-to-end encryption remains independent of physical Amnezia pair links.
use crate::{AWG_PROTOCOL, AWG_WIRE_VERSION, AwgTransport};
use iroh::EndpointId;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::SharedLink;
use tsunagi::dataplane::{IpPlugin, PluginCapability, PluginContext, PluginError, ProtocolOption};
use tsunagi::state::Ipv4Range;
use tsunagi::{BoxFuture, NetworkId};
use tsunagi_wg_quic::{NetworkOverview, WireguardConfig, WireguardPlugin};
/// AWG capability and an independent end-to-end WireGuard engine.
/// Pair transport keys/profiles never enter its durable end-to-end key store.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct AwgPlugin {
inner: Arc<WireguardPlugin>,
transport: Arc<AwgTransport>,
}
impl AwgPlugin {
/// Uses standard tunnel MTU/keepalive options; pair ports and profiles are ephemeral.
pub const OPTIONS: &'static [ProtocolOption] = &[
ProtocolOption {
key: "keepalive",
value: "SECONDS",
help: "end-to-end tunnel keepalive; 0 disables it",
default: Some("25"),
},
ProtocolOption {
key: "mtu",
value: "BYTES",
help: "maximum overlay packet size",
default: Some("1280"),
},
ProtocolOption {
key: "stun",
value: "HOST:PORT|off",
help: "UDP public mapping discovery; disabled in local reach mode",
default: Some("stun.l.google.com:19302"),
},
];
/// Opens the end-to-end engine, retaining separate pair transport state.
pub async fn open(
mut config: WireguardConfig,
transport: Arc<AwgTransport>,
) -> Result<Arc<Self>, PluginError> {
config.protocol = AWG_PROTOCOL;
Ok(Arc::new(Self {
inner: WireguardPlugin::open(config).await?,
transport,
}))
}
/// Reports end-to-end tunnel health and traffic counters.
pub fn overview(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Option<NetworkOverview> {
self.inner.overview(network)
}
}
impl IpPlugin for AwgPlugin {
fn protocol_id(&self) -> &str {
AWG_PROTOCOL
}
fn protocol_version(&self) -> u16 {
AWG_WIRE_VERSION
}
fn options(&self) -> &'static [ProtocolOption] {
Self::OPTIONS
}
fn attach(&self, context: PluginContext) {
self.inner.attach(context);
}
fn local_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
) -> Result<Option<PluginCapability>, PluginError> {
self.inner.local_capability(network).map(|cap| {
cap.map(|mut cap| {
cap.protocol = AWG_PROTOCOL.into();
cap.version = AWG_WIRE_VERSION;
cap
})
})
}
fn on_network_activated(&self, network: NetworkId) {
self.inner.on_network_activated(network);
}
fn on_peer_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
capability: &PluginCapability,
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
if capability.protocol != AWG_PROTOCOL
|| capability.version != AWG_WIRE_VERSION
|| !capability.enabled
{
return Err(PluginError::Rejected("unsupported AWG capability".into()));
}
self.inner.on_peer_capability(network, peer, capability)?;
self.transport.allow_peer(network, peer);
Ok(())
}
fn on_address_allocation(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
range: Ipv4Range,
allocations: &[(EndpointId, std::net::Ipv4Addr)],
) {
self.inner
.on_address_allocation(network, range, allocations);
}
fn carry(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, packet: bytes::Bytes) -> bool {
self.inner.carry(network, peer, packet)
}
fn on_peer_link(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, link: SharedLink) {
self.inner.on_peer_link(network, peer, link);
}
fn on_peer_gone(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
self.transport.forget_peer(network, peer);
self.inner.on_peer_gone(network, peer);
}
fn on_network_deactivated(&self, network: NetworkId) {
self.transport.stop_network(network);
self.inner.on_network_deactivated(network);
}
fn on_network_forgotten(&self, network: NetworkId) {
self.inner.on_network_forgotten(network);
}
fn shutdown(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
self.transport.shutdown();
self.inner.shutdown().await;
})
}
}
+226
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//! Bounded profiles, regenerated for every pair connection attempt.
use crate::masking::{AmneziaConfig, AwgKind, Range};
use bytes::Bytes;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// An ephemeral masking profile. Secret fields are redacted and erased on drop.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct PairProfile {
id: [u8; 16],
prefix: u16,
headers: [[u32; 2]; 4],
header_key: [u8; 32],
pub(crate) psk: [u8; 32],
junk_count: u8,
junk_min: u16,
junk_max: u16,
padding: u16,
signature: u8,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PairProfile {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str("PairProfile([REDACTED])")
}
}
impl PairProfile {
/// Generates a new safe profile; no deterministic seed or durable state.
pub fn generate() -> Self {
let headers = std::array::from_fn(|i| {
let base = (i as u32) * 0x4000_0000 + rand::random_range(1024..0x3fff_0000);
[base, base + rand::random_range(64..1024)]
});
Self {
id: rand::random(),
prefix: rand::random_range(12..49),
headers,
header_key: rand::random(),
psk: rand::random(),
junk_count: rand::random_range(4..9),
junk_min: rand::random_range(24..65),
junk_max: rand::random_range(80..161),
padding: rand::random_range(16..65),
signature: rand::random_range(0..2),
}
}
/// Public attempt identifier, useful for distinguishing retries without revealing secrets.
pub fn id(&self) -> [u8; 16] {
self.id
}
/// Header key, for packet engines and protocol tests; never log this value.
pub fn header_key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.header_key
}
/// Rejects invalid remote profiles before allocating packets or entering the codec.
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
if !(12..=48).contains(&self.prefix)
|| !(4..=8).contains(&self.junk_count)
|| self.junk_min < 24
|| self.junk_min > self.junk_max
|| self.junk_max > 160
|| self.padding > 64
|| self.signature > 1
|| self.header_key == [0; 32]
|| self.psk == [0; 32]
{
return Err("invalid AWG profile bounds");
}
for (i, [lo, hi]) in self.headers.iter().copied().enumerate() {
if lo < 5 || lo > hi || hi - lo > 1024 {
return Err("invalid AWG header range");
}
for [other_lo, other_hi] in &self.headers[..i] {
if lo <= *other_hi && *other_lo <= hi {
return Err("overlapping AWG header ranges");
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn config(&self) -> AmneziaConfig {
let range = |i: usize| Range {
min: self.headers[i][0],
max: self.headers[i][1],
};
AmneziaConfig {
jc: self.junk_count.into(),
jmin: self.junk_min.into(),
jmax: self.junk_max.into(),
s1: self.prefix.into(),
s2: self.prefix.into(),
s3: self.prefix.into(),
s4: self.prefix.into(),
h1: range(0),
h2: range(1),
h3: range(2),
h4: range(3),
i1: String::new(),
i2: String::new(),
i3: String::new(),
i4: String::new(),
i5: String::new(),
header_protection_key: Some(self.header_key),
content_padding_addition: Range {
min: 0,
max: self.padding.into(),
},
random_trailers: true,
mtu: 1050,
}
}
/// Masks one standard WireGuard message; invalid types and oversized packets are refused.
pub fn encode(&self, raw: &[u8]) -> Option<Bytes> {
let kind = match raw.get(..4)? {
[1, 0, 0, 0] => AwgKind::Initiation,
[2, 0, 0, 0] => AwgKind::Response,
[3, 0, 0, 0] => AwgKind::Cookie,
[4, 0, 0, 0] => AwgKind::Transport,
_ => return None,
};
if raw.len() < kind.fixed_size() || raw.len() > 1050 {
return None;
}
let config = self.config();
let range = match kind {
AwgKind::Initiation => config.h1,
AwgKind::Response => config.h2,
AwgKind::Cookie => config.h3,
AwgKind::Transport => config.h4,
};
let mut payload = raw.to_vec();
payload[..4].copy_from_slice(&range.random().to_le_bytes());
Some(config.encode(kind, Bytes::from(payload), 1200))
}
/// Unmasks a packet and restores standard headers before WireGuard validation.
pub fn decode(&self, wire: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
if wire.len() > 1200 {
return None;
}
let decoded = self.config().decode(&Bytes::copy_from_slice(wire))?;
let (kind, len) = match decoded.kind {
AwgKind::Initiation => (1, 148),
AwgKind::Response => (2, 92),
AwgKind::Cookie => (3, 64),
AwgKind::Transport => (4, decoded.message.len()),
};
let mut message = decoded.message.get(..len)?.to_vec();
message[..4].copy_from_slice(&(kind as u32).to_le_bytes());
Some(message)
}
pub(crate) fn pad(&self, packet: Bytes) -> Bytes {
self.config().prepare_transport_plaintext(packet, 1200)
}
/// Generates structured signature packets with fresh fields, never static captures.
/// These target the other Tsunagi peer, not DNS or SIP services.
pub fn signature_packets(&self) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
if self.signature == 0 {
// A complete DNS query. Counts, label lengths and qtype remain valid.
let label = format!("n{:016x}", rand::random::<u64>());
let mut packet = Vec::from(rand::random::<u16>().to_be_bytes());
packet.extend_from_slice(&[1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
packet.push(label.len() as u8);
packet.extend_from_slice(label.as_bytes());
packet.extend_from_slice(b"\x07example\x03net\0\0");
packet.push(if rand::random() { 1 } else { 28 });
packet.extend_from_slice(&[0, 1]);
vec![packet]
} else {
let id = rand::random::<u64>();
vec![format!("OPTIONS sip:n{id:x}@example.net SIP/2.0\r\nVia: SIP/2.0/UDP example.net;branch=z9hG4bK{id:x}\r\nMax-Forwards: 70\r\nFrom: <sip:a@example.net>;tag={id:x}\r\nTo: <sip:n{id:x}@example.net>\r\nCall-ID: {id:x}@example.net\r\nCSeq: 1 OPTIONS\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n").into_bytes()]
}
}
pub(crate) fn junk_packets(&self) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
(0..self.junk_count)
.map(|_| {
let mut packet = vec![0; rand::random_range(self.junk_min..=self.junk_max).into()];
rand::fill(&mut packet[..]);
packet
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
#[test]
fn unsafe_peer_profiles_are_rejected_before_the_codec() {
let valid = PairProfile::generate();
let mut bad = valid.clone();
bad.prefix = 11;
assert!(bad.validate().is_err());
let mut bad = valid.clone();
bad.headers[1] = bad.headers[0];
assert!(bad.validate().is_err());
let mut bad = valid.clone();
bad.junk_max = u16::MAX;
assert!(bad.validate().is_err());
let mut bad = valid.clone();
bad.padding = u16::MAX;
assert!(bad.validate().is_err());
let mut bad = valid.clone();
bad.psk = [0; 32];
assert!(bad.validate().is_err());
let mut bad = valid.clone();
bad.signature = 2;
assert!(bad.validate().is_err());
}
#[test]
fn signature_templates_have_consistent_framing_and_fresh_fields() {
let mut profile = PairProfile::generate();
profile.signature = 0;
let dns = profile.signature_packets().remove(0);
assert_eq!(&dns[2..12], &[1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
let mut at = 12;
while dns[at] != 0 {
at += 1 + usize::from(dns[at]);
}
assert_eq!(at + 5, dns.len());
assert_eq!(&dns[dns.len() - 2..], &[0, 1]);
profile.signature = 1;
let sip = profile.signature_packets().remove(0);
assert!(sip.starts_with(b"OPTIONS sip:"));
assert!(sip.ends_with(b"Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n"));
assert_ne!(sip, profile.signature_packets().remove(0));
}
}
+402
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//! One cancellable actor and UDP socket per pair. All payload and health frames
//! are inside the Amnezia-masked authenticated WireGuard tunnel.
use crate::profile::PairProfile;
use boringtun::noise::{Tunn, TunnResult};
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use std::collections::{HashMap, VecDeque};
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{PacketLink, TransportError};
use tsunagi::{BoxFuture, NetworkId};
pub(crate) const MAX_PAYLOAD: usize = tsunagi::config::MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM;
const CHUNK: usize = 700;
const QUEUE: usize = 64;
const WINDOW: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
pub(crate) struct PairLink {
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
pub(crate) attempt: [u8; 16],
tx: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
stop: watch::Sender<bool>,
closed: AtomicBool,
remote: Mutex<Option<SocketAddr>>,
reason: Mutex<Option<String>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PairLink {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("AwgPair")
.field("network", &self.network)
.field("peer", &self.peer)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
impl PairLink {
pub(crate) fn has_authenticated_path(&self) -> bool {
match self.remote.lock() {
Ok(remote) => remote.is_some(),
Err(_) => false,
}
}
}
impl PacketLink for PairLink {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.network
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.peer
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
MAX_PAYLOAD
}
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.is_closed() {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
}
if payload.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD {
return Err(TransportError::TooLarge {
size: payload.len(),
limit: MAX_PAYLOAD,
});
}
self.tx
.try_send(payload)
.map_err(|_| TransportError::Other("AWG send queue full or closed".into()))
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut stop = self.stop.subscribe();
if *stop.borrow() {
return None;
}
let mut rx = self.rx.lock().await;
tokio::select! {biased; _=stop.changed()=>None,packet=rx.recv()=>packet}
})
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut stop = self.stop.subscribe();
if !*stop.borrow() {
let _ = stop.changed().await;
}
})
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
self.closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) || *self.stop.borrow()
}
fn close(&self) {
self.stop.send_replace(true);
}
fn failure_reason(&self) -> Option<String> {
match self.reason.lock() {
Ok(reason) => reason.clone(),
Err(_) => None,
}
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
match self.remote.lock() {
Ok(addr) => match *addr {
Some(addr) => format!("awg UDP via {addr}"),
None => "awg UDP, establishing".into(),
},
Err(_) => "awg UDP".into(),
}
}
}
impl Drop for PairLink {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.stop.send_replace(true);
}
}
pub(crate) fn start(
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
socket: UdpSocket,
tunn: Tunn,
profile: PairProfile,
candidates: Vec<SocketAddr>,
parent: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) -> Arc<PairLink> {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(QUEUE);
let (in_tx, in_rx) = mpsc::channel(QUEUE);
let (stop, _) = watch::channel(false);
let link = Arc::new(PairLink {
network,
peer,
attempt: profile.id(),
tx,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(in_rx),
stop: stop.clone(),
closed: AtomicBool::new(false),
remote: Mutex::new(None),
reason: Mutex::new(None),
});
let weak = Arc::downgrade(&link);
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut engine = Engine {
stop: stop.subscribe(),
socket,
tunn,
profile,
candidates,
remote: None,
inbox: in_tx,
rx,
counter: rand::random(),
sequence: 0,
pending: VecDeque::new(),
samples: VecDeque::new(),
assemblies: HashMap::new(),
started: Instant::now(),
last_authenticated: Instant::now(),
};
engine.run(parent, &weak).await;
if let Some(link) = weak.upgrade() {
link.closed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
link.stop.send_replace(true);
}
});
link
}
struct Assembly {
created: Instant,
count: u16,
chunks: Vec<Option<Bytes>>,
}
struct Engine {
stop: watch::Receiver<bool>,
socket: UdpSocket,
tunn: Tunn,
profile: PairProfile,
candidates: Vec<SocketAddr>,
remote: Option<SocketAddr>,
inbox: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
rx: mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>,
counter: u64,
sequence: u64,
pending: VecDeque<(u64, Instant)>,
samples: VecDeque<bool>,
assemblies: HashMap<u64, Assembly>,
started: Instant,
last_authenticated: Instant,
}
enum ResultOwned {
Wire(Vec<u8>),
Plain(Vec<u8>),
Done,
}
fn own(result: TunnResult<'_>) -> ResultOwned {
match result {
TunnResult::WriteToNetwork(p) => ResultOwned::Wire(p.to_vec()),
TunnResult::WriteToTunnelV4(p, _) => ResultOwned::Plain(p.to_vec()),
_ => ResultOwned::Done,
}
}
fn ip(payload: &[u8]) -> Bytes {
let mut packet = vec![0; 20];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[8] = 64;
packet[9] = 253;
packet[12..16].copy_from_slice(&Ipv4Addr::new(192, 0, 2, 1).octets());
packet[16..20].copy_from_slice(&Ipv4Addr::new(192, 0, 2, 2).octets());
packet[2..4].copy_from_slice(&((20 + payload.len()) as u16).to_be_bytes());
let sum = packet
.as_chunks::<2>()
.0
.iter()
.map(|b| u32::from(u16::from_be_bytes([b[0], b[1]])))
.sum::<u32>();
let sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16);
packet[10..12].copy_from_slice(&(!(sum as u16)).to_be_bytes());
packet.extend_from_slice(payload);
Bytes::from(packet)
}
impl Engine {
async fn run(&mut self, mut stop: watch::Receiver<bool>, link: &std::sync::Weak<PairLink>) {
if *self.stop.borrow() || *stop.borrow() {
return;
}
let mut buffer = [0; 1201];
let mut scratch = [0; 4096];
let mut timer = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_millis(250));
timer.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Skip);
let mut last_probe = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(2);
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_=stop.changed()=>break,
_=self.stop.changed()=>break,
_=timer.tick()=>{
let result=own(self.tunn.update_timers(&mut scratch));self.process(result,None).await;
if last_probe.elapsed()>=Duration::from_secs(1) {
last_probe=Instant::now();self.sequence=self.sequence.wrapping_add(1);
self.pending.push_back((self.sequence,Instant::now()));
let mut probe=vec![1];probe.extend_from_slice(&self.sequence.to_be_bytes());
probe.resize(713,0);rand::fill(&mut probe[9..]);self.encrypt(&probe).await;
}
while self.pending.front().is_some_and(|(_,at)|at.elapsed()>=Duration::from_secs(3)) {
self.pending.pop_front();self.samples.push_back(false);
}
while self.samples.len()>20 {self.samples.pop_front();}
self.assemblies.retain(|_,a|a.created.elapsed()<Duration::from_secs(5));
if self.started.elapsed()>WINDOW && (self.last_authenticated.elapsed()>Duration::from_secs(10)
|| (self.samples.len()>=15&&self.samples.iter().filter(|ok|!**ok).count()*100>=self.samples.len()*60)) {
if let Some(link)=link.upgrade() && let Ok(mut reason)=link.reason.lock() {*reason=Some("AWG data delivery checks: persistent loss or timeout".into());}
break;
}
}
packet=self.socket.recv_from(&mut buffer)=>{
if let Ok((len,source))=packet && let Some(message)=self.profile.decode(&buffer[..len]) {
let result=own(self.tunn.decapsulate(None,&message,&mut scratch));
if matches!(result,ResultOwned::Plain(_)) {
self.remote=Some(source);self.last_authenticated=Instant::now();
if let Some(link)=link.upgrade() && let Ok(mut remote)=link.remote.lock(){*remote=Some(source);}
}
self.process(result,Some(source)).await;
for _ in 0..16 {
let result=own(self.tunn.decapsulate(None,&[],&mut scratch));
if matches!(result,ResultOwned::Done){break;}
self.process(result,Some(source)).await;
}
}
}
packet=self.rx.recv()=>{
let Some(packet)=packet else{break;};
let count=packet.len().max(1).div_ceil(CHUNK) as u16;
self.counter=self.counter.wrapping_add(1);
for (index,chunk) in packet.chunks(CHUNK).enumerate() {
let mut payload=vec![3];payload.extend_from_slice(&self.counter.to_be_bytes());
payload.extend_from_slice(&(index as u16).to_be_bytes());payload.extend_from_slice(&count.to_be_bytes());
payload.extend_from_slice(chunk);self.encrypt(&payload).await;
// Large logical datagrams must let local readers and other
// pairs drain their bounded socket/command queues.
if (index + 1).is_multiple_of(16) {tokio::task::yield_now().await;}
}
}
}
}
}
async fn encrypt(&mut self, payload: &[u8]) {
let packet = self.profile.pad(ip(payload));
let mut scratch = [0; 4096];
let result = own(self.tunn.encapsulate(&packet, &mut scratch));
self.process(result, None).await;
}
async fn wire(&self, raw: &[u8], target: Option<SocketAddr>) {
let Some(wire) = self.profile.encode(raw) else {
return;
};
let targets: Vec<_> = target
.or(self.remote)
.map(|a| vec![a])
.unwrap_or_else(|| self.candidates.clone());
for addr in targets {
if raw.first() == Some(&1) {
for signature in self.profile.signature_packets() {
let _ = self.send_wire(&signature, addr).await;
}
for junk in self.profile.junk_packets() {
let _ = self.send_wire(&junk, addr).await;
}
}
let _ = self.send_wire(&wire, addr).await;
}
}
async fn send_wire(&self, bytes: &[u8], address: SocketAddr) {
let mut stop = self.stop.clone();
if *stop.borrow() {
return;
}
tokio::select! {biased; _=stop.changed()=>{}, _=tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(100),self.socket.send_to(bytes,address))=>{}}
}
async fn process(&mut self, result: ResultOwned, target: Option<SocketAddr>) {
match result {
ResultOwned::Wire(raw) => self.wire(&raw, target).await,
ResultOwned::Plain(packet) => {
let Some(payload) = packet.get(20..) else {
return;
};
let Some(seq) = payload
.get(1..9)
.and_then(|b| b.try_into().ok())
.map(u64::from_be_bytes)
else {
return;
};
match payload.first() {
Some(1) => {
let mut pong = vec![2];
pong.extend_from_slice(&seq.to_be_bytes());
pong.resize(713, 0);
let packet = self.profile.pad(ip(&pong));
let mut scratch = [0; 4096];
if let ResultOwned::Wire(raw) =
own(self.tunn.encapsulate(&packet, &mut scratch))
{
self.wire(&raw, target).await;
}
}
Some(2) => {
if let Some(index) =
self.pending.iter().position(|(pending, _)| *pending == seq)
{
self.pending.remove(index);
self.samples.push_back(true);
}
}
Some(3) => self.fragment(seq, payload),
_ => {}
}
}
ResultOwned::Done => {}
}
}
fn fragment(&mut self, id: u64, payload: &[u8]) {
let Some(header) = payload.get(9..13) else {
return;
};
let index = u16::from_be_bytes([header[0], header[1]]);
let count = u16::from_be_bytes([header[2], header[3]]);
let chunk = &payload[13..];
if count == 0
|| usize::from(count) > MAX_PAYLOAD.div_ceil(CHUNK)
|| index >= count
|| chunk.len() > CHUNK
{
return;
}
if !self.assemblies.contains_key(&id) && self.assemblies.len() >= 8 {
return;
}
let assembly = self.assemblies.entry(id).or_insert_with(|| Assembly {
created: Instant::now(),
count,
chunks: vec![None; count.into()],
});
if assembly.count != count {
return;
}
assembly.chunks[usize::from(index)] = Some(Bytes::copy_from_slice(chunk));
if assembly.chunks.iter().all(Option::is_some)
&& let Some(assembly) = self.assemblies.remove(&id)
{
let mut packet = Vec::new();
for chunk in assembly.chunks.into_iter().flatten() {
packet.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
}
if packet.len() <= MAX_PAYLOAD {
let _ = self.inbox.try_send(Bytes::from(packet));
}
}
}
}
+101
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
//! Optional, bounded server-reflexive discovery on the pair's own UDP socket.
//! A STUN answer is a candidate only; WireGuard authentication verifies a path.
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
const COOKIE: [u8; 4] = [0x21, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x42];
pub(crate) async fn mapped(socket: &UdpSocket, server: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(1200), async {
let address = tokio::net::lookup_host(server)
.await
.ok()?
.find(SocketAddr::is_ipv4)?;
let transaction: [u8; 12] = rand::random();
let mut request = [0; 20];
request[..2].copy_from_slice(&[0, 1]);
request[4..8].copy_from_slice(&COOKIE);
request[8..].copy_from_slice(&transaction);
socket.send_to(&request, address).await.ok()?;
let mut bytes = [0; 1024];
loop {
let (len, source) = socket.recv_from(&mut bytes).await.ok()?;
if source == address
&& let Some(mapped) = parse(&bytes[..len], &transaction)
{
return Some(mapped);
}
}
})
.await
.ok()
.flatten()
}
fn parse(bytes: &[u8], transaction: &[u8; 12]) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
if bytes.len() < 20
|| bytes[..2] != [1, 1]
|| bytes[4..8] != COOKIE
|| &bytes[8..20] != transaction
{
return None;
}
let declared = u16::from_be_bytes(bytes[2..4].try_into().ok()?) as usize;
if !declared.is_multiple_of(4) || declared != bytes.len() - 20 {
return None;
}
let mut at = 20;
while at + 4 <= bytes.len() {
let kind = u16::from_be_bytes(bytes[at..at + 2].try_into().ok()?);
let len = u16::from_be_bytes(bytes[at + 2..at + 4].try_into().ok()?) as usize;
at += 4;
let attribute = bytes.get(at..at.checked_add(len)?)?;
if kind == 0x0020 && attribute.len() == 8 && attribute[0..2] == [0, 1] {
let port = u16::from_be_bytes([attribute[2] ^ COOKIE[0], attribute[3] ^ COOKIE[1]]);
let ip = Ipv4Addr::new(
attribute[4] ^ COOKIE[0],
attribute[5] ^ COOKIE[1],
attribute[6] ^ COOKIE[2],
attribute[7] ^ COOKIE[3],
);
if port == 0 || ip.is_unspecified() || ip.is_multicast() || ip.is_broadcast() {
return None;
}
return Some(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(ip), port));
}
at = at.checked_add((len + 3) & !3)?;
}
None
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn mapping_uses_the_actual_socket_and_rejects_unrelated_or_truncated_answers() {
let server = UdpSocket::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).await.unwrap();
let address = server.local_addr().unwrap();
let socket = UdpSocket::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).await.unwrap();
let expected = socket.local_addr().unwrap();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut request = [0; 128];
let (len, source) = server.recv_from(&mut request).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(len, 20);
assert_eq!(source, expected);
let tx: [u8; 12] = request[8..20].try_into().unwrap();
let mut reply = request[..20].to_vec();
reply[..4].copy_from_slice(&[1, 1, 0, 12]);
reply.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0x20, 0, 8, 0, 1]);
let port = source.port().to_be_bytes();
reply.extend_from_slice(&[port[0] ^ COOKIE[0], port[1] ^ COOKIE[1]]);
for (i, b) in Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST.octets().into_iter().enumerate() {
reply.push(b ^ COOKIE[i]);
}
assert!(parse(&reply, &[0; 12]).is_none());
for len in 0..reply.len() {
assert!(parse(&reply[..len], &tx).is_none());
}
server.send_to(&reply, source).await.unwrap();
});
assert_eq!(mapped(&socket, &address.to_string()).await, Some(expected));
task.await.unwrap();
}
}
+720
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
//! Private pair negotiation. No secret profiles in capabilities or durable state.
use crate::{
AWG_PROTOCOL, AWG_WIRE_VERSION,
profile::PairProfile,
session::{self, PairLink},
};
use boringtun::{
noise::Tunn,
x25519::{PublicKey, StaticSecret},
};
use iroh::EndpointId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock, Weak};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, oneshot, watch};
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::TransportPayload;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{
ControlSender, InboundLink, PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError,
};
use tsunagi::{BoxFuture, NetworkId};
type Pair = (NetworkId, EndpointId);
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
enum Negotiation {
Offer {
version: u16,
profile: PairProfile,
key: [u8; 32],
#[serde(deserialize_with = "bounded_addresses")]
addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>,
},
Answer {
attempt: [u8; 16],
key: [u8; 32],
#[serde(deserialize_with = "bounded_addresses")]
addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>,
},
}
fn bounded_addresses<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(
deserializer: D,
) -> Result<Vec<SocketAddr>, D::Error> {
struct Visitor;
impl<'de> serde::de::Visitor<'de> for Visitor {
type Value = Vec<SocketAddr>;
fn expecting(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str("at most 32 UDP candidates")
}
fn visit_seq<A: serde::de::SeqAccess<'de>>(
self,
mut sequence: A,
) -> Result<Self::Value, A::Error> {
if sequence.size_hint().is_some_and(|n| n > 32) {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("too many UDP candidates"));
}
let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(sequence.size_hint().unwrap_or(0).min(32));
while let Some(address) = sequence.next_element()? {
if addresses.len() == 32 {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("too many UDP candidates"));
}
addresses.push(address);
}
Ok(addresses)
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_seq(Visitor)
}
struct Pending {
profile: PairProfile,
key: StaticSecret,
socket: UdpSocket,
reply: oneshot::Sender<Result<SharedLink, TransportError>>,
}
struct Inner {
stopped: watch::Sender<bool>,
local: EndpointId,
bind: Ipv4Addr,
stun: Option<String>,
busy: Mutex<HashSet<Pair>>,
control: OnceLock<Arc<dyn ControlSender>>,
allowed: Mutex<HashSet<Pair>>,
pending: Mutex<HashMap<Pair, Pending>>,
links: Mutex<HashMap<Pair, Arc<PairLink>>>,
inbound: mpsc::Sender<InboundLink>,
port_by_pair: Mutex<HashMap<Pair, u16>>,
}
/// Public diagnostics for one pair. No key or masking parameters are exposed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PairOverview {
/// Other endpoint's authenticated identity.
pub peer: EndpointId,
/// Fresh connection-attempt identifier.
pub attempt: [u8; 16],
/// Last known UDP port; None if diagnostics race with pair retirement.
pub local_port: Option<u16>,
/// Actual transport path, if established.
pub path: String,
/// Whether this attempt has been retired.
pub closed: bool,
}
/// A bounded set of independently configured pair engines.
pub struct AwgTransport {
inner: Arc<Inner>,
commands: mpsc::Sender<(NetworkId, EndpointId, Negotiation)>,
incoming: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<InboundLink>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for AwgTransport {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("AwgTransport")
.field("local", &self.inner.local)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
}
}
fn error(text: &str) -> TransportError {
TransportError::Other(text.into())
}
async fn addresses(inner: &Inner, socket: &UdpSocket) -> Result<Vec<SocketAddr>, TransportError> {
let local = socket
.local_addr()
.map_err(|_| error("AWG socket address unavailable"))?;
let mut candidates = if inner.bind.is_loopback() {
vec![local]
} else {
tsunagi_wireguard::local_ip_candidates()
.into_iter()
.filter(|ip| ip.is_ipv4())
.take(31)
.map(|ip| SocketAddr::new(ip, local.port()))
.collect()
};
if let Some(server) = &inner.stun
&& let Some(mapped) = crate::stun::mapped(socket, server).await
&& !candidates.contains(&mapped)
{
candidates.push(mapped);
}
if candidates.is_empty() {
return Err(error("AWG has no UDP address candidates"));
}
Ok(candidates)
}
fn validate_endpoint(key: &[u8; 32], addresses: &[SocketAddr]) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if *key == [0; 32]
|| addresses.is_empty()
|| addresses.len() > 32
|| addresses.iter().any(|address| {
address.port() == 0
|| !address.is_ipv4()
|| address.ip().is_unspecified()
|| address.ip().is_multicast()
|| matches!(address.ip(), std::net::IpAddr::V4(ip) if ip.is_broadcast())
})
{
return Err(error("invalid AWG endpoint"));
}
Ok(())
}
impl AwgTransport {
/// Starts the coordinator. Production binds wildcard IPv4; tests use loopback.
pub fn new(local: EndpointId, bind: Ipv4Addr) -> Arc<Self> {
Self::new_with_stun(local, bind, None)
}
/// Enables an optional STUN server (host:port) for this pair's own socket.
/// Local-only callers pass None; failure still permits local UDP candidates.
pub fn new_with_stun(local: EndpointId, bind: Ipv4Addr, stun: Option<String>) -> Arc<Self> {
let (commands, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(64);
let (inbound, incoming) = mpsc::channel(64);
let (stopped, _) = watch::channel(false);
let inner = Arc::new(Inner {
stopped,
local,
bind,
stun,
busy: Mutex::default(),
control: OnceLock::new(),
allowed: Mutex::default(),
pending: Mutex::default(),
links: Mutex::default(),
inbound,
port_by_pair: Mutex::default(),
});
let weak = Arc::downgrade(&inner);
let mut stopped = inner.stopped.subscribe();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some((network, peer, message)) =
tokio::select! { biased; _=stopped.changed()=>None, message=rx.recv()=>message }
{
let Some(inner) = weak.upgrade() else {
break;
};
if !lock(&inner.allowed).contains(&(network, peer))
|| !lock(&inner.busy).insert((network, peer))
{
continue;
}
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut stop = inner.stopped.subscribe();
tokio::select! {biased; _=stop.changed()=>{}, _=async {
if let Err(err)=receive(&inner,(network,peer),message).await {tracing::debug!(%err,"AWG pair negotiation rejected");}
}=>{}}
lock(&inner.busy).remove(&(network, peer));
});
}
});
Arc::new(Self {
inner,
commands,
incoming: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(incoming),
})
}
/// Registers a peer after its authenticated capability has been validated.
pub fn allow_peer(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
let mut allowed = lock(&self.inner.allowed);
if !*self.inner.stopped.borrow() && allowed.len() < 128 {
allowed.insert((network, peer));
}
}
/// Retires a pair when its network membership session goes away.
pub fn forget_peer(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
let pair = (network, peer);
lock(&self.inner.allowed).remove(&pair);
lock(&self.inner.pending).remove(&pair);
lock(&self.inner.port_by_pair).remove(&pair);
if let Some(link) = lock(&self.inner.links).remove(&pair) {
link.close();
}
}
/// Stops all pair engines in this network.
pub fn stop_network(&self, network: NetworkId) {
let peers: Vec<_> = lock(&self.inner.allowed)
.iter()
.filter(|(n, _)| *n == network)
.map(|(_, p)| *p)
.collect();
for peer in peers {
self.forget_peer(network, peer);
}
}
/// Stops all sockets and coordinator work without waiting for remote peers.
pub fn shutdown(&self) {
self.inner.stopped.send_replace(true);
lock(&self.inner.allowed).clear();
lock(&self.inner.pending).clear();
for (_, link) in lock(&self.inner.links).drain() {
link.close();
}
lock(&self.inner.port_by_pair).clear();
}
/// Receives a successfully negotiated and authenticated inbound pair link.
pub async fn next_inbound(&self) -> Option<InboundLink> {
let mut stopped = self.inner.stopped.subscribe();
if *stopped.borrow() {
return None;
}
let mut incoming = self.incoming.lock().await;
tokio::select! {biased; _=stopped.changed()=>None, link=incoming.recv()=>link}
}
/// Takes a public snapshot of this network's pair attempts.
pub fn overview(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Vec<PairOverview> {
let links = lock(&self.inner.links);
let ports = lock(&self.inner.port_by_pair);
links
.iter()
.filter(|((n, _), _)| *n == network)
.map(|((_, peer), link)| PairOverview {
peer: *peer,
attempt: link.attempt,
local_port: ports.get(&(network, *peer)).copied(),
path: link.path_description(),
closed: link.is_closed(),
})
.collect()
}
}
impl PacketTransport for AwgTransport {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
AWG_PROTOCOL
}
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any {
self
}
fn attach_control(&self, control: Arc<dyn ControlSender>) {
let _ = self.inner.control.set(control);
}
fn on_control(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &str,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if protocol != AWG_PROTOCOL || !lock(&self.inner.allowed).contains(&(network, peer)) {
return Err(TransportError::Declined(protocol.into()));
}
if payload.len() > 4096 {
return Err(error("AWG negotiation too large"));
}
let message: Negotiation =
postcard::from_bytes(payload).map_err(|_| error("malformed AWG negotiation"))?;
match &message {
Negotiation::Offer {
version,
profile,
key,
addresses,
} => {
if *version != AWG_WIRE_VERSION || peer.as_bytes() >= self.inner.local.as_bytes() {
return Err(error("invalid AWG offer role/version"));
}
profile.validate().map_err(error)?;
validate_endpoint(key, addresses)?;
}
Negotiation::Answer { key, addresses, .. } => validate_endpoint(key, addresses)?,
}
self.commands
.try_send((network, peer, message))
.map_err(|_| error("AWG negotiation queue full"))
}
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let pair = (network, peer);
if protocol != AWG_PROTOCOL
|| self.inner.local.as_bytes() >= peer.as_bytes()
|| !lock(&self.inner.allowed).contains(&pair)
{
return Err(TransportError::Declined(protocol.into()));
}
let control = self
.inner
.control
.get()
.ok_or_else(|| error("AWG control plane unavailable"))?;
let socket = UdpSocket::bind((self.inner.bind, 0))
.await
.map_err(|_| error("AWG UDP bind failed"))?;
let profile = PairProfile::generate();
let attempt = profile.id();
let key = StaticSecret::from(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>());
let public = PublicKey::from(&key).to_bytes();
let message = Negotiation::Offer {
version: AWG_WIRE_VERSION,
profile: profile.clone(),
key: public,
addresses: addresses(&self.inner, &socket).await?,
};
let (reply, rx) = oneshot::channel();
if lock(&self.inner.pending).len() >= 128 {
return Err(error("too many AWG pair negotiations"));
}
lock(&self.inner.pending).insert(
pair,
Pending {
profile,
key,
socket,
reply,
},
);
// A cancellation guard also retires partially started attempts.
let mut guard = AttemptGuard {
inner: Arc::downgrade(&self.inner),
pair,
attempt,
completed: false,
};
let bytes =
postcard::to_stdvec(&message).map_err(|_| error("AWG offer encoding failed"))?;
control
.send(network, peer, AWG_PROTOCOL, TransportPayload::new(bytes))
.await?;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(15), rx)
.await
.map_err(|_| error("AWG negotiation/handshake timed out"))?
.map_err(|_| error("AWG attempt cancelled"))?;
guard.completed = result.is_ok();
result
})
}
}
struct AttemptGuard {
inner: Weak<Inner>,
pair: Pair,
attempt: [u8; 16],
completed: bool,
}
impl Drop for AttemptGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if let Some(inner) = self.inner.upgrade() {
let mut pending = lock(&inner.pending);
if pending
.get(&self.pair)
.is_some_and(|p| p.profile.id() == self.attempt)
{
pending.remove(&self.pair);
}
drop(pending);
if !self.completed
&& let Some(link) = lock(&inner.links).get(&self.pair)
&& link.attempt == self.attempt
{
link.close();
}
}
}
}
async fn receive(
inner: &Arc<Inner>,
pair: Pair,
message: Negotiation,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if !lock(&inner.allowed).contains(&pair) {
return Err(error("AWG peer no longer authenticated"));
}
match message {
Negotiation::Offer {
profile,
key,
addresses: candidates,
..
} => {
if let Some(link) = lock(&inner.links).get(&pair) {
if link.attempt == profile.id() {
return Err(error("duplicate AWG offer"));
}
link.close();
}
let socket = UdpSocket::bind((inner.bind, 0))
.await
.map_err(|_| error("AWG UDP bind failed"))?;
let local_port = socket
.local_addr()
.map_err(|_| error("AWG socket address unavailable"))?
.port();
let local_key = StaticSecret::from(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>());
let public = PublicKey::from(&local_key).to_bytes();
let answer = Negotiation::Answer {
attempt: profile.id(),
key: public,
addresses: addresses(inner, &socket).await?,
};
let tunn = Tunn::new(
local_key,
PublicKey::from(key),
Some(profile.psk),
Some(1),
rand::random(),
None,
);
let link = session::start(
pair.0,
pair.1,
socket,
tunn,
profile,
candidates,
inner.stopped.subscribe(),
);
if !lock(&inner.allowed).contains(&pair) {
link.close();
return Err(error("AWG membership ended"));
}
lock(&inner.links).insert(pair, link.clone());
lock(&inner.port_by_pair).insert(pair, local_port);
let control = inner
.control
.get()
.ok_or_else(|| error("AWG control unavailable"))?;
if let Err(err) = control
.send(
pair.0,
pair.1,
AWG_PROTOCOL,
TransportPayload::new(
postcard::to_stdvec(&answer)
.map_err(|_| error("AWG answer encoding failed"))?,
),
)
.await
{
link.close();
return Err(err);
}
publish_when_up(Arc::downgrade(inner), pair, link, None);
}
Negotiation::Answer {
attempt,
key,
addresses: candidates,
} => {
if !lock(&inner.pending)
.get(&pair)
.is_some_and(|p| p.profile.id() == attempt)
{
return Err(error("stale AWG answer"));
}
let pending = lock(&inner.pending)
.remove(&pair)
.ok_or_else(|| error("AWG attempt cancelled"))?;
let local_port = pending
.socket
.local_addr()
.map_err(|_| error("AWG socket address unavailable"))?
.port();
let tunn = Tunn::new(
pending.key,
PublicKey::from(key),
Some(pending.profile.psk),
Some(1),
rand::random(),
None,
);
let link = session::start(
pair.0,
pair.1,
pending.socket,
tunn,
pending.profile,
candidates,
inner.stopped.subscribe(),
);
if !lock(&inner.allowed).contains(&pair) {
link.close();
return Err(error("AWG membership ended"));
}
lock(&inner.links).insert(pair, link.clone());
lock(&inner.port_by_pair).insert(pair, local_port);
publish_when_up(Arc::downgrade(inner), pair, link, Some(pending.reply));
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn publish_when_up(
inner: Weak<Inner>,
pair: Pair,
link: Arc<PairLink>,
reply: Option<oneshot::Sender<Result<SharedLink, TransportError>>>,
) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut reply = reply;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(14), async {
loop {
if link.is_closed() || reply.as_ref().is_some_and(oneshot::Sender::is_closed) {
return Err(error("AWG pair closed during handshake"));
}
if link.has_authenticated_path() {
return Ok(());
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(25)).await;
}
})
.await;
if !matches!(result, Ok(Ok(()))) {
link.close();
if let Some(reply) = reply.take() {
let _ = reply.send(Err(error("AWG authenticated data path timed out")));
}
return;
}
let Some(inner) = inner.upgrade() else {
link.close();
return;
};
if !lock(&inner.allowed).contains(&pair) {
link.close();
return;
}
if link.is_closed()
|| !lock(&inner.links)
.get(&pair)
.is_some_and(|current| current.attempt == link.attempt)
{
link.close();
return;
}
let shared: SharedLink = link.clone();
if let Some(reply) = reply {
if reply.send(Ok(shared)).is_err() {
link.close();
}
} else if inner
.inbound
.try_send(InboundLink {
network: pair.0,
peer: pair.1,
protocol: AWG_PROTOCOL.into(),
link: shared,
})
.is_err()
{
link.close();
}
});
}
impl Drop for AwgTransport {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.shutdown();
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn concurrent_admission_is_bounded_across_networks_and_retirement_releases_slots() {
let identity = tsunagi::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate();
let transport = AwgTransport::new(identity.endpoint_id(), Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST);
let peer = tsunagi::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate().endpoint_id();
std::thread::scope(|scope| {
for thread in 0..8u8 {
let transport = &transport;
scope.spawn(move || {
for item in 0..32u8 {
let mut id = [0; 32];
id[0] = thread;
id[1] = item;
transport.allow_peer(NetworkId::from_bytes(id), peer);
}
});
}
});
assert_eq!(lock(&transport.inner.allowed).len(), 128);
let network = lock(&transport.inner.allowed).iter().next().unwrap().0;
transport.stop_network(network);
let new = NetworkId::from_bytes([255; 32]);
transport.allow_peer(new, peer);
assert!(lock(&transport.inner.allowed).contains(&(new, peer)));
assert_eq!(lock(&transport.inner.allowed).len(), 128);
transport.shutdown();
assert!(lock(&transport.inner.allowed).is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn private_negotiation_bounds_roles_and_membership_before_starting_engines() {
let mut ids = [
tsunagi::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate().endpoint_id(),
tsunagi::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate().endpoint_id(),
];
ids.sort_by_key(|id| *id.as_bytes());
let peer = ids[0];
let local = ids[1];
let network = NetworkId::from_bytes([7; 32]);
let transport = AwgTransport::new(local, Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST);
let offer = |version, key, addresses| Negotiation::Offer {
version,
profile: PairProfile::generate(),
key,
addresses,
};
let address = SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 12345));
let encode = |message: &Negotiation| postcard::to_stdvec(message).unwrap();
let valid = encode(&offer(AWG_WIRE_VERSION, [1; 32], vec![address]));
assert!(
transport
.on_control(network, peer, AWG_PROTOCOL, &valid)
.is_err()
);
transport.allow_peer(network, peer);
assert!(
transport
.on_control(network, peer, "wrong-protocol", &valid)
.is_err()
);
assert!(
transport
.on_control(network, peer, AWG_PROTOCOL, &[0; 4097])
.is_err()
);
for bytes in [
encode(&offer(99, [1; 32], vec![address])),
encode(&offer(AWG_WIRE_VERSION, [0; 32], vec![address])),
encode(&offer(AWG_WIRE_VERSION, [1; 32], vec![])),
encode(&offer(AWG_WIRE_VERSION, [1; 32], vec![address; 33])),
] {
assert!(
transport
.on_control(network, peer, AWG_PROTOCOL, &bytes)
.is_err()
);
}
for len in 0..valid.len() {
assert!(
transport
.on_control(network, peer, AWG_PROTOCOL, &valid[..len])
.is_err()
);
}
let wrong_role = AwgTransport::new(peer, Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST);
wrong_role.allow_peer(network, local);
assert!(
wrong_role
.on_control(network, local, AWG_PROTOCOL, &valid)
.is_err()
);
transport.forget_peer(network, peer);
assert!(
transport
.on_control(network, peer, AWG_PROTOCOL, &valid)
.is_err()
);
assert!(transport.overview(network).is_empty());
transport.shutdown();
wrong_role.shutdown();
}
}
+773
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
//! Real membership, UDP sockets, pair negotiation and nested WireGuard encryption.
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use bytes::Bytes;
use std::{
net::Ipv4Addr,
path::Path,
sync::{
Arc,
atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering},
},
time::Duration,
};
use tempfile::TempDir;
use tsunagi::dataplane::IpPlugin;
use tsunagi::dataplane::transport::{
ControlSender, PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError,
};
use tsunagi::discovery::SharedMemoryDiscovery;
use tsunagi::overlay::{MemoryTun, MemoryTunFactory};
use tsunagi::testing::{config_with, network, wait_for_peers, wait_until};
use tsunagi::{Agent, BoxFuture, NetworkId};
use tsunagi_awg::{AWG_PROTOCOL, AwgPlugin, AwgTransport};
use tsunagi_wg_quic::WireguardConfig;
struct Node {
agent: Agent,
plugin: Arc<AwgPlugin>,
quic: Option<Arc<tsunagi_wg_quic::WireguardPlugin>>,
transport: Arc<AwgTransport>,
tuns: MemoryTunFactory,
loss: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl Node {
async fn open(root: &Path, discovery: &SharedMemoryDiscovery, interface: &str) -> Self {
Self::open_with_fallback(root, discovery, interface, false).await
}
async fn open_with_fallback(
root: &Path,
discovery: &SharedMemoryDiscovery,
interface: &str,
fallback: bool,
) -> Self {
Self::open_config(root, discovery, interface, fallback, 1280).await
}
async fn open_config(
root: &Path,
discovery: &SharedMemoryDiscovery,
interface: &str,
fallback: bool,
mtu: u32,
) -> Self {
Self::open_selected(root, discovery, interface, fallback, mtu, None).await
}
async fn open_selected(
root: &Path,
discovery: &SharedMemoryDiscovery,
interface: &str,
fallback: bool,
mtu: u32,
default_protocols: Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Self {
let identity =
tsunagi::storage::StateStore::open(tsunagi::StoragePaths::under(root).state_db())
.unwrap()
.load_or_create_device_identity()
.unwrap();
let transport = AwgTransport::new(identity.endpoint_id(), Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST);
let plugin = AwgPlugin::open(
WireguardConfig::new(root.join("awg"))
.with_mtu(mtu)
.with_reconcile(Duration::from_millis(20), Duration::from_millis(250)),
transport.clone(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
let loss = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let faults = Arc::new(FaultTransport {
inner: transport.clone(),
loss: loss.clone(),
});
let tuns = MemoryTunFactory::new();
let mut config = config_with(root, discovery)
.with_interface(Arc::new(tuns.clone()), interface, mtu)
.with_plugin(plugin.clone() as Arc<dyn IpPlugin>)
.with_custom_transport(AWG_PROTOCOL, faults);
let mut quic_plugin = None;
if fallback {
let quic = tsunagi_wg_quic::WireguardPlugin::open(
WireguardConfig::new(root.join("wg-quic"))
.with_mtu(mtu)
.with_reconcile(Duration::from_millis(20), Duration::from_millis(250)),
)
.await
.unwrap();
config = config.with_plugin(quic.clone());
quic_plugin = Some(quic);
}
config.default_protocols = default_protocols;
let agent = Agent::spawn(config).await.unwrap();
let inbound_agent = agent.clone();
let inbound_transport = transport.clone();
let inbound_loss = loss.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(mut link) = inbound_transport.next_inbound().await {
link.link = impaired(link.link, inbound_loss.clone());
let _ = inbound_agent.install_inbound_link(link).await;
}
});
Self {
agent,
plugin,
quic: quic_plugin,
transport,
tuns,
loss,
}
}
async fn ready(&self, id: NetworkId, n: usize) {
wait_until("AWG outer paths and end-to-end handshakes", || async {
(self
.transport
.overview(id)
.iter()
.filter(|p| !p.closed && !p.path.contains("establishing"))
.count()
== n
&& self
.plugin
.overview(id)?
.peers
.iter()
.filter(|p| {
p.tunnel
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|t| t.health.is_up() && t.path.contains("awg UDP via"))
})
.count()
== n)
.then_some(())
})
.await;
}
fn tun(&self) -> Arc<MemoryTun> {
self.tuns
.device(&self.agent.overlay().unwrap().interface)
.unwrap()
}
fn addr(&self, id: NetworkId) -> Ipv4Addr {
self.plugin
.overview(id)
.unwrap()
.overlay_address_v4
.unwrap()
}
}
fn packet(source: Ipv4Addr, dest: Ipv4Addr, len: usize) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = vec![0; len];
bytes[0] = 0x45;
bytes[2..4].copy_from_slice(&(len as u16).to_be_bytes());
bytes[8] = 64;
bytes[9] = 253;
bytes[12..16].copy_from_slice(&source.octets());
bytes[16..20].copy_from_slice(&dest.octets());
rand::fill(&mut bytes[20..]);
Bytes::from(bytes)
}
async fn exchange(a: &Node, b: &Node, id: NetworkId) {
for len in [64, 1097, 1280] {
let bytes = packet(a.addr(id), b.addr(id), len);
a.tun().push_from_os(bytes.clone());
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), b.tun().pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
bytes
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_control_only_agent_enables_real_data_without_restart_and_cancels_stale_attempts() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [TempDir::new().unwrap(), TempDir::new().unwrap()];
let a = Node::open_selected(
roots[0].path(),
&discovery,
"initial-none-a",
true,
1280,
Some(vec![]),
)
.await;
let b = Node::open_selected(
roots[1].path(),
&discovery,
"initial-none-b",
true,
1280,
Some(vec![]),
)
.await;
let (name, secret) = network("enable-after-control-only");
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
wait_for_peers(&a.agent, id, 1).await;
wait_for_peers(&b.agent, id, 1).await;
assert!(a.agent.overlay().is_none());
assert!(b.agent.overlay().is_none());
for node in [&a, &b] {
assert!(
node.agent
.network_status(id)
.await
.unwrap()
.protocols
.is_empty()
);
node.agent
.set_protocols(id, vec!["awg".into()])
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(node.agent.overlay().is_some());
}
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
let before = a.agent.overlay().unwrap().interface;
// Changes race unfinished opens and prepared plugin callbacks; the last
// selection must win even if an earlier open has completed in its queue.
for selection in [
vec!["wg-quic".into()],
vec![],
vec!["awg".into()],
vec![],
vec!["awg".into()],
] {
a.agent.set_protocols(id, selection).await.unwrap();
}
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
assert_eq!(a.agent.overlay().unwrap().interface, before);
for node in [&a, &b] {
let status = node.agent.network_status(id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(status.protocols, ["awg"]);
assert_eq!(status.metrics.sessions_established, 1);
assert_eq!(status.metrics.disconnects, 0);
}
a.agent.shutdown().await;
b.agent.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn runtime_protocol_selection_replaces_real_tunnels_and_survives_restart() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [TempDir::new().unwrap(), TempDir::new().unwrap()];
let a = Node::open_with_fallback(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "runtime-a", true).await;
let b = Node::open_with_fallback(roots[1].path(), &discovery, "runtime-b", true).await;
let (name, secret) = network("runtime-protocols");
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
let (other_name, other_secret, other_id) = loop {
let (name, secret) = network("unchanged-runtime-network");
let other_id = tsunagi::identity::NetworkKeys::derive(&name, &secret).network_id();
if tsunagi::state::derived_ipv4_range(id) != tsunagi::state::derived_ipv4_range(other_id) {
break (name, secret, other_id);
}
};
a.agent
.join_network(&other_name, &other_secret)
.await
.unwrap();
b.agent
.join_network(&other_name, &other_secret)
.await
.unwrap();
a.ready(other_id, 1).await;
b.ready(other_id, 1).await;
let other_before = a
.agent
.network_status(other_id)
.await
.unwrap()
.metrics
.data_links_established;
for node in [&a, &b] {
let before = node.agent.network_status(id).await.unwrap().protocols;
for invalid in [vec!["unknown".into()], vec!["awg".into(), "awg".into()]] {
assert!(node.agent.set_protocols(id, invalid).await.is_err());
assert_eq!(
node.agent.network_status(id).await.unwrap().protocols,
before
);
}
}
// Exercise updates initiated by either endpoint-id role, including an
// empty set. Membership and the control session stay alive throughout.
for node in [&a, &b] {
node.agent.set_protocols(id, Vec::new()).await.unwrap();
wait_until("peer accepts control-only selection", || async {
let other = if node.agent.endpoint_id() == a.agent.endpoint_id() {
&b
} else {
&a
};
let status = other.agent.network_status(id).await.ok()?;
(status.peers.len() == 1
&& status.peers[0].protocols.is_empty()
&& matches!(status.peers[0].data_path, tsunagi::agent::DataPath::None))
.then_some(())
})
.await;
assert_eq!(node.agent.network_status(id).await.unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
node.agent
.set_protocols(id, vec!["wg-quic".into(), "awg".into()])
.await
.unwrap();
}
a.agent
.set_protocols(id, vec!["wg-quic".into()])
.await
.unwrap();
wait_until("real QUIC replaces AWG", || async {
let a_status = a.agent.network_status(id).await.ok()?;
let b_status = b.agent.network_status(id).await.ok()?;
(a_status.peers[0].protocols == ["wg-quic"]
&& b_status.peers[0].protocols == ["wg-quic"]
&& !matches!(a_status.peers[0].data_path, tsunagi::agent::DataPath::None)
&& !matches!(b_status.peers[0].data_path, tsunagi::agent::DataPath::None)
&& a.transport.overview(id).iter().all(|p| p.closed)
&& b.transport.overview(id).iter().all(|p| p.closed))
.then_some(())
})
.await;
// Get addresses from the system allocation: the disabled AWG plugin no
// longer has a live view of this network.
for (source, dest) in [(&a, &b), (&b, &a)] {
wait_until("QUIC end-to-end handshake", || async {
source
.quic
.as_ref()?
.overview(id)?
.peers
.iter()
.any(|p| p.tunnel.as_ref().is_some_and(|t| t.health.is_up()))
.then_some(())
})
.await;
let addr = |n: &Node| {
n.quic
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.overview(id)
.unwrap()
.overlay_address_v4
.unwrap()
};
let bytes = packet(addr(source), addr(dest), 1280);
source.tun().push_from_os(bytes.clone());
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), dest.tun().pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
bytes
);
}
assert_eq!(
a.agent
.network_status(other_id)
.await
.unwrap()
.metrics
.data_links_established,
other_before
);
exchange(&a, &b, other_id).await;
a.agent.shutdown().await;
let restarted = Node::open_with_fallback(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "runtime-a", true).await;
wait_for_peers(&restarted.agent, id, 1).await;
assert_eq!(
restarted.agent.network_status(id).await.unwrap().protocols,
["wg-quic"]
);
assert_eq!(
b.agent.network_status(other_id).await.unwrap().protocols,
["awg", "wg-quic"]
);
restarted.ready(other_id, 1).await;
b.ready(other_id, 1).await;
exchange(&restarted, &b, other_id).await;
restarted
.agent
.set_protocols(id, vec!["awg".into()])
.await
.unwrap();
restarted.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
exchange(&restarted, &b, id).await;
restarted.agent.shutdown().await;
b.agent.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn real_pairs_carry_full_size_packets_and_restart_with_fresh_profiles() {
tsunagi::testing::init_tracing();
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [
TempDir::new().unwrap(),
TempDir::new().unwrap(),
TempDir::new().unwrap(),
];
let a = Node::open(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "awga").await;
let b = Node::open(roots[1].path(), &discovery, "awgb").await;
let c = Node::open(roots[2].path(), &discovery, "awgc").await;
let (name, secret) = network("awg-pairs");
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
c.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
for node in [&a, &b, &c] {
wait_for_peers(&node.agent, id, 2).await;
node.ready(id, 2).await;
}
let ids: std::collections::HashSet<_> = [&a, &b, &c]
.into_iter()
.flat_map(|n| n.transport.overview(id).into_iter().map(|p| p.attempt))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
ids.len(),
3,
"one independent profile for each of three pairs"
);
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
exchange(&b, &a, id).await;
exchange(&a, &c, id).await;
let old_ports: Vec<_> = a
.transport
.overview(id)
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|p| p.local_port)
.collect();
a.agent.shutdown().await;
for port in old_ports {
wait_until("old pair socket released", || async {
tokio::net::UdpSocket::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, port))
.await
.ok()
})
.await;
}
let restarted = Node::open(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "awga").await;
restarted.ready(id, 2).await;
assert!(
restarted
.transport
.overview(id)
.iter()
.all(|p| !ids.contains(&p.attempt))
);
exchange(&restarted, &b, id).await;
exchange(&c, &restarted, id).await;
restarted.agent.shutdown().await;
b.agent.shutdown().await;
c.agent.shutdown().await;
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), restarted.transport.next_inbound())
.await
.unwrap()
.is_none()
);
}
// Drops datagrams at the link boundary. Membership, control, sockets, crypto,
// addressing and storage remain real. This substitutes a lossy physical path.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct FaultTransport {
inner: Arc<AwgTransport>,
loss: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl PacketTransport for FaultTransport {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
AWG_PROTOCOL
}
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any {
self
}
fn attach_control(&self, sender: Arc<dyn ControlSender>) {
self.inner.attach_control(sender);
}
fn on_control(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: iroh::EndpointId,
protocol: &str,
bytes: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.inner.on_control(network, peer, protocol, bytes)
}
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: iroh::EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
Ok(impaired(
self.inner.open(network, peer, protocol).await?,
self.loss.clone(),
))
})
}
}
fn impaired(raw: SharedLink, loss: Arc<AtomicBool>) -> SharedLink {
Arc::new(FaultLink {
raw,
loss,
sequence: AtomicU64::new(0),
})
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct FaultLink {
raw: SharedLink,
loss: Arc<AtomicBool>,
sequence: AtomicU64,
}
impl PacketLink for FaultLink {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.raw.network()
}
fn peer(&self) -> iroh::EndpointId {
self.raw.peer()
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
self.raw.max_datagram_size()
}
fn send(&self, bytes: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.loss.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
&& !self
.sequence
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
.is_multiple_of(5)
{
Ok(())
} else {
self.raw.send(bytes)
}
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
self.raw.recv()
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
self.raw.closed()
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
self.raw.is_closed()
}
fn close(&self) {
self.raw.close();
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
self.raw.path_description()
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn persistent_runtime_loss_retires_the_pair_and_negotiates_fresh_parameters() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [TempDir::new().unwrap(), TempDir::new().unwrap()];
let a = Node::open(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "lossa").await;
let b = Node::open(roots[1].path(), &discovery, "lossb").await;
let (name, secret) = network("awg-loss");
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
let old = a.transport.overview(id)[0].attempt;
let mut events = a.agent.subscribe();
a.loss.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
tsunagi::testing::wait_event(&mut events, |event| match event {
tsunagi::Event::DataLinkDown {
network, reason, ..
} if *network == id && reason.contains("delivery checks") => Some(()),
_ => None,
})
.await;
a.loss.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
wait_until("fresh AWG profile after runtime loss", || async {
a.transport
.overview(id)
.iter()
.any(|p| p.attempt != old && !p.closed && !p.path.contains("establishing"))
.then_some(())
})
.await;
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
let initiator = if a.agent.endpoint_id().as_bytes() < b.agent.endpoint_id().as_bytes() {
&a
} else {
&b
};
let received = initiator.plugin.overview(id).unwrap().peers[0]
.tunnel
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.stats
.rx_packets;
let attempt = initiator.transport.overview(id)[0].attempt;
wait_until(
"fresh pair delivery checks answered after installation",
|| async {
let view = initiator.plugin.overview(id)?;
(view.peers.first()?.tunnel.as_ref()?.stats.rx_packets >= received + 3).then_some(())
},
)
.await;
assert_eq!(initiator.transport.overview(id)[0].attempt, attempt);
wait_for_peers(&a.agent, id, 1).await;
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
exchange(&b, &a, id).await;
a.agent.shutdown().await;
b.agent.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn runtime_loss_falls_back_to_real_iroh_without_interrupting_control_or_ip() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [TempDir::new().unwrap(), TempDir::new().unwrap()];
let a = Node::open_with_fallback(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "fallba", true).await;
let b = Node::open_with_fallback(roots[1].path(), &discovery, "fallbb", true).await;
let (name, secret) = network("awg-fallback");
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
let mut events = a.agent.subscribe();
a.loss.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
tsunagi::testing::wait_event(&mut events, |event| match event {
tsunagi::Event::DataLinkDown {
network, reason, ..
} if *network == id && reason.contains("delivery checks") => Some(()),
_ => None,
})
.await;
for node in [&a, &b] {
wait_until("fallback carrier is wg-quic",||async {
let status=node.agent.status().await.ok()?;
let network=status.networks.iter().find(|n|n.network_id==id)?;
(network.members.iter().any(|m|matches!(&m.data_path,tsunagi::agent::DataPath::Direct{transport} if transport=="wg-quic"))).then_some(())
}).await;
wait_for_peers(&node.agent, id, 1).await;
}
exchange(&a, &b, id).await;
exchange(&b, &a, id).await;
a.agent.shutdown().await;
b.agent.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn opaque_pair_carrier_fragments_its_full_advertised_capacity() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [TempDir::new().unwrap(), TempDir::new().unwrap()];
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
for root in &roots {
let identity = tsunagi::storage::StateStore::open(
tsunagi::StoragePaths::under(root.path()).state_db(),
)
.unwrap()
.load_or_create_device_identity()
.unwrap();
let transport = AwgTransport::new(identity.endpoint_id(), Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST);
let agent = Agent::spawn(
config_with(root.path(), &discovery)
.with_custom_transport(AWG_PROTOCOL, transport.clone()),
)
.await
.unwrap();
nodes.push((agent, transport));
}
let (name, secret) = network("awg-capacity");
let id = nodes[0].0.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
nodes[1].0.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
for (i, (agent, transport)) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
wait_for_peers(agent, id, 1).await;
// This fixture tests only the transport contract: register the member
// after the real core has authenticated it, without an IP plugin/TUN.
transport.allow_peer(id, nodes[1 - i].0.endpoint_id());
}
nodes.sort_by_key(|(agent, _)| *agent.endpoint_id().as_bytes());
let outgoing = nodes[0]
.1
.open(id, nodes[1].0.endpoint_id(), AWG_PROTOCOL)
.await
.unwrap();
let incoming = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), nodes[1].1.next_inbound())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap()
.link;
for (from, to) in [(&outgoing, &incoming), (&incoming, &outgoing)] {
let mut bytes = vec![0; from.max_datagram_size()];
rand::fill(&mut bytes[..]);
let bytes = Bytes::from(bytes);
from.send(bytes.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), to.recv())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
bytes
);
assert!(matches!(
from.send(Bytes::from(vec![0; from.max_datagram_size() + 1])),
Err(TransportError::TooLarge { .. })
));
}
outgoing.close();
incoming.close();
for (agent, transport) in nodes {
transport.shutdown();
agent.shutdown().await;
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn encrypted_health_checks_fit_a_smaller_peers_configured_interface_mtu() {
let discovery = SharedMemoryDiscovery::new();
let roots = [TempDir::new().unwrap(), TempDir::new().unwrap()];
let a = Node::open_config(roots[0].path(), &discovery, "smalla", false, 1280).await;
let b = Node::open_config(roots[1].path(), &discovery, "smallb", false, 576).await;
let (name, secret) = network("awg-small-mtu");
let id = a.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
b.agent.join_network(&name, &secret).await.unwrap();
a.ready(id, 1).await;
b.ready(id, 1).await;
let bytes = packet(a.addr(id), b.addr(id), 576);
a.tun().push_from_os(bytes.clone());
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), b.tun().pop_to_os())
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
bytes
);
wait_until(
"encrypted delivery checks answered with a small MTU",
|| async {
let view = a.plugin.overview(id)?;
let peer = view.peers.first()?.tunnel.as_ref()?;
(peer.stats.rx_packets >= 3).then_some(())
},
)
.await;
for node in [&a, &b] {
assert_eq!(
node.plugin.overview(id).unwrap().peers[0]
.tunnel
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.stats
.dropped_oversize,
0
);
}
a.agent.shutdown().await;
b.agent.shutdown().await;
}
+36
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
//! Fresh and bounded masking profiles, and rejection of foreign/truncated wire packets.
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use tsunagi_awg::profile::PairProfile;
#[test]
fn profiles_are_fresh_bounded_and_redacted() {
let profiles: Vec<_> = (0..128).map(|_| PairProfile::generate()).collect();
for (i, profile) in profiles.iter().enumerate() {
profile.validate().unwrap();
assert!(!format!("{profile:?}").contains(&format!("{:?}", profile.header_key())));
for other in &profiles[..i] {
assert_ne!(profile.header_key(), other.header_key());
assert_ne!(profile.id(), other.id());
}
for packet in profile.signature_packets() {
assert!(packet.len() < 1200);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn masked_packets_round_trip_and_reject_other_profiles_and_truncation() {
let profile = PairProfile::generate();
let other = PairProfile::generate();
for (kind, size) in [(1, 148), (2, 92), (3, 64), (4, 800)] {
let mut message = vec![0x7b; size];
message[..4].copy_from_slice(&(kind as u32).to_le_bytes());
let wire = profile.encode(&message).unwrap();
assert_ne!(&wire[..4], &message[..4]);
assert_eq!(profile.decode(&wire).unwrap(), message);
assert!(other.decode(&wire).is_none());
for length in 0..44 {
assert!(profile.decode(&wire[..length]).is_none());
}
}
}
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
[package]
name = "tsunagi-cli"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "The tsunagi command line agent."
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
repository.workspace = true
[[bin]]
name = "tsunagi"
path = "src/main.rs"
# The binary and the library share a name, which `cargo doc` cannot map to
# two directories. The command line is documented by `--help`, not rustdoc,
# so the library keeps the name and this opts out.
doc = false
[dependencies]
tsunagi = { path = "../tsunagi", version = "0.1.0", features = ["tun-device", "dns-publish"] }
tsunagi-wg-quic = { path = "../tsunagi-wg-quic", version = "0.1.0" }
iroh.workspace = true
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros", "signal"] }
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
clap = { version = "4.5", features = ["derive", "env"] }
# Already in the tree through clap. `anstream` strips the escapes when stdout
# is not a terminal and turns on virtual terminal processing on Windows, so
# colour is never written where it would show up as rubbish.
anstream = "1.0"
anstyle = "1.0"
# Local interface addresses, for the diagnostics in `status`.
netwatch = "0.19.3"
[dev-dependencies]
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros", "process"] }
tempfile.workspace = true
simple-dns = "0.12"
[lints]
workspace = true
-56
View File
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
//! What the command line says about this device, against a running agent.
//!
//! These drive the real binary, which is why they live beside it rather
//! than with the library's own tests: the library cannot depend on a binary
//! built from a crate that depends on it.
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use tempfile::TempDir;
use tsunagi::Agent;
use tsunagi::config::{AgentConfig, StoragePaths, TransportPolicy};
/// Asking who this device is must not need the directory lock.
///
/// The lock belongs to the one agent allowed to *write* the state. `id` only
/// reads, so making it take the lock would mean the question could never be
/// answered while an agent was running — which is exactly when you want to
/// ask it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn identity_can_be_read_while_an_agent_holds_the_directory() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
// Hold the directory the way a running agent does.
let agent = Agent::spawn(
AgentConfig::new(StoragePaths::under(dir.path()))
.with_transport(TransportPolicy::LocalOnly)
.with_loopback_bind(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
let expected = agent.endpoint_id().to_string();
let output = tokio::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_tsunagi"))
.arg("id")
// The same layout `StoragePaths::under` gives the agent above.
.arg("--state-dir")
.arg(dir.path().join("state"))
.arg("--cache-dir")
.arg(dir.path().join("cache"))
.output()
.await
.unwrap();
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"`id` failed while an agent was running:\n{stderr}"
);
assert!(
stdout.contains(&expected),
"expected {expected} in:\n{stdout}"
);
agent.shutdown().await;
}
-252
View File
@@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
//! Making and joining a network from the command line, against a real agent.
//!
//! The rules here are small and easy to get wrong in a way no unit test
//! notices: what a bare network name means, when a secret is invented, and
//! whether what is printed is enough for the other person to paste.
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::time::Duration;
use tempfile::TempDir;
/// An agent running as a real process, with its own directories.
struct Running {
child: std::process::Child,
dir: TempDir,
}
impl Drop for Running {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.child.kill();
let _ = self.child.wait();
}
}
impl Running {
fn run(&self, args: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_tsunagi"))
.args(args)
.arg("--state-dir")
.arg(self.dir.path().join("state"))
.arg("--cache-dir")
.arg(self.dir.path().join("cache"))
.output()
.expect("the agent binary runs")
}
}
/// An agent with no network at all, the way a daemon is started before
/// anything has been decided.
fn start_bare(port: u16) -> Running {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let child = std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_tsunagi"))
.arg("up")
.arg("--state-dir")
.arg(dir.path().join("state"))
.arg("--cache-dir")
.arg(dir.path().join("cache"))
.args(["--reach", "local", "--no-tun", "--no-dns"])
.arg("--bind")
.arg(format!("127.0.0.1:{port}"))
.args(["--log", "error", "--status-interval", "0"])
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.spawn()
.expect("the agent binary starts");
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(2));
Running { child, dir }
}
/// An agent already in one network, the way most of these start.
fn start(network: &str, port: u16) -> Running {
let agent = start_bare(port);
let joined = agent.run(&[
"join",
"--network",
network,
"--secret",
"a-secret-for-the-cli-test",
]);
assert!(
joined.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&joined.stderr)
);
agent
}
#[test]
fn joining_with_no_secret_makes_one_and_prints_what_to_send() {
// The hurry case: a network with somebody, for as long as it is needed,
// and then gone. Asking for a secret first is a step with no purpose,
// and a secret that is not printed is a network nobody else can join.
let agent = start("resident", 45071);
let joined = agent.run(&["network", "join", "--network", "spontaneous"]);
assert!(
joined.status.success(),
"joining failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&joined.stderr)
);
let out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&joined.stdout);
assert!(out.contains("joined `spontaneous`"), "{out}");
// The secret in full, and one line the other side can paste as it is.
let secret = out
.lines()
.find_map(|line| line.trim().strip_prefix("secret "))
.expect("the invented secret is printed");
assert!(secret.starts_with("tsn1"), "{out}");
let command = out
.lines()
.find(|line| line.contains("tsunagi join --network spontaneous"))
.expect("a command to send");
assert!(command.contains(secret), "with the secret in it: {out}");
// And where to find this device, for an agent that is not up yet.
assert!(out.contains("--peer "), "somewhere to find us: {out}");
// Joining the same name again resumes it rather than making another
// network that merely looks the same.
let again = agent.run(&["network", "join", "--network", "spontaneous"]);
let out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&again.stdout);
assert!(again.status.success());
assert!(out.contains("already here"), "{out}");
assert!(!out.contains("secret tsn1"), "no second secret: {out}");
}
#[test]
fn a_bare_name_resumes_the_network_of_that_name_rather_than_inventing_one() {
// `join --network resident` with no secret is the same rule: this device
// has exactly one network of that name, so that is the one meant.
let agent = start("resident", 45072);
let listed = agent.run(&["network"]);
let before = String::from_utf8_lossy(&listed.stdout).to_string();
let id = before
.lines()
.find(|line| line.contains("resident"))
.and_then(|line| line.split_whitespace().nth(1))
.expect("the network is listed")
.to_string();
let joined = agent.run(&["network", "join", "--network", "resident"]);
assert!(joined.status.success());
let out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&joined.stdout);
assert!(out.contains(&id), "the same network, not a new one: {out}");
assert!(out.contains("already here"), "{out}");
}
#[test]
fn a_network_can_be_stopped_and_resumed_without_losing_anything() {
// Leaving gives everything up; stopping is being away. The difference
// is what somebody wants when they will be back.
let agent = start("resident", 45073);
let listed = agent.run(&["network"]);
let out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&listed.stdout).to_string();
let id = out
.lines()
.find(|line| line.contains("resident"))
.and_then(|line| line.split_whitespace().nth(1))
.expect("the network is listed")
.to_string();
let secret_before = agent.run(&["network", "secret", &id[..10]]);
let secret_before = String::from_utf8_lossy(&secret_before.stdout)
.trim()
.to_string();
assert!(secret_before.starts_with("tsn1"));
let stopped = agent.run(&["network", "stop", &id[..10]]);
assert!(
stopped.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&stopped.stderr)
);
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&stopped.stdout).contains("stopped `resident`"),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&stopped.stdout)
);
// Still configured, and said to be stopped rather than missing.
let listed = String::from_utf8_lossy(&agent.run(&["network"]).stdout).to_string();
assert!(listed.contains(&id), "still configured: {listed}");
assert!(listed.contains("stopped"), "{listed}");
// Stopping what is stopped is the state asked for, not an error.
let again = agent.run(&["network", "stop", &id[..10]]);
assert!(again.status.success());
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&again.stdout).contains("already stopped"),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&again.stdout)
);
let started = agent.run(&["network", "start", &id[..10]]);
assert!(started.status.success());
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&started.stdout).contains("started `resident`"),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&started.stdout)
);
let listed = String::from_utf8_lossy(&agent.run(&["network"]).stdout).to_string();
assert!(listed.contains("running"), "{listed}");
// And nothing was given up on the way: the same network, same secret.
let secret_after = agent.run(&["network", "secret", &id[..10]]);
assert_eq!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&secret_after.stdout).trim(),
secret_before,
"the secret is kept, so this is the same network"
);
}
#[test]
fn an_agent_starts_with_no_network_and_takes_one_later() {
// A daemon in one terminal and the deciding done in another: the
// agent is the identity, and which networks it is in is a separate
// question it can answer at any time.
let agent = start_bare(45074);
let listed = agent.run(&["network"]);
assert!(listed.status.success());
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&listed.stderr).contains("no network has been joined"),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&listed.stderr)
);
let joined = agent.run(&["network", "join", "--network", "afterwards"]);
assert!(
joined.status.success(),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&joined.stderr)
);
let listed = String::from_utf8_lossy(&agent.run(&["network"]).stdout).to_string();
assert!(listed.contains("afterwards"), "{listed}");
assert!(listed.contains("running"), "and it is live: {listed}");
}
#[test]
fn up_is_the_agent_and_takes_no_network_at_all() {
// The two commands are separate on purpose: `up` runs the device's
// agent, `join` decides what it is in. A network on `up` would be a
// second way to do the same thing, and the one that cannot be undone
// without a restart.
for argument in ["--network", "--secret"] {
let out = std::process::Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_tsunagi"))
.args(["up", argument, "whatever"])
.arg("--state-dir")
.arg(TempDir::new().unwrap().path().join("state"))
.output()
.expect("the agent binary runs");
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"`up {argument}` should not be a thing"
);
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("unexpected argument"),
"{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
}
+113
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
[package]
name = "tsunagi-core"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "Small private mesh networks: persistent agent identity, deterministic network spaces, an iroh control plane, signed state and a local DNS view."
readme = "../../README.md"
keywords = ["mesh", "p2p", "iroh", "networking"]
categories = ["network-programming"]
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
repository.workspace = true
[lib]
name = "tsunagi"
[features]
default = []
# A real TUN device, so a plugin can carry actual IP traffic. On Linux it
# needs CAP_NET_ADMIN; on Windows the process must run elevated and
# `wintun.dll` must be reachable. Without either the in-memory device serves
# tests. The platform-specific dependencies are declared per target, so
# enabling this only pulls what the target it is built for actually uses.
tun-device = [
"dep:tun",
"dep:rtnetlink",
"dep:caps",
"dep:futures-util",
]
# Telling the operating system where to send its DNS questions. systemd-resolved
# on Linux, the Name Resolution Policy Table on Windows; the zone and the
# server work without it either way.
dns-publish = ["dep:zbus"]
# The test harness in `testing`, for this crate's own tests and for a
# protocol crate's. Not on by default: it is only of use to a test.
testing = ["dep:tempfile", "dep:tracing-subscriber"]
[dependencies]
arc-swap = "1.9"
iroh.workspace = true
# `net` for the local control interface: a Unix socket on Unix, a named pipe
# on Windows. Both live behind the same `net` feature.
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net"] }
tokio-stream = "0.1"
serde.workspace = true
postcard.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
data-encoding.workspace = true
rusqlite = { version = "0.40", features = ["bundled"] }
hkdf = "0.13"
hmac = "0.13"
sha2 = "0.11"
subtle = "2.6"
zeroize = { version = "1.9", features = ["derive"] }
rand = "0.10"
# Already in the tree through iroh. A packet codec, not a DNS server: the
# zone logic is ours and a full server framework would be a large dependency
# for answering A records from memory.
simple-dns = "0.12"
# The IANA top-level domain list, compiled in: one function, no
# dependencies, no network. Used only to warn that a zone name shadows a
# real public domain, never to refuse one.
tld = "2.40"
fs4 = { version = "1.1", features = ["sync"] }
directories = "6.0"
# The real system hostname, without a libc call of our own: this crate is
# forbidden `unsafe` and will not make one.
gethostname = "1.1"
netwatch = "0.19.3"
netdev = "0.46"
mainline = "8.0"
futures-lite = "2.6"
tun = { version = "0.8", features = ["async"], optional = true }
# Only for the `testing` harness, which a protocol crate's tests use too.
tempfile = { version = "3.24", optional = true }
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"], optional = true }
# Linux-only interface provisioning. `rtnetlink` configures the interface in
# process, so no `ip` invocation is ever needed; `caps` keeps CAP_NET_ADMIN
# out of the effective set except during the moments it is used.
[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies]
rtnetlink = { version = "0.23", optional = true }
# Pure Rust D-Bus, no libdbus to link against. `tokio` rather than the
# default reactor, because the agent brings its own.
zbus = { version = "5.19", default-features = false, features = ["tokio"], optional = true }
caps = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
futures-util = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, optional = true }
# Windows-only interface provisioning. The Wintun adapter itself is created
# and driven through the `tun` dependency, whose safe wrapper is the only way
# in — loading `wintun.dll` is an `unsafe` call this crate forbids. `netdev`
# (already in the tree through `netwatch`) reads the interface table through a
# safe wrapper, which is how the provisioner observes an adapter by name
# before deciding what to change. Creating an adapter needs the process to be
# elevated and `wintun.dll` to be reachable at run time.
[target.'cfg(target_os = "windows")'.dependencies]
windows-sys = { version = "0.61", features = [
"Win32_Security",
"Win32_Security_Authorization",
"Win32_Foundation",
] }
[dev-dependencies]
# Its own tests use the harness it publishes.
tsunagi-core = { path = ".", features = ["testing"] }
tokio = { version = "1.53", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time", "macros", "process", "test-util"] }
tempfile.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
@@ -129,6 +129,19 @@ pub enum Event {
/// Why it is not up.
reason: String,
},
/// The name this agent claimed was claimed first by another member.
///
/// Nothing stops working: this agent keeps its address and every
/// connection. It just is not found by that name until it is renamed or
/// the member that holds the name lets it go.
HostnameTaken {
/// The network.
network: NetworkId,
/// The name that is taken.
name: String,
/// The member that holds it.
holder: EndpointId,
},
/// An IP plugin reported an error. Never fatal.
PluginError {
/// The network the call was scoped to.
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -70,20 +70,24 @@ pub(crate) struct Session {
pub(crate) conn: Connection,
/// Already encoded frame payloads, so the runtime can account for the exact
/// number of control bytes it queues.
pub(crate) outbound: mpsc::Sender<Vec<u8>>,
pub(crate) outbound: mpsc::Sender<zeroize::Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>>,
pub(crate) hostname: Option<String>,
pub(crate) capabilities: Vec<PluginCapability>,
pub(crate) broadcast: bool,
/// The peer offers itself as an exit node in this network.
pub(crate) exit_node: bool,
pub(crate) messages_sent: u64,
pub(crate) messages_received: u64,
pub(crate) bytes_sent: u64,
pub(crate) bytes_received: u64,
reader: JoinHandle<()>,
writer: JoinHandle<()>,
path_monitor: JoinHandle<()>,
shutdown: Shutdown,
}
impl Session {
/// Signals both tasks to stop and waits for them, with a bounded grace
/// Signals all tasks to stop and waits for them, with a bounded grace
/// period.
///
/// A peer that stops reading must not be able to hold up shutdown, so the
@@ -93,6 +97,7 @@ impl Session {
conn,
reader,
writer,
path_monitor,
shutdown,
..
} = self;
@@ -102,23 +107,27 @@ impl Session {
let reader_abort = reader.abort_handle();
let writer_abort = writer.abort_handle();
let path_abort = path_monitor.abort_handle();
let joined = tokio::time::timeout(STOP_GRACE, async move {
let _ = reader.await;
let _ = writer.await;
let _ = path_monitor.await;
})
.await;
if joined.is_err() {
tracing::debug!("session tasks did not wind down in time; aborting them");
reader_abort.abort();
writer_abort.abort();
path_abort.abort();
}
}
/// Aborts both tasks without waiting. Used on replacement.
/// Aborts all tasks without waiting. Used on replacement.
pub(crate) fn abort(&self) {
self.shutdown.trigger();
self.reader.abort();
self.writer.abort();
self.path_monitor.abort();
}
}
@@ -154,6 +163,52 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn(
parent_shutdown.clone(),
));
let path_conn = conn.clone();
let path_shutdown = shutdown.clone();
let path_parent = parent_shutdown.clone();
let path_monitor = tokio::spawn(async move {
use tokio_stream::StreamExt;
let mut events = path_conn.path_events();
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = path_shutdown.wait() => break,
_ = path_parent.wait() => break,
ev = events.next() => {
match ev {
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Selected { remote_addr, local_addr, .. }) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer.fmt_short(),
remote = %remote_addr,
local = ?local_addr,
"Connection path selected (direct / relay / hole punch switch)"
);
}
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Opened { remote_addr, .. }) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer.fmt_short(),
remote = %remote_addr,
"Network path opened to peer"
);
}
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Closed { remote_addr, .. }) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer.fmt_short(),
remote = %remote_addr,
"Network path closed for peer"
);
}
Some(iroh::endpoint::PathEvent::Lagged { missed, .. }) => {
tracing::trace!(peer = %peer.fmt_short(), missed, "Path events lagged");
}
Some(_) => {}
None => break,
}
}
}
}
});
let reader = tokio::spawn(reader_task(
id,
network_id,
@@ -174,19 +229,22 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn(
outbound: outbound_tx,
hostname: None,
capabilities: Vec::new(),
broadcast: false,
exit_node: false,
messages_sent: 0,
messages_received: 0,
bytes_sent: 0,
bytes_received: 0,
reader,
writer,
path_monitor,
shutdown,
}
}
async fn writer_task(
mut send: SendStream,
mut outbound: mpsc::Receiver<Vec<u8>>,
mut outbound: mpsc::Receiver<zeroize::Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>>,
limits: Arc<Limits>,
shutdown: Shutdown,
parent: Shutdown,
@@ -273,6 +331,7 @@ async fn reader_task(
}
};
let payload = zeroize::Zeroizing::new(payload);
let bytes = payload.len();
let envelope: Envelope = match decode(&payload) {
Ok(envelope) => envelope,
@@ -53,6 +53,47 @@ pub struct OverlayStatus {
pub addresses: Vec<crate::overlay::Cidr>,
/// What has happened on it.
pub counters: crate::overlay::Counters,
/// The route and firewall allowance installed for LAN broadcast, when
/// some network has broadcast on and the interface is on the host.
/// `None` is "none installed", not "unknown".
pub broadcast_rules: Option<crate::overlay::BroadcastRulesReport>,
}
/// How packets reach a member right now.
///
/// Being reachable is one thing and being reachable well is another, and
/// the second is never a reason to call a member away: a member that can only
/// be reached through somebody else is online, over a longer path.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum DataPath {
/// Nothing carries packets to it yet. The member is connected for
/// control only, which is the state of a data path being set up.
None,
/// A direct link, of the named kind of transport.
Direct {
/// The kind of transport carrying it, e.g. `wg`.
transport: String,
},
/// Through other members.
Relayed {
/// Number of links on the way, at least two.
hops: u8,
/// The member the first of them goes to.
via: EndpointId,
},
}
/// A name that a member claimed and somebody else holds.
///
/// A name belongs to whoever claimed it first. The member that claimed it
/// later is still a member and still reachable by its address; it is just
/// not found by that name, on any member of the network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HostnameConflict {
/// The name that is taken.
pub name: String,
/// The member that holds it.
pub holder: EndpointId,
}
/// A member the signed state knows about, connected or not.
@@ -67,6 +108,8 @@ pub struct OverlayStatus {
/// connected.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct MemberStatus {
/// Current signed claim version, used to bind cleanup confirmation.
pub record_version: u64,
/// The member's device identity.
pub endpoint_id: EndpointId,
/// The IPv4 overlay address it claimed and signed for.
@@ -76,11 +119,29 @@ pub struct MemberStatus {
/// Signed, so it is still known while the member is away — which is what
/// lets an absent member be named rather than shown as a bare id.
pub hostname: Option<String>,
/// The last name this agent saw it announce, whether or not it is here.
///
/// Not signed, so it is a convenience for naming a member that is away
/// and never a claim: the zone is served from `hostname`.
pub last_hostname: Option<String>,
/// The name it claimed, when somebody else claimed it first.
pub hostname_conflict: Option<HostnameConflict>,
/// Whether this agent can reach it now, by any path: a live control
/// session, or a data path through other members. The one answer to "is
/// it online" for every client, so that none of them has to work it out
/// from a different part of the picture. This agent counts as online.
pub online: bool,
/// How packets reach it. [`DataPath::None`] while it is offline.
pub data_path: DataPath,
}
/// Status of one authenticated session.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PeerStatus {
/// This authenticated peer accepts network broadcasts.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// This authenticated peer offers itself as an exit node.
pub exit_node: bool,
/// Authenticated endpoint id.
pub endpoint_id: EndpointId,
/// Which side this agent played in the handshake.
@@ -115,6 +176,8 @@ pub struct PeerStatus {
pub control_bytes_sent: u64,
/// Control payload bytes read from this session.
pub control_bytes_received: u64,
/// How packets reach this peer right now.
pub data_path: DataPath,
}
/// Counters scoped to one logical network.
@@ -148,9 +211,34 @@ pub struct NetworkMetrics {
pub data_link_failures: u64,
}
/// An active network preventing another network from starting locally.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RangeConflict {
/// The blocking network's public identifier.
pub network_id: NetworkId,
/// Its configured name.
pub name: NetworkName,
/// Its overlapping overlay range.
pub range: crate::state::Ipv4Range,
}
/// Status of one network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct NetworkStatus {
/// Enabled local data-plane protocols, in preference order.
pub protocols: Vec<String>,
/// Whether this network is requested to start or resume automatically.
pub auto_start: bool,
/// Local broadcast participation in this network.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// This agent offers itself as an exit node in this network.
pub exit_offer: bool,
/// The member this device sends all its internet traffic through.
pub exit_via: Option<EndpointId>,
/// Whether that member is connected and still offering to be one.
pub exit_via_online: bool,
/// What the host rules for the exit settings are doing.
pub exit_rules: crate::overlay::ExitRulesReport,
/// Immutable deterministic description of the network space.
pub descriptor: NetworkDescriptor,
/// Network name, for convenience.
@@ -165,15 +253,16 @@ pub struct NetworkStatus {
pub candidates: Vec<CandidateStatus>,
/// Members the signed state knows about, whether connected or not.
pub members: Vec<MemberStatus>,
/// This agent's own name, when another member claimed it first and so
/// holds it. This agent keeps working by address; nobody finds it by
/// this name until it is renamed or the other member lets it go.
pub hostname_conflict: Option<HostnameConflict>,
/// The overlay range this network uses, once it has one.
pub range: Option<crate::state::Ipv4Range>,
/// The range it could not have, because another network on this agent
/// already holds it.
///
/// One agent has one interface, so an address belongs to one network.
/// This network waits to adopt whatever its members settle on instead of
/// proposing something it could not route.
/// The first overlapping active range; `range_conflicts` identifies all blockers.
pub range_conflict: Option<crate::state::Ipv4Range>,
/// Active networks that would be suspended by switching to this network.
pub range_conflicts: Vec<RangeConflict>,
/// Per-network counters.
pub metrics: NetworkMetrics,
/// What has gone through a peer in the middle, in both directions.
@@ -12,9 +12,13 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use crate::dataplane::SharedPlugin;
use crate::discovery::{MainlineDiscovery, NetworkDiscovery};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::error::Result;
/// Qualifier/organisation/application triple used for platform directories.
///
/// Unused on macOS, where the default paths are fixed system locations rather
/// than per-user directories derived from this.
#[cfg_attr(target_os = "macos", allow(dead_code))]
const APP_NAME: &str = "tsunagi";
/// Rendezvous slots per network; this bounds a discovery sample, not membership.
@@ -74,17 +78,34 @@ impl StoragePaths {
}
}
/// The per-user platform directories.
/// The default platform directories.
///
/// A future system service can supply its own paths instead.
/// Per user on Linux and Windows. On macOS the agent runs as a root
/// LaunchDaemon (creating a utun interface needs root, and `$HOME` under
/// `sudo` points at the wrong place), so the stores live in the system
/// locations instead — `/var/db/tsunagi` for the mandatory state and a
/// disposable cache beside it. A caller that wants somewhere else passes
/// explicit paths to [`StoragePaths::new`] or [`StoragePaths::under`].
pub fn user_default() -> Result<Self> {
let dirs = directories::ProjectDirs::from("", "", APP_NAME).ok_or_else(|| {
Error::Storage("no valid home directory for platform config paths".into())
})?;
Ok(Self {
state_dir: dirs.data_dir().to_path_buf(),
cache_dir: dirs.cache_dir().to_path_buf(),
})
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
Ok(Self {
state_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/db/tsunagi"),
cache_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/db/tsunagi/cache"),
})
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
{
let dirs = directories::ProjectDirs::from("", "", APP_NAME).ok_or_else(|| {
crate::error::Error::Storage(
"no valid home directory for platform config paths".into(),
)
})?;
Ok(Self {
state_dir: dirs.data_dir().to_path_buf(),
cache_dir: dirs.cache_dir().to_path_buf(),
})
}
}
/// Path of the mandatory state database.
@@ -145,12 +166,16 @@ pub struct Limits {
pub max_capabilities: usize,
/// Largest opaque plugin payload, in bytes.
pub max_capability_data_len: usize,
/// Largest private transport negotiation payload (also hard-capped at 4096 bytes).
pub max_transport_payload_len: usize,
/// Largest accepted echo payload in a ping/pong exchange, in bytes.
pub max_echo_payload_len: usize,
/// Largest accepted free-text reason string, in bytes.
pub max_reason_len: usize,
/// Largest number of signed records accepted in one snapshot.
pub max_state_records: usize,
/// Maximum durable retirement markers retained per network.
pub max_retirements: usize,
/// Deadline for the whole handshake.
pub handshake_timeout: Duration,
/// Deadline for one outbound dial attempt.
@@ -183,10 +208,12 @@ impl Default for Limits {
max_frame_len: 64 * 1024,
max_hostname_len: 255,
max_capabilities: 16,
max_transport_payload_len: 4096,
max_capability_data_len: 4 * 1024,
max_echo_payload_len: 4 * 1024,
max_reason_len: 256,
max_state_records: crate::state::MAX_RECORDS_PER_MESSAGE,
max_retirements: 1024,
handshake_timeout: Duration::from_secs(10),
dial_timeout: Duration::from_secs(10),
write_timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
@@ -304,6 +331,12 @@ pub struct AgentConfig {
pub reconnect: ReconnectPolicy,
/// IP plugins whose capabilities are announced and dispatched.
pub plugins: Vec<SharedPlugin>,
/// Initial ordered selection for networks without a saved override.
/// `None` enables all registered plugins; an empty list is control-only.
pub default_protocols: Option<Vec<String>>,
/// Custom packet transports registered per protocol.
pub custom_transports:
std::collections::HashMap<String, Arc<dyn crate::dataplane::PacketTransport>>,
/// Where the overlay interface comes from, when the agent should have one.
///
/// One agent, one interface: it belongs here rather than to a protocol,
@@ -315,7 +348,11 @@ pub struct AgentConfig {
pub interface_name: String,
/// The interface MTU.
pub interface_mtu: u32,
/// The IPv4 overlay range this agent proposes.
/// Whether new networks derive their IPv4 range from their network id.
///
/// Enabled by default. Explicit ranges and IPv4 opt-out disable this.
pub overlay_ipv4_auto: bool,
/// The IPv4 overlay range this agent proposes when automatic selection is off.
///
/// Addresses are allocated from it and recorded in signed state, so a
/// participant keeps the same one across restarts. A network that has
@@ -345,10 +382,13 @@ impl AgentConfig {
limits: Limits::default(),
reconnect: ReconnectPolicy::default(),
plugins: Vec::new(),
default_protocols: None,
custom_transports: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
tun_factory: None,
interface_name: "tsun0".to_string(),
interface_mtu: 1280,
overlay_ipv4_range: Some(crate::state::DEFAULT_IPV4_RANGE),
overlay_ipv4_auto: true,
overlay_ipv4_range: None,
}
}
@@ -420,6 +460,7 @@ impl AgentConfig {
/// Sets the IPv4 overlay range this agent proposes, or disables IPv4.
pub fn with_overlay_ipv4_range(mut self, range: Option<crate::state::Ipv4Range>) -> Self {
self.overlay_ipv4_auto = false;
self.overlay_ipv4_range = range;
self
}
@@ -430,6 +471,16 @@ impl AgentConfig {
self
}
/// Registers a custom packet transport for a specific protocol.
pub fn with_custom_transport(
mut self,
protocol: impl Into<String>,
transport: Arc<dyn crate::dataplane::PacketTransport>,
) -> Self {
self.custom_transports.insert(protocol.into(), transport);
self
}
/// Gives the agent an overlay interface, from this factory.
pub fn with_interface(
mut self,
@@ -480,3 +531,5 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for AgentConfig {
.finish()
}
}
/// Maximum number of transport links a routed datagram may traverse.
pub const ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT: u8 = 16;
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@
//! recorded and surfaced, the control plane keeps running.
pub mod relay;
pub mod routing;
pub mod transport;
pub mod tunnel;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -30,11 +32,41 @@ use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
pub use transport::{PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError};
pub use transport::{
MultiPacketTransport, PacketLink, PacketTransport, SharedLink, TransportError,
};
pub use tunnel::{GenericTunnelPlugin, TunnelCodec};
/// Maximum length of a plugin protocol identifier.
pub const MAX_PROTOCOL_ID_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Validates bounded local protocol preferences before storing or applying them.
pub(crate) fn validate_protocols(protocols: &[String], max: usize) -> crate::error::Result<()> {
if protocols.len() > max {
return Err(crate::Error::InvalidProtocols(format!(
"at most {max} protocols are allowed"
)));
}
for (index, name) in protocols.iter().enumerate() {
if name.is_empty()
|| name.len() > MAX_PROTOCOL_ID_LEN
|| !name
.bytes()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == b'-' || c == b'_')
{
return Err(crate::Error::InvalidProtocols(
"names must be 1–32 ASCII letters, digits, hyphens or underscores".into(),
));
}
if protocols[..index].contains(name) {
return Err(crate::Error::InvalidProtocols(format!(
"`{name}` is listed more than once"
)));
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// An announcement of one IP plugin's capability.
///
/// `data` is opaque to the core. Nothing in it may be interpreted as a shell
@@ -114,7 +146,7 @@ pub enum PluginError {
/// A request a plugin makes of the agent that owns it.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) enum PluginRequest {
pub enum PluginRequest {
/// Re-send this agent's announcement to every peer of a network.
Reannounce(NetworkId),
/// Surface a plugin error on the agent's event stream.
@@ -126,6 +158,17 @@ pub(crate) enum PluginRequest {
/// Human readable reason, free of secrets.
reason: String,
},
/// A plugin reported that a data link or tunnel for a peer failed.
ProtocolFailure {
/// Network the failure occurred in.
network: NetworkId,
/// Peer whose protocol failed.
peer: EndpointId,
/// Protocol that failed.
protocol: String,
/// Human readable reason.
reason: String,
},
}
/// The agent-side handle a plugin is given when it is attached.
@@ -178,6 +221,29 @@ impl PluginContext {
}
}
/// A context configured with a custom packet sink.
pub fn with_sink(sink: Arc<dyn PacketSink>) -> Self {
Self {
sender: None,
local: None,
sink: Some(sink),
}
}
/// A context configured with a channel for plugin requests and custom sink, for tests.
#[cfg(feature = "testing")]
pub fn for_test(
sender: mpsc::Sender<PluginRequest>,
local: EndpointId,
sink: Option<Arc<dyn PacketSink>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
sender: Some(sender),
local: Some(local),
sink,
}
}
/// This agent's own endpoint id, when the context is attached.
///
/// A plugin needs it to find itself in the agreed allocation.
@@ -219,6 +285,22 @@ impl PluginContext {
reason: reason.into(),
});
}
/// Reports that data plane connectivity or a tunnel for a peer has failed.
pub fn report_peer_protocol_failure(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: impl Into<String>,
reason: impl Into<String>,
) {
self.send(PluginRequest::ProtocolFailure {
network,
peer,
protocol: protocol.into(),
reason: reason.into(),
});
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PluginContext {
+646
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
//! Userspace forwarding. Topology updates publish immutable tables; the packet
//! path takes no routing mutex, walks no graph and never inspects plugin bytes.
//! Each transport reader forwards transit immediately, independently of the
//! destination protocol's receive task. Only local delivery enters its inbox.
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use tokio::sync::{Notify, mpsc, watch};
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use super::routing::{FlowId, PeerId, RoutingTable, envelope, mix64};
use super::transport::{PacketLink, SharedLink, TransportError};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::config::{MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT};
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
/// Fixed routing header, subtracted from the logical transport MTU.
pub const RELAY_OVERHEAD: usize = envelope::HEADER;
const INBOX: usize = 256;
/// Forwarding counters, shared by all protocols of one network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RelayCounters {
/// Datagrams originated here and sent through another member.
pub sent_via: u64,
/// Transit datagrams handed to the next transport link.
pub forwarded: u64,
/// Local datagrams received through another member.
pub received_via: u64,
/// Missing or failed next hop.
pub dropped_no_link: u64,
/// Malformed envelope or unknown member.
pub dropped_unknown: u64,
/// Exhausted hop limit, including loops during topology convergence.
pub dropped_hop_limit: u64,
/// Full local protocol inbox. Transit does not use this queue.
pub dropped_congested: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Tally {
sent_via: AtomicU64,
forwarded: AtomicU64,
received_via: AtomicU64,
dropped_no_link: AtomicU64,
dropped_unknown: AtomicU64,
dropped_hop_limit: AtomicU64,
dropped_congested: AtomicU64,
}
impl Tally {
fn snapshot(&self) -> RelayCounters {
RelayCounters {
sent_via: self.sent_via.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
forwarded: self.forwarded.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
received_via: self.received_via.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_no_link: self.dropped_no_link.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_unknown: self.dropped_unknown.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_hop_limit: self.dropped_hop_limit.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped_congested: self.dropped_congested.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
}
}
}
/// The links to one neighbour, best first. Which transport carries a frame
/// is decided here and nowhere else: the end-to-end protocol is in the
/// envelope and never depends on it.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct NextHop {
peer: PeerId,
links: Box<[SharedLink]>,
}
impl NextHop {
fn usable(&self) -> bool {
self.links.iter().any(|link| !link.is_closed())
}
fn first_open(&self) -> Option<&SharedLink> {
self.links.iter().find(|link| !link.is_closed())
}
/// Hands a frame to the best open link that accepts it. A link that
/// cannot carry the frame (too large for its path, closed a moment ago)
/// leaves it to the next one; the frame is only copied when there is
/// another to try.
fn send(&self, frame: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let mut open = self.links.iter().filter(|link| !link.is_closed());
let Some(mut current) = open.next() else {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
};
for next in open {
if current.send(frame.clone()).is_ok() {
return Ok(());
}
current = next;
}
current.send(frame)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct ForwardRoute {
hops: u8,
next: Box<[NextHop]>,
}
impl ForwardRoute {
fn select(&self, source: &PeerId, flow: FlowId) -> Option<&NextHop> {
if self.next.len() == 1 {
return self.next.first().filter(|hop| hop.usable());
}
let seed = u64::from_le_bytes(source[..8].try_into().ok()?);
let start = mix64(flow ^ seed) as usize % self.next.len();
// Stable fallback if a link closed just before its table was replaced.
(0..self.next.len())
.map(|i| &self.next[(start + i) % self.next.len()])
.find(|hop| hop.usable())
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct ForwardingTable {
routes: HashMap<PeerId, ForwardRoute>,
/// Local delivery, by who sent it and which end-to-end protocol it is.
inboxes: HashMap<(PeerId, u64), mpsc::Sender<Bytes>>,
members: HashSet<PeerId>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Plane {
local: PeerId,
table: ArcSwap<ForwardingTable>,
tally: Arc<Tally>,
}
impl Plane {
/// Synchronous hot path: one snapshot, bounded header decode, table lookup,
/// and transport send. An exclusively owned buffer is modified in place.
fn receive(&self, incoming: PeerId, frame: Bytes) {
let Some(header) = envelope::decode(&frame) else {
self.tally.dropped_unknown.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return;
};
let table = self.table.load();
if !table.members.contains(&header.source) || header.source == self.local {
self.tally.dropped_unknown.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return;
}
if header.destination == self.local {
let Some(inbox) = table.inboxes.get(&(header.source, header.protocol)) else {
self.tally.dropped_unknown.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return;
};
if inbox.try_send(frame.slice(RELAY_OVERHEAD..)).is_err() {
self.tally.dropped_congested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
} else if incoming != header.source {
self.tally.received_via.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
return;
}
if header.remaining <= 1 {
self.tally.dropped_hop_limit.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return;
}
let hop = table
.routes
.get(&header.destination)
.and_then(|route| route.select(&header.source, header.flow));
let Some(hop) = hop else {
self.tally.dropped_no_link.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return;
};
if hop.send(envelope::decrement(frame)).is_ok() {
self.tally.forwarded.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
} else {
self.tally.dropped_no_link.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
}
/// One physical link to a neighbour, of whatever kind of transport.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct RawLink {
kind: String,
link: SharedLink,
reader: JoinHandle<()>,
}
/// How a destination is reached right now.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RouteSummary {
/// Number of transport links to it. One is a direct link.
pub hops: u8,
/// The neighbour the first link goes to. For a direct link that is the
/// destination itself.
pub via: EndpointId,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct State {
plane: Arc<Plane>,
/// Transport kinds, best first. A neighbour with several links is
/// reached over the first of these it has.
priority: Vec<String>,
graph: HashMap<PeerId, Vec<PeerId>>,
members: HashSet<PeerId>,
raw: HashMap<PeerId, Vec<RawLink>>,
links: HashMap<(PeerId, String), Arc<PeerLink>>,
}
impl State {
fn rank(&self, kind: &str) -> usize {
self.priority
.iter()
.position(|known| known == kind)
.unwrap_or(usize::MAX)
}
/// A neighbour's links, best kind first.
fn ordered(&self, peer: &PeerId) -> Vec<&RawLink> {
let mut links: Vec<&RawLink> = self
.raw
.get(peer)
.map(|links| links.iter().collect())
.unwrap_or_default();
links.sort_by_key(|raw| (self.rank(&raw.kind), raw.kind.clone()));
links
}
fn publish(&self) {
let mut graph = self.graph.clone();
let mut neighbours: Vec<PeerId> = self
.raw
.iter()
.filter(|(_, links)| links.iter().any(|raw| !raw.link.is_closed()))
.map(|(peer, _)| *peer)
.collect();
neighbours.sort_unstable();
graph.insert(self.plane.local, neighbours);
let routing = RoutingTable::build(self.plane.local, &graph, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT);
let routes = routing
.iter()
.filter_map(|(peer, route)| {
let next: Box<[_]> = route
.next_hops
.iter()
.filter_map(|id| {
let links: Box<[_]> = self
.ordered(id)
.into_iter()
.map(|raw| raw.link.clone())
.collect();
(!links.is_empty()).then_some(NextHop { peer: *id, links })
})
.collect();
(!next.is_empty()).then_some((
*peer,
ForwardRoute {
hops: route.hops,
next,
},
))
})
.collect();
let mut members = self.members.clone();
members.extend(self.raw.keys().copied());
self.plane.table.store(Arc::new(ForwardingTable {
routes,
members,
inboxes: self
.links
.iter()
.map(|((peer, _), link)| ((*peer, link.tag), link.inbox_tx.clone()))
.collect(),
}));
}
fn stop_readers(&mut self) {
for raw in self.raw.values().flatten() {
raw.reader.abort();
}
}
}
impl Drop for State {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.stop_readers();
for link in self.links.values() {
link.close();
}
self.plane.table.store(Arc::default());
}
}
/// One network's transport links and its published forwarding table.
///
/// There is one table for the whole network, whatever protocols run over it.
/// A link is a way to reach a neighbour; a protocol is an end-to-end channel
/// to a peer. The two meet only in the envelope, which names the protocol, so
/// a tunnel keeps working over any mix of transports and a middle member
/// needs no protocol in common with either end.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct RelayHub {
network: NetworkId,
state: Mutex<State>,
tally: Arc<Tally>,
changed: Arc<Notify>,
}
impl RelayHub {
/// Creates the router at this network's local endpoint.
pub fn new(network: NetworkId, local: EndpointId) -> Arc<Self> {
let tally = Arc::new(Tally::default());
Arc::new(Self {
network,
state: Mutex::new(State {
plane: Arc::new(Plane {
local: *local.as_bytes(),
table: ArcSwap::from_pointee(ForwardingTable::default()),
tally: tally.clone(),
}),
priority: Vec::new(),
graph: HashMap::new(),
members: HashSet::new(),
raw: HashMap::new(),
links: HashMap::new(),
}),
tally,
changed: Arc::default(),
})
}
fn state(&self) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, State> {
self.state.lock().unwrap_or_else(|error| error.into_inner())
}
/// Sets which kinds of transport are preferred, best first, when a
/// neighbour can be reached over more than one.
pub fn set_priority(&self, kinds: Vec<String>) {
let mut state = self.state();
if state.priority != kinds {
state.priority = kinds;
state.publish();
}
}
/// Wakes the control loop promptly when a transport reader ends.
pub async fn changed(&self) {
self.changed.notified().await;
}
/// Current counters.
pub fn counters(&self) -> RelayCounters {
self.tally.snapshot()
}
/// Publishes authenticated topology. Refreshing identical state is cheap.
///
/// Every row of `graph` is one member's own account of who it has a link
/// to; what kind of link it is does not matter here.
pub fn set_topology(&self, graph: HashMap<PeerId, Vec<PeerId>>, members: HashSet<PeerId>) {
let mut state = self.state();
if state.graph != graph || state.members != members {
state.graph = graph;
state.members = members;
state.publish();
}
}
/// Whether the current table has a path to this destination.
pub fn reachable(&self, peer: EndpointId) -> bool {
self.state()
.plane
.table
.load()
.routes
.contains_key(peer.as_bytes())
}
/// How a destination is reached right now, if it is.
pub fn route(&self, peer: EndpointId) -> Option<RouteSummary> {
let table = self.state().plane.table.load_full();
let route = table.routes.get(peer.as_bytes())?;
let via = EndpointId::from_bytes(&route.next.first()?.peer).ok()?;
Some(RouteSummary {
hops: route.hops,
via,
})
}
/// The kinds of transport with an open direct link to a peer, best
/// first.
pub fn direct_kinds(&self, peer: EndpointId) -> Vec<String> {
let state = self.state();
state
.ordered(peer.as_bytes())
.into_iter()
.filter(|raw| !raw.link.is_closed())
.map(|raw| raw.kind.clone())
.collect()
}
/// Stable end-to-end channel for a protocol, preserved across topology
/// and transport changes.
pub fn link(&self, peer: EndpointId, protocol: &str) -> Arc<PeerLink> {
let mut state = self.state();
let key = (*peer.as_bytes(), protocol.to_owned());
if let Some(link) = state.links.get(&key) {
return link.clone();
}
let (inbox_tx, inbox_rx) = mpsc::channel(INBOX);
let (closed, _) = watch::channel(false);
let link = Arc::new(PeerLink {
network: self.network,
peer,
tag: envelope::protocol_tag(protocol),
plane: state.plane.clone(),
inbox_tx,
inbox_rx: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(inbox_rx),
closed,
});
state.links.insert(key, link.clone());
state.publish();
link
}
/// Whether the protocol already owns its end-to-end channel to a peer.
pub fn has_link(&self, peer: EndpointId, protocol: &str) -> bool {
self.state()
.links
.contains_key(&(*peer.as_bytes(), protocol.to_owned()))
}
/// Installs a raw transport link and starts its independent ingress reader.
///
/// A neighbour may have one link per kind of transport; installing a
/// second of the same kind replaces the first.
pub fn set_direct(&self, peer: EndpointId, kind: &str, raw: SharedLink) {
if raw.network() != self.network || raw.peer() != peer {
return;
}
let mut state = self.state();
let id = *peer.as_bytes();
let plane = state.plane.clone();
let changed = self.changed.clone();
let reader_link = raw.clone();
let reader = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut batch = 0;
while let Some(frame) = reader_link.recv().await {
plane.receive(id, frame);
batch += 1;
if batch == 64 {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
batch = 0;
}
}
changed.notify_one();
});
let links = state.raw.entry(id).or_default();
if let Some(position) = links.iter().position(|known| known.kind == kind) {
links.remove(position).reader.abort();
}
links.push(RawLink {
kind: kind.to_owned(),
link: raw,
reader,
});
state.publish();
}
/// Removes one physical link without tearing down end-to-end protocol state.
pub fn clear_direct(&self, peer: EndpointId, kind: &str) {
let mut state = self.state();
let mut changed = false;
if let Some(links) = state.raw.get_mut(peer.as_bytes()) {
if let Some(position) = links.iter().position(|known| known.kind == kind) {
links.remove(position).reader.abort();
changed = true;
}
if links.is_empty() {
state.raw.remove(peer.as_bytes());
}
}
if changed {
state.publish();
}
}
/// Retires data channels without removing an authenticated peer's topology.
pub fn clear_peer_links(&self, peer: EndpointId) {
let mut state = self.state();
if let Some(links) = state.raw.remove(peer.as_bytes()) {
for raw in links {
raw.link.close();
raw.reader.abort();
}
}
let gone: Vec<_> = state
.links
.keys()
.filter(|(id, _)| id == peer.as_bytes())
.cloned()
.collect();
for key in gone {
if let Some(link) = state.links.remove(&key) {
link.close();
}
}
state.publish();
}
/// Revokes all links and topology involving a departed authenticated peer.
pub fn remove_peer(&self, peer: EndpointId) {
self.clear_peer_links(peer);
let mut state = self.state();
state.members.remove(peer.as_bytes());
state.graph.remove(peer.as_bytes());
for neighbors in state.graph.values_mut() {
neighbors.retain(|id| id != peer.as_bytes());
}
state.publish();
}
/// Stops every reader and releases all transport handles.
pub fn close(&self) {
let mut state = self.state();
state.stop_readers();
state.raw.clear();
for link in state.links.values() {
link.close();
}
state.links.clear();
state.graph.clear();
state.members.clear();
state.plane.table.store(Arc::default());
}
}
/// A protocol's end-to-end channel, independent of its current next hop.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct PeerLink {
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
tag: u64,
plane: Arc<Plane>,
inbox_tx: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
inbox_rx: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
closed: watch::Sender<bool>,
}
impl PeerLink {
fn close(&self) {
self.closed.send_replace(true);
}
}
impl PacketLink for PeerLink {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.network
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.peer
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM - RELAY_OVERHEAD
}
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send_flow(payload, 0)
}
fn send_flow(&self, payload: Bytes, flow: FlowId) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.is_closed() {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
}
if payload.len() > self.max_datagram_size() {
return Err(TransportError::TooLarge {
size: payload.len(),
limit: self.max_datagram_size(),
});
}
let table = self.plane.table.load();
let route = table
.routes
.get(self.peer.as_bytes())
.ok_or(TransportError::Closed)?;
let hop = route
.select(&self.plane.local, flow)
.ok_or(TransportError::Closed)?;
hop.send(envelope::encode(
self.plane.local,
*self.peer.as_bytes(),
flow,
self.tag,
&payload,
))?;
if route.hops > 1 {
self.plane.tally.sent_via.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
Ok(())
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut closed = self.closed.subscribe();
if *closed.borrow_and_update() {
return None;
}
let mut inbox = self.inbox_rx.lock().await;
tokio::select! { biased; _ = closed.changed() => None, frame = inbox.recv() => frame }
})
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut closed = self.closed.subscribe();
if !*closed.borrow_and_update() {
let _ = closed.changed().await;
}
})
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
*self.closed.borrow()
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
let table = self.plane.table.load();
match table.routes.get(self.peer.as_bytes()) {
Some(route) if route.hops == 1 => route.next[0]
.first_open()
.map_or_else(|| "unreachable".into(), |link| link.path_description()),
Some(route) => format!(
"relay {} hops via {} ({} equal paths)",
route.hops,
hex::encode(route.next[0].peer),
route.next.len()
),
None => "unreachable".into(),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "relay_tests.rs"]
mod tests;
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
fn network() -> NetworkId {
NetworkKeys::derive(
&NetworkName::new("routing-tests").unwrap(),
&NetworkSecret::from_bytes([3; 32]).unwrap(),
)
.network_id()
}
fn peer(seed: u8) -> EndpointId {
iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).public()
}
fn id(seed: u8) -> PeerId {
*peer(seed).as_bytes()
}
fn tag() -> u64 {
envelope::protocol_tag("ip")
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Wire {
peer: EndpointId,
sent: Mutex<Vec<Bytes>>,
feed: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
inbound: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
dead: AtomicBool,
count: AtomicU64,
record: bool,
}
impl Wire {
fn new(seed: u8, record: bool) -> Arc<Self> {
let (feed, inbound) = mpsc::channel(32);
Arc::new(Self {
peer: peer(seed),
sent: Mutex::default(),
feed,
inbound: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(inbound),
dead: AtomicBool::new(false),
count: AtomicU64::new(0),
record,
})
}
fn take(&self) -> Vec<Bytes> {
std::mem::take(&mut self.sent.lock().unwrap())
}
}
impl PacketLink for Wire {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
network()
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.peer
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM
}
fn send(&self, frame: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.is_closed() {
return Err(TransportError::Closed);
}
self.count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
if self.record {
self.sent.lock().unwrap().push(frame);
}
Ok(())
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move { self.inbound.lock().await.recv().await })
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(std::future::pending())
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
self.dead.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
"test-direct".into()
}
}
fn topology(hub: &RelayHub, edges: &[(u8, &[u8])], members: &[u8]) {
hub.set_topology(
edges
.iter()
.map(|(a, bs)| (id(*a), bs.iter().map(|b| id(*b)).collect()))
.collect(),
members.iter().map(|p| id(*p)).collect(),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ecmp_is_per_flow_direct_wins_and_existing_tunnel_survives_changes() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(1));
let b = Wire::new(2, true);
let c = Wire::new(3, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(2), "ip", b.clone());
hub.set_direct(peer(3), "ip", c.clone());
topology(&hub, &[(2, &[4]), (3, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let link = hub.link(peer(4), "ip");
let mut chosen = HashMap::new();
for _ in 0..8 {
for flow in 0..100 {
link.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"ciphertext"), flow)
.unwrap();
}
for (hop, wire) in [(2, &b), (3, &c)] {
for frame in wire.take() {
let header = envelope::decode(&frame).unwrap();
assert_eq!(header.source, id(1));
assert_eq!(header.destination, id(4));
if let Some(old) = chosen.insert(header.flow, hop) {
assert_eq!(old, hop);
}
}
}
}
assert_eq!(
chosen.values().copied().collect::<HashSet<_>>(),
HashSet::from([2, 3])
);
let direct = Wire::new(4, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(4), "ip", direct.clone());
link.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"direct"), 8).unwrap();
assert_eq!(direct.take().len(), 1);
assert!(b.take().is_empty() && c.take().is_empty());
hub.clear_direct(peer(4), "ip");
b.dead.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
for flow in 0..100 {
link.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"fallback"), flow)
.unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(c.take().len(), 100);
hub.clear_direct(peer(2), "ip");
topology(&hub, &[(3, &[])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
assert!(link.send(Bytes::new()).is_err());
assert!(!link.is_closed());
assert!(Arc::ptr_eq(&link, &hub.link(peer(4), "ip")));
hub.remove_peer(peer(4));
assert!(link.is_closed());
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), link.closed())
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(link.recv().await.is_none());
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn transport_reader_forwards_without_any_plugin_reader_and_isolates_protocols() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let a = Wire::new(1, true);
let c = Wire::new(3, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", a.clone());
hub.set_direct(peer(3), "ip", c.clone());
topology(&hub, &[(3, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let frame = envelope::encode(id(1), id(4), 91, tag(), b"end-to-end encrypted");
let pointer = frame.as_ptr();
a.feed.send(frame).await.unwrap();
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), async {
while hub.counters().forwarded == 0 {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.unwrap();
let sent = c.take();
assert_eq!(sent[0].as_ptr(), pointer);
assert_eq!(
envelope::decode(&sent[0]).unwrap().remaining,
ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1
);
assert_eq!(&sent[0][RELAY_OVERHEAD..], b"end-to-end encrypted");
assert_eq!(hub.counters().forwarded, 1);
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_frame_is_delivered_only_to_the_protocol_it_names() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
hub.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", Wire::new(1, true));
let ip = hub.link(peer(1), "ip");
let other = hub.link(peer(1), "other-ip");
let plane = ip.plane.clone();
plane.receive(id(1), envelope::encode(id(1), id(2), 0, tag(), b"for ip"));
plane.receive(
id(1),
envelope::encode(
id(1),
id(2),
0,
envelope::protocol_tag("other-ip"),
b"for other",
),
);
plane.receive(
id(1),
envelope::encode(
id(1),
id(2),
0,
envelope::protocol_tag("nobody-runs-this"),
b"for nobody",
),
);
assert_eq!(ip.recv().await.unwrap(), Bytes::from_static(b"for ip"));
assert_eq!(
other.recv().await.unwrap(),
Bytes::from_static(b"for other")
);
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_unknown, 1);
hub.close();
}
/// A middle member joins two neighbours over different transports, and the
/// two ends share a protocol the middle has never heard of.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_tunnel_crosses_a_middle_member_whose_links_are_of_different_kinds() {
let a = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(1));
let c = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(3));
let b = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let a_to_c = Wire::new(3, true);
let c_to_a = Wire::new(1, true);
let c_to_b = Wire::new(2, true);
let b_to_c = Wire::new(3, true);
a.set_direct(peer(3), "wg", a_to_c.clone());
c.set_direct(peer(1), "wg", c_to_a);
c.set_direct(peer(2), "wg-quic", c_to_b.clone());
b.set_direct(peer(3), "wg-quic", b_to_c.clone());
topology(&a, &[(3, &[1, 2])], &[1, 2, 3]);
topology(&b, &[(3, &[1, 2])], &[1, 2, 3]);
topology(&c, &[(1, &[3]), (2, &[3])], &[1, 2, 3]);
let outgoing = a.link(peer(2), "tunnel");
let incoming = b.link(peer(1), "tunnel");
outgoing
.send_flow(Bytes::from_static(b"sealed"), 5)
.unwrap();
let frame = a_to_c.take().remove(0);
// The middle forwards it onto its other kind of link without looking
// inside.
c.state().plane.receive(id(1), frame);
let frame = c_to_b.take().remove(0);
assert_eq!(c.counters().forwarded, 1);
b.state().plane.receive(id(3), frame);
assert_eq!(
incoming.recv().await.unwrap(),
Bytes::from_static(b"sealed")
);
assert_eq!(b.counters().received_via, 1);
assert_eq!(
b.route(peer(1)),
Some(RouteSummary {
hops: 2,
via: peer(3)
})
);
a.close();
b.close();
c.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_neighbour_is_reached_over_the_preferred_kind_and_falls_back_when_it_is_lost() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(1));
hub.set_priority(vec!["wg".into(), "tcp-tls".into(), "wg-quic".into()]);
let slow = Wire::new(2, true);
let fast = Wire::new(2, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(2), "wg-quic", slow.clone());
let link = hub.link(peer(2), "tunnel");
link.send(Bytes::from_static(b"one")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(slow.take().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(hub.direct_kinds(peer(2)), ["wg-quic"]);
// A better kind appears: traffic moves to it with nothing to redo.
hub.set_direct(peer(2), "wg", fast.clone());
assert_eq!(hub.direct_kinds(peer(2)), ["wg", "wg-quic"]);
link.send(Bytes::from_static(b"two")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(fast.take().len(), 1);
assert!(slow.take().is_empty());
// It dies: the worse one carries on, and the logical link is untouched.
fast.dead.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
link.send(Bytes::from_static(b"three")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(slow.take().len(), 1);
assert!(!link.is_closed());
assert_eq!(
hub.route(peer(2)),
Some(RouteSummary {
hops: 1,
via: peer(2)
})
);
hub.clear_direct(peer(2), "wg-quic");
hub.clear_direct(peer(2), "wg");
assert!(!hub.reachable(peer(2)));
assert!(Arc::ptr_eq(&link, &hub.link(peer(2), "tunnel")));
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn local_delivery_is_bounded_and_malformed_or_unknown_sources_are_dropped() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let a = Wire::new(1, true);
hub.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", a);
let link = hub.link(peer(1), "ip");
let plane = link.plane.clone();
for _ in 0..INBOX + 1 {
plane.receive(id(1), envelope::encode(id(1), id(2), 0, tag(), b"ip"));
}
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_congested, 1);
for _ in 0..INBOX {
assert_eq!(link.recv().await.unwrap(), Bytes::from_static(b"ip"));
}
plane.receive(id(1), Bytes::from_static(b"broken"));
plane.receive(
id(1),
envelope::encode(id(9), id(2), 0, tag(), b"unknown member"),
);
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_unknown, 2);
plane.receive(
id(1),
envelope::encode(id(1), id(9), 0, tag(), b"unknown destination"),
);
assert_eq!(hub.counters().dropped_no_link, 1);
hub.close();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn inconsistent_tables_cannot_loop_beyond_the_hop_limit() {
let a = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(1));
let b = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let ab = Wire::new(2, true);
let ba = Wire::new(1, true);
a.set_direct(peer(2), "ip", ab.clone());
b.set_direct(peer(1), "ip", ba.clone());
// Deliberately inconsistent snapshots while updates are in flight.
topology(&a, &[(2, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
topology(&b, &[(1, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let ap = a.link(peer(4), "ip").plane.clone();
let bp = b.link(peer(4), "ip").plane.clone();
let mut frame = envelope::encode(id(3), id(4), 7, tag(), b"transit");
for turn in 0..ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT {
let (plane, incoming, wire) = if turn % 2 == 0 {
(&ap, id(2), &ab)
} else {
(&bp, id(1), &ba)
};
plane.receive(incoming, frame);
let sent = wire.take();
if turn == ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1 {
assert!(sent.is_empty());
break;
}
assert_eq!(sent.len(), 1);
frame = sent.into_iter().next().unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(
a.counters().forwarded + b.counters().forwarded,
u64::from(ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1)
);
assert_eq!(
a.counters().dropped_hop_limit + b.counters().dropped_hop_limit,
1
);
a.close();
b.close();
}
/// Measures the actual synchronous transit routine, including header checks,
/// snapshot lookup, ECMP, in-place TTL update and mock transport submission.
/// Packet construction, encryption and socket I/O are outside this measurement.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "manual release-mode forwarding microbenchmark"]
async fn forwarding_benchmark() {
let hub = RelayHub::new(network(), peer(2));
let wire = Wire::new(3, false);
hub.set_direct(peer(3), "ip", wire.clone());
let alternate = Wire::new(5, false);
hub.set_direct(peer(5), "ip", alternate.clone());
topology(&hub, &[(3, &[4]), (5, &[4])], &[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
let plane = hub.link(peer(4), "ip").plane.clone();
let source = id(1);
let destination = id(4);
let incoming = id(1);
for size in [64, 1280] {
let mut elapsed = std::time::Duration::ZERO;
const COUNT: usize = 10000;
const BATCHES: usize = 100;
for _ in 0..BATCHES {
let frames: Vec<_> = (0..COUNT)
.map(|flow| {
envelope::encode(source, destination, flow as u64, tag(), &vec![42; size])
})
.collect();
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
for frame in frames {
plane.receive(incoming, std::hint::black_box(frame));
}
elapsed += start.elapsed();
}
let count = (COUNT * BATCHES) as f64;
println!(
"transit {size} B: {:.1} ns/packet, {:.2} Mpps (1M packets, two equal paths)",
elapsed.as_nanos() as f64 / count,
count / elapsed.as_secs_f64() / 1e6
);
}
assert_eq!(
wire.count.load(Ordering::Relaxed) + alternate.count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
2000000
);
hub.close();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
//! Fixed header. Transit changes one byte in an owned receive buffer.
use super::{FlowId, PeerId};
use crate::config::{MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT};
use bytes::{BufMut, Bytes, BytesMut};
pub(crate) const HEADER: usize = 2 + 32 + 32 + 8 + 8;
const VERSION: u8 = 2;
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct Header {
pub source: PeerId,
pub destination: PeerId,
pub remaining: u8,
pub flow: FlowId,
/// Which end-to-end protocol the payload belongs to, whatever links carry it.
pub protocol: u64,
}
/// A stable 64-bit tag for a protocol id (FNV-1a), the same on every member.
pub(crate) fn protocol_tag(name: &str) -> u64 {
name.bytes().fold(0xcbf2_9ce4_8422_2325, |hash, byte| {
(hash ^ u64::from(byte)).wrapping_mul(0x0000_0100_0000_01b3)
})
}
pub(crate) fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Header> {
if bytes.len() < HEADER
|| bytes.len() > MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM
|| bytes[0] != VERSION
|| bytes[1] == 0
|| bytes[1] > ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT
{
return None;
}
Some(Header {
source: bytes[2..34].try_into().ok()?,
destination: bytes[34..66].try_into().ok()?,
remaining: bytes[1],
flow: u64::from_be_bytes(bytes[66..74].try_into().ok()?),
protocol: u64::from_be_bytes(bytes[74..82].try_into().ok()?),
})
}
pub(crate) fn encode(
source: PeerId,
destination: PeerId,
flow: FlowId,
protocol: u64,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = BytesMut::with_capacity(HEADER + payload.len());
bytes.put_u8(VERSION);
bytes.put_u8(ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT);
bytes.extend_from_slice(&source);
bytes.extend_from_slice(&destination);
bytes.put_u64(flow);
bytes.put_u64(protocol);
bytes.extend_from_slice(payload);
bytes.freeze()
}
pub(crate) fn decrement(bytes: Bytes) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = match bytes.try_into_mut() {
Ok(bytes) => bytes,
Err(bytes) => BytesMut::from(bytes.as_ref()),
};
// Called only after decode and after excluding remaining <= 1.
bytes[1] -= 1;
bytes.freeze()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
#[test]
fn transit_reuses_the_buffer_and_rejects_invalid_headers() {
let frame = encode([1; 32], [2; 32], 17, protocol_tag("wg"), &[42; 1280]);
let address = frame.as_ptr();
let frame = decrement(frame);
assert_eq!(
frame.as_ptr(),
address,
"no payload copy for an owned buffer"
);
let header = decode(&frame).unwrap();
assert_eq!(header.remaining, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT - 1);
assert_eq!(header.protocol, protocol_tag("wg"));
assert_ne!(protocol_tag("wg"), protocol_tag("wg-quic"));
assert_eq!(&frame[HEADER..], &[42; 1280]);
for length in 0..HEADER {
assert!(decode(&frame[..length]).is_none());
}
for ttl in [0, ROUTING_HOP_LIMIT + 1] {
let mut bad = frame.to_vec();
bad[1] = ttl;
assert!(decode(&bad).is_none());
}
let mut bad = frame.to_vec();
bad[0] = 99;
assert!(decode(&bad).is_none());
assert!(decode(&vec![1; MAX_DATA_DATAGRAM + 1]).is_none());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
//! Optional IP flow classifier for IP plugins, called before encryption.
//! The router itself treats this identifier and the payload as opaque.
use super::FlowId;
fn hash(parts: &[&[u8]]) -> FlowId {
let mut value = 0xcbf29ce484222325u64;
for part in parts {
for byte in *part {
value = (value ^ u64::from(*byte)).wrapping_mul(0x100000001b3);
}
}
value
}
/// Stable directional IP flow hash, independent of TCP sequence numbers,
/// checksums and packet contents. Fragmented traffic uses addresses/protocol
/// instead of ports: even non-initial fragments and subsequent fragmented
/// datagrams stay together. This deliberately coalesces fragmented flows.
/// Malformed packets get a coarse hash; parsing is bounded and never allocates.
pub fn ip_flow(packet: &[u8]) -> FlowId {
match packet.first().map(|b| b >> 4) {
Some(4) if packet.len() >= 20 => {
let addresses = &packet[12..20];
let protocol = &packet[9..10];
let offset = usize::from(packet[0] & 15) * 4;
if u16::from_be_bytes([packet[6], packet[7]]) & 0x3fff != 0 {
return hash(&[addresses, protocol]);
}
if offset >= 20
&& matches!(packet[9], 6 | 17)
&& let Some(ports) = packet.get(offset..offset + 4)
{
return hash(&[addresses, protocol, ports]);
}
hash(&[addresses, protocol])
}
Some(6) if packet.len() >= 40 => {
let addresses = &packet[8..40];
let mut protocol = packet[6];
let mut offset = 40;
for _ in 0..8 {
match protocol {
44 => {
if let Some(fragment) = packet.get(offset..offset + 8) {
return hash(&[addresses, &fragment[..1]]);
}
break;
}
0 | 43 | 60 | 51 => {
let Some(header) = packet.get(offset..offset + 2) else {
break;
};
let size = if protocol == 51 {
(usize::from(header[1]) + 2) * 4
} else {
(usize::from(header[1]) + 1) * 8
};
protocol = header[0];
offset += size;
}
6 | 17 => {
if let Some(ports) = packet.get(offset..offset + 4) {
return hash(&[addresses, &[protocol], ports]);
}
break;
}
_ => break,
}
}
hash(&[addresses, &[protocol]])
}
_ => 0,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn tcp_flow_ignores_packet_contents_but_distinguishes_ports() {
let mut packet = [0u8; 80];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[9] = 6;
packet[12..24].copy_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1, 10, 0, 0, 2, 0, 22, 1, 2]);
let flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[4] = 123; // IP id changes for each unfragmented packet.
packet[24..].fill(47);
assert_eq!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[23] = 3;
assert_ne!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[6] = 0x20;
let fragment_flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[6] = 0;
packet[7] = 1;
packet[20..].fill(99);
assert_eq!(fragment_flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[4] = 97;
assert_eq!(fragment_flow, ip_flow(&packet));
}
#[test]
fn ipv6_extensions_and_fragments_are_bounded_and_stable() {
let mut packet = [0u8; 80];
packet[0] = 0x60;
packet[6] = 0;
packet[40] = 17;
packet[48..52].copy_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3, 4]);
let flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[52..].fill(5);
assert_eq!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[50] = 9;
assert_ne!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
packet[6] = 44;
packet[40] = 6;
let flow = ip_flow(&packet);
packet[42] = 32;
packet[48..].fill(3);
assert_eq!(flow, ip_flow(&packet));
for len in 0..packet.len() {
let _ = ip_flow(&packet[..len]);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
//! Transport-independent routing over opaque identities. Tables are built on
//! topology changes, never on the packet path. No WireGuard or iroh APIs here.
pub(crate) mod envelope;
pub mod flow;
use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, VecDeque};
/// Opaque authenticated identity; the transport adapter validates its keys.
pub type PeerId = [u8; 32];
/// Stable flow identifier, carried unchanged between transit routers.
pub type FlowId = u64;
/// A shortest route with all equal-cost first hops in stable order.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Route {
/// Number of transport links to the destination.
pub hops: u8,
/// Equal-cost first hops. Direct destinations have one entry.
pub next_hops: Box<[PeerId]>,
}
/// Immutable shortest-path table, replaced when connectivity changes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct RoutingTable {
routes: HashMap<PeerId, Route>,
}
impl RoutingTable {
/// Computes shortest directed paths bounded by `hop_limit`.
/// The caller supplies only authenticated, fresh, compatible edges.
pub fn build(local: PeerId, graph: &HashMap<PeerId, Vec<PeerId>>, hop_limit: u8) -> Self {
let mut distances = HashMap::from([(local, 0u8)]);
let mut first_hops: HashMap<PeerId, BTreeSet<PeerId>> = HashMap::new();
let mut pending = VecDeque::from([local]);
while let Some(node) = pending.pop_front() {
let distance = distances[&node];
if distance >= hop_limit {
continue;
}
let inherited = first_hops.get(&node).cloned().unwrap_or_default();
for &next in graph.get(&node).into_iter().flatten() {
let next_distance = distance + 1;
match distances.get(&next) {
Some(&known) if known < next_distance => continue,
None => {
distances.insert(next, next_distance);
pending.push_back(next);
}
_ => {}
}
let hops = first_hops.entry(next).or_default();
if node == local {
hops.insert(next);
} else {
hops.extend(inherited.iter().copied());
}
}
}
Self {
routes: first_hops
.into_iter()
.map(|(peer, hops)| {
(
peer,
Route {
hops: distances[&peer],
next_hops: hops.into_iter().collect(),
},
)
})
.collect(),
}
}
/// Precomputed route to a destination.
pub fn get(&self, destination: &PeerId) -> Option<&Route> {
self.routes.get(destination)
}
/// All reachable destinations, excluding ourselves.
pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = (&PeerId, &Route)> {
self.routes.iter()
}
}
/// Stable ECMP mixing, without random state or hashing the payload per hop.
pub(crate) fn mix64(mut value: u64) -> u64 {
value ^= value >> 30;
value = value.wrapping_mul(0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9);
value ^= value >> 27;
value = value.wrapping_mul(0x94d049bb133111eb);
value ^ (value >> 31)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn p(n: u8) -> PeerId {
[n; 32]
}
#[test]
fn shortest_paths_keep_equal_cost_hops_and_prefer_direct_links() {
let mut graph = HashMap::from([
(p(1), vec![p(3), p(2)]),
(p(2), vec![p(4)]),
(p(3), vec![p(4)]),
(p(4), vec![p(5)]),
(p(5), vec![p(1)]),
]);
let routes = RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 16);
assert_eq!(routes.get(&p(5)).unwrap().hops, 3);
assert_eq!(&*routes.get(&p(5)).unwrap().next_hops, &[p(2), p(3)]);
assert!(routes.get(&p(1)).is_none());
assert!(routes.get(&p(9)).is_none());
graph.get_mut(&p(1)).unwrap().push(p(5));
assert_eq!(
RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 16).get(&p(5)).unwrap(),
&Route {
hops: 1,
next_hops: Box::new([p(5)])
}
);
}
#[test]
fn topology_removal_and_hop_budget_remove_impossible_routes() {
let mut graph = HashMap::from([(p(1), vec![p(2)]), (p(2), vec![p(3)]), (p(3), vec![p(4)])]);
assert!(RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 2).get(&p(4)).is_none());
assert!(RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 3).get(&p(4)).is_some());
graph.remove(&p(2));
assert!(RoutingTable::build(p(1), &graph, 16).get(&p(4)).is_none());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
//! Authenticated probes of the actual data link, independent of control RTT.
//! Keys are negotiated privately for each physical link. No fixed wire magic.
use super::{PacketLink, SharedLink, TransportError};
use crate::dataplane::SharedPlugin;
use crate::overlay::RoutingTable;
use crate::{BoxFuture, NetworkId};
use bytes::Bytes;
use hmac::{Hmac, KeyInit, Mac};
use iroh::EndpointId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::Sha256;
use std::collections::VecDeque;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub(crate) struct Settings {
marker: [u8; 16],
key: [u8; 32],
}
impl Settings {
pub(crate) fn fresh() -> Self {
Self {
marker: rand::random(),
key: rand::random(),
}
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Settings {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str("HealthSettings([REDACTED])")
}
}
struct Samples {
pending: VecDeque<(u64, Instant)>,
recent: VecDeque<bool>,
}
impl Samples {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
pending: VecDeque::new(),
recent: VecDeque::new(),
}
}
fn sent(&mut self, seq: u64, now: Instant) {
self.pending.push_back((seq, now));
}
fn acknowledge(&mut self, seq: u64) {
if let Some(i) = self.pending.iter().position(|(n, _)| *n == seq) {
self.pending.remove(i);
self.recent.push_back(true);
}
}
fn expire(&mut self, now: Instant) {
while self
.pending
.front()
.is_some_and(|(_, at)| now.duration_since(*at) >= Duration::from_secs(3))
{
self.pending.pop_front();
self.recent.push_back(false);
}
while self.recent.len() > 20 {
self.recent.pop_front();
}
}
fn degraded(&self) -> bool {
self.recent.len() >= 15
&& self.recent.iter().filter(|ok| !**ok).count() * 100 >= self.recent.len() * 60
}
}
// This prefix is inside end-to-end encryption. It never appears on the UDP wire.
const IP_MAGIC: &[u8; 16] = b"tsunagi-health01";
pub(crate) fn ip_payload(packet: &[u8]) -> Option<&[u8]> {
(packet.len() >= 36 && packet[0] == 0x45 && packet[9] == 253 && &packet[20..36] == IP_MAGIC)
.then(|| &packet[36..])
}
/// Inject probes through the same encrypted tunnel as application IP packets.
/// This matters for pure WG: raw UDP probes could pass DPI while WG is blocked.
pub(crate) struct ProbeRoute {
pub(crate) plugin: SharedPlugin,
pub(crate) routes: Arc<RoutingTable>,
pub(crate) network: NetworkId,
pub(crate) peer: EndpointId,
pub(crate) max_probe_size: usize,
}
impl ProbeRoute {
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> bool {
let Some((source, destination)) = self.routes.probe_addresses(self.network, self.peer)
else {
return false;
};
let mut packet = vec![0; 36];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[8] = 64;
packet[9] = 253;
packet[12..16].copy_from_slice(&source.octets());
packet[16..20].copy_from_slice(&destination.octets());
packet[20..36].copy_from_slice(IP_MAGIC);
let length = (packet.len() + payload.len()) as u16;
packet[2..4].copy_from_slice(&length.to_be_bytes());
let sum = packet[..20]
.as_chunks::<2>()
.0
.iter()
.map(|b| u32::from(u16::from_be_bytes(*b)))
.sum::<u32>();
let sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16);
packet[10..12].copy_from_slice(&(!(sum as u16)).to_be_bytes());
packet.extend_from_slice(&payload);
self.plugin
.carry(self.network, self.peer, Bytes::from(packet))
}
}
/// A monitored physical link. It forwards application bytes unchanged.
pub(crate) struct HealthLink {
probes: mpsc::Sender<Bytes>,
raw: SharedLink,
settings: Mutex<Option<Settings>>,
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>,
stop: watch::Sender<bool>,
reason: Mutex<Option<String>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for HealthLink {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("HealthLink")
.field("raw", &self.raw)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
fn lock<T>(m: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match m.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
}
}
impl HealthLink {
pub(crate) fn new(
raw: SharedLink,
local: EndpointId,
settings: Option<Settings>,
route: Option<ProbeRoute>,
) -> Arc<Self> {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(64);
let (probe_tx, mut probe_rx) = mpsc::channel(64);
let (stop, _) = watch::channel(false);
let link = Arc::new(Self {
probes: probe_tx,
raw: raw.clone(),
settings: Mutex::new(settings),
rx: tokio::sync::Mutex::new(rx),
stop,
reason: Mutex::new(None),
});
let weak = Arc::downgrade(&link);
let mut stopped = link.stop.subscribe();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(1));
interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Skip);
let mut samples = Samples::new();
let mut sequence = rand::random::<u64>();
let mut since: Option<Instant> = None;
let mut marker = None;
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_=stopped.changed()=>break,
_=interval.tick()=>{
let Some(link)=weak.upgrade()else{break;};let Some(settings)=lock(&link.settings).clone()else{continue;};
if marker != Some(settings.marker) { marker = Some(settings.marker); samples = Samples::new(); since = None; }
let start=*since.get_or_insert_with(Instant::now);let now=Instant::now();samples.expire(now);
if now.duration_since(start)>=Duration::from_secs(20) && samples.degraded() {
*lock(&link.reason)=Some("data delivery checks: at least 60% loss over the last 20 probes".into());break;
}
sequence=sequence.wrapping_add(1);
let size=route.as_ref().map_or(raw.max_datagram_size(),|route|route.max_probe_size);
let packet=probe(&settings,local,1,sequence,size.min(1000));
if let Some(route)=&route { if route.send(packet) {samples.sent(sequence,now);} }
else { let _=raw.send(packet); samples.sent(sequence,now); }
}
packet=raw.recv()=>{
let Some(packet)=packet else{break;};let Some(link)=weak.upgrade()else{break;};
let settings=lock(&link.settings).clone();
if route.is_none() && let Some(settings)=settings && packet.starts_with(&settings.marker) {
if let Some((kind,seq))=verify(&settings,raw.peer(),&packet) {
if kind==1 {let _=raw.send(probe(&settings,local,2,seq,packet.len()));}
else if kind==2 {samples.acknowledge(seq);}
}
} else {let _=tx.try_send(packet);}
}
packet=probe_rx.recv(),if route.is_some()=>{
let Some(packet)=packet else {break;};let Some(link)=weak.upgrade()else{break;};
let Some(settings)=lock(&link.settings).clone()else{continue;};
if let Some((kind,seq))=verify(&settings,raw.peer(),&packet) {
if kind==1 { if let Some(route)=&route { route.send(probe(&settings,local,2,seq,packet.len().min(route.max_probe_size))); } }
else if kind==2 {samples.acknowledge(seq);}
}
}
}
}
raw.close();
if let Some(link) = weak.upgrade() {
link.stop.send_replace(true);
}
});
link
}
pub(crate) fn receive_probe(&self, packet: Bytes) {
let _ = self.probes.try_send(packet);
}
pub(crate) fn configure(&self, settings: Settings) {
*lock(&self.settings) = Some(settings);
}
}
fn probe(settings: &Settings, sender: EndpointId, kind: u8, seq: u64, size: usize) -> Bytes {
let mut bytes = vec![0; size.max(57)];
bytes[..16].copy_from_slice(&settings.marker);
bytes[16] = kind;
bytes[17..25].copy_from_slice(&seq.to_be_bytes());
rand::fill(&mut bytes[25..size.max(57) - 32]);
let tail = bytes.len() - 32;
if let Ok(mut mac) = <Hmac<Sha256> as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(&settings.key) {
mac.update(sender.as_bytes());
mac.update(&bytes[..tail]);
bytes[tail..].copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
}
Bytes::from(bytes)
}
fn verify(settings: &Settings, sender: EndpointId, bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<(u8, u64)> {
if bytes.len() < 57 || !bytes.starts_with(&settings.marker) {
return None;
}
let mut mac = <Hmac<Sha256> as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(&settings.key).ok()?;
let tail = bytes.len() - 32;
mac.update(sender.as_bytes());
mac.update(&bytes[..tail]);
mac.verify_slice(&bytes[tail..]).ok()?;
Some((
bytes[16],
u64::from_be_bytes(bytes.get(17..25)?.try_into().ok()?),
))
}
impl PacketLink for HealthLink {
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.raw.network()
}
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId {
self.raw.peer()
}
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize {
self.raw.max_datagram_size()
}
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.is_closed() {
Err(TransportError::Closed)
} else {
self.raw.send(payload)
}
}
fn send_flow(
&self,
payload: Bytes,
flow: super::super::routing::FlowId,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
if self.is_closed() {
Err(TransportError::Closed)
} else {
self.raw.send_flow(payload, flow)
}
}
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut stop = self.stop.subscribe();
if *stop.borrow() {
return None;
}
let mut rx = self.rx.lock().await;
tokio::select! {biased;_=stop.changed()=>None,packet=rx.recv()=>packet}
})
}
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut stop = self.stop.subscribe();
if !*stop.borrow() {
let _ = stop.changed().await;
}
})
}
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool {
*self.stop.borrow() || self.raw.is_closed()
}
fn close(&self) {
self.stop.send_replace(true);
self.raw.close();
}
fn failure_reason(&self) -> Option<String> {
lock(&self.reason)
.clone()
.or_else(|| self.raw.failure_reason())
}
fn path_description(&self) -> String {
self.raw.path_description()
}
}
impl Drop for HealthLink {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.stop.send_replace(true);
self.raw.close();
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
#[test]
fn no_false_failure_before_window_but_persistent_loss_is_detected() {
let mut samples = Samples::new();
let now = Instant::now();
for seq in 0..20 {
samples.sent(seq, now);
if seq % 5 == 0 {
samples.acknowledge(seq);
}
}
assert!(!samples.degraded());
samples.expire(now + Duration::from_secs(4));
assert!(samples.degraded());
for seq in 20..40 {
samples.sent(seq, now);
samples.acknowledge(seq);
}
samples.expire(now + Duration::from_secs(4));
assert!(!samples.degraded());
}
#[test]
fn a_forged_or_reflected_probe_cannot_claim_delivery() {
let a = crate::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate().endpoint_id();
let b = crate::identity::DeviceIdentity::generate().endpoint_id();
let settings = Settings::fresh();
let packet = probe(&settings, a, 1, 42, 1100);
assert_eq!(verify(&settings, a, &packet), Some((1, 42)));
assert!(verify(&settings, b, &packet).is_none());
let mut forged = packet.to_vec();
forged[16] = 2;
assert!(verify(&settings, a, &forged).is_none());
}
}
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ impl IrohLink {
}
impl PacketLink for IrohLink {
fn close(&self) {
self.conn.close(0u32.into(), b"data link retired");
}
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.network
}
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
//! The data plane transport boundary.
//!
//! This is the seam that keeps the control protocol and the data plane
//! independent. An [`IpPlugin`] never learns how its packets are moved: it is
//! handed a [`PacketLink`] to a peer and writes datagrams into it. Whether
//! that link runs over iroh today, a raw UDP socket, or something else
//! entirely tomorrow is the transport's business alone.
//!
//! [`IpPlugin`]: crate::dataplane::IpPlugin
//!
//! # Why the transport may use iroh
//!
//! The separation between control and data is **logical**, not a ban on
//! sharing technology. Refusing to use iroh for data would throw away exactly
//! what iroh is good at — hole punching a direct path between two peers behind
//! NAT, with a relay as fallback — and force the data plane to reimplement it.
//! So the default transport is [`iroh_link::IrohTransport`], which gives every
//! plugin that connectivity for free.
//!
//! What the separation does buy is that the control protocol in
//! [`crate::proto`] knows nothing about packets, and this module knows nothing
//! about WireGuard. Either side can be replaced on its own.
//!
//! # Semantics
//!
//! A link is an **unreliable, unordered datagram** channel, because that is
//! what a tunnelled UDP protocol needs: no retransmission, no head-of-line
//! blocking, loss is normal rather than an error. It is authenticated and
//! encrypted by the transport, and scoped to exactly one network, one peer and
//! one plugin protocol.
mod fragments;
pub(crate) mod health;
pub mod iroh_link;
use std::sync::Arc;
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
/// Why a data plane link failed.
///
/// None of these ever stop the control plane.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum TransportError {
/// The peer is not reachable for the data plane right now.
#[error("peer is unreachable: {0}")]
Unreachable(String),
/// The peer declined to open a channel for this protocol.
#[error("peer declined a data channel for protocol `{0}`")]
Declined(String),
/// The link is closed.
#[error("data link is closed")]
Closed,
/// A datagram was larger than the link can carry.
#[error("datagram of {size} bytes exceeds the {limit} byte link limit")]
TooLarge {
/// Size that was attempted.
size: usize,
/// Largest datagram this link accepts.
limit: usize,
},
/// Anything else.
#[error("data transport error: {0}")]
Other(String),
}
/// An authenticated datagram channel to one peer, for one plugin protocol.
///
/// Dropping the link closes it.
pub trait PacketLink: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// The network this link belongs to.
fn network(&self) -> NetworkId;
/// The authenticated peer on the other end.
fn peer(&self) -> EndpointId;
/// The largest datagram this link can carry, in bytes.
///
/// This is the logical payload limit. A transport can fragment underneath
/// it so path MTU changes do not force a plugin to resize the host interface.
fn max_datagram_size(&self) -> usize;
/// Sends one datagram.
///
/// Delivery is not guaranteed. Returning `Ok` means the datagram was
/// handed to the transport, nothing more.
fn send(&self, payload: Bytes) -> Result<(), TransportError>;
/// Sends a datagram with an opaque stable flow identifier. Plugins derive
/// this before encryption; transports that do not route can ignore it.
fn send_flow(
&self,
payload: Bytes,
_flow: super::routing::FlowId,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send(payload)
}
/// Receives the next datagram, or `None` once the link is finished.
fn recv(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Option<Bytes>>;
/// Resolves once the link is closed, for whatever reason.
fn closed(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, ()>;
/// Whether the link is already closed.
///
/// Lets the owner notice a dead link and ask for a new one without
/// keeping a task parked on [`PacketLink::closed`].
fn is_closed(&self) -> bool;
/// Explicitly retires a physical link. Implementations should wake readers.
fn close(&self) {}
/// Observed reason for retiring this link, if available.
fn failure_reason(&self) -> Option<String> {
None
}
/// A short description of the path in use, for diagnostics.
///
/// Reports what the transport actually knows. It must not invent a value.
fn path_description(&self) -> String;
}
/// A shared handle to a link.
pub type SharedLink = std::sync::Arc<dyn PacketLink>;
/// Maximum opaque pair-negotiation payload.
pub const MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD: usize = 4096;
/// Private transport bytes, never included in Debug output.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct TransportPayload(Vec<u8>);
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for TransportPayload {
fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(
deserializer: D,
) -> std::result::Result<Self, D::Error> {
struct Visitor;
impl<'de> serde::de::Visitor<'de> for Visitor {
type Value = TransportPayload;
fn expecting(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "at most {MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD} private transport bytes")
}
fn visit_seq<A: serde::de::SeqAccess<'de>>(
self,
mut sequence: A,
) -> std::result::Result<Self::Value, A::Error> {
if sequence
.size_hint()
.is_some_and(|size| size > MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD)
{
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("transport payload too large"));
}
let mut payload = TransportPayload(Vec::with_capacity(
sequence.size_hint().unwrap_or(0).min(MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD),
));
while let Some(byte) = sequence.next_element::<u8>()? {
if payload.0.len() == MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("transport payload too large"));
}
payload.0.push(byte);
}
Ok(payload)
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_seq(Visitor)
}
}
impl TransportPayload {
/// Wraps bytes for one authenticated control session.
pub fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
Self(bytes)
}
/// Borrows private bytes; callers must not log them.
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.0
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for TransportPayload {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str("TransportPayload([REDACTED])")
}
}
/// Private control-plane sender for transports. Contains no network secret.
pub trait ControlSender: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// Queues a bounded message to one authenticated member of one network.
fn send<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
payload: TransportPayload,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<(), TransportError>>;
}
/// An inbound link a peer opened towards us.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InboundLink {
/// The network it belongs to.
pub network: NetworkId,
/// The peer that opened it.
pub peer: EndpointId,
/// The plugin protocol it carries.
pub protocol: String,
/// The link itself.
pub link: SharedLink,
}
/// Opens and accepts data plane links.
///
/// The agent owns one of these and hands links to plugins; plugins never call
/// it directly.
pub trait PacketTransport: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// Supplies a private sender before network activation.
fn attach_control(&self, _control: Arc<dyn ControlSender>) {}
/// Validates and queues private negotiation received from an authenticated member.
fn on_control(
&self,
_network: NetworkId,
_peer: EndpointId,
_protocol: &str,
_payload: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
Err(TransportError::Declined(self.name().into()))
}
/// A short name used in diagnostics.
fn name(&self) -> &str;
/// Lets the agent recover the concrete transport to drive its accept side.
///
/// Accepting is inherently transport-specific — it starts from whatever
/// the transport's own listener produced — so it is not part of this
/// trait's uniform interface.
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any;
/// Opens a link to `peer` in `network` for `protocol`.
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>>;
}
/// A composite packet transport that dispatches requests by protocol id.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MultiPacketTransport {
default: Arc<dyn PacketTransport>,
by_protocol: std::collections::HashMap<String, Arc<dyn PacketTransport>>,
}
impl MultiPacketTransport {
/// Creates a new composite transport with a default fallback transport.
pub fn new(
default: Arc<dyn PacketTransport>,
by_protocol: std::collections::HashMap<String, Arc<dyn PacketTransport>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
default,
by_protocol,
}
}
/// Access the default underlying transport.
pub fn default_transport(&self) -> &Arc<dyn PacketTransport> {
&self.default
}
}
impl PacketTransport for MultiPacketTransport {
fn attach_control(&self, control: Arc<dyn ControlSender>) {
self.default.attach_control(control.clone());
for transport in self.by_protocol.values() {
transport.attach_control(control.clone());
}
}
fn on_control(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &str,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
match self.by_protocol.get(protocol) {
Some(transport) => transport.on_control(network, peer, protocol, payload),
None => Err(TransportError::Declined(protocol.into())),
}
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"multi"
}
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn std::any::Any {
self
}
fn open<'a>(
&'a self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
protocol: &'a str,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedLink, TransportError>> {
if let Some(transport) = self.by_protocol.get(protocol) {
transport.open(network, peer, protocol)
} else {
self.default.open(network, peer, protocol)
}
}
}
+380
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
//! Generic harness for IP tunnel plugins.
//!
//! Implementing [`super::IpPlugin`] directly requires managing per-peer background
//! tasks, synchronization, packet queues, and graceful shutdown.
//!
//! [`TunnelCodec`] provides a simplified interface where a plugin author only
//! defines cryptographic transformation and handshake payloads.
//! [`GenericTunnelPlugin`] adapts any [`TunnelCodec`] into a full [`super::IpPlugin`].
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use bytes::Bytes;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use super::{IpPlugin, PluginCapability, PluginContext, PluginError, ProtocolOption, SharedLink};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
/// The simplified contract for an IP tunnel protocol implementation.
///
/// Implementors only handle key announcements, link lifecycle events,
/// and packet encrypt/decrypt. Concurrency and task management are handled
/// by [`GenericTunnelPlugin`].
pub trait TunnelCodec: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Protocol identifier, e.g. `tcp-tls`.
fn protocol_id(&self) -> &str;
/// Protocol wire version.
fn protocol_version(&self) -> u16;
/// Options accepted by the protocol.
fn options(&self) -> &'static [ProtocolOption] {
&[]
}
/// Generates local capability announcement data for a network.
fn local_capability_data(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PluginError>;
/// Handles a peer's announced capability payload.
fn on_peer_capability_data(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
data: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), PluginError>;
/// Called when an authenticated link to a peer is established.
fn on_peer_link_up(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, link: &SharedLink) {
let _ = (network, peer, link);
}
/// Called when a peer goes away.
fn on_peer_down(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
let _ = (network, peer);
}
/// Encrypts an outbound IP packet into a payload to send over the link.
fn encrypt(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
packet: &[u8],
) -> Result<Bytes, PluginError>;
/// Decrypts an inbound payload from the link into an IP packet.
fn decrypt(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Result<Bytes, PluginError>;
/// Called during shutdown.
fn shutdown<'a>(&'a self) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async {})
}
}
struct TunnelPeerState {
link: SharedLink,
tx_packets: AtomicU64,
rx_packets: AtomicU64,
tx_bytes: AtomicU64,
rx_bytes: AtomicU64,
dropped: AtomicU64,
established_at: std::time::Instant,
}
/// Statistics and status for one active peer in [`GenericTunnelPlugin`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct TunnelPeerReport {
/// Peer endpoint identity.
pub peer: EndpointId,
/// Protocol identifier.
pub protocol: String,
/// Human-readable path description.
pub path: String,
/// Packets successfully encrypted and sent.
pub tx_packets: u64,
/// Packets successfully received and decrypted.
pub rx_packets: u64,
/// Plaintext bytes successfully encrypted and sent.
pub tx_bytes: u64,
/// Plaintext bytes successfully received and decrypted.
pub rx_bytes: u64,
/// Packets dropped due to encryption/decryption/send failures.
pub dropped: u64,
/// Uptime in seconds since the data link was established.
pub uptime_secs: u64,
}
/// Generic wrapper that turns a [`TunnelCodec`] into a full [`IpPlugin`].
pub struct GenericTunnelPlugin<C: TunnelCodec> {
codec: Arc<C>,
context: Mutex<Option<PluginContext>>,
links: RwLock<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId), Arc<TunnelPeerState>>>,
tasks: Mutex<HashMap<(NetworkId, EndpointId), JoinHandle<()>>>,
}
impl<C: TunnelCodec> GenericTunnelPlugin<C> {
/// Wraps `codec` into an [`IpPlugin`].
pub fn new(codec: C) -> Self {
Self {
codec: Arc::new(codec),
context: Mutex::new(None),
links: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
tasks: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
/// Returns a reference to the underlying codec.
pub fn codec(&self) -> &C {
&self.codec
}
/// Returns the active peers with established data links for a network.
pub fn active_peers(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Vec<TunnelPeerReport> {
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.iter()
.filter(|((net, _), _)| *net == network)
.map(|((_, peer), state)| TunnelPeerReport {
peer: *peer,
protocol: self.codec.protocol_id().to_string(),
path: state.link.path_description(),
tx_packets: state.tx_packets.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
rx_packets: state.rx_packets.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
tx_bytes: state.tx_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
rx_bytes: state.rx_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
dropped: state.dropped.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
uptime_secs: state.established_at.elapsed().as_secs(),
})
.collect()
}
}
impl<C: TunnelCodec> std::fmt::Debug for GenericTunnelPlugin<C> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("GenericTunnelPlugin")
.field("protocol_id", &self.codec.protocol_id())
.field("protocol_version", &self.codec.protocol_version())
.finish()
}
}
impl<C: TunnelCodec> IpPlugin for GenericTunnelPlugin<C> {
fn protocol_id(&self) -> &str {
self.codec.protocol_id()
}
fn protocol_version(&self) -> u16 {
self.codec.protocol_version()
}
fn options(&self) -> &'static [ProtocolOption] {
self.codec.options()
}
fn attach(&self, context: PluginContext) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = self.context.lock() {
*guard = Some(context);
}
}
fn local_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
) -> Result<Option<PluginCapability>, PluginError> {
let data = self.codec.local_capability_data(network)?;
Ok(Some(PluginCapability {
protocol: self.codec.protocol_id().to_string(),
version: self.codec.protocol_version(),
enabled: true,
data,
}))
}
fn on_peer_capability(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
capability: &PluginCapability,
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
if capability.protocol != self.codec.protocol_id() {
return Ok(());
}
self.codec
.on_peer_capability_data(network, peer, &capability.data)
}
fn carry(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, packet: bytes::Bytes) -> bool {
let state = {
let guard = match self.links.read() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.get(&(network, peer)).cloned()
};
let Some(state) = state else {
return false;
};
match self.codec.encrypt(network, peer, &packet) {
Ok(ciphertext) => {
if state.link.send(ciphertext).is_ok() {
state.tx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
state
.tx_bytes
.fetch_add(packet.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
true
} else {
state.dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
false
}
}
Err(err) => {
state.dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
tracing::debug!(%peer, %err, "tunnel encrypt failed");
false
}
}
}
fn on_peer_link(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, link: SharedLink) {
let state = Arc::new(TunnelPeerState {
link: Arc::clone(&link),
tx_packets: AtomicU64::new(0),
rx_packets: AtomicU64::new(0),
tx_bytes: AtomicU64::new(0),
rx_bytes: AtomicU64::new(0),
dropped: AtomicU64::new(0),
established_at: std::time::Instant::now(),
});
{
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.insert((network, peer), Arc::clone(&state));
}
self.codec.on_peer_link_up(network, peer, &link);
let codec = Arc::clone(&self.codec);
let sink = match self.context.lock() {
Ok(g) => g.as_ref().map(|ctx| ctx.packet_sink()),
Err(p) => p.into_inner().as_ref().map(|ctx| ctx.packet_sink()),
};
let rx_link = Arc::clone(&link);
let rx_state = Arc::clone(&state);
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(payload) = rx_link.recv().await {
match codec.decrypt(network, peer, &payload) {
Ok(packet) => {
rx_state.rx_packets.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
rx_state
.rx_bytes
.fetch_add(packet.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
if let Some(ref sink) = sink {
sink.deliver(network, peer, packet).await;
}
}
Err(err) => {
rx_state.dropped.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
tracing::debug!(%peer, %err, "tunnel decrypt failed");
}
}
}
});
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(old) = guard.insert((network, peer), handle) {
old.abort();
}
}
fn on_peer_gone(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId) {
{
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
if let Some(task) = guard.remove(&(network, peer)) {
task.abort();
}
}
{
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.remove(&(network, peer));
}
self.codec.on_peer_down(network, peer);
}
fn on_network_deactivated(&self, network: NetworkId) {
let keys_to_remove: Vec<(NetworkId, EndpointId)> = {
let guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard
.keys()
.filter(|(net, _)| *net == network)
.copied()
.collect()
};
{
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
for key in &keys_to_remove {
if let Some(task) = guard.remove(key) {
task.abort();
}
}
}
{
let mut guard = match self.links.write() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
guard.retain(|(net, _), _| *net != network);
}
}
fn shutdown<'a>(&'a self) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let mut tasks = Vec::new();
{
let mut guard = match self.tasks.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(p) => p.into_inner(),
};
for (_, task) in guard.drain() {
tasks.push(task);
}
}
for task in tasks {
task.abort();
}
self.codec.shutdown().await;
})
}
}
File renamed without changes.
File renamed without changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
//! Telling the macOS resolver to send some questions here, through
//! `/etc/resolver`.
//!
//! macOS reads one file per domain out of `/etc/resolver`: a file named after
//! a domain, containing the `nameserver` and `port` to send that domain's
//! questions to, makes the system resolver a *scoped* resolver for exactly
//! that suffix and nothing else (see `resolver(5)`). That is the same contract
//! the systemd-resolved and NRPT publishers arrange on the other platforms:
//! route these suffixes to this server, and claim nothing else.
//!
//! # Why a port, and so no privileged socket
//!
//! A resolver file carries a `port`, so the server does not have to sit on 53
//! and the agent needs nothing like `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`. It can serve on a
//! high port and still be reached for its suffixes.
//!
//! # Tagged, reversible, and never clobbering
//!
//! Every file this publisher writes begins with a marker line, so it only ever
//! replaces or removes files it wrote itself: a pre-existing `/etc/resolver`
//! entry a user set up by hand is left untouched. The files are removed when
//! the resolver is turned off and on shutdown; a crash leaves them behind, and
//! the next apply for the same domains overwrites them.
//!
//! # Privilege
//!
//! Writing under `/etc/resolver` needs root. A permission error is reported as
//! a refusal — the kind of failure a person has to act on — rather than a
//! transient one, so the agent does not retry it at the ordinary pace.
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use super::{DnsPublisher, PublishError, Published};
/// The directory macOS reads scoped resolvers from.
const RESOLVER_DIR: &str = "/etc/resolver";
/// The first line of every file this publisher writes, so it recognises its
/// own and never touches a file a user created.
const MARKER: &str = "# managed by tsunagi — do not edit";
/// Writes and removes `/etc/resolver` files for the overlay zones.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ResolverDirPublisher {
/// The resolver directory. A field rather than a constant so the tests can
/// point it at a temporary directory and never touch the real one.
dir: PathBuf,
/// The domain files written by the last apply, so a later apply can remove
/// the ones no longer wanted and `revert` can remove them all.
written: Mutex<BTreeSet<String>>,
}
impl Default for ResolverDirPublisher {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl ResolverDirPublisher {
/// A publisher writing to the real `/etc/resolver`.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::in_dir(RESOLVER_DIR)
}
/// A publisher writing to a specific directory. For the tests.
fn in_dir(dir: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self {
dir: dir.into(),
written: Mutex::new(BTreeSet::new()),
}
}
fn apply_inner(&self, published: &Published) -> Result<(), PublishError> {
let desired = desired_files(published)?;
// The directory may not exist yet; creating it needs root.
std::fs::create_dir_all(&self.dir).map_err(|err| classify(&self.dir, err))?;
// Remove the files from a previous apply that are no longer wanted.
let previous = lock(&self.written).clone();
for name in previous.difference(&keys(&desired)) {
remove_if_ours(&self.dir.join(name));
}
for (name, body) in &desired {
let path = self.dir.join(name);
// Only ever overwrite a file that is already ours, or a name that
// is free. A resolver a user set up by hand is left in place and
// reported, never clobbered.
if path.exists() && !is_ours(&path) {
return Err(PublishError::Failed(format!(
"{} already exists and was not created by tsunagi; \
remove it or rename the network to publish its resolver",
path.display()
)));
}
std::fs::write(&path, body).map_err(|err| classify(&path, err))?;
}
*lock(&self.written) = keys(&desired);
Ok(())
}
fn revert_inner(&self) {
let written = std::mem::take(&mut *lock(&self.written));
for name in &written {
remove_if_ours(&self.dir.join(name));
}
}
}
impl DnsPublisher for ResolverDirPublisher {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"resolver-dir"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, published: &'a Published) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<(), PublishError>> {
// A handful of small file writes, short enough to run in place rather
// than hop to the blocking pool.
Box::pin(async move { self.apply_inner(published) })
}
fn revert(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, Result<(), PublishError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
self.revert_inner();
Ok(())
})
}
}
/// The resolver files a publication implies: a map of file name to contents.
fn desired_files(published: &Published) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, PublishError> {
if published.servers.is_empty() {
return Err(PublishError::Failed(
"no server address to point the resolver at".to_string(),
));
}
let body = file_contents(published);
let mut files = Vec::new();
for domain in &published.domains {
let name = resolver_file_name(domain)?;
files.push((name, body.clone()));
}
Ok(files)
}
/// The contents of one resolver file: the marker, every server, one port.
fn file_contents(published: &Published) -> String {
let mut out = String::from(MARKER);
out.push('\n');
for server in &published.servers {
let ip = match server.ip() {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.to_string(),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.to_string(),
};
out.push_str("nameserver ");
out.push_str(&ip);
out.push('\n');
}
// One port for the file; every server listens on the same one. The `port`
// directive is what lets the server stay off 53.
if let Some(first) = published.servers.first() {
out.push_str("port ");
out.push_str(&first.port().to_string());
out.push('\n');
}
out
}
/// The file name for a domain, rejecting anything that is not a plain label
/// path component: a resolver file name must never escape the directory.
fn resolver_file_name(domain: &str) -> Result<String, PublishError> {
let trimmed = domain.trim_end_matches('.');
if trimmed.is_empty()
|| trimmed.contains('/')
|| trimmed.contains('\\')
|| trimmed.contains(std::path::MAIN_SEPARATOR)
|| trimmed == "."
|| trimmed == ".."
|| trimmed.starts_with('.')
{
return Err(PublishError::Failed(format!(
"cannot make a resolver file name for the domain {domain:?}"
)));
}
Ok(trimmed.to_string())
}
/// Whether a file is one this publisher wrote, by its marker first line.
fn is_ours(path: &Path) -> bool {
match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
Ok(text) => text.lines().next() == Some(MARKER),
Err(_) => false,
}
}
/// Removes a file, but only if it is one of ours. Best effort.
fn remove_if_ours(path: &Path) {
if is_ours(path)
&& let Err(err) = std::fs::remove_file(path)
&& err.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound
{
tracing::debug!(path = %path.display(), %err, "cannot remove the resolver file");
}
}
/// The set of file names in a desired-files list.
fn keys(files: &[(String, String)]) -> BTreeSet<String> {
files.iter().map(|(name, _)| name.clone()).collect()
}
/// Turns a filesystem error into the right kind of publish error: a permission
/// problem is a refusal a person must act on, anything else is a plain failure.
fn classify(path: &Path, err: std::io::Error) -> PublishError {
if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied {
PublishError::Refused(format!(
"writing {} needs root; start the agent with `sudo` or as a root LaunchDaemon",
path.display()
))
} else {
PublishError::Failed(format!("cannot write {}: {err}", path.display()))
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use super::*;
fn published(domains: &[&str]) -> Published {
Published {
interface: "utun5".into(),
servers: vec![
"10.13.37.1:5353".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
"[fd00::1]:5353".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
],
domains: domains.iter().map(|d| d.to_string()).collect(),
}
}
#[test]
fn a_file_lists_every_server_and_one_port_under_the_marker() {
let body = file_contents(&published(&["mynet."]));
let mut lines = body.lines();
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some(MARKER));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some("nameserver 10.13.37.1"));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some("nameserver fd00::1"));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), Some("port 5353"));
assert_eq!(lines.next(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_domain_becomes_a_plain_file_name_without_its_trailing_dot() {
assert_eq!(resolver_file_name("mynet.").unwrap(), "mynet");
assert_eq!(resolver_file_name("my.net").unwrap(), "my.net");
}
#[test]
fn a_domain_that_would_escape_the_directory_is_refused() {
assert!(resolver_file_name("../etc/passwd").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name("a/b").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name("").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name(".").is_err());
assert!(resolver_file_name(".hidden").is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn apply_writes_a_file_per_domain_and_revert_removes_them() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let publisher = ResolverDirPublisher::in_dir(dir.path());
publisher
.apply(&published(&["mynet.", "other."]))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(dir.path().join("mynet").is_file());
assert!(dir.path().join("other").is_file());
publisher.revert().await.unwrap();
assert!(!dir.path().join("mynet").exists());
assert!(!dir.path().join("other").exists());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn re_applying_removes_a_domain_that_is_no_longer_wanted() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let publisher = ResolverDirPublisher::in_dir(dir.path());
publisher.apply(&published(&["a.", "b."])).await.unwrap();
publisher.apply(&published(&["a."])).await.unwrap();
assert!(dir.path().join("a").is_file());
assert!(
!dir.path().join("b").exists(),
"the dropped domain's file is removed"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_file_a_user_created_is_never_clobbered_or_removed() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let foreign = dir.path().join("mynet");
std::fs::write(&foreign, "nameserver 9.9.9.9\n").unwrap();
let publisher = ResolverDirPublisher::in_dir(dir.path());
let err = publisher.apply(&published(&["mynet."])).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, PublishError::Failed(_)), "{err:?}");
// Untouched.
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(&foreign).unwrap(),
"nameserver 9.9.9.9\n"
);
// And revert leaves a foreign file alone even if it is in our set.
publisher.revert().await.unwrap();
assert!(foreign.is_file());
}
}
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ mod windows;
#[cfg(all(feature = "dns-publish", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows::NrptPublisher;
#[cfg(all(feature = "dns-publish", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos;
#[cfg(all(feature = "dns-publish", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos::ResolverDirPublisher;
mod unsupported;
pub use unsupported::UnsupportedPublisher;
File renamed without changes.
File renamed without changes.
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ pub type Result<T, E = Error> = std::result::Result<T, E>;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum Error {
/// A node-history cleanup is unsafe, stale or cannot be performed.
#[error("cannot forget node: {0}")]
ForgetNode(String),
/// An ordered local data-plane protocol selection is invalid.
#[error("invalid protocol selection: {0}")]
InvalidProtocols(String),
/// The supplied network name does not satisfy the documented rules.
#[error("invalid network name: {0}")]
InvalidNetworkName(&'static str),
@@ -97,6 +103,19 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("network {0} is not configured")]
NetworkUnknown(NetworkId),
/// An overlay range overlaps networks already active on this agent.
#[error(
"network {network} cannot start: {range} overlaps active networks {conflicts:?}; switch to it to suspend those networks"
)]
NetworkRangeConflict {
/// Network that could not start.
network: NetworkId,
/// Its agreed or proposed range.
range: crate::state::Ipv4Range,
/// Active networks that must be suspended first.
conflicts: Vec<NetworkId>,
},
/// No session with that peer exists in the given network.
#[error("no authenticated session with peer {peer} in network {network}")]
NoSuchPeer {
@@ -120,6 +139,13 @@ pub enum Error {
what: String,
},
/// The request is understood and cannot be done as things stand.
#[error("{reason}")]
Rejected {
/// Why, phrased so the message stands on its own.
reason: String,
},
/// Discovery backend failure. Never fatal for the agent.
#[error("discovery error: {0}")]
Discovery(String),
@@ -49,11 +49,16 @@ impl DeviceIdentity {
self.secret.public()
}
/// The raw secret key bytes, for persistence only.
pub(crate) fn secret_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
/// The raw secret key bytes, for persistence and transport certificate generation.
pub fn secret_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.secret.to_bytes()
}
/// Signs a message with the device's persistent secret key.
pub fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> iroh::Signature {
self.secret.sign(message)
}
/// A clone of the iroh secret key, for endpoint construction only.
pub(crate) fn secret_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
self.secret.clone()
@@ -44,6 +44,21 @@ use windows as transport;
#[cfg(any(unix, windows))]
pub use transport::ControlSocket;
/// Who may open the local control socket.
///
/// The default is owner-only. A system service shares its socket with a GUI or
/// CLI running as another user by granting a group; the agent sets that on the
/// socket when it binds it, so the access is correct from creation rather than
/// patched afterwards.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum ControlSocketAccess {
/// Owner only — mode `0600`. The per-user agent's default.
Private,
/// The owner and members of this group — the socket's group is set to this
/// gid and the mode to `0660`. The caller resolves a group name to its gid.
Group(u32),
}
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
@@ -58,6 +73,31 @@ use crate::error::{Error, Result};
/// Largest accepted local control message.
pub const MAX_MESSAGE_LEN: usize = 1024 * 1024;
/// A string the control protocol must carry but that must never appear in a
/// log: it serialises transparently (the text crosses the socket intact) but
/// its `Debug` is redacted. Used for a network secret handed back to a local
/// client that asked to copy it.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RedactedText(String);
impl RedactedText {
/// Wraps a string.
pub fn new(text: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self(text.into())
}
/// Unwraps to the plain string.
pub fn into_string(self) -> String {
self.0
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for RedactedText {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str("<redacted>")
}
}
/// Where the control socket for a state directory lives.
///
/// A Unix socket path is limited to around 100 bytes, which a state directory
@@ -82,6 +122,47 @@ pub fn control_socket_path(state_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
state_dir.join("agent.sock")
}
/// Where the default system control socket lives on this platform.
///
/// On Windows, the system-wide `%ProgramData%\tsunagi\agent.sock` is used so that
/// any local user, tray application, or CLI tool can manage the running agent
/// without needing to know which user account or service started it.
/// On macOS the agent runs as a root LaunchDaemon, so a fixed system path under
/// `/var/run` is used for the same reason, and it stays short enough for the
/// Unix socket path limit. On other Unix it derives from the default per-user
/// state directory.
pub fn default_control_socket_path() -> PathBuf {
#[cfg(windows)]
{
if let Some(program_data) = std::env::var_os("ProgramData") {
let pd = PathBuf::from(program_data);
if pd.is_absolute() {
return pd.join("tsunagi").join("agent.sock");
}
}
PathBuf::from(r"C:\ProgramData\tsunagi\agent.sock")
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
PathBuf::from("/var/run/tsunagi/agent.sock")
}
#[cfg(all(unix, not(target_os = "macos")))]
{
// Prefer a running system service's socket when it is present, so a
// GUI or CLI reaches the packaged daemon with no configuration; fall
// back to the per-user location otherwise.
let system = PathBuf::from("/run/tsunagi/agent.sock");
if system.exists() {
return system;
}
if let Ok(paths) = crate::config::StoragePaths::user_default() {
control_socket_path(&paths.state_dir)
} else {
system
}
}
}
/// What a client asks for.
///
/// `Debug` is written by hand rather than derived: one of these carries a
@@ -90,8 +171,31 @@ pub fn control_socket_path(state_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum Request {
/// Retire the selected offline member's observed claim.
ForgetNode {
/// Exact public network id.
network_id: String,
/// Exact device identity selected by the client.
peer: String,
/// Claim version displayed when the user selected the node.
expected_version: u64,
},
/// Replace one network's ordered local data-plane selection.
SetProtocols {
/// Public network identifier.
network_id: String,
/// Protocol names, best first; empty selects control only.
protocols: Vec<String>,
},
/// Report what the agent is doing.
Status,
/// Set local broadcast participation in one configured network.
SetBroadcast {
/// Public network identifier.
network_id: String,
/// Whether to originate and accept broadcasts.
enabled: bool,
},
/// Answer to a different name from now on.
///
/// Applied by the running agent rather than written behind its back, so
@@ -126,7 +230,7 @@ pub enum Request {
///
/// Asked of the running agent because that is the only way to add a
/// network to an agent that is already up: the state directory belongs
/// to one live agent, so a second `tsunagi up` cannot.
/// to one live agent, so a second `tsng up` cannot.
Join {
/// The network name.
name: String,
@@ -135,13 +239,58 @@ pub enum Request {
/// It travels over a socket only its owner can open, to the agent
/// that stores it anyway, and never appears in `Debug`.
secret: String,
/// Explicit choice, or preserve the saved setting.
#[serde(default)]
broadcast: Option<bool>,
},
/// Ask for a configured network's shared secret, in its `tsn1…` text form,
/// so a local GUI or script can copy it to re-share. The reply travels only
/// over the owner/group socket and the secret is never logged.
Secret {
/// Which network, by the id text `status` prints.
network_id: String,
},
/// Offer this agent as an exit node in one network, or stop. Off unless
/// asked.
SetExitOffer {
/// Public network identifier.
network_id: String,
/// Whether members may send their internet traffic through this agent.
enabled: bool,
},
/// Send all this device's internet traffic through a member of one
/// network, or back the ordinary way.
SetExitNode {
/// Public network identifier.
network_id: String,
/// The member's endpoint id, or `None` to stop using an exit node.
peer: Option<String>,
},
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Request {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
Request::ForgetNode {
network_id,
peer,
expected_version,
} => write!(
f,
"ForgetNode {{ {network_id}, peer: {peer}, version: {expected_version} }}"
),
Request::SetProtocols {
network_id,
protocols,
} => write!(
f,
"SetProtocols {{ {network_id}, protocols: {protocols:?} }}"
),
Request::Status => f.write_str("Status"),
Request::SetBroadcast {
network_id,
enabled,
} => write!(f, "SetBroadcast {{ {network_id}, enabled: {enabled} }}"),
Request::SetHostname(name) => write!(f, "SetHostname({name})"),
Request::Leave(network) => write!(f, "Leave({network})"),
Request::SetActive { network_id, active } => {
@@ -152,6 +301,14 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for Request {
write!(f, "Dns {{ enable: {enable}, port: {port:?} }}")
}
Request::Join { name, .. } => write!(f, "Join {{ name: {name}, secret: <redacted> }}"),
Request::Secret { network_id } => write!(f, "Secret {{ {network_id} }}"),
Request::SetExitOffer {
network_id,
enabled,
} => write!(f, "SetExitOffer {{ {network_id}, enabled: {enabled} }}"),
Request::SetExitNode { network_id, peer } => {
write!(f, "SetExitNode {{ {network_id}, peer: {peer:?} }}")
}
}
}
}
@@ -160,8 +317,14 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for Request {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum Response {
/// An observed offline claim was durably retired.
NodeForgotten(ForgottenNodeReport),
/// Accepted ordered protocol selection.
Protocols(Vec<String>),
/// A status report.
Status(Box<StatusReport>),
/// Accepted local broadcast participation.
Broadcast(bool),
/// The name the agent now answers to, after reducing it to canonical form.
Hostname(String),
/// A network was left.
@@ -174,10 +337,151 @@ pub enum Response {
///
/// `None` means it is not serving at all.
Dns(Option<DnsReport>),
/// A network's shared secret, redacted in `Debug`.
Secret(RedactedText),
/// Whether this agent now offers itself as an exit node.
ExitOffer(bool),
/// The member this device now sends its internet traffic through.
ExitNode(Option<String>),
/// The request could not be served.
Error(String),
}
/// The durable result of an offline-node cleanup.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ForgottenNodeReport {
/// Selected device identity.
pub peer: String,
/// The retired claim version, not a future-version ban.
pub record_version: u64,
/// Peers to which cleanup was immediately queued.
pub peers_told: u32,
}
/// Resolves a node by exact hostname, full id, unique id prefix or overlay IPv4.
/// Ambiguity is reported with names and full ids and never guessed.
pub fn resolve_node<'a>(
network: &'a NetworkReport,
selector: &str,
) -> std::result::Result<&'a MemberReport, String> {
let selector = selector.trim();
if selector.is_empty() {
return Err("select a node by name, id or IPv4 address".into());
}
if let Some(member) = network.members.iter().find(|m| m.endpoint_id == selector) {
return Ok(member);
}
let prefix = selector.trim_end_matches('…');
let matches: Vec<_> = network
.members
.iter()
.filter(|m| {
m.hostname.as_deref() == Some(selector)
|| m.overlay_address_v4.as_deref() == Some(selector)
|| (!prefix.is_empty() && m.endpoint_id.starts_with(prefix))
})
.collect();
match matches.as_slice() {
[one] => Ok(one),
[] => Err(format!(
"no signed node matches `{selector}` in `{}`",
network.name
)),
many => Err(format!(
"`{selector}` is ambiguous; use a full id or unique id prefix:\n{}",
many.iter()
.map(|m| format!(
" {} {} {}",
m.hostname.as_deref().unwrap_or("unnamed"),
m.endpoint_id,
m.overlay_address_v4.as_deref().unwrap_or("no IPv4")
))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n")
)),
}
}
/// Retires an exact selected claim; an online or changed target is rejected.
pub async fn forget_node(
socket: &Path,
network: &str,
peer: &str,
expected_version: u64,
) -> Result<ForgottenNodeReport> {
let request = Request::ForgetNode {
network_id: network.into(),
peer: peer.into(),
expected_version,
};
match exchange(socket, &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::NodeForgotten(report) => Ok(report),
Response::Error(reason) => Err(Error::ForgetNode(reason)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected response: {other:?}"))),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod node_selector_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn exact_names_addresses_and_unique_prefixes_select_the_same_signed_node() {
let node = MemberReport {
endpoint_id: "abcdef01".into(),
hostname: Some("laptop".into()),
overlay_address_v4: Some("10.2.0.3".into()),
record_version: 42,
..Default::default()
};
let network = NetworkReport {
name: "home".into(),
members: vec![node.clone()],
..Default::default()
};
for selector in ["laptop", "10.2.0.3", "abcdef01", "abc…"] {
assert_eq!(resolve_node(&network, selector), Ok(&node));
}
for selector in ["", "LAPTOP", "missing"] {
assert!(resolve_node(&network, selector).is_err());
}
}
#[test]
fn collisions_between_names_addresses_and_prefixes_require_an_explicit_identity() {
let first = MemberReport {
endpoint_id: "abcdef01".into(),
hostname: Some("duplicate".into()),
overlay_address_v4: Some("10.2.0.3".into()),
..Default::default()
};
let second = MemberReport {
endpoint_id: "abcdef02".into(),
hostname: Some("duplicate".into()),
overlay_address_v4: Some("10.2.0.3".into()),
..Default::default()
};
let third = MemberReport {
endpoint_id: "12345678".into(),
hostname: Some("abc".into()),
..Default::default()
};
let network = NetworkReport {
name: "home".into(),
members: vec![first.clone(), second, third],
..Default::default()
};
for selector in ["duplicate", "10.2.0.3", "abc"] {
let result = resolve_node(&network, selector);
assert!(result.is_err_and(|error| error.contains("ambiguous")
&& error.contains("abcdef01")
&& error.contains("abcdef02")
&& error.contains("duplicate")));
}
assert_eq!(resolve_node(&network, "abcdef01"), Ok(&first));
}
}
/// What happened when a network was stopped or started.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ActiveReport {
@@ -190,6 +494,9 @@ pub struct ActiveReport {
/// Stopping something already stopped is not an error — it is the state
/// asked for — but it is worth saying which happened.
pub changed: bool,
/// Networks suspended by switching to this network.
#[serde(default)]
pub suspended: Vec<RangeConflictReport>,
}
/// What happened when a network was joined.
@@ -211,6 +518,13 @@ pub struct JoinedReport {
/// Almost always a mistyped secret, and the one thing that makes two
/// sections of a report look like one network.
pub name_shared_with: Option<String>,
/// Whether it started; false means it is configured but blocked by overlap.
#[serde(default = "joined_active_default")]
pub active: bool,
}
fn joined_active_default() -> bool {
true
}
/// What happened when a network was left.
@@ -233,6 +547,8 @@ pub struct LeftReport {
/// Everything the agent is doing, in one snapshot.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct StatusReport {
/// Data-plane protocols this agent can enable at runtime.
pub available_protocols: Vec<ProtocolReport>,
/// This device's persistent endpoint id.
pub endpoint_id: String,
/// Hostname announced to peers.
@@ -245,6 +561,38 @@ pub struct StatusReport {
pub networks: Vec<NetworkReport>,
/// The local DNS service, when one was asked for.
pub dns: Option<DnsReport>,
/// The state directory the agent is actually using.
///
/// A client that was not told one would look in its own default, which is
/// not the agent's when the agent runs as a service under another user.
pub state_dir: String,
/// The cache directory the agent is actually using.
pub cache_dir: String,
/// The executable the agent runs, which is what needs the capability.
pub program: String,
/// Whether the agent itself can manage the overlay interface.
///
/// It is the agent that creates the interface, so the client's own
/// capabilities say nothing about it.
pub privilege: PrivilegeReport,
/// The version of the agent's software.
pub version: String,
/// The data plane protocols it has, each as `name vN` (wire version).
pub protocols: Vec<String>,
}
/// What the agent found when it checked whether it may manage an interface.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum PrivilegeReport {
/// Not checked.
#[default]
Unknown,
/// It can.
Available,
/// It cannot, with what was found.
Missing(String),
/// This platform has no provisioner yet.
Unsupported,
}
/// The local DNS service.
@@ -271,9 +619,37 @@ pub struct DnsReport {
pub names: u32,
}
/// An active network with an overlapping overlay range.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RangeConflictReport {
/// Public network id, for unambiguous selection.
pub network_id: String,
/// Configured network name.
pub name: String,
/// The overlapping range.
pub range: String,
}
/// A data-plane protocol available in the running agent.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProtocolReport {
/// Stable protocol name used by the CLI and network negotiation.
pub name: String,
/// A short description of encryption and transport.
pub summary: String,
}
/// One network.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkReport {
/// Enabled local data-plane protocols, in preference order.
pub protocols: Vec<String>,
/// Whether the network starts or resumes automatically when its range is free.
#[serde(default)]
pub auto_start: bool,
/// Whether this agent participates in LAN broadcasts in this network.
#[serde(default)]
pub broadcast: bool,
/// Network name.
pub name: String,
/// Public network identifier.
@@ -313,19 +689,70 @@ pub struct NetworkReport {
/// The range it could not have, because another network on this agent
/// already holds it.
pub range_conflict: Option<String>,
/// Networks that switching to this network would suspend.
#[serde(default)]
pub range_conflicts: Vec<RangeConflictReport>,
/// The overlay, when a protocol is running one.
pub overlay: Option<OverlayReport>,
/// This agent's own name, when another member claimed it first.
pub hostname_conflict: Option<HostnameConflictReport>,
/// Exit-node settings: whether this agent offers one, and whether it
/// uses one.
pub exit: ExitReport,
}
/// How packets reach a member right now.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum DataPathReport {
/// Nothing carries packets to it: it is away, or only connected for
/// control while a data path is being set up.
#[default]
None,
/// A direct link.
Direct {
/// The kind of transport carrying it, e.g. `wg`.
transport: String,
},
/// Through other members.
Relayed {
/// Number of links on the way, at least two.
hops: u8,
/// The member the first of them goes to, as an endpoint id.
via: String,
},
}
/// A name somebody else claimed first.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct HostnameConflictReport {
/// The name that is taken.
pub name: String,
/// The member that holds it, as an endpoint id.
pub holder: String,
}
/// One member of the network, from signed state.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MemberReport {
/// Signed claim version used to reject stale cleanup requests.
pub record_version: u64,
/// The member's device identity.
pub endpoint_id: String,
/// The IPv4 overlay address it claimed and signed for.
pub overlay_address_v4: Option<String>,
/// Consecutive failed dial attempts, when this agent is trying to reach it.
pub failed_dials: u32,
/// The last hostname this agent saw it announce, kept while it is away.
pub hostname: Option<String>,
/// Whether this agent can reach it now, by any path. The one answer
/// every client gives to "is it online": a member reached through
/// others is online, over a longer path.
pub online: bool,
/// How packets reach it.
pub path: DataPathReport,
/// The name it claimed, when somebody else claimed it first. It still
/// works by address; it is not found by that name.
pub hostname_conflict: Option<HostnameConflictReport>,
}
/// One control plane peer.
@@ -340,6 +767,10 @@ pub struct PeerReport {
pub transport: String,
/// Round-trip time in milliseconds, when a path is selected.
pub rtt_ms: Option<u64>,
/// The peer offers itself as an exit node in this network.
pub exit_node: bool,
/// How packets reach it.
pub path: DataPathReport,
}
/// The WireGuard overlay of one network.
@@ -367,6 +798,50 @@ pub struct OverlayReport {
pub multicast_packets: u64,
/// One destination nobody owned, if there was one.
pub unroutable_sample: Option<String>,
/// The broadcast route and firewall allowance on this host, when the
/// agent installed them. `None` means none are installed.
pub broadcast_rules: Option<HostRulesReport>,
}
/// How one set of exit-node host rules went.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RuleSetReport {
/// Whether every step took.
pub ok: bool,
/// One line: what is in place, or what is missing and why.
pub detail: String,
}
/// One network's exit-node settings and what they are doing.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ExitReport {
/// This agent offers itself as an exit node in this network.
pub offering: bool,
/// Masquerading and forwarding rules for members' traffic, when offering.
pub offer_rules: Option<RuleSetReport>,
/// Whether the kernel forwards packets for the overlay interface.
/// `Some(false)` means the rules are in place and nothing passes until it
/// is turned on. `None` when unknown.
pub forwarding: Option<bool>,
/// The member this device sends its internet traffic through, as an
/// endpoint id.
pub via: Option<String>,
/// Whether that member is connected and still offering to be one.
pub via_online: bool,
/// The routes that send this device's traffic through it.
pub client_rules: Option<RuleSetReport>,
}
/// What the agent installed on the host so LAN broadcast reaches the overlay.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct HostRulesReport {
/// Whether both the route and the firewall allowance are in place.
pub ok: bool,
/// One line: `ok (route + firewall)`, or what is missing and why.
pub detail: String,
/// The overlay address the `255.255.255.255` route is bound to. With
/// several networks on one interface only one address can be its source.
pub source: String,
}
/// One overlay peer.
@@ -375,7 +850,9 @@ pub struct OverlayPeerReport {
/// The peer's control plane identity, so a tunnel can be matched to the
/// session and the member it belongs to.
pub endpoint_id: String,
/// The peer's WireGuard public key.
/// Protocol carrying overlay traffic for this peer (e.g. "tcp-tls", "wg-quic").
pub protocol: String,
/// The peer's WireGuard public key (if applicable).
pub public_key: String,
/// The overlay address the network agreed it holds.
pub address: Option<String>,
@@ -387,6 +864,10 @@ pub struct OverlayPeerReport {
pub tx_packets: u64,
/// Packets decrypted from this peer.
pub rx_packets: u64,
/// Plaintext bytes encrypted and sent to this peer.
pub tx_bytes: u64,
/// Plaintext bytes decrypted from this peer.
pub rx_bytes: u64,
/// Data packets dropped: wrong source address, or too large for the path.
pub dropped: u64,
/// WireGuard protocol errors.
@@ -424,6 +905,23 @@ impl OverlayPeerReport {
/// running and what they can report or change. That is what keeps this module
/// free of any knowledge of them.
pub trait ReportSource: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Persists and announces a version-scoped node cleanup.
fn forget_node(
&self,
_network: String,
_peer: String,
_expected_version: u64,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<ForgottenNodeReport, String>> {
Box::pin(async { Err("this agent cannot forget node history".into()) })
}
/// Saves and applies a local ordered protocol set for one network.
fn set_protocols(
&self,
_network_id: String,
_protocols: Vec<String>,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<Vec<String>, String>> {
Box::pin(async { Err("this agent cannot change protocols".into()) })
}
/// Produces a fresh report.
fn report(&self) -> BoxFuture<'_, StatusReport>;
@@ -455,10 +953,20 @@ pub trait ReportSource: Send + Sync + 'static {
&self,
_name: String,
_secret: String,
_broadcast: Option<bool>,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<JoinedReport, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot join a network".to_string()) })
}
/// Persists and applies local broadcast participation.
fn set_broadcast(
&self,
_network_id: String,
_enabled: bool,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<bool, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot change broadcast participation".into()) })
}
/// Stops serving a network, or starts serving it again.
///
/// Defaulted to a refusal, like the others.
@@ -480,6 +988,39 @@ pub trait ReportSource: Send + Sync + 'static {
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<Option<DnsReport>, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot serve DNS".to_string()) })
}
/// Returns a configured network's shared secret in its `tsn1…` text form.
///
/// Defaulted to a refusal, like the others. An implementor reads it from
/// local state; it must never be logged.
fn network_secret(
&self,
_network_id: String,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<String, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot read secrets".to_string()) })
}
/// Offers this agent as an exit node in a network, or stops.
///
/// Defaulted to a refusal, like the others.
fn set_exit_offer(
&self,
_network_id: String,
_enabled: bool,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<bool, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot be an exit node".to_string()) })
}
/// Sends this device's internet traffic through a member, or stops.
///
/// Defaulted to a refusal, like the others.
fn set_exit_node(
&self,
_network_id: String,
_peer: Option<String>,
) -> BoxFuture<'_, std::result::Result<Option<String>, String>> {
Box::pin(async move { Err("this agent cannot use an exit node".to_string()) })
}
}
impl<F> ReportSource for F
@@ -495,7 +1036,7 @@ where
///
/// A local answer comes from memory, so anything this slow means the agent is
/// wedged rather than busy. Saying so beats waiting: unbounded, one wedged
/// runtime leaves `tsunagi status` hanging with nothing on screen and no way
/// runtime leaves `tsng status` hanging with nothing on screen and no way
/// out but Ctrl-C.
pub const EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
@@ -510,7 +1051,7 @@ pub const EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
///
/// Bump it whenever [`Request`], [`Response`] or anything they contain
/// changes shape.
pub const CONTROL_PROTOCOL: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes([b'T', b'S', b'N', 13]);
pub const CONTROL_PROTOCOL: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes([b'T', b'S', b'N', 21]);
/// Reads one request off an accepted stream, answers it, writes the response.
///
@@ -534,7 +1075,29 @@ where
}
};
let response = match request {
Request::ForgetNode {
network_id,
peer,
expected_version,
} => match source.forget_node(network_id, peer, expected_version).await {
Ok(report) => Response::NodeForgotten(report),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::SetProtocols {
network_id,
protocols,
} => match source.set_protocols(network_id, protocols).await {
Ok(protocols) => Response::Protocols(protocols),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::Status => Response::Status(Box::new(source.report().await)),
Request::SetBroadcast {
network_id,
enabled,
} => match source.set_broadcast(network_id, enabled).await {
Ok(enabled) => Response::Broadcast(enabled),
Err(error) => Response::Error(error),
},
Request::SetHostname(hostname) => match source.set_hostname(hostname).await {
Ok(accepted) => Response::Hostname(accepted),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
@@ -543,7 +1106,11 @@ where
Ok(report) => Response::Left(report),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::Join { name, secret } => match source.join(name, secret).await {
Request::Join {
name,
secret,
broadcast,
} => match source.join(name, secret, broadcast).await {
Ok(report) => Response::Joined(report),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
@@ -557,6 +1124,23 @@ where
Ok(report) => Response::Dns(report),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::Secret { network_id } => match source.network_secret(network_id).await {
Ok(secret) => Response::Secret(RedactedText::new(secret)),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::SetExitOffer {
network_id,
enabled,
} => match source.set_exit_offer(network_id, enabled).await {
Ok(enabled) => Response::ExitOffer(enabled),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
},
Request::SetExitNode { network_id, peer } => {
match source.set_exit_node(network_id, peer).await {
Ok(peer) => Response::ExitNode(peer),
Err(reason) => Response::Error(reason),
}
}
};
write_message(&mut stream, &response).await
}
@@ -636,9 +1220,21 @@ pub async fn join_network(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
name: &str,
secret: &str,
) -> Result<JoinedReport> {
let path = path.as_ref();
join_network_with_broadcast(path, name, secret, None).await
}
/// Joins with an explicit per-network broadcast choice.
pub async fn join_network_with_broadcast(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
name: &str,
secret: &str,
broadcast: Option<bool>,
) -> Result<JoinedReport> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let request = Request::Join {
broadcast,
name: name.to_string(),
secret: secret.to_string(),
};
@@ -649,6 +1245,41 @@ pub async fn join_network(
}
}
/// Replaces the enabled data-plane protocols of one configured network.
pub async fn set_protocols(
socket: &Path,
network_id: &str,
protocols: Vec<String>,
) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
let request = Request::SetProtocols {
network_id: network_id.to_owned(),
protocols,
};
match exchange(socket, &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::Protocols(protocols) => Ok(protocols),
Response::Error(reason) => Err(Error::Storage(reason)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected response: {other:?}"))),
}
}
/// Changes local broadcast participation in a network.
pub async fn set_broadcast(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
network_id: &str,
enabled: bool,
) -> Result<bool> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let request = Request::SetBroadcast {
network_id: network_id.to_owned(),
enabled,
};
match exchange(path, &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::Broadcast(enabled) => Ok(enabled),
Response::Error(message) => Err(Error::Storage(message)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected answer: {other:?}"))),
}
}
/// Asks a running agent to stop serving a network, or to serve it again.
pub async fn set_active(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
@@ -681,6 +1312,56 @@ pub async fn set_dns(
}
}
/// Offers the running agent as an exit node in one network, or stops.
pub async fn set_exit_offer(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
network_id: &str,
enabled: bool,
) -> Result<bool> {
let request = Request::SetExitOffer {
network_id: network_id.to_owned(),
enabled,
};
match exchange(path.as_ref(), &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::ExitOffer(enabled) => Ok(enabled),
Response::Error(message) => Err(Error::Storage(message)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected answer: {other:?}"))),
}
}
/// Sends the running agent's internet traffic through a member of one
/// network, or back the ordinary way with `None`.
pub async fn set_exit_node(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
network_id: &str,
peer: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Option<String>> {
let request = Request::SetExitNode {
network_id: network_id.to_owned(),
peer: peer.map(str::to_owned),
};
match exchange(path.as_ref(), &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::ExitNode(peer) => Ok(peer),
Response::Error(message) => Err(Error::Storage(message)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected answer: {other:?}"))),
}
}
/// Asks a running agent for a configured network's shared secret, in its
/// `tsn1…` text form, so a local client can copy it. The secret is never
/// logged by this path.
pub async fn network_secret(path: impl AsRef<Path>, network_id: &str) -> Result<String> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let request = Request::Secret {
network_id: network_id.to_string(),
};
match exchange(path, &request, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT).await? {
Response::Secret(secret) => Ok(secret.into_string()),
Response::Error(reason) => Err(Error::Storage(reason)),
other => Err(Error::Storage(format!("unexpected answer: {other:?}"))),
}
}
pub(crate) async fn write_message<S, T>(stream: &mut S, value: &T) -> Result<()>
where
S: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ use crate::error::{Error, Result};
// The transport-agnostic surface, re-exported so this module is a complete
// view of the local control interface on its own.
pub use super::{
CONTROL_PROTOCOL, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT, ReportSource, is_serving, join_network, leave_network,
request_status, set_active, set_dns, set_hostname,
CONTROL_PROTOCOL, ControlSocketAccess, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT, ReportSource, is_serving,
join_network, leave_network, request_status, set_active, set_dns, set_hostname,
};
/// Serves the local control interface on a Unix socket.
@@ -39,11 +39,15 @@ impl ControlSocket {
/// A socket file left behind by a crashed agent is replaced, but only
/// after checking that nothing is listening on it, so two live agents
/// never fight over one path.
pub async fn bind(path: impl AsRef<Path>, source: Arc<dyn ReportSource>) -> Result<Self> {
pub async fn bind(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
source: Arc<dyn ReportSource>,
access: ControlSocketAccess,
) -> Result<Self> {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
crate::storage::create_dir(parent)?;
create_parent(parent, &access)?;
}
if path.exists() {
@@ -61,7 +65,7 @@ impl ControlSocket {
path: path.clone(),
source,
})?;
restrict(&path)?;
apply_access(&path, &access)?;
let task = tokio::spawn(serve(listener, source));
Ok(Self {
@@ -94,9 +98,48 @@ impl Drop for ControlSocket {
}
}
fn restrict(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
/// Creates the socket's parent directory.
///
/// A group-shared socket must sit in a directory the group can traverse, so it
/// is `0755`; a private socket keeps the owner-only state-directory default.
fn create_parent(parent: &Path, access: &ControlSocketAccess) -> Result<()> {
match access {
ControlSocketAccess::Private => crate::storage::create_dir(parent),
ControlSocketAccess::Group(_) => {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(|source| Error::Io {
path: parent.to_path_buf(),
source,
})?;
set_mode(parent, 0o755)
}
}
}
/// Applies the access policy to the bound socket.
///
/// Private is owner-only `0600`. Group sets the socket's group to the gid and
/// the mode to `0660`; if the group cannot be set — the agent is not a member,
/// say — it falls back to owner-only rather than leaving the group wrong, so
/// the socket is never more open than intended.
fn apply_access(path: &Path, access: &ControlSocketAccess) -> Result<()> {
match access {
ControlSocketAccess::Private => set_mode(path, 0o600),
ControlSocketAccess::Group(gid) => {
if let Err(source) = std::os::unix::fs::chown(path, None, Some(*gid)) {
tracing::warn!(
path = %path.display(), gid, %source,
"cannot set the control socket group; keeping it owner-only"
);
return set_mode(path, 0o600);
}
set_mode(path, 0o660)
}
}
}
fn set_mode(path: &Path, mode: u32) -> Result<()> {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).map_err(|source| {
std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(mode)).map_err(|source| {
Error::Io {
path: path.to_path_buf(),
source,
@@ -170,7 +213,9 @@ mod tests {
let source: Arc<dyn ReportSource> = Arc::new(|| -> BoxFuture<'static, StatusReport> {
Box::pin(async { StatusReport::default() })
});
let control = ControlSocket::bind(&path, source).await.unwrap();
let control = ControlSocket::bind(&path, source, ControlSocketAccess::Private)
.await
.unwrap();
let answer = exchange(&path, &Request::Status, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT)
.await
@@ -18,15 +18,16 @@
//!
//! # Who may connect
//!
//! The pipe rejects clients from other machines, and takes the process's
//! default security, under which the creating user has full access. Narrowing
//! that further with an explicit ACL needs a raw security-descriptor call this
//! crate forbids, so it is not attempted; on a single-user machine, and against
//! other unprivileged users, the default is the practical equivalent of the
//! owner-only Unix socket. There is no leftover to clean up: a pipe exists only
//! while its server does.
//! Commands must run as the same Windows user with the same elevation as the
//! agent. A permission denial is reported as such, never as an absent agent.
//! The pipe rejects clients from other machines (`reject_remote_clients(true)`).
//! An explicit SDDL security descriptor grants Full Control to Administrators
//! and LocalSystem, while granting Read and Write (`GRGW`) to all local users
//! with a Medium Integrity SACL label (`S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)`). This allows unprivileged
//! user-space tools (such as tray applications, status monitors, or CLI commands
//! launched by regular users) to connect to the agent even when the agent was
//! started by an elevated Administrator or as a system service.
//! A permission denial is reported as such, never as an absent agent.
#![allow(unsafe_code)]
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -39,8 +40,8 @@ use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
pub use super::{
CONTROL_PROTOCOL, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT, ReportSource, is_serving, join_network, leave_network,
request_status, set_active, set_dns, set_hostname,
CONTROL_PROTOCOL, ControlSocketAccess, EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT, ReportSource, is_serving,
join_network, leave_network, request_status, set_active, set_dns, set_hostname,
};
/// `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`: creating a first instance finds an existing pipe,
@@ -50,6 +51,91 @@ const ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED: i32 = 5;
/// is there; the client only has to wait for a free instance.
const ERROR_PIPE_BUSY: i32 = 231;
/// RAII wrapper for Windows named pipe security attributes with permissive local ACL.
///
/// SDDL specification:
/// - `D:(A;;GRGW;;;WD)`: DACL allows Generic Read and Generic Write to Everyone (`WD`).
/// Full control (`GA`) remains reserved to Administrators and LocalSystem.
/// - `(A;;GA;;;BA)`: DACL allows Generic All to Builtin Administrators (`BA`).
/// - `(A;;GA;;;SY)`: DACL allows Generic All to LocalSystem (`SY`).
/// - `S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)`: SACL Mandatory Label with Medium Integrity (`ME`) and No Write Up (`NW`).
/// This allows unprivileged user-space processes (Medium Integrity) to write to the
/// named pipe even when the agent runs as an elevated Administrator (High Integrity).
struct PipeSecurityAttributes {
attrs: windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PipeSecurityAttributes {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("PipeSecurityAttributes")
.field("nLength", &self.attrs.nLength)
.field("lpSecurityDescriptor", &self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor)
.field("bInheritHandle", &self.attrs.bInheritHandle)
.finish()
}
}
impl PipeSecurityAttributes {
fn new() -> Result<Self> {
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt;
use windows_sys::Win32::Security::Authorization::{
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, SDDL_REVISION_1,
};
const SDDL: &str = "D:(A;;GRGW;;;WD)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GA;;;SY)S:(ML;;NW;;;ME)";
let wide: Vec<u16> = OsStr::new(SDDL)
.encode_wide()
.chain(std::iter::once(0))
.collect();
let mut p_sd = std::ptr::null_mut();
// SAFETY: We pass a valid null-terminated wide string, standard revision 1,
// and a valid pointer to receive the descriptor.
let success = unsafe {
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
wide.as_ptr(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
&mut p_sd,
std::ptr::null_mut(),
)
};
if success == 0 || p_sd.is_null() {
let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
return Err(Error::Storage(format!(
"cannot create pipe security descriptor: {err}"
)));
}
let attrs = windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
nLength: std::mem::size_of::<windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>()
as u32,
lpSecurityDescriptor: p_sd,
bInheritHandle: 0,
};
Ok(Self { attrs })
}
fn as_raw_mut(&mut self) -> *mut std::ffi::c_void {
&mut self.attrs as *mut _ as *mut std::ffi::c_void
}
}
impl Drop for PipeSecurityAttributes {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if !self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor.is_null() {
// SAFETY: The descriptor was allocated by ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW
// and must be freed with LocalFree.
unsafe {
windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::LocalFree(self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor);
}
self.attrs.lpSecurityDescriptor = std::ptr::null_mut();
}
}
}
/// Serves the local control interface on a named pipe.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ControlSocket {
@@ -63,15 +149,27 @@ impl ControlSocket {
/// Claiming the first instance of the name is what detects a second agent:
/// if the name already exists, the create is refused and that is reported
/// as the state being locked, so two live agents never share one pipe.
pub async fn bind(path: impl AsRef<Path>, source: Arc<dyn ReportSource>) -> Result<Self> {
///
/// `_access` is accepted for parity with the Unix socket; granting a group
/// here means a pipe security descriptor and is a separate follow-up, so for
/// now the pipe keeps its default (creator plus the built-in access the
/// `PipeSecurityAttributes` set).
pub async fn bind(
path: impl AsRef<Path>,
source: Arc<dyn ReportSource>,
_access: ControlSocketAccess,
) -> Result<Self> {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
let name = pipe_name(&path);
let server = match ServerOptions::new()
.first_pipe_instance(true)
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create(&name)
{
let mut sec_attrs = PipeSecurityAttributes::new()?;
// SAFETY: sec_attrs points to valid initialized SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES.
let server = match unsafe {
ServerOptions::new()
.first_pipe_instance(true)
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create_with_security_attributes_raw(&name, sec_attrs.as_raw_mut())
} {
Ok(server) => server,
Err(err) if err.raw_os_error() == Some(ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) => {
return Err(Error::StateLocked { path });
@@ -112,7 +210,7 @@ impl Drop for ControlSocket {
/// Accepts one client at a time, keeping a fresh instance ready for the next.
///
/// A named pipe server instance serves a single client, so a new instance is
/// created as soon as one is taken — otherwise a second `tsunagi status` while
/// created as soon as one is taken — otherwise a second `tsng status` while
/// the first is mid-flight would find nothing listening.
async fn serve(
name: String,
@@ -155,10 +253,19 @@ async fn serve(
/// Creates the next pipe instance, or `None` if the name can no longer be
/// served.
fn next_instance(name: &str) -> Option<tokio::net::windows::named_pipe::NamedPipeServer> {
match ServerOptions::new()
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create(name)
{
let mut sec_attrs = match PipeSecurityAttributes::new() {
Ok(attrs) => attrs,
Err(err) => {
tracing::debug!(%err, "cannot build pipe security attributes for next instance");
return None;
}
};
// SAFETY: sec_attrs points to valid initialized SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES.
match unsafe {
ServerOptions::new()
.reject_remote_clients(true)
.create_with_security_attributes_raw(name, sec_attrs.as_raw_mut())
} {
Ok(server) => Some(server),
Err(err) => {
tracing::debug!(%err, "cannot create the next control pipe instance");
@@ -187,7 +294,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn connect(path: &Path) -> Result<NamedPipeClient> {
format!(
"the agent's control pipe exists, but Windows denied access. \
Run this command as the same Windows user and with the same \
elevation as `tsunagi up` (use an administrator terminal if \
elevation as `tsng up` (use an administrator terminal if \
the agent is elevated). Windows error: {err}"
),
),
File renamed without changes.
@@ -240,6 +240,57 @@ impl EndpointAdapter {
TransportPolicy::N0Defaults => builder.preset(presets::N0),
};
if matches!(
config.transport,
TransportPolicy::N0Defaults | TransportPolicy::DirectOnly
) {
let filter = iroh::address_lookup::AddrFilter::new(|addrs| {
let mut overlay_ips = std::collections::HashSet::new();
for iface in netdev::get_interfaces() {
let name = iface.name.to_lowercase();
let friendly = iface
.friendly_name
.as_deref()
.map(str::to_lowercase)
.unwrap_or_default();
let desc = iface
.description
.as_deref()
.map(str::to_lowercase)
.unwrap_or_default();
if name.starts_with("tsun")
|| name.contains("tsunagi")
|| name.contains("wintun")
|| friendly.starts_with("tsun")
|| friendly.contains("tsunagi")
|| friendly.contains("wintun")
|| desc.contains("wintun")
|| desc.contains("tsunagi")
{
for ip in iface.ipv4 {
overlay_ips.insert(std::net::IpAddr::V4(ip.addr()));
}
for ip in iface.ipv6 {
overlay_ips.insert(std::net::IpAddr::V6(ip.addr()));
}
}
}
if overlay_ips.is_empty() {
return std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(addrs);
}
let filtered: Vec<iroh::TransportAddr> = addrs
.iter()
.filter(|addr| match addr {
iroh::TransportAddr::Ip(sock) => !overlay_ips.contains(&sock.ip()),
_ => true,
})
.cloned()
.collect();
std::borrow::Cow::Owned(filtered)
});
builder = builder.addr_filter(filter);
}
#[cfg(feature = "testing")]
if let Some(transport) = &config.test_quic_transport {
builder = builder.transport_config(transport.clone());
@@ -259,6 +310,91 @@ impl EndpointAdapter {
.await
.map_err(|err| Error::Endpoint(format!("cannot bind endpoint: {err}")))?;
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %endpoint.id().fmt_short(),
bound_sockets = ?endpoint.bound_sockets(),
"iroh endpoint bound locally"
);
let ep_id = endpoint.id();
let mut addr_watcher = endpoint.watch_addr();
let mut relay_watcher = endpoint.home_relay_status();
let close_token = endpoint.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
use iroh::Watcher;
let mut last_addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = Vec::new();
let mut last_relays: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let warn_timer = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(12));
tokio::pin!(warn_timer);
let mut warned = false;
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = close_token.closed() => {
break;
}
() = &mut warn_timer, if !warned => {
warned = true;
if last_addrs.is_empty() && !last_relays.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
relays = ?last_relays,
"No direct reflexive or UPnP addresses discovered after probe; communications will rely on relay servers"
);
} else if last_addrs.is_empty() && last_relays.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
"No reachability discovered (neither direct reflexive/UPnP addresses nor relay servers available)"
);
}
}
res = addr_watcher.updated() => {
let addr = match res {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(_) => break,
};
let addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = addr.ip_addrs().copied().collect();
let relays: Vec<String> = addr.relay_urls().map(|u| u.to_string()).collect();
if addrs != last_addrs || relays != last_relays {
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
direct_addrs = ?addrs,
relays = ?relays,
"Discovered endpoint reachability (STUN/UPnP/local/relay)"
);
last_addrs = addrs;
last_relays = relays;
}
}
res = relay_watcher.updated() => {
let relays = match res {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(_) => break,
};
for relay in &relays {
if relay.is_connected() {
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
relay = %relay.url(),
"Connected to home relay server"
);
} else if let Some(err) = relay.last_error() {
tracing::debug!(
endpoint = %ep_id.fmt_short(),
relay = %relay.url(),
error = %err,
"Relay connection attempt failed"
);
}
}
}
}
}
});
Ok(Self { endpoint })
}
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
//! Scoped LAN discovery fanout at IP ingress. A domain is one logical network;
//! routed copies use ordinary encrypted peer links and are never reflooded.
//! Future subnet exporters must supply explicitly authorized ingress domains
//! here, not teach the encrypted transit router to inspect application bytes.
use super::router::{NetworkRoutes, Route};
use crate::NetworkId;
use iroh::EndpointId;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::Arc;
/// Local participation and the currently authenticated participants in a domain.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BroadcastPolicy {
/// Whether this agent originates and accepts LAN broadcasts in this network.
pub enabled: bool,
/// Live members explicitly advertising that they accept broadcasts.
pub peers: HashSet<EndpointId>,
}
impl Default for BroadcastPolicy {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
enabled: true,
peers: HashSet::new(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Domain {
network: NetworkId,
directed: Ipv4Addr,
enabled: bool,
recipients: Arc<[Route]>,
members: HashSet<EndpointId>,
}
/// Immutable ingress-domain index rebuilt with address/policy changes.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub(crate) struct BroadcastTable {
sources: HashMap<Ipv4Addr, Arc<Domain>>,
networks: HashMap<NetworkId, Arc<Domain>>,
destinations: HashSet<Ipv4Addr>,
}
impl BroadcastTable {
pub fn build(networks: &HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>) -> Self {
let mut table = Self::default();
for (&network, routes) in networks {
let (Some(range), Some(local)) = (routes.range, routes.local) else {
continue;
};
if range.prefix_len > 30 {
continue;
}
let directed = Ipv4Addr::from(u32::from(range.base) | (u32::MAX >> range.prefix_len));
let mut recipients: Vec<_> = routes
.peers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, peer)| routes.broadcast.peers.contains(peer))
.map(|(_, peer)| Route {
network,
peer: *peer,
})
.collect();
recipients.sort_by_key(|route| route.peer);
recipients.dedup();
let domain = Arc::new(Domain {
network,
directed,
enabled: routes.broadcast.enabled,
members: recipients.iter().map(|route| route.peer).collect(),
recipients: recipients.into(),
});
table.sources.insert(local, domain.clone());
table.networks.insert(network, domain);
table.destinations.insert(directed);
}
table
}
pub fn is_destination(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
destination.is_broadcast() || self.destinations.contains(&destination)
}
pub fn outgoing(&self, source: Ipv4Addr, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> Option<Arc<[Route]>> {
let domain = self.sources.get(&source)?;
(domain.enabled && (destination.is_broadcast() || destination == domain.directed))
.then(|| domain.recipients.clone())
}
pub fn accepts(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.networks.get(&network).is_some_and(|domain| {
domain.network == network
&& domain.enabled
&& domain.members.contains(&peer)
&& (destination.is_broadcast() || destination == domain.directed)
})
}
}
/// Validates IPv4/UDP lengths before broadcast fanout. No game-specific ports,
/// payload rewriting or checksum changes. IP fragments retain their bytes and
/// are reassembled by the destination OS; even later fragments have protocol 17.
pub(crate) fn valid_udp(packet: &[u8]) -> bool {
if packet.len() < 20 || packet[0] >> 4 != 4 || packet[9] != 17 {
return false;
}
let header = usize::from(packet[0] & 15) * 4;
let total = usize::from(u16::from_be_bytes([packet[2], packet[3]]));
if header < 20 || total <= header || total > packet.len() {
return false;
}
let fragment = u16::from_be_bytes([packet[6], packet[7]]);
if fragment & 0x1fff != 0 {
return true;
}
if total < header + 8 {
return false;
}
let udp = usize::from(u16::from_be_bytes([packet[header + 4], packet[header + 5]]));
udp >= 8
&& if fragment & 0x2000 != 0 {
udp >= total - header
} else {
udp == total - header
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
fn id(name: &str) -> NetworkId {
NetworkKeys::derive(
&NetworkName::new(name).unwrap(),
&NetworkSecret::from_bytes([4; 32]).unwrap(),
)
.network_id()
}
#[test]
fn limited_and_directed_broadcasts_never_cross_domains_or_target_disabled_peers() {
let peer = iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes(&[8; 32]).public();
let a = NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.0.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some("10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap()),
peers: vec![("10.0.0.2".parse().unwrap(), peer)],
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: true,
peers: HashSet::from([peer]),
},
};
let b = NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.1.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some("10.1.0.1".parse().unwrap()),
peers: vec![("10.1.0.2".parse().unwrap(), peer)],
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy::default(),
};
let table = BroadcastTable::build(&HashMap::from([(id("a"), a.clone()), (id("b"), b)]));
let routes = table
.outgoing(a.local.unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
&*routes,
&[Route {
network: id("a"),
peer
}]
);
assert!(
table
.outgoing(a.local.unwrap(), "10.1.0.255".parse().unwrap())
.is_none()
);
assert!(
table
.outgoing("192.168.1.2".parse().unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.is_none()
);
assert!(
table
.outgoing("10.1.0.1".parse().unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.unwrap()
.is_empty()
);
assert!(!table.accepts(id("a"), peer, "10.1.0.255".parse().unwrap()));
assert!(!table.accepts(id("b"), peer, Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST));
assert!(table.accepts(id("a"), peer, Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST));
let disabled = NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled: false,
..a.broadcast.clone()
},
..a.clone()
};
let table = BroadcastTable::build(&HashMap::from([(id("a"), disabled)]));
assert!(
table
.outgoing(a.local.unwrap(), Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)
.is_none()
);
assert!(!table.accepts(id("a"), peer, Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST));
}
#[test]
fn malformed_udp_is_not_amplified_but_ipv4_fragments_are_supported() {
let mut packet = vec![0u8; 36];
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[3] = 36;
packet[9] = 17;
packet[25] = 16;
assert!(valid_udp(&packet));
for length in 0..36 {
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet[..length]));
}
packet[9] = 6;
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet));
packet[9] = 17;
packet[0] = 0x44;
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet));
packet[0] = 0x45;
packet[25] = 8;
assert!(!valid_udp(&packet));
packet[6] = 0x20;
packet[25] = 64;
assert!(valid_udp(&packet));
packet[6] = 0;
packet[7] = 2;
assert!(valid_udp(&packet));
}
}
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
//! Exit-node host rules: what makes this device an exit node for others, and
//! what sends this device's own traffic through one.
//!
//! The packet side lives in [`super::router`]; this is the side the operating
//! system sees. It is kept apart from the broadcast rules, which have a
//! different lifetime and different tags.
/// How one set of host rules went.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RuleSetReport {
/// Whether every step took.
pub ok: bool,
/// One line: what is in place, or what is missing and why.
pub detail: String,
}
/// What the host rules of one network's exit-node settings are doing.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ExitRulesReport {
/// Masquerading and forwarding for members' traffic, when this agent
/// offers itself as an exit node here. `None` means none are wanted.
pub offer: Option<RuleSetReport>,
/// Whether the kernel forwards packets for the overlay interface.
///
/// `Some(false)` means the rules are in place but nothing passes until
/// forwarding is turned on, which the agent never does itself. `None`
/// when it could not be read.
pub forwarding: Option<bool>,
/// The routes that send this device's traffic through its exit node.
/// `None` means it uses none through this network.
pub client: Option<RuleSetReport>,
}
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
//! Host rules for exit nodes: what the operating system needs for this agent
//! to carry other members' internet traffic, and for this device's own
//! traffic to go through a member.
//!
//! Two independent halves, planned together because one interface carries
//! both:
//!
//! * **Offering** — one set of rules per network that offers this agent as an
//! exit node, chosen by that network's range: masquerade the range out of
//! every other interface and let it through the forward chain. A network
//! that does not offer has no rules, so its members' packets are dropped by
//! the firewall as well as by the agent.
//! * **Using** — policy routing that sends everything the host does not have
//! a more specific route for into the overlay interface, while the agent's
//! own sockets keep the ordinary route (see `linux_exit`).
//!
//! Nothing a peer announces becomes a host setting. Offering is the owner's
//! switch; using is the user's choice of a member. Every object is tagged,
//! reversible, and removed when it is no longer wanted, when the network
//! leaves or stops, and when the agent stops.
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
use super::RuleOutcome;
/// What the host should hold for one interface's exit settings.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ExitHostPlan {
/// The overlay interface.
pub interface: String,
/// The ranges of every network that offers this agent as an exit node.
pub offer: Vec<Ipv4Range>,
/// Whether this device sends its internet traffic through a member.
pub client: bool,
/// The range of every network on the interface. Only the using side
/// reads it, to keep this agent's own traffic *to* the overlay inside it
/// where the host has no per-user routing (macOS).
pub overlay: Vec<Ipv4Range>,
/// Underlay addresses this agent talks to directly and must keep reaching
/// outside the overlay's default route. Only filled while `client` is set
/// and only for hosts that report [`ExitHostRules::needs_bypass`].
pub bypass: Vec<std::net::Ipv4Addr>,
/// Host names (relay servers) that must stay reachable the same way; the
/// host rules resolve them.
pub bypass_hosts: Vec<String>,
}
impl ExitHostPlan {
/// Whether there is nothing to hold.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.offer.is_empty() && !self.client
}
}
/// What applying a plan achieved.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ExitHostReport {
/// One outcome per offered range: its masquerade and forward rules.
pub offer: Vec<(Ipv4Range, RuleOutcome)>,
/// Whether the kernel forwards packets for the interface. `None` when it
/// could not be read. The agent only reads this: turning forwarding on is
/// the owner's decision.
pub forwarding: Option<bool>,
/// The routes and rules that send this device's traffic through the
/// interface, when the plan asked for them.
pub client: Option<RuleOutcome>,
}
/// Installs and removes exit-node rules for an overlay interface.
///
/// Like the broadcast rules, no call fails as a whole: a step that cannot be
/// done is in the report, because the caller's only useful response is to
/// say so.
pub trait ExitHostRules: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// Makes the host match the plan, replacing what this agent put there
/// for the interface before.
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, ExitHostReport>;
/// Removes everything this agent put there for the interface. Succeeds
/// when nothing is there: it runs on the shutdown path, and once at
/// startup to take away what a crashed run left.
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()>;
/// Refreshes volatile local socket protection without replacing exit routes.
fn refresh<'a>(&'a self, _plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, Option<RuleOutcome>> {
Box::pin(async { None })
}
/// Whether using an exit node on this host needs the underlay addresses
/// the agent talks to, because the host cannot exempt the agent's own
/// traffic from the default route by user id (Windows). The default is no.
fn needs_bypass(&self) -> bool {
false
}
}
/// The tag every firewall object of one offered range carries.
pub fn exit_tag(interface: &str, range: &Ipv4Range) -> String {
format!("{}{range}", exit_tag_prefix(interface))
}
/// The start of every tag for an interface; what cleanup selects by.
pub fn exit_tag_prefix(interface: &str) -> String {
format!("tsunagi-exit:{interface}:")
}
/// The one-line detail for a set of offer outcomes.
pub fn offer_detail(outcome: &RuleOutcome, range: &Ipv4Range) -> String {
match outcome {
RuleOutcome::Applied => format!("masquerade + forward for {range} in place"),
RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) => reason.clone(),
}
}
/// An in-memory host for exit rules, for tests: nothing is touched.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct MockExitRules {
state: Arc<Mutex<Option<ExitHostPlan>>>,
calls: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
forwarding: Arc<Mutex<Option<bool>>>,
failure: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
needs_bypass: Arc<Mutex<bool>>,
}
impl MockExitRules {
/// An empty host with forwarding turned on.
pub fn new() -> Self {
let rules = Self::default();
*lock(&rules.forwarding) = Some(true);
rules
}
/// What the host reports for kernel forwarding from now on.
pub fn set_forwarding(&self, forwarding: Option<bool>) {
*lock(&self.forwarding) = forwarding;
}
/// Whether this host asks for the underlay addresses, like Windows.
pub fn set_needs_bypass(&self, needs: bool) {
*lock(&self.needs_bypass) = needs;
}
/// Makes every step fail with this reason from now on.
pub fn fail_with(&self, reason: Option<String>) {
*lock(&self.failure) = reason;
}
/// What is installed now.
pub fn installed(&self) -> Option<ExitHostPlan> {
lock(&self.state).clone()
}
/// Every `apply:<interface>` / `clear:<interface>` call, in order.
pub fn calls(&self) -> Vec<String> {
lock(&self.calls).clone()
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
impl ExitHostRules for MockExitRules {
fn needs_bypass(&self) -> bool {
*lock(&self.needs_bypass)
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, ExitHostReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
lock(&self.calls).push(format!("apply:{}", plan.interface));
let outcome = match lock(&self.failure).clone() {
Some(reason) => RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
None => {
*lock(&self.state) = Some(plan.clone());
RuleOutcome::Applied
}
};
ExitHostReport {
offer: plan
.offer
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, outcome.clone()))
.collect(),
forwarding: *lock(&self.forwarding),
client: plan.client.then_some(outcome),
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
lock(&self.calls).push(format!("clear:{interface}"));
*lock(&self.state) = None;
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn range() -> Ipv4Range {
"10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn tags_name_the_interface_and_the_range() {
assert_eq!(
exit_tag("tsun0", &range()),
"tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24"
);
assert!(exit_tag("tsun0", &range()).starts_with(&exit_tag_prefix("tsun0")));
// Another interface's tag never matches this one's prefix.
assert!(!exit_tag("tsun01", &range()).starts_with(&exit_tag_prefix("tsun0")));
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_plan_is_nothing_to_hold() {
let mut plan = ExitHostPlan::default();
assert!(plan.is_empty());
plan.client = true;
assert!(!plan.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_mock_applies_reports_and_clears() {
let rules = MockExitRules::new();
let plan = ExitHostPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
offer: vec![range()],
client: true,
overlay: vec![range()],
..Default::default()
};
let report = rules.apply(&plan).await;
assert_eq!(report.offer[0].1, RuleOutcome::Applied);
assert_eq!(report.forwarding, Some(true));
assert_eq!(report.client, Some(RuleOutcome::Applied));
assert_eq!(rules.installed(), Some(plan));
rules.set_forwarding(Some(false));
rules.fail_with(Some("denied".into()));
let report = rules
.apply(&ExitHostPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
offer: vec![range()],
client: false,
overlay: Vec::new(),
..Default::default()
})
.await;
assert_eq!(report.forwarding, Some(false));
assert!(matches!(report.offer[0].1, RuleOutcome::Failed(_)));
assert_eq!(report.client, None);
rules.clear("tsun0").await;
assert_eq!(rules.installed(), None);
assert_eq!(rules.calls(), ["apply:tsun0", "apply:tsun0", "clear:tsun0"]);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
//! Broadcast host rules on Linux: a netlink route and an `iptables` rule.
//!
//! The route is added by the netlink thread the interface provisioner already
//! owns (see [`super::super::provision`]), because that thread is the only one
//! that ever holds `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. It belongs to the interface and goes away
//! with it.
//!
//! The firewall allowance is a rule in the `INPUT` chain, inserted at the top
//! so a default-deny chain further down cannot drop discovery replies first:
//!
//! ```text
//! iptables -I INPUT 1 -i <if> -p udp -s <range> -m comment --comment tsunagi:<if> -j ACCEPT
//! ```
//!
//! `iptables` is a program, not a netlink call, so it is looked up in fixed
//! system directories rather than on `PATH`, and its arguments are built from
//! values this agent computed. It works with both the legacy backend and
//! `iptables-nft`. A host with only `nft` or `firewalld` has no `iptables`;
//! that is reported on the firewall half and the route is still installed.
//!
//! The rule carries a comment tag. That is how a rule left behind by a crashed
//! run is found and replaced, and why nothing else in the chain is ever
//! deleted.
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::provision::RouteHandle;
use super::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, RuleOutcome, tag_for};
const CHAIN: &str = "INPUT";
/// Fixed places `iptables` is installed. Never `PATH`: the agent is
/// privileged and a directory a user controls must not decide what it runs.
const IPTABLES_DIRECTORIES: [&str; 6] = [
"/usr/sbin/iptables",
"/sbin/iptables",
"/usr/bin/iptables",
"/bin/iptables",
"/usr/local/sbin/iptables",
"/run/current-system/sw/bin/iptables",
];
/// The first candidate that exists.
fn pick_iptables(exists: impl Fn(&str) -> bool) -> Option<&'static str> {
IPTABLES_DIRECTORIES
.into_iter()
.find(|candidate| exists(candidate))
}
/// What running `iptables` produced.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum Ran {
/// There is no `iptables` to run.
Missing,
/// It ran, and exited like this.
Exited {
success: bool,
stdout: String,
stderr: String,
},
}
/// Runs `iptables` with these arguments. A function value so the flow below
/// can be tested without touching the host.
pub(super) type Run<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&[String]) -> Ran;
/// The match and target of the rule, without the chain or position.
///
/// `comment` false leaves the tag off, for a kernel that has no `comment`
/// match; the rule is then recognised by its shape, see [`tagged_deletions`].
fn rule_spec(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan, comment: bool) -> Vec<String> {
let range = plan.range.to_string();
let tag = plan.tag();
let mut words = vec!["-i", plan.interface.as_str(), "-p", "udp", "-s", &range];
if comment {
words.extend(["-m", "comment", "--comment", &tag]);
}
words.extend(["-j", "ACCEPT"]);
words.into_iter().map(str::to_string).collect()
}
/// Whether the kernel has the `comment` match, which a rule needs to carry
/// its tag. Asked of iptables itself: checking a rule that does not exist
/// fails either way, but only a missing match says so.
pub(super) fn comment_supported(run: Run<'_>) -> bool {
let probe = locked(
[
"-t",
"filter",
"-C",
"FORWARD",
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
"tsunagi-probe",
"-j",
"ACCEPT",
]
.map(str::to_string),
);
match run(&probe) {
Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stderr,
..
} => !stderr.contains("No chain/target/match by that name"),
_ => true,
}
}
/// `iptables -S` words as option clauses: an option with its value, a negated
/// one with its `!`. It prints the options in its own order, not the one a
/// rule was written in, so rules are compared by their clauses, sorted.
fn clauses(words: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
let mut at = 0;
while at < words.len() {
let take = if words[at] == "!" { 3 } else { 2 };
let end = (at + take).min(words.len());
out.push(words[at..end].join(" "));
at = end;
}
out.sort();
out
}
/// Whether two rules say the same thing, whatever order they list it in.
pub(super) fn same_rule(a: &[String], b: &[String]) -> bool {
clauses(a) == clauses(b)
}
/// Waits briefly for the xtables lock instead of failing when another tool
/// holds it.
pub(super) fn locked(args: impl IntoIterator<Item = String>) -> Vec<String> {
["-w", "5"]
.into_iter()
.map(str::to_string)
.chain(args)
.collect()
}
fn check_args(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan, comment: bool) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
["-C".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string()]
.into_iter()
.chain(rule_spec(plan, comment)),
)
}
fn insert_args(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan, comment: bool) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
["-I".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string(), "1".to_string()]
.into_iter()
.chain(rule_spec(plan, comment)),
)
}
fn list_args() -> Vec<String> {
locked(["-S".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string()])
}
/// Splits one `iptables -S` line into words, honouring double quotes, which
/// `iptables` puts around comments that need them.
pub(super) fn split_rule_line(line: &str) -> Vec<String> {
let mut words = Vec::new();
let mut current = String::new();
let mut quoted = false;
let mut started = false;
for c in line.chars() {
match c {
'"' => {
quoted = !quoted;
started = true;
}
c if c.is_whitespace() && !quoted => {
if started {
words.push(std::mem::take(&mut current));
started = false;
}
}
c => {
current.push(c);
started = true;
}
}
}
if started {
words.push(current);
}
words
}
/// Whether a rule is the one this module writes for some range of the
/// interface the tag belongs to, with no comment on it.
fn is_uncommented_rule(tag: &str, rest: &[String]) -> bool {
let Some(interface) = tag.strip_prefix("tsunagi:") else {
return false;
};
let Some(range) = rest
.windows(2)
.find(|pair| pair[0] == "-s")
.map(|pair| pair[1].as_str())
else {
return false;
};
let ours: Vec<String> = ["-i", interface, "-p", "udp", "-s", range, "-j", "ACCEPT"]
.map(str::to_string)
.to_vec();
same_rule(&ours, rest)
}
/// The delete commands for every rule in an `iptables -S INPUT` listing that
/// carries exactly this tag, or, with no `comment` match in the kernel, is
/// exactly the rule written for some range. Anything else is left alone.
fn tagged_deletions(listing: &str, tag: &str) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
listing
.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
let words = split_rule_line(line);
let [append, chain, rest @ ..] = words.as_slice() else {
return None;
};
if append != "-A" || chain != CHAIN {
return None;
}
let tagged = rest
.windows(2)
.any(|pair| pair[0] == "--comment" && pair[1] == tag)
|| is_uncommented_rule(tag, rest);
tagged.then(|| {
locked(
["-D".to_string(), CHAIN.to_string()]
.into_iter()
.chain(rest.iter().cloned()),
)
})
})
.collect()
}
/// A failure message with the likely fix for the likely cause.
pub(super) fn failure(stderr: &str) -> String {
let text = stderr.trim();
let lower = text.to_ascii_lowercase();
if lower.contains("permission denied") || lower.contains("must be root") {
format!("iptables needs root: {text}")
} else if text.is_empty() {
"iptables failed without saying why".to_string()
} else {
format!("iptables failed: {text}")
}
}
fn missing(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
format!(
"iptables not found; install it (the iptables-nft package is enough) or allow inbound \
UDP from {} on `{}` in your firewall",
plan.range, plan.interface
)
}
/// Makes the firewall hold exactly one rule for this interface, the planned one.
fn apply_firewall(run: Run<'_>, plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> RuleOutcome {
let comment = comment_supported(run);
let present = match run(&check_args(plan, comment)) {
Ran::Missing => return RuleOutcome::Failed(missing(plan)),
Ran::Exited { success, .. } => success,
};
let listing = match run(&list_args()) {
Ran::Missing => return RuleOutcome::Failed(missing(plan)),
Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} => stdout,
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => return RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr)),
};
let stale = tagged_deletions(&listing, &plan.tag());
// `-C` matched an identical rule and nothing else carries our tag, so
// there is nothing to do. Otherwise start from a clean slate for this
// interface: a rule from an earlier run may name another range.
if present && stale.len() == 1 {
return RuleOutcome::Applied;
}
for delete in &stale {
if let Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stderr,
..
} = run(delete)
{
return RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr));
}
}
match run(&insert_args(plan, comment)) {
Ran::Missing => RuleOutcome::Failed(missing(plan)),
Ran::Exited { success: true, .. } => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr)),
}
}
/// Removes every rule tagged for this interface. Best effort.
fn clear_firewall(run: Run<'_>, interface: &str) {
let Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} = run(&list_args())
else {
return;
};
for delete in tagged_deletions(&stdout, &tag_for(interface)) {
if let Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stderr,
..
} = run(&delete)
{
tracing::warn!(
interface,
"cannot remove the broadcast firewall rule: {}",
failure(&stderr)
);
}
}
}
/// Runs the real `iptables`.
pub(super) fn run_iptables(args: &[String]) -> Ran {
run_firewall(false, args)
}
pub(super) fn run_firewall(ipv6: bool, args: &[String]) -> Ran {
let v6_paths: Vec<_> = IPTABLES_DIRECTORIES
.iter()
.map(|p| p.replace("iptables", "ip6tables"))
.collect();
let v6_program = v6_paths
.iter()
.find(|path| std::path::Path::new(path).is_file());
let program = if ipv6 {
v6_program.map(String::as_str)
} else {
pick_iptables(|path| std::path::Path::new(path).is_file())
};
let Some(program) = program else {
return Ran::Missing;
};
match std::process::Command::new(program).args(args).output() {
Ok(output) => Ran::Exited {
success: output.status.success(),
stdout: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).into_owned(),
stderr: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).into_owned(),
},
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ran::Missing,
Err(err) => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: err.to_string(),
},
}
}
/// The Linux implementation: netlink for the route, `iptables` for the rule.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct LinuxHostRules {
pub(super) route: RouteHandle,
/// Interface, sorted socket snapshot and whether exit routes committed.
pub(super) underlay_sockets:
std::sync::Mutex<Option<(String, Vec<super::linux_exit_mark::Listener>, bool)>>,
}
impl LinuxHostRules {
pub(crate) fn new(route: RouteHandle) -> Self {
Self {
route,
underlay_sockets: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
}
}
async fn set_route(&self, interface: String, source: Ipv4Addr) -> RuleOutcome {
let route = self.route.clone();
match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || route.set(&interface, source)).await {
Ok(Ok(())) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ok(Err(err)) => RuleOutcome::Failed(err.to_string()),
Err(err) => RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("the route task failed: {err}")),
}
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for LinuxHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"netlink+iptables"
}
fn exit_rules(&self) -> Option<&dyn super::ExitHostRules> {
Some(self)
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = self.set_route(plan.interface.clone(), plan.source).await;
let owned = plan.clone();
let firewall =
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || apply_firewall(&run_iptables, &owned))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| {
RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("the firewall task failed: {err}"))
});
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route,
firewall,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = self.route.clone();
let name = interface.to_string();
let route_name = name.clone();
if let Ok(Err(err)) =
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || route.clear(&route_name)).await
{
tracing::warn!(interface = %name, %err, "cannot remove the broadcast route");
}
let name = interface.to_string();
let _ = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || clear_firewall(&run_iptables, &name)).await;
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use std::cell::RefCell;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
fn words(args: &[String]) -> String {
args.join(" ")
}
#[test]
fn the_rule_is_udp_only_from_the_overlay_range_on_this_interface() {
let spec = words(&rule_spec(&plan(), true));
assert_eq!(
spec,
"-i tsun0 -p udp -s 10.13.37.0/24 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT"
);
// Nothing here may widen to other protocols or every source.
assert!(spec.contains("-p udp"));
assert!(!spec.contains("0.0.0.0/0"));
assert!(words(&insert_args(&plan(), true)).starts_with("-w 5 -I INPUT 1 -i tsun0"));
assert!(words(&check_args(&plan(), true)).starts_with("-w 5 -C INPUT -i tsun0"));
}
#[test]
fn iptables_is_found_in_fixed_directories_never_on_path() {
assert_eq!(pick_iptables(|_| false), None);
assert_eq!(
pick_iptables(|p| p == "/sbin/iptables"),
Some("/sbin/iptables")
);
assert_eq!(pick_iptables(|_| true), Some("/usr/sbin/iptables"));
}
#[test]
fn only_rules_with_our_exact_tag_are_selected_for_deletion() {
let listing = "\
-P INPUT DROP
-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment \"tsunagi:tsun0\" -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i tsun1 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun1 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -m comment --comment \"allow ssh tsunagi:tsun0\" -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -i tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
";
let deletions = tagged_deletions(listing, "tsunagi:tsun0");
assert_eq!(deletions.len(), 2, "{deletions:?}");
assert_eq!(
words(&deletions[0]),
"-w 5 -D INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT"
);
assert!(words(&deletions[1]).contains("-D INPUT -i tsun0 -m comment"));
assert!(tagged_deletions("", "tsunagi:tsun0").is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_kernel_without_the_comment_match_says_so_in_its_error() {
let answer = |stderr: &'static str| {
move |_: &[String]| Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: stderr.to_string(),
}
};
assert!(!comment_supported(&answer(
"iptables: No chain/target/match by that name."
)));
assert!(comment_supported(&answer(
"iptables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?)."
)));
assert!(comment_supported(&|_: &[String]| Ran::Missing));
}
#[test]
fn a_rule_written_without_a_comment_is_found_by_its_shape() {
// Listed the way iptables prints it: its own option order.
let listing = "\
-P INPUT ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 10.99.0.0/16 -i tsun0 -p udp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun1 -p udp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -j DROP
-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p tcp -j ACCEPT
";
let deletions = tagged_deletions(listing, "tsunagi:tsun0");
assert_eq!(deletions.len(), 2, "{deletions:?}");
assert!(words(&deletions[0]).ends_with("-s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -j ACCEPT"));
assert!(words(&deletions[1]).contains("10.99.0.0/16"));
}
#[test]
fn without_a_comment_the_rule_has_none() {
let with = words(&rule_spec(&plan(), true));
let without = words(&rule_spec(&plan(), false));
assert!(with.contains("-m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0"));
assert_eq!(without, "-i tsun0 -p udp -s 10.13.37.0/24 -j ACCEPT");
}
/// A scripted `iptables`: answers by the leading verb, records every call.
struct Fake {
calls: RefCell<Vec<String>>,
check_ok: bool,
listing: String,
insert_stderr: Option<&'static str>,
missing: bool,
}
impl Fake {
fn new(check_ok: bool, listing: &str) -> Self {
Self {
calls: RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
check_ok,
listing: listing.to_string(),
insert_stderr: None,
missing: false,
}
}
fn run(&self, args: &[String]) -> Ran {
// The probe for the `comment` match: not part of what is tested.
if args.iter().any(|word| word == "tsunagi-probe") {
return Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: "Bad rule".into(),
};
}
self.calls.borrow_mut().push(words(args));
if self.missing {
return Ran::Missing;
}
let ok = |stdout: &str| Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout: stdout.to_string(),
stderr: String::new(),
};
match args.get(2).map(String::as_str) {
Some("-C") if self.check_ok => ok(""),
Some("-C") => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: "Bad rule".into(),
},
Some("-S") => ok(&self.listing),
Some("-I") => match self.insert_stderr {
Some(stderr) => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: stderr.into(),
},
None => ok(""),
},
_ => ok(""),
}
}
fn verbs(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.calls
.borrow()
.iter()
.map(|call| call.split(' ').nth(2).unwrap().to_string())
.collect()
}
}
const ONE_OURS: &str =
"-A INPUT -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT\n";
#[test]
fn an_identical_rule_already_in_place_is_left_alone() {
let fake = Fake::new(true, ONE_OURS);
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S"], "no insert, no delete");
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_rule_is_inserted_once() {
let fake = Fake::new(false, "-P INPUT ACCEPT\n");
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S", "-I"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_stale_rule_for_another_range_is_replaced_not_stacked() {
// A crashed run left a rule for an old range under our tag.
let stale = "-A INPUT -s 10.99.0.0/16 -i tsun0 -p udp -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT\n";
let fake = Fake::new(false, stale);
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S", "-D", "-I"]);
}
#[test]
fn duplicates_of_the_rule_collapse_to_one() {
let doubled = format!("{ONE_OURS}{ONE_OURS}");
let fake = Fake::new(true, &doubled);
assert_eq!(
apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()),
RuleOutcome::Applied
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-C", "-S", "-D", "-D", "-I"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_iptables_says_what_to_install_and_what_to_allow() {
let mut fake = Fake::new(false, "");
fake.missing = true;
let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()) else {
panic!("expected a failure");
};
assert!(reason.contains("iptables not found"), "{reason}");
assert!(reason.contains("10.13.37.0/24"), "{reason}");
assert!(reason.contains("tsun0"), "{reason}");
}
#[test]
fn a_refused_insert_is_reported_with_the_cause() {
let mut fake = Fake::new(false, "");
fake.insert_stderr = Some(
"iptables v1.8.10: can't initialize iptables table `filter': Permission denied (you must be root)",
);
let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = apply_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), &plan()) else {
panic!("expected a failure");
};
assert!(reason.starts_with("iptables needs root"), "{reason}");
}
#[test]
fn clearing_removes_only_tagged_rules_and_ignores_a_missing_iptables() {
let listing = format!(
"-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT\n{ONE_OURS}-A INPUT -i tsun1 -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun1 -j ACCEPT\n"
);
let fake = Fake::new(true, &listing);
clear_firewall(&|a| fake.run(a), "tsun0");
assert_eq!(fake.verbs(), ["-S", "-D"]);
let mut gone = Fake::new(true, "");
gone.missing = true;
clear_firewall(&|a| gone.run(a), "tsun0");
assert_eq!(gone.verbs(), ["-S"]);
}
#[test]
fn rule_listing_words_honour_quotes() {
assert_eq!(
split_rule_line("-A INPUT -m comment --comment \"a b\" -j ACCEPT"),
[
"-A",
"INPUT",
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
"a b",
"-j",
"ACCEPT"
]
);
assert!(split_rule_line(" ").is_empty());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,968 @@
//! Exit-node host rules on Linux: `iptables` for the offering side, policy
//! routing over netlink for the using side.
//!
//! # Offering
//!
//! For every network that offers this agent as an exit node, three rules,
//! selected by that network's range and carrying the tag
//! `tsunagi-exit:<if>:<range>`:
//!
//! ```text
//! -t nat POSTROUTING -s <range> ! -o <if> -j MASQUERADE
//! -t filter FORWARD -i <if> -s <range> ! -o <if> -j ACCEPT
//! -t filter FORWARD -o <if> -d <range> -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
//! ```
//!
//! `! -o <if>` is the egress without naming it: whatever interface the
//! default route uses, now or after it changes. Kernel forwarding is only
//! *read*. Turning it on changes how the whole host behaves, which is the
//! owner's decision, so when it is off the rules are installed anyway and the
//! report says so.
//!
//! # Using
//!
//! Policy routing, with no `/1` routes and nothing in the main table:
//!
//! ```text
//! table 0x7473: default dev <if>
//! 5205: from all fwmark 0x40000000/0x40000000 lookup main
//! 5206: from all uidrange <euid>-<euid> lookup main
//! 5290: from all lookup main suppress_prefixlength 0
//! 5300: from all lookup 0x7473
//! ```
//!
//! The first two keep the agent's *own* sockets and marked replies off the tunnel: its QUIC, relay,
//! DHT and DNS traffic would otherwise be routed into the interface it is
//! carrying, a loop. The specific-route rule lets the LAN, another
//! VPN, a tunnel to somewhere else — keep working, because only the default
//! route is suppressed. Mark/UID bypass precedes Tailscale; application rules follow it.
//!
//! The UID rule exempts a *user id*, so it is only right when the agent has
//! one of its own, as the packaged service does. An agent started from a login
//! session would take that user's own applications out of the tunnel with it,
//! and the exit node would silently do nothing for them. That is refused, not
//! guessed at: see [`client_refusal`].
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
use super::RuleOutcome;
use super::exit::{ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport, ExitHostRules, exit_tag, exit_tag_prefix};
use super::linux::{
LinuxHostRules, Ran, Run, comment_supported, failure, locked, run_firewall, run_iptables,
same_rule, split_rule_line,
};
use super::linux_exit_mark;
/// The chains the offering rules live in: `(table, chain)`.
const CHAINS: [(&str, &str); 2] = [("nat", "POSTROUTING"), ("filter", "FORWARD")];
/// One firewall rule: where it goes, and its match and target.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct Rule {
table: &'static str,
chain: &'static str,
spec: Vec<String>,
}
fn owned(words: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
words.iter().map(|word| word.to_string()).collect()
}
/// The three rules of one offered range.
///
/// Each carries a comment naming its interface and range, which is how it is
/// found again. A kernel without the `comment` match (small router builds
/// leave it out) cannot take that, so `comment` false leaves it off and the
/// rules are recognised by their shape instead; see [`tagged_rules`].
fn offer_rules(interface: &str, range: &Ipv4Range, comment: bool) -> Vec<Rule> {
let range_text = range.to_string();
let tag = exit_tag(interface, range);
let comment: Vec<String> = if comment {
owned(&["-m", "comment", "--comment", tag.as_str()])
} else {
Vec::new()
};
let spec = |head: &[&str], tail: &[&str]| -> Vec<String> {
owned(head)
.into_iter()
.chain(comment.iter().cloned())
.chain(owned(tail))
.collect()
};
vec![
Rule {
table: "nat",
chain: "POSTROUTING",
spec: spec(
&["-s", &range_text, "!", "-o", interface],
&["-j", "MASQUERADE"],
),
},
Rule {
table: "filter",
chain: "FORWARD",
spec: spec(
&["-i", interface, "-s", &range_text, "!", "-o", interface],
&["-j", "ACCEPT"],
),
},
Rule {
table: "filter",
chain: "FORWARD",
spec: spec(
&[
"-o",
interface,
"-d",
&range_text,
"-m",
"conntrack",
"--ctstate",
"RELATED,ESTABLISHED",
],
&["-j", "ACCEPT"],
),
},
]
}
fn check_args(rule: &Rule) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
owned(&["-t", rule.table, "-C", rule.chain])
.into_iter()
.chain(rule.spec.iter().cloned()),
)
}
fn insert_args(rule: &Rule) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
owned(&["-t", rule.table, "-I", rule.chain, "1"])
.into_iter()
.chain(rule.spec.iter().cloned()),
)
}
fn list_args(table: &str, chain: &str) -> Vec<String> {
locked(owned(&["-t", table, "-S", chain]))
}
/// A rule found in a listing whose comment starts with our prefix.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct Found {
/// The whole tag.
tag: String,
/// The words after `-A <chain>`, which is what `-D` needs.
rest: Vec<String>,
}
/// Every rule in an `iptables -S <chain>` listing that is ours: carrying a
/// tag that starts with `prefix`, or, on a kernel with no `comment` match,
/// being exactly one of the three rules this module writes for some range.
/// Anything else in the chain is left alone.
fn tagged_rules(listing: &str, chain: &str, prefix: &str) -> Vec<Found> {
// `tsunagi-exit:<interface>:`
let interface = prefix
.strip_prefix("tsunagi-exit:")
.and_then(|rest| rest.strip_suffix(':'))
.unwrap_or_default();
listing
.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
let words = split_rule_line(line);
let [append, found_chain, rest @ ..] = words.as_slice() else {
return None;
};
if append != "-A" || found_chain != chain {
return None;
}
let tag = rest
.windows(2)
.find(|pair| pair[0] == "--comment" && pair[1].starts_with(prefix))
.map(|pair| pair[1].clone())
.or_else(|| uncommented_tag(interface, chain, rest))?;
Some(Found {
tag,
rest: rest.to_vec(),
})
})
.collect()
}
/// The tag a rule would have carried, when it is one of ours written without
/// a comment: its words are those of the rule for the range it names.
fn uncommented_tag(interface: &str, chain: &str, rest: &[String]) -> Option<String> {
if interface.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let range: Ipv4Range = rest
.windows(2)
.find(|pair| pair[0] == "-s" || pair[0] == "-d")
.and_then(|pair| pair[1].parse().ok())?;
offer_rules(interface, &range, false)
.iter()
.any(|rule| rule.chain == chain && same_rule(&rule.spec, rest))
.then(|| exit_tag(interface, &range))
}
fn delete_args(table: &str, chain: &str, found: &Found) -> Vec<String> {
locked(
owned(&["-t", table, "-D", chain])
.into_iter()
.chain(found.rest.iter().cloned()),
)
}
fn missing_iptables(range: &Ipv4Range, interface: &str) -> String {
format!(
"iptables not found; install it (the iptables-nft package is enough), or masquerade \
{range} out of every interface but `{interface}` and forward it yourself"
)
}
/// Reads one chain, or says why not.
fn read_chain(run: Run<'_>, table: &str, chain: &str) -> Result<String, Failure> {
match run(&list_args(table, chain)) {
Ran::Missing => Err(Failure::Missing),
Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} => Ok(stdout),
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => Err(Failure::Failed(failure(&stderr))),
}
}
enum Failure {
Missing,
Failed(String),
}
/// Deletes found rules; the first failure ends it.
fn delete_all(
run: Run<'_>,
table: &str,
chain: &str,
found: &[Found],
keep: impl Fn(&Found) -> bool,
) -> Result<(), String> {
for rule in found.iter().filter(|rule| !keep(rule)) {
if let Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stderr,
..
} = run(&delete_args(table, chain, rule))
{
return Err(failure(&stderr));
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Makes the firewall hold exactly the offering rules of these ranges for the
/// interface, and no others of ours.
fn apply_offer(
run: Run<'_>,
interface: &str,
ranges: &[Ipv4Range],
) -> Vec<(Ipv4Range, RuleOutcome)> {
let fail_all = |reason: String| -> Vec<(Ipv4Range, RuleOutcome)> {
ranges
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, RuleOutcome::Failed(reason.clone())))
.collect()
};
let prefix = exit_tag_prefix(interface);
let wanted: Vec<String> = ranges.iter().map(|r| exit_tag(interface, r)).collect();
let comment = comment_supported(run);
// What is there now, per chain.
let mut present: Vec<(&str, &str, Vec<Found>)> = Vec::new();
for (table, chain) in CHAINS {
match read_chain(run, table, chain) {
Ok(listing) => present.push((table, chain, tagged_rules(&listing, chain, &prefix))),
Err(Failure::Missing) => {
return match ranges.first() {
Some(range) => fail_all(missing_iptables(range, interface)),
None => Vec::new(),
};
}
Err(Failure::Failed(reason)) => return fail_all(reason),
}
}
// Rules for a range no longer offered, or left by an earlier run.
for (table, chain, found) in &present {
if let Err(reason) = delete_all(run, table, chain, found, |rule| wanted.contains(&rule.tag))
{
return fail_all(reason);
}
}
ranges
.iter()
.map(|range| {
let rules = offer_rules(interface, range, comment);
let tag = exit_tag(interface, range);
let in_place = rules
.iter()
.all(|rule| matches!(run(&check_args(rule)), Ran::Exited { success: true, .. }))
&& present.iter().all(|(_, chain, found)| {
let have = found.iter().filter(|rule| rule.tag == tag).count();
have == rules.iter().filter(|rule| rule.chain == *chain).count()
});
if in_place {
return (*range, RuleOutcome::Applied);
}
// Start this range from a clean slate: a half-installed set, or
// one that differs from the plan, is replaced as a whole.
for (table, chain, found) in &present {
if let Err(reason) = delete_all(run, table, chain, found, |rule| rule.tag != tag) {
return (*range, RuleOutcome::Failed(reason));
}
}
for rule in &rules {
match run(&insert_args(rule)) {
Ran::Missing => {
return (
*range,
RuleOutcome::Failed(missing_iptables(range, interface)),
);
}
Ran::Exited { success: true, .. } => {}
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => {
return (*range, RuleOutcome::Failed(failure(&stderr)));
}
}
}
(*range, RuleOutcome::Applied)
})
.collect()
}
/// Removes every offering rule of ours for the interface. Best effort.
fn clear_offer(run: Run<'_>, interface: &str) {
let prefix = exit_tag_prefix(interface);
for (table, chain) in CHAINS {
let Ok(listing) = read_chain(run, table, chain) else {
continue;
};
let found = tagged_rules(&listing, chain, &prefix);
if let Err(reason) = delete_all(run, table, chain, &found, |_| false) {
tracing::warn!(
interface,
"cannot remove an exit node firewall rule: {reason}"
);
}
}
}
/// The kernel's forwarding switch for packets arriving on the interface,
/// read from the text of the sysctl files. Never written.
fn forwarding_state(read: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<String>, interface: &str) -> Option<bool> {
let flag = |text: String| match text.trim() {
"1" => Some(true),
"0" => Some(false),
_ => None,
};
// The name is derived here, but it ends up in a path.
if !interface.is_empty() && !interface.contains(['/', '\0']) && interface != ".." {
let per_interface = format!("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/{interface}/forwarding");
if let Some(state) = read(&per_interface).and_then(flag) {
return Some(state);
}
}
read("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward").and_then(flag)
}
fn read_sysctl(path: &str) -> Option<String> {
std::fs::read_to_string(path).ok()
}
fn check_kernel_rpf(overlay: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let directory = "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf";
let value = |name: &str, setting: &str| -> Result<u32, String> {
read_sysctl(&format!("{directory}/{name}/{setting}"))
.and_then(|s| s.trim().parse().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| format!("cannot check {name}/{setting} before installing exit routes"))
};
let mut interfaces = Vec::new();
for entry in std::fs::read_dir(directory).map_err(|err| err.to_string())? {
let entry = entry.map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
let name = entry.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
if name != "all" && name != "default" && name != "lo" && name != overlay {
interfaces.push((
name.clone(),
value(&name, "rp_filter")?,
value(&name, "src_valid_mark")?,
));
}
}
linux_exit_mark::check_kernel_rpf(
value("all", "rp_filter")?,
value("all", "src_valid_mark")?,
&interfaces,
)
}
/// The effective user id from the text of `/proc/self/status`.
fn parse_euid(status: &str) -> Option<u32> {
status
.lines()
.find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("Uid:"))
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_whitespace().nth(1))
.and_then(|effective| effective.parse().ok())
}
/// Why the using side must not be installed for this process, if it must not.
///
/// The bypass rule exempts this process's *user id* from the tunnel. That is
/// right for a service with an id of its own and wrong for a process started
/// from somebody's login session, which shares its id with every application
/// that person runs. A login session is recognised by `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR`,
/// which `systemd --user` and the login managers set and a system service
/// does not. Crude on purpose: refusing a service that was started oddly is
/// a message, and exempting a user's applications is a silent failure.
fn client_refusal(xdg_runtime_dir: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
xdg_runtime_dir.filter(|dir| !dir.is_empty()).map(|_| {
"the exit node needs the agent to run as a system service with a user of its own: \
this agent was started from a login session, so routing everything through the \
overlay would take that user's own applications out of the tunnel with it"
.to_string()
})
}
impl LinuxHostRules {
async fn blocking<T: Send + 'static>(
work: impl FnOnce() -> T + Send + 'static,
) -> Result<T, String> {
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(work)
.await
.map_err(|err| format!("the task failed: {err}"))
}
async fn apply_client(&self, interface: &str) -> RuleOutcome {
let xdg = std::env::var("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR").ok();
if let Some(reason) = client_refusal(xdg.as_deref()) {
// Whatever an earlier run left must not stay in force.
let _ = self.clear_client(interface).await;
return RuleOutcome::Failed(reason);
}
let Some(euid) = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status")
.ok()
.and_then(|status| parse_euid(&status))
else {
return RuleOutcome::Failed("cannot tell which user this agent runs as".to_string());
};
let installed = self
.underlay_sockets
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner())
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|(name, _, routed)| name == interface && *routed);
if installed {
// A failed socket refresh must never remove an active exit route.
return self
.refresh_sockets(interface)
.await
.unwrap_or(RuleOutcome::Applied);
}
if let Err(reason) = self.clear_client(interface).await {
return RuleOutcome::Failed(reason);
}
let name = interface.to_string();
let prepared = Self::blocking(move || {
check_kernel_rpf(&name)?;
linux_exit_mark::install(
&run_firewall,
&name,
euid,
std::path::Path::new("/proc/sys/net/ipv6").is_dir(),
)
})
.await;
match prepared {
Ok(Ok(sockets)) => {
*self
.underlay_sockets
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()) = Some((interface.into(), sockets, false));
}
Ok(Err(reason)) | Err(reason) => return RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
}
let route = self.route.clone();
let name = interface.to_string();
let outcome = match Self::blocking(move || route.set_exit_client(&name, euid)).await {
Ok(Ok(())) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ok(Err(err)) => RuleOutcome::Failed(err.to_string()),
Err(reason) => RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
};
if let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = outcome {
let reason = match self.clear_client(interface).await {
Ok(()) => reason,
Err(cleanup) => format!("{reason}; cannot roll back exit rules: {cleanup}"),
};
RuleOutcome::Failed(reason)
} else {
if let Some((_, _, routed)) = self
.underlay_sockets
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner())
.as_mut()
{
*routed = true;
}
outcome
}
}
async fn clear_client(&self, interface: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let route = self.route.clone();
Self::blocking(move || route.clear_exit_client())
.await?
.map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
// Route removal must precede removing reply protection.
let name = interface.to_string();
Self::blocking(move || {
linux_exit_mark::clear(
&run_firewall,
&name,
std::path::Path::new("/proc/sys/net/ipv6").is_dir(),
)
})
.await??;
*self
.underlay_sockets
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()) = None;
Ok(())
}
async fn refresh_sockets(&self, interface: &str) -> Option<RuleOutcome> {
let previous = self
.underlay_sockets
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner())
.clone();
if previous
.as_ref()
.is_none_or(|(name, _, routed)| name != interface || !routed)
{
return None;
}
let name = interface.to_string();
let work_name = name.clone();
let result = Self::blocking(move || {
let uid = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| parse_euid(&s))
.ok_or("cannot read agent UID")?;
check_kernel_rpf(&work_name)?;
let v6 = std::path::Path::new("/proc/sys/net/ipv6").is_dir();
let sockets = linux_exit_mark::local_sockets(uid, v6)?;
if previous
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|(name, old, _)| name == &work_name && old == &sockets)
{
return Ok(None);
}
linux_exit_mark::refresh(&run_firewall, &work_name, v6, &sockets)?;
Ok(Some(sockets))
})
.await;
match result {
Ok(Ok(None)) => None,
Ok(Ok(Some(sockets))) => {
*self
.underlay_sockets
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()) = Some((name, sockets, true));
Some(RuleOutcome::Applied)
}
Ok(Err(reason)) | Err(reason) => Some(RuleOutcome::Failed(reason)),
}
}
}
impl ExitHostRules for LinuxHostRules {
fn refresh<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, Option<RuleOutcome>> {
Box::pin(async move {
if plan.client {
self.refresh_sockets(&plan.interface).await
} else {
None
}
})
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, ExitHostReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let interface = plan.interface.clone();
let ranges = plan.offer.clone();
let offer = {
let (job_interface, job_ranges) = (interface.clone(), ranges.clone());
Self::blocking(move || apply_offer(&run_iptables, &job_interface, &job_ranges))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|reason| {
ranges
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, RuleOutcome::Failed(reason.clone())))
.collect()
})
};
let forwarding = if ranges.is_empty() {
None
} else {
forwarding_state(read_sysctl, &interface)
};
let client = if plan.client {
Some(self.apply_client(&interface).await)
} else {
if let Err(reason) = self.clear_client(&interface).await {
tracing::warn!(%reason, "cannot remove exit-client rules");
}
None
};
ExitHostReport {
offer,
forwarding,
client,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let name = interface.to_string();
let _ = Self::blocking(move || clear_offer(&run_iptables, &name)).await;
if let Err(reason) = self.clear_client(interface).await {
tracing::warn!(%reason, "cannot remove exit-client rules");
}
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::cell::RefCell;
use super::*;
fn range() -> Ipv4Range {
"10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()
}
fn words(args: &[String]) -> String {
args.join(" ")
}
#[test]
fn the_rules_masquerade_the_range_out_of_every_other_interface_and_forward_it() {
let rules = offer_rules("tsun0", &range(), true);
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(
words(&rules[0].spec),
"-s 10.13.37.0/24 ! -o tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24 -j MASQUERADE"
);
assert_eq!((rules[0].table, rules[0].chain), ("nat", "POSTROUTING"));
assert_eq!(
words(&rules[1].spec),
"-i tsun0 -s 10.13.37.0/24 ! -o tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24 -j ACCEPT"
);
assert_eq!((rules[1].table, rules[1].chain), ("filter", "FORWARD"));
assert_eq!(
words(&rules[2].spec),
"-o tsun0 -d 10.13.37.0/24 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24 -j ACCEPT"
);
// Nothing may widen to every source or to the other direction.
for rule in &rules {
assert!(!words(&rule.spec).contains("0.0.0.0/0"));
}
assert!(words(&insert_args(&rules[1])).starts_with("-w 5 -t filter -I FORWARD 1 -i tsun0"));
assert!(words(&check_args(&rules[0])).starts_with("-w 5 -t nat -C POSTROUTING -s"));
}
#[test]
fn only_rules_with_our_tag_for_this_interface_are_selected() {
let listing = "\
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -i tsun0 -s 10.13.37.0/24 ! -o tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -i tsun1 -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun1:10.99.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -i tsun01 -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun01:10.5.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -m comment --comment \"allow tsunagi-exit:tsun0:x\" -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -m comment --comment tsunagi:tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -j ACCEPT
";
let found = tagged_rules(listing, "FORWARD", &exit_tag_prefix("tsun0"));
assert_eq!(found.len(), 1, "{found:?}");
assert_eq!(found[0].tag, "tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24");
assert_eq!(
words(&delete_args("filter", "FORWARD", &found[0])),
"-w 5 -t filter -D FORWARD -i tsun0 -s 10.13.37.0/24 ! -o tsun0 -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24 -j ACCEPT"
);
assert!(tagged_rules("", "FORWARD", "tsunagi-exit:tsun0:").is_empty());
}
/// A scripted `iptables` that remembers which rules it was given.
struct Fake {
calls: RefCell<Vec<String>>,
/// Rules present, as `-S` lines per `(table, chain)`.
listing: RefCell<Vec<(String, String)>>,
missing: bool,
check_ok: bool,
/// A kernel with no `comment` match, as small router builds have.
no_comment: bool,
}
impl Fake {
fn new(check_ok: bool) -> Self {
Self {
calls: RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
listing: RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
missing: false,
check_ok,
no_comment: false,
}
}
fn with_rule(self, table: &str, line: &str) -> Self {
self.listing
.borrow_mut()
.push((table.to_string(), line.to_string()));
self
}
fn run(&self, args: &[String]) -> Ran {
if self.missing {
return Ran::Missing;
}
let line = args.join(" ");
self.calls.borrow_mut().push(line.clone());
let table = args
.iter()
.position(|word| word == "-t")
.map(|at| args[at + 1].clone())
.unwrap_or_default();
let ok = |stdout: String| Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
stderr: String::new(),
};
if self.no_comment && line.contains("-m comment") {
return Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: "iptables: No chain/target/match by that name.".to_string(),
};
}
if line.contains(" -S ") {
let listing: Vec<String> = self
.listing
.borrow()
.iter()
.filter(|(t, _)| *t == table)
.map(|(_, l)| l.clone())
.collect();
return ok(listing.join("\n"));
}
if line.contains(" -C ") {
return Ran::Exited {
success: self.check_ok,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: String::new(),
};
}
ok(String::new())
}
fn verbs(&self, verb: &str) -> Vec<String> {
self.calls
.borrow()
.iter()
.filter(|call| call.contains(&format!(" {verb} ")))
.cloned()
.collect()
}
}
#[test]
fn a_kernel_without_the_comment_match_gets_the_rules_without_comments() {
let mut fake = Fake::new(false);
fake.no_comment = true;
let outcome = apply_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0", &[range()]);
assert_eq!(outcome, vec![(range(), RuleOutcome::Applied)]);
let inserted = fake.verbs("-I");
assert_eq!(inserted.len(), 3, "{inserted:?}");
assert!(
inserted.iter().all(|call| !call.contains("comment")),
"{inserted:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn rules_written_without_a_comment_are_ours_and_are_removed_with_them() {
// The way iptables prints them: its own option order.
let listing = "\
-P FORWARD ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun0 ! -o tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -d 10.13.37.0/24 -o tsun0 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -i tsun0 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -s 10.13.37.0/24 -i tsun1 ! -o tsun1 -j ACCEPT
";
let found = tagged_rules(listing, "FORWARD", &exit_tag_prefix("tsun0"));
assert_eq!(found.len(), 2, "{found:?}");
assert!(
found
.iter()
.all(|rule| rule.tag == exit_tag("tsun0", &range()))
);
let nat = "-A POSTROUTING -s 10.13.37.0/24 ! -o tsun0 -j MASQUERADE\n";
assert_eq!(
tagged_rules(nat, "POSTROUTING", &exit_tag_prefix("tsun0")).len(),
1
);
}
#[test]
fn a_fresh_host_gets_the_three_rules() {
let fake = Fake::new(false);
let outcome = apply_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0", &[range()]);
assert_eq!(outcome, vec![(range(), RuleOutcome::Applied)]);
let inserted = fake.verbs("-I");
assert_eq!(inserted.len(), 3, "{inserted:?}");
assert!(inserted[0].contains("-t nat -I POSTROUTING 1"));
assert!(fake.verbs("-D").is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn rules_already_in_place_are_left_alone() {
let tag = exit_tag("tsun0", &range());
let fake = Fake::new(true)
.with_rule(
"nat",
&format!("-A POSTROUTING -s 10.13.37.0/24 ! -o tsun0 -m comment --comment {tag} -j MASQUERADE"),
)
.with_rule("filter", &format!("-A FORWARD -i tsun0 -m comment --comment {tag} -j ACCEPT"))
.with_rule("filter", &format!("-A FORWARD -o tsun0 -m comment --comment {tag} -j ACCEPT"));
let outcome = apply_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0", &[range()]);
assert_eq!(outcome, vec![(range(), RuleOutcome::Applied)]);
assert!(fake.verbs("-I").is_empty());
assert!(fake.verbs("-D").is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_stale_range_is_removed_and_a_half_installed_set_is_replaced() {
let old: Ipv4Range = "10.99.0.0/24".parse().unwrap();
let old_tag = exit_tag("tsun0", &old);
let tag = exit_tag("tsun0", &range());
let fake = Fake::new(true)
.with_rule(
"nat",
&format!(
"-A POSTROUTING -s 10.99.0.0/24 -m comment --comment {old_tag} -j MASQUERADE"
),
)
// Only one of the three for the current range.
.with_rule(
"filter",
&format!("-A FORWARD -i tsun0 -m comment --comment {tag} -j ACCEPT"),
)
// Somebody else's rule, which must survive.
.with_rule("filter", "-A FORWARD -i eth0 -j ACCEPT");
let outcome = apply_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0", &[range()]);
assert_eq!(outcome, vec![(range(), RuleOutcome::Applied)]);
let deleted = fake.verbs("-D");
assert!(
deleted.iter().any(|call| call.contains(&old_tag)),
"{deleted:?}"
);
assert!(
deleted.iter().any(|call| call.contains(&tag)),
"{deleted:?}"
);
assert!(
deleted.iter().all(|call| !call.contains("eth0")),
"{deleted:?}"
);
assert_eq!(fake.verbs("-I").len(), 3);
}
#[test]
fn clearing_removes_only_our_rules_for_the_interface() {
let tag = exit_tag("tsun0", &range());
let other = exit_tag("tsun1", &range());
let fake = Fake::new(true)
.with_rule(
"nat",
&format!("-A POSTROUTING -m comment --comment {tag} -j MASQUERADE"),
)
.with_rule(
"nat",
&format!("-A POSTROUTING -m comment --comment {other} -j MASQUERADE"),
)
.with_rule("filter", "-A FORWARD -j ACCEPT");
clear_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0");
let deleted = fake.verbs("-D");
assert_eq!(deleted.len(), 1, "{deleted:?}");
assert!(deleted[0].contains(&tag));
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_iptables_is_a_failure_that_says_what_to_do() {
let mut fake = Fake::new(false);
fake.missing = true;
let outcome = apply_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0", &[range()]);
let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = &outcome[0].1 else {
panic!("{outcome:?}");
};
assert!(reason.contains("iptables not found"), "{reason}");
assert!(reason.contains("10.13.37.0/24"), "{reason}");
// Nothing wanted and nothing to run is not a failure of anything.
assert!(apply_offer(&|args| fake.run(args), "tsun0", &[]).is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn forwarding_is_read_per_interface_then_globally_and_never_written() {
let files = |per: Option<&'static str>, global: Option<&'static str>| {
move |path: &str| match path {
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/tsun0/forwarding" => per.map(str::to_string),
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward" => global.map(str::to_string),
_ => None,
}
};
assert_eq!(
forwarding_state(files(Some("1\n"), Some("0\n")), "tsun0"),
Some(true)
);
assert_eq!(
forwarding_state(files(Some("0\n"), Some("1\n")), "tsun0"),
Some(false)
);
assert_eq!(
forwarding_state(files(None, Some("1\n")), "tsun0"),
Some(true)
);
assert_eq!(forwarding_state(files(None, None), "tsun0"), None);
assert_eq!(forwarding_state(files(Some("junk"), None), "tsun0"), None);
// A name that would leave the directory is not looked up.
assert_eq!(forwarding_state(files(Some("1"), None), "../../x"), None);
}
#[test]
fn the_effective_uid_is_the_second_field() {
let status = "Name:\ttsunagi\nUid:\t1001\t1002\t1001\t1001\nGid:\t5\t5\t5\t5\n";
assert_eq!(parse_euid(status), Some(1002));
assert_eq!(parse_euid("Name:\tx\n"), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_login_session_is_refused_and_a_service_is_not() {
let reason = client_refusal(Some("/run/user/1000")).unwrap();
assert!(reason.contains("system service"), "{reason}");
assert!(client_refusal(None).is_none());
assert!(client_refusal(Some("")).is_none());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
//! Privileged routing regression, isolated from the host in named namespaces.
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader, Read, Write};
use std::net::{SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream, UdpSocket};
use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;
use std::process::{Child, Command};
use std::time::Duration;
use super::linux::run_firewall;
use super::linux_exit_mark::{clear, install, local_sockets, refresh};
use crate::overlay::NetlinkProvisioner;
const TEST: &str = "overlay::hostrules::linux_exit_kernel::strict_firewall_preserves_underlay_and_application_exit_routing";
const ROLE: &str = "TSUNAGI_EXIT_KERNEL_TEST_ROLE";
fn ip(arguments: &[&str]) -> String {
let result = Command::new("ip").args(arguments).output().unwrap();
assert!(
result.status.success(),
"ip {arguments:?}: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stderr)
);
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stdout).into_owned()
}
struct Namespace(String);
impl Drop for Namespace {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = Command::new("ip").args(["netns", "del", &self.0]).status();
}
}
struct Echo(Child);
impl Drop for Echo {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.0.kill();
let _ = self.0.wait();
}
}
fn probes() {
let should_pass = std::env::var("TSUNAGI_EXIT_KERNEL_EXPECT").unwrap() == "pass";
for address in ["198.51.100.2:42000", "[2001:db8:2::2]:42000"] {
let address: SocketAddr = address.parse().unwrap();
let socket = UdpSocket::bind(if address.is_ipv4() {
"0.0.0.0:0"
} else {
"[::]:0"
})
.unwrap();
socket
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1)))
.unwrap();
socket.send_to(b"rpf", address).unwrap();
let mut packet = [0u8; 3];
assert_eq!(
socket.recv(&mut packet).is_ok(),
should_pass,
"UDP {address}"
);
if should_pass {
assert_eq!(&packet, b"rpf");
}
let connected = TcpStream::connect_timeout(&address, Duration::from_secs(1));
assert_eq!(connected.is_ok(), should_pass, "TCP {address}");
if let Ok(mut stream) = connected {
stream
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(1)))
.unwrap();
stream.write_all(b"rpf").unwrap();
stream.read_exact(&mut packet).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&packet, b"rpf");
}
}
}
fn run_probes(expect: &str) {
let result = Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
.args(["--ignored", "--exact", TEST, "--nocapture"])
.env(ROLE, "probe")
.env("TSUNAGI_EXIT_KERNEL_EXPECT", expect)
.uid(990)
.gid(990)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
result.status.success(),
"{}\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stderr)
);
}
fn passive_listener() {
let listeners: Vec<_> = ["192.0.2.1:42010", "[2001:db8:1::1]:42010"]
.into_iter()
.map(|address| TcpListener::bind(address).unwrap())
.collect();
println!("PASSIVE_READY");
let tasks: Vec<_> = listeners
.into_iter()
.map(|listener| {
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let (mut socket, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
socket
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let mut bytes = [0; 3];
socket.read_exact(&mut bytes).unwrap();
socket.write_all(&bytes).unwrap();
})
})
.collect();
for task in tasks {
task.join().unwrap();
}
}
fn udp_listener() {
let sockets: Vec<_> = ["192.0.2.1:42011", "[2001:db8:1::1]:42011"]
.into_iter()
.map(|a| UdpSocket::bind(a).unwrap())
.collect();
println!("PASSIVE_READY");
let tasks: Vec<_> = sockets
.into_iter()
.map(|socket| {
std::thread::spawn(move || {
socket
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))
.unwrap();
let mut bytes = [0; 3];
let (len, peer) = socket.recv_from(&mut bytes).unwrap();
socket.send_to(&bytes[..len], peer).unwrap();
})
})
.collect();
for task in tasks {
task.join().unwrap();
}
}
fn spawn_listener(role: &str) -> Echo {
let process = Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
.args(["--ignored", "--exact", TEST, "--nocapture"])
.env(ROLE, role)
.uid(990)
.gid(990)
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
let mut child = Echo(process);
let mut output = BufReader::new(child.0.stdout.take().unwrap());
loop {
let mut line = String::new();
assert_ne!(
output.read_line(&mut line).unwrap(),
0,
"listener exited before readiness"
);
if line.contains("PASSIVE_READY") {
// Keep the reader open for libtest's final status after the socket
// worker finishes; closing it here makes success a broken pipe.
child.0.stdout = Some(output.into_inner());
return child;
}
}
}
fn client() {
for setting in ["rp_filter", "src_valid_mark"] {
std::fs::write(format!("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/{setting}"), b"1").unwrap();
}
std::fs::write("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/rpf-c/rp_filter", b"1").unwrap();
for family in [false, true] {
let args: Vec<_> = [
"-t",
"mangle",
"-A",
"PREROUTING",
"-m",
"rpfilter",
"--invert",
"--validmark",
"-j",
"DROP",
]
.into_iter()
.map(str::to_string)
.collect();
let result = run_firewall(family, &args);
assert!(
matches!(result, super::linux::Ran::Exited { success: true, .. }),
"{result:?}"
);
}
let provisioner = NetlinkProvisioner::new().unwrap();
let route = provisioner.host_rules().route;
// Model Tailscale's earlier lookup, without running another VPN daemon.
ip(&["-4", "rule", "add", "priority", "5270", "table", "52"]);
ip(&[
"-4", "route", "add", "default", "dev", "tsun0", "table", "52",
]);
ip(&["-6", "rule", "add", "priority", "5270", "table", "52"]);
ip(&[
"-6",
"route",
"add",
"unreachable",
"default",
"table",
"52",
]);
// A foreign VPN must leave neighbour discovery and connected LAN paths
// usable; otherwise the fixture itself cannot resolve its uplink neighbour.
for prefix in ["fe80::/64", "2001:db8:1::/64"] {
ip(&["-6", "route", "add", "throw", prefix, "table", "52"]);
}
let mut passive = spawn_listener("listener");
route.set_exit_client("tsun0", 990).unwrap();
// uid bypass alone cannot protect reverse lookups, reproducing the bug.
run_probes("blocked");
install(&run_firewall, "tsun0", 990, true).unwrap();
run_probes("pass");
// Pair transports may bind fresh UDP ports after exit activation.
let mut dynamic_udp = spawn_listener("udp-listener");
refresh(
&run_firewall,
"tsun0",
true,
&local_sockets(990, true).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
let server = std::env::var("TSUNAGI_EXIT_KERNEL_SERVER").unwrap();
let incoming = Command::new("ip").args(["netns", "exec", &server, "python3", "-c", r#"import socket
for family,source,target in [(socket.AF_INET,'198.51.100.2','192.0.2.1'),(socket.AF_INET6,'2001:db8:2::2','2001:db8:1::1')]:
for kind,port in [(socket.SOCK_STREAM,42010),(socket.SOCK_DGRAM,42011)]:
s=socket.socket(family,kind); s.settimeout(2); s.bind((source,0)); s.connect((target,port)); s.sendall(b'rpf'); assert s.recv(3)==b'rpf'; s.close()
"#]).output().unwrap();
assert!(
incoming.status.success(),
"first inbound TCP/UDP must be protected: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&incoming.stderr)
);
assert!(passive.0.wait().unwrap().success());
assert!(dynamic_udp.0.wait().unwrap().success());
// Repeated apply remains usable, and does not redirect application sockets.
install(&run_firewall, "tsun0", 990, true).unwrap();
run_probes("pass");
assert!(ip(&["-4", "route", "get", "198.51.100.2", "uid", "991"]).contains("dev tsun0"));
let blocked = Command::new("ip")
.args(["-6", "route", "get", "2001:db8:2::2", "uid", "991"])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!blocked.status.success(),
"application IPv6 must stay blocked"
);
route.clear_exit_client().unwrap();
clear(&run_firewall, "tsun0", true).unwrap();
for family in ["-4", "-6"] {
assert!(
ip(&[family, "rule", "show"]).contains("5270:"),
"foreign routing rules survive cleanup"
);
ip(&[family, "rule", "del", "priority", "5270"]);
}
assert!(ip(&["-4", "route", "get", "198.51.100.2", "uid", "991"]).contains("dev rpf-c"));
assert!(ip(&["-6", "route", "get", "2001:db8:2::2", "uid", "991"]).contains("dev rpf-c"));
for family in [false, true] {
let result = run_firewall(family, &["-t".into(), "mangle".into(), "-S".into()]);
if let super::linux::Ran::Exited { stdout, .. } = result {
assert!(!stdout.contains("tsunagi-exit-underlay:"));
assert!(!stdout.contains("tsunagi-exit-sockets:"));
assert!(
stdout.contains("rpfilter"),
"strict host filtering is retained"
);
}
}
}
#[test]
#[ignore = "needs root, iproute2, iptables/ip6tables and Python; changes only temporary namespaces"]
fn strict_firewall_preserves_underlay_and_application_exit_routing() {
match std::env::var(ROLE).as_deref() {
Ok("probe") => {
probes();
return;
}
Ok("client") => {
client();
return;
}
Ok("listener") => {
passive_listener();
return;
}
Ok("udp-listener") => {
udp_listener();
return;
}
_ => {}
}
let suffix = std::process::id();
let client_name = format!("tsng-rpf-c-{suffix}");
let server_name = format!("tsng-rpf-s-{suffix}");
ip(&["netns", "add", &client_name]);
let _client = Namespace(client_name.clone());
ip(&["netns", "add", &server_name]);
let _server = Namespace(server_name.clone());
ip(&[
"link",
"add",
"rpf-c",
"netns",
&client_name,
"type",
"veth",
"peer",
"name",
"rpf-s",
"netns",
&server_name,
]);
for (namespace, interface, v4, v6) in [
(&client_name, "rpf-c", "192.0.2.1/24", "2001:db8:1::1/64"),
(&server_name, "rpf-s", "192.0.2.2/24", "2001:db8:1::2/64"),
] {
ip(&["-n", namespace, "link", "set", "lo", "up"]);
ip(&["-n", namespace, "addr", "add", v4, "dev", interface]);
ip(&[
"-n", namespace, "-6", "addr", "add", v6, "dev", interface, "nodad",
]);
ip(&["-n", namespace, "link", "set", interface, "up"]);
}
ip(&[
"-n",
&server_name,
"addr",
"add",
"198.51.100.2/32",
"dev",
"lo",
]);
ip(&[
"-n",
&server_name,
"-6",
"addr",
"add",
"2001:db8:2::2/128",
"dev",
"lo",
"nodad",
]);
ip(&[
"-n",
&client_name,
"route",
"add",
"default",
"via",
"192.0.2.2",
]);
ip(&[
"-n",
&client_name,
"-6",
"route",
"add",
"default",
"via",
"2001:db8:1::2",
]);
ip(&["-n", &client_name, "link", "add", "tsun0", "type", "dummy"]);
ip(&[
"-n",
&client_name,
"addr",
"add",
"10.13.37.1/24",
"dev",
"tsun0",
]);
ip(&["-n", &client_name, "link", "set", "tsun0", "up"]);
let echo_code = r#"import socket,selectors,sys
selector=selectors.DefaultSelector()
for family in [socket.AF_INET,socket.AF_INET6]:
for kind in [socket.SOCK_DGRAM,socket.SOCK_STREAM]:
sock=socket.socket(family,kind)
if family==socket.AF_INET6: sock.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6,socket.IPV6_V6ONLY,1)
sock.bind(('198.51.100.2' if family==socket.AF_INET else '2001:db8:2::2',42000))
if kind==socket.SOCK_STREAM: sock.listen()
selector.register(sock,selectors.EVENT_READ,kind)
print('ready',flush=True)
while True:
for key,_ in selector.select():
if key.data==socket.SOCK_DGRAM:
data,address=key.fileobj.recvfrom(128); key.fileobj.sendto(data,address)
else:
conn,_=key.fileobj.accept(); conn.settimeout(2)
try: conn.sendall(conn.recv(128))
finally: conn.close()
"#;
let child = Command::new("ip")
.args([
"netns",
"exec",
&server_name,
"python3",
"-u",
"-c",
echo_code,
])
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
let mut echo = Echo(child);
let mut ready = String::new();
BufReader::new(echo.0.stdout.take().unwrap())
.read_line(&mut ready)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(ready.trim(), "ready");
let result = Command::new("ip")
.args(["netns", "exec", &client_name])
.arg(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
.args(["--ignored", "--exact", TEST, "--nocapture"])
.env(ROLE, "client")
.env("TSUNAGI_EXIT_KERNEL_SERVER", &server_name)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
result.status.success(),
"{}\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stderr)
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
//! Own-bit connection marks for exit-client underlay traffic.
//! Reply marks are restored before host reverse-path filtering, never accepted
//! around it. No peer address becomes a host route or firewall argument.
use super::linux::{Ran, failure, locked, split_rule_line};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
/// Outside Tailscale's 0xff0000 mask and ordinary low-bit WireGuard marks.
pub(crate) const UNDERLAY_MARK: u32 = 0x4000_0000;
pub(crate) const UNDERLAY_MASK: u32 = UNDERLAY_MARK;
const MARK: &str = "0x40000000/0x40000000";
const MASK: &str = "0x40000000";
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub(super) struct Listener {
address: IpAddr,
port: u16,
tcp: bool,
}
fn parse_listeners(listing: &str, uid: u32, v6: bool, tcp: bool) -> Result<Vec<Listener>, String> {
let mut result = Vec::new();
for line in listing.lines().skip(1) {
let fields: Vec<_> = line.split_whitespace().collect();
if (tcp && fields.get(3) != Some(&"0A"))
|| fields.get(7).and_then(|s| s.parse::<u32>().ok()) != Some(uid)
{
continue;
}
let (address, port) = fields
.get(1)
.and_then(|s| s.split_once(':'))
.ok_or("malformed local socket")?;
let port = u16::from_str_radix(port, 16).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
let address = if v6 {
let mut bytes = [0; 16];
for (word, chunk) in bytes.as_chunks_mut::<4>().0.iter_mut().enumerate() {
let hex = address
.get(word * 8..word * 8 + 8)
.ok_or("malformed local IPv6 listener")?;
chunk.copy_from_slice(
&u32::from_str_radix(hex, 16)
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
.to_ne_bytes(),
);
}
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(bytes))
} else {
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(
u32::from_str_radix(address, 16)
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
.to_ne_bytes(),
))
};
if result.len() == 128 {
return Err("too many local sockets for exit protection".into());
}
if port != 0 {
result.push(Listener { address, port, tcp });
}
}
Ok(result)
}
pub(super) fn local_sockets(uid: u32, v6: bool) -> Result<Vec<Listener>, String> {
let mut listeners = Vec::new();
for (protocol, tcp) in [("tcp", true), ("udp", false)] {
for family in [false, true].into_iter().filter(|f| !f || v6) {
let path = format!("/proc/net/{protocol}{}", if family { "6" } else { "" });
listeners.extend(parse_listeners(
&std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?,
uid,
family,
tcp,
)?);
}
}
listeners.sort();
listeners.dedup();
Ok(listeners)
}
fn listener_rules(interface: &str, listener: &Listener) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
let mut base = words(&[
"!",
"-i",
interface,
"-p",
if listener.tcp { "tcp" } else { "udp" },
"--dport",
&listener.port.to_string(),
]);
if !listener.address.is_unspecified() {
base.extend(words(&["-d", &listener.address.to_string()]));
}
// Match an actual local socket, not just a destination port. Listening
// sockets need protection on the first packet, before any outbound connmark.
base.extend(words(&[
"-m",
"socket",
"--nowildcard",
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
&listener_tag(interface),
]));
let save = base
.iter()
.cloned()
.chain(words(&[
"-m",
"mark",
"--mark",
MARK,
"-j",
"CONNMARK",
"--save-mark",
"--nfmask",
MASK,
"--ctmask",
MASK,
]))
.collect();
let mark = base
.into_iter()
.chain(words(&["-j", "MARK", "--set-xmark", MARK]))
.collect();
vec![save, mark]
}
pub(super) type RunFamily<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(bool, &[String]) -> Ran;
fn tag(interface: &str) -> String {
format!("tsunagi-exit-underlay:{interface}")
}
fn listener_tag(interface: &str) -> String {
format!("tsunagi-exit-sockets:{interface}")
}
fn words(values: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
values.iter().map(|s| (*s).into()).collect()
}
fn rules(interface: &str, uid: u32) -> Vec<(&'static str, Vec<String>)> {
let tag = tag(interface);
let uid = uid.to_string();
// Insert at position one in this order: final OUTPUT order is MARK, SAVE.
vec![
(
"PREROUTING",
words(&[
"!",
"-i",
interface,
"-m",
"connmark",
"--mark",
MARK,
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
&tag,
"-j",
"CONNMARK",
"--restore-mark",
"--nfmask",
MASK,
"--ctmask",
MASK,
]),
),
(
"OUTPUT",
words(&[
"-m",
"owner",
"--uid-owner",
&uid,
"-m",
"mark",
"--mark",
MARK,
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
&tag,
"-j",
"CONNMARK",
"--save-mark",
"--nfmask",
MASK,
"--ctmask",
MASK,
]),
),
(
"OUTPUT",
words(&[
"-m",
"owner",
"--uid-owner",
&uid,
"-m",
"comment",
"--comment",
&tag,
"-j",
"MARK",
"--set-xmark",
MARK,
]),
),
]
}
fn execute(run: RunFamily<'_>, v6: bool, args: Vec<String>) -> Result<String, String> {
match run(v6, &locked(args)) {
Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} => Ok(stdout),
Ran::Exited { stderr, .. } => Err(failure(&stderr)),
Ran::Missing => Err(format!(
"{} is required for exit-node connection marks",
if v6 { "ip6tables" } else { "iptables" }
)),
}
}
/// Removes only exact interface tags, retaining other agents and host rules.
pub(super) fn clear(run: RunFamily<'_>, interface: &str, v6: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
clear_tags(run, interface, v6, false)
}
fn clear_tags(
run: RunFamily<'_>,
interface: &str,
v6: bool,
sockets_only: bool,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let wanted = tag(interface);
let sockets = listener_tag(interface);
for family in [false, true].into_iter().filter(|family| !family || v6) {
let chains: &[&str] = if sockets_only {
&["PREROUTING"]
} else {
&["OUTPUT", "PREROUTING"]
};
for chain in chains {
let listing = execute(run, family, words(&["-t", "mangle", "-S", chain]))?;
for line in listing.lines() {
let tokens = split_rule_line(line);
let [append, listed_chain, rest @ ..] = tokens.as_slice() else {
continue;
};
if append == "-A"
&& listed_chain == *chain
&& rest.windows(2).any(|pair| {
pair[0] == "--comment"
&& (pair[1] == sockets || (!sockets_only && pair[1] == wanted))
})
{
let args = words(&["-t", "mangle", "-D", chain])
.into_iter()
.chain(rest.iter().cloned())
.collect();
execute(run, family, args)?;
}
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Establishes protection before routing may redirect application traffic.
pub(super) fn install(
run: RunFamily<'_>,
interface: &str,
uid: u32,
v6: bool,
) -> Result<Vec<Listener>, String> {
let listeners = local_sockets(uid, v6)?;
install_with_listeners(run, interface, uid, v6, &listeners)?;
Ok(listeners)
}
fn install_with_listeners(
run: RunFamily<'_>,
interface: &str,
uid: u32,
v6: bool,
listeners: &[Listener],
) -> Result<(), String> {
clear(run, interface, v6)?;
let result = (|| {
for family in [false, true].into_iter().filter(|family| !family || v6) {
for (chain, spec) in rules(interface, uid) {
let args = words(&["-t", "mangle", "-I", chain, "1"])
.into_iter()
.chain(spec)
.collect();
execute(run, family, args)?;
}
for listener in listeners.iter().filter(|s| s.address.is_ipv6() == family) {
for spec in listener_rules(interface, listener) {
execute(
run,
family,
words(&["-t", "mangle", "-I", "PREROUTING", "1"])
.into_iter()
.chain(spec)
.collect(),
)?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
})();
if result.is_err()
&& let Err(cleanup) = clear(run, interface, v6)
{
return Err(format!(
"{}; cannot roll back connection marks: {cleanup}",
result.err().unwrap_or_default()
));
}
result
}
/// Updates passive protection without interrupting established connmark rules.
pub(super) fn refresh(
run: RunFamily<'_>,
interface: &str,
v6: bool,
listeners: &[Listener],
) -> Result<(), String> {
clear_tags(run, interface, v6, true)?;
for family in [false, true].into_iter().filter(|f| !f || v6) {
for listener in listeners.iter().filter(|s| s.address.is_ipv6() == family) {
for spec in listener_rules(interface, listener) {
execute(
run,
family,
words(&["-t", "mangle", "-I", "PREROUTING", "1"])
.into_iter()
.chain(spec)
.collect(),
)?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Kernel strict RPF must include the restored mark, independently of iptables.
pub(super) fn check_kernel_rpf(
all_rpf: u32,
all_valid: u32,
interfaces: &[(String, u32, u32)],
) -> Result<(), String> {
for (interface, rpf, valid) in interfaces {
if all_rpf.max(*rpf) == 1 && all_valid.max(*valid) == 0 {
return Err(format!(
"strict rp_filter on `{interface}` ignores connection marks; enable net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark=1 before using an exit node (rp_filter stays enabled)"
));
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use std::cell::RefCell;
#[test]
fn both_families_restore_before_firewall_and_preserve_foreign_mark_bits() {
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |v6, args: &[String]| {
calls.borrow_mut().push((v6, args.to_vec()));
Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: String::new(),
}
};
install_with_listeners(&run, "tsun0", 990, true, &[]).unwrap();
let calls = calls.borrow();
for family in [false, true] {
let inserts: Vec<_> = calls
.iter()
.filter(|(v6, a)| *v6 == family && a.iter().any(|s| s == "-I"))
.map(|(_, a)| a.join(" "))
.collect();
assert_eq!(inserts.len(), 3);
assert!(inserts[0].contains("-I PREROUTING 1 ! -i tsun0 -m connmark"));
assert!(inserts[0].contains("--restore-mark --nfmask 0x40000000 --ctmask 0x40000000"));
assert!(inserts[1].contains("--uid-owner 990"));
assert!(inserts[1].contains("--save-mark"));
assert!(inserts[2].contains("--set-xmark 0x40000000/0x40000000"));
assert!(
!inserts
.iter()
.any(|s| s.contains("-j ACCEPT") || s.contains("-j RETURN"))
);
}
assert_eq!(UNDERLAY_MASK & 0x00ff_0000, 0);
}
#[test]
fn cleanup_retains_other_interfaces_and_rolls_back_partial_ipv6_installation() {
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |v6, args: &[String]| {
calls.borrow_mut().push((v6, args.to_vec()));
let listing = "-A OUTPUT -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit-underlay:tsun0 -j MARK --set-xmark 0x40000000/0x40000000\n-A OUTPUT -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit-underlay:tsun1 -j MARK --set-xmark 0x40000000/0x40000000\n-A OUTPUT -m comment --comment unrelated -j RETURN\n";
Ran::Exited {
success: !(v6 && args.iter().any(|s| s == "-I")),
stdout: if args.iter().any(|s| s == "-S") {
listing.into()
} else {
String::new()
},
stderr: "injected IPv6 failure".into(),
}
};
assert!(install_with_listeners(&run, "tsun0", 990, true, &[]).is_err());
let calls = calls.borrow();
let deletions: Vec<_> = calls
.iter()
.filter(|(_, a)| a.iter().any(|s| s == "-D"))
.collect();
assert!(
deletions.len() >= 4,
"both initial and rollback cleanup run"
);
assert!(
deletions
.iter()
.all(|(_, a)| a.iter().any(|s| s == "tsunagi-exit-underlay:tsun0"))
);
}
#[test]
fn kernel_strict_validation_requires_mark_awareness_without_weakening_rpf() {
let interfaces = vec![("eth0".into(), 1, 0)];
assert!(check_kernel_rpf(0, 0, &interfaces).is_err());
assert!(check_kernel_rpf(0, 1, &interfaces).is_ok());
assert!(check_kernel_rpf(2, 0, &interfaces).is_ok());
assert!(check_kernel_rpf(0, 0, &[("eth0".into(), 1, 1)]).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn passive_tcp_protection_uses_only_locally_owned_listeners() {
let listing = "header\n0: 00000000:01BB 00000000:0000 0A 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 1\n1: 0100007F:1111 00000000:0000 0A 0:0 0:0 0 1000 0 2\n2: 0100007F:2222 00000000:0000 01 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 3\n";
let listeners = parse_listeners(listing, 990, false, true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
listeners,
vec![Listener {
address: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
port: 443,
tcp: true
}]
);
let rules = listener_rules("tsun0", &listeners[0]);
assert!(
rules[0]
.join(" ")
.contains("-p tcp --dport 443 -m socket --nowildcard")
);
assert!(rules[0].join(" ").contains("--save-mark"));
assert!(rules[1].join(" ").contains("--set-xmark"));
}
#[test]
fn listener_parser_checks_family_encoding_and_bounds() {
let loopback = Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST.octets();
let hex: String = loopback
.as_chunks::<4>()
.0
.iter()
.map(|bytes| format!("{:08X}", u32::from_ne_bytes(*bytes)))
.collect();
let listing = format!("header\n0: {hex}:01BB 0:0 0A 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 1\n");
assert_eq!(
parse_listeners(&listing, 990, true, true).unwrap(),
vec![Listener {
address: IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST),
port: 443,
tcp: true
}]
);
assert!(
parse_listeners(
"header\n0: BAD:01BB 0:0 0A 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 1",
990,
true,
true
)
.is_err()
);
let huge = format!(
"header\n{}",
"0: 00000000:01BB 0:0 0A 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 1\n".repeat(129)
);
assert!(parse_listeners(&huge, 990, false, true).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn udp_refresh_preserves_general_connmark_protection_and_other_interfaces() {
let listing = "header\n0: 00000000:ABA0 0:0 07 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 1\n1: 00000000:0000 0:0 07 0:0 0:0 0 990 0 2\n";
let sockets = parse_listeners(listing, 990, false, false).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sockets.len(), 1);
assert!(!sockets[0].tcp);
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |v6, args: &[String]| {
calls.borrow_mut().push((v6, args.join(" ")));
Ran::Exited { success: true, stdout: "-A PREROUTING -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit-underlay:tsun0 -j CONNMARK --restore-mark\n-A PREROUTING -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit-sockets:tsun0 -j MARK\n-A PREROUTING -m comment --comment tsunagi-exit-sockets:tsun1 -j MARK\n".into(), stderr: String::new() }
};
refresh(&run, "tsun0", false, &sockets).unwrap();
let calls = calls.borrow();
assert!(
calls
.iter()
.any(|(_, a)| a.contains("-I PREROUTING 1") && a.contains("-p udp"))
);
assert!(
calls
.iter()
.filter(|(_, a)| a.contains("-D"))
.all(|(_, a)| a.contains("tsunagi-exit-sockets:tsun0"))
);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
//! Broadcast host rules on macOS: a `route` entry; the firewall is deferred.
//!
//! The limited-broadcast route is installed with `/sbin/route`, so a game's
//! LAN discovery packet leaves through the overlay interface. It belongs to
//! the interface and is removed when broadcast is turned off, the network
//! leaves, or the agent stops — and, because a utun is torn down with the
//! process, it also goes away on its own if the agent is killed.
//!
//! The inbound-UDP firewall allowance is **not** implemented here. On macOS
//! that means a `pf` anchor, which is a good deal more machinery; until it is
//! written the firewall half reports itself as missing with what to allow by
//! hand, and the route is still installed. Failure is contained: neither half
//! can stop the agent, and `status` shows exactly which is in place.
//!
//! `route` is a program, not a system call, so it is run by absolute path from
//! `/sbin` rather than off `PATH`, and its arguments are built from values
//! this agent computed — the interface name the kernel assigned, nothing a
//! peer said.
use crate::BoxFuture;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use super::exit::{ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport, ExitHostRules};
use super::macos_exit::{apply_plan, clear_all, run_tool};
use super::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, RuleOutcome};
/// The limited-broadcast destination routed through the overlay interface.
const LIMITED_BROADCAST: &str = "255.255.255.255";
/// The `route` arguments that direct the limited broadcast out an interface.
fn route_add_args(interface: &str) -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"add".into(),
"-host".into(),
LIMITED_BROADCAST.into(),
"-interface".into(),
interface.into(),
]
}
/// The `route` arguments that remove it again.
fn route_del_args(interface: &str) -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"delete".into(),
"-host".into(),
LIMITED_BROADCAST.into(),
"-interface".into(),
interface.into(),
]
}
/// What to do by hand while the `pf` allowance is unimplemented.
fn firewall_todo(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
format!(
"the inbound-UDP firewall allowance is not implemented on macOS yet; if the host \
firewall drops discovery replies, allow inbound UDP from {} on `{}` with a pf rule \
yourself",
plan.range, plan.interface
)
}
/// The macOS implementation: `route` for the route, no firewall yet, and
/// `pf` plus `route` for exit nodes (see [`super::macos_exit`]).
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct MacosHostRules {
/// The reference `pfctl -E` handed out, held while exit-node rules need
/// `pf` on and released when they are removed.
pub(super) pf_token: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
}
impl MacosHostRules {
/// Creates the host rules.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Installs the route, replacing one this agent added earlier so the call
/// can be repeated. The delete is best effort: a route that is not there
/// is the state the add then reaches anyway.
async fn set_route(&self, interface: String) -> RuleOutcome {
let _ = run(route_del_args(&interface)).await;
match run(route_add_args(&interface)).await {
Ok(()) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Err(reason) => RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
}
}
}
impl ExitHostRules for MacosHostRules {
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, ExitHostReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let job_plan = plan.clone();
let token = Arc::clone(&self.pf_token);
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || apply_plan(&run_tool, &token, &job_plan))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| {
let failed = RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("the task failed: {err}"));
ExitHostReport {
offer: plan
.offer
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, failed.clone()))
.collect(),
forwarding: None,
client: plan.client.then_some(failed),
}
})
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let name = interface.to_string();
let token = Arc::clone(&self.pf_token);
let _ = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || clear_all(&run_tool, &token, &name)).await;
})
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for MacosHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"route"
}
fn exit_rules(&self) -> Option<&dyn ExitHostRules> {
Some(self)
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = self.set_route(plan.interface.clone()).await;
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route,
firewall: RuleOutcome::Failed(firewall_todo(plan)),
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
if let Err(reason) = run(route_del_args(interface)).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %interface, %reason, "cannot remove the broadcast route");
}
})
}
}
/// Runs `/sbin/route`, turning a non-zero exit into the message it printed.
async fn run(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), String> {
let display = format!("route {}", args.join(" "));
let output = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
std::process::Command::new("/sbin/route")
.args(&args)
.output()
})
.await
.map_err(|err| format!("could not run {display}: {err}"))?
.map_err(|err| format!("could not run {display}: {err}"))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(());
}
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let text = stderr.trim();
if text.is_empty() {
Err(format!("{display} failed with {}", output.status))
} else {
Err(format!("{display} failed: {text}"))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use super::*;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "utun5".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
#[test]
fn the_route_is_the_limited_broadcast_out_the_interface() {
assert_eq!(
route_add_args("utun5"),
vec![
"-q",
"-n",
"add",
"-host",
"255.255.255.255",
"-interface",
"utun5"
]
);
assert_eq!(
route_del_args("utun5"),
vec![
"-q",
"-n",
"delete",
"-host",
"255.255.255.255",
"-interface",
"utun5"
]
);
}
#[test]
fn the_firewall_todo_names_the_range_and_interface() {
let todo = firewall_todo(&plan());
assert!(todo.contains("10.13.37.0/24"), "{todo}");
assert!(todo.contains("utun5"), "{todo}");
assert!(todo.contains("pf"), "{todo}");
// Deferred, so the firewall half is always reported as not in place;
// the route runs for real and so is left to an on-host check. Running
// `route` here would need root and would change the host routing
// table, which the default test suite must never do.
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,915 @@
//! Exit-node host rules on macOS: a `pf` anchor and `route` entries.
//!
//! Compiled on every platform so the rule text and the parsers are tested
//! everywhere; only `MacosHostRules` runs them, and only on macOS.
//!
//! # Offering
//!
//! Per offered range, in the anchor `com.apple/tsunagi-exit-<if>`:
//!
//! ```text
//! nat on <egress> inet from <range> to any -> (<egress>)
//! pass in quick on <if> inet from <range> to ! <range>
//! ```
//!
//! The anchor lives under `com.apple/` on purpose: the stock `/etc/pf.conf`
//! evaluates `nat-anchor "com.apple/*"` and `anchor "com.apple/*"`, so the
//! rules take effect without editing the user's ruleset. `pf` cannot say
//! "every interface but one" in a translation address, so the egress is the
//! interface of the default route **when the rules are applied**; after the
//! default route moves (Wi-Fi to Ethernet) the rules are re-applied by
//! switching the exit node off and on, or restarting the agent.
//!
//! The kernel's `net.inet.ip.forwarding` is only read, never written: it
//! changes how the whole host behaves, which is the owner's decision.
//!
//! # Using
//!
//! macOS has no `uidrange` policy routing, and the agent is root, so the
//! Linux scheme does not carry over. Instead:
//!
//! ```text
//! route add -net 0.0.0.0/1 -interface <if>
//! route add -net 128.0.0.0/1 -interface <if>
//! pass out quick on <if> route-to (<egress> <gateway>) inet proto { tcp udp }
//! from any to ! <overlay ranges> user <agent uid>
//! nat on <egress> inet from (<if>) to any -> (<egress>)
//! ```
//!
//! The two halves outrank the default route without replacing it, and every
//! more specific route (LAN, another VPN) keeps working. The `route-to` rule
//! sends the *agent's own* traffic — QUIC, relay, DHT, which would otherwise
//! loop into the tunnel it carries — back out the physical interface, and the
//! translation gives it that interface's address, since an unbound socket
//! picked the overlay address when the route pointed at the overlay. Like the
//! Linux exemption this is by user id, so anything else running as root also
//! bypasses the tunnel.
//!
//! IPv6 is blocked while an exit node is in use, as on Linux: `::/1` and
//! `8000::/1` are rejecting routes, so applications fall back to IPv4 at once
//! instead of leaking.
//!
//! Every object is derived from local state and the interface the agent owns;
//! none of it comes from a peer.
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
use super::RuleOutcome;
use super::exit::{ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport};
/// The programs this module runs, always by absolute path.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum Tool {
Route,
Pfctl,
Sysctl,
Id,
}
impl Tool {
fn path(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Route => "/sbin/route",
Self::Pfctl => "/sbin/pfctl",
Self::Sysctl => "/usr/sbin/sysctl",
Self::Id => "/usr/bin/id",
}
}
}
/// What running a tool came to.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum Ran {
/// The program is not there.
Missing,
/// It ran.
Exited {
success: bool,
stdout: String,
stderr: String,
},
}
/// Runs a tool with optional standard input; injectable so the logic is
/// tested without touching the host.
pub(super) type Run<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(Tool, &[String], Option<&str>) -> Ran;
/// Runs a real tool. Blocking: callers use `spawn_blocking`.
pub(super) fn run_tool(tool: Tool, args: &[String], stdin: Option<&str>) -> Ran {
use std::io::Write;
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
let mut command = Command::new(tool.path());
command
.args(args)
.stdin(if stdin.is_some() {
Stdio::piped()
} else {
Stdio::null()
})
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped());
let mut child = match command.spawn() {
Ok(child) => child,
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ran::Missing,
Err(err) => {
return Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: format!("could not run {}: {err}", tool.path()),
};
}
};
if let (Some(text), Some(mut pipe)) = (stdin, child.stdin.take()) {
// A write error shows up as the tool's own failure below.
let _ = pipe.write_all(text.as_bytes());
}
match child.wait_with_output() {
Ok(output) => Ran::Exited {
success: output.status.success(),
stdout: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).into_owned(),
stderr: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).into_owned(),
},
Err(err) => Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: format!("could not run {}: {err}", tool.path()),
},
}
}
fn owned(words: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
words.iter().map(|word| word.to_string()).collect()
}
/// A name that is safe in a `pf` rule, an anchor path and a table name.
fn safe_name(name: &str) -> bool {
!name.is_empty() && name.len() <= 32 && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
}
/// The anchor holding every rule of one interface.
fn anchor_name(interface: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
if safe_name(interface) {
Ok(format!("com.apple/tsunagi-exit-{interface}"))
} else {
Err(format!(
"`{interface}` is not an interface name this agent can write a pf rule for"
))
}
}
/// The default route as `route -n get default` reports it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) struct DefaultRoute {
pub interface: String,
pub gateway: Option<Ipv4Addr>,
}
/// Reads `interface:` and `gateway:` out of `route -n get default`.
fn parse_default_route(text: &str) -> Option<DefaultRoute> {
let field = |name: &str| {
text.lines().find_map(|line| {
let (key, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
(key.trim() == name).then(|| value.trim().to_string())
})
};
let interface = field("interface").filter(|name| safe_name(name))?;
let gateway = field("gateway").and_then(|value| value.parse().ok());
Some(DefaultRoute { interface, gateway })
}
fn failure(stderr: &str, stdout: &str) -> String {
let text = if stderr.trim().is_empty() {
stdout.trim()
} else {
stderr.trim()
};
if text.is_empty() {
"the command failed without saying why".to_string()
} else {
text.to_string()
}
}
/// Runs a tool and turns a failure into a sentence a person can act on.
fn run_ok(
run: Run<'_>,
tool: Tool,
args: &[String],
stdin: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<String, String> {
match run(tool, args, stdin) {
Ran::Missing => Err(format!("{} not found", tool.path())),
Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout,
..
} => Ok(stdout),
Ran::Exited { stderr, stdout, .. } => Err(format!(
"{} {} failed: {}",
tool.path(),
args.join(" "),
failure(&stderr, &stdout)
)),
}
}
/// The route traffic leaves by now, which is the egress for translation and
/// for the agent's own sockets. Read *before* the overlay routes are added.
fn default_route(run: Run<'_>, overlay: &str) -> Result<DefaultRoute, String> {
let out = run_ok(run, Tool::Route, &owned(&["-n", "get", "default"]), None)
.map_err(|why| format!("cannot find the default route: {why}"))?;
let route = parse_default_route(&out)
.ok_or_else(|| "the host has no default route to send traffic out of".to_string())?;
if route.interface == overlay {
return Err(format!(
"the default route already goes through `{overlay}`"
));
}
Ok(route)
}
/// Whether the kernel forwards IPv4. Read only.
fn forwarding_state(run: Run<'_>) -> Option<bool> {
let out = run_ok(
run,
Tool::Sysctl,
&owned(&["-n", "net.inet.ip.forwarding"]),
None,
)
.ok()?;
match out.trim() {
"1" => Some(true),
"0" => Some(false),
_ => None,
}
}
/// The effective user id of this process, from `id -u`.
fn agent_uid(run: Run<'_>) -> Result<u32, String> {
run_ok(run, Tool::Id, &owned(&["-u"]), None)
.ok()
.and_then(|out| out.trim().parse().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| "cannot tell which user this agent runs as".to_string())
}
/// What the using side adds to the rules.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct ClientRules<'a> {
uid: u32,
/// Every overlay range: the agent's own traffic *to* those still goes
/// through the interface.
overlay: &'a [Ipv4Range],
}
/// The text of the anchor: translation first, filtering after, which is the
/// order `pf` insists on.
fn pf_rules(
interface: &str,
egress: &DefaultRoute,
offer: &[Ipv4Range],
client: Option<&ClientRules<'_>>,
) -> String {
let out = &egress.interface;
let mut nat = Vec::new();
let mut filter = Vec::new();
for range in offer {
nat.push(format!("nat on {out} inet from {range} to any -> ({out})"));
filter.push(format!(
"pass in quick on {interface} inet from {range} to ! {range}"
));
}
let mut tables = Vec::new();
if let Some(client) = client {
nat.push(format!(
"nat on {out} inet from ({interface}) to any -> ({out})"
));
let target = if client.overlay.is_empty() {
"any".to_string()
} else {
let ranges: Vec<String> = client.overlay.iter().map(|r| r.to_string()).collect();
// A table, because `! { a, b }` expands to one rule per element
// in older `pf`, which matches everything.
tables.push(format!(
"table <tsunagi_overlay_{interface}> const {{ {} }}",
ranges.join(", ")
));
format!("! <tsunagi_overlay_{interface}>")
};
let via = match egress.gateway {
Some(gateway) => format!("({out} {gateway})"),
None => out.clone(),
};
filter.push(format!(
"pass out quick on {interface} route-to {via} inet proto {{ tcp udp }} \
from any to {target} user {}",
client.uid
));
}
tables
.into_iter()
.chain(nat)
.chain(filter)
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n")
+ "\n"
}
/// Turns `pf` on if nobody has, holding the reference `pfctl` hands out so it
/// can be released when the agent is done. One reference at most.
fn acquire_pf(run: Run<'_>, slot: &Mutex<Option<String>>) -> Result<(), String> {
if lock(slot).is_some() {
return Ok(());
}
match run(Tool::Pfctl, &owned(&["-E"]), None) {
Ran::Missing => Err(format!("{} not found", Tool::Pfctl.path())),
Ran::Exited {
success,
stdout,
stderr,
} => {
// `pfctl -E` reports `Token : <n>` on stderr, and also says so
// when pf is already enabled.
let token = stdout.lines().chain(stderr.lines()).find_map(parse_token);
if !success && token.is_none() {
return Err(format!("cannot enable pf: {}", failure(&stderr, &stdout)));
}
*lock(slot) = token;
Ok(())
}
}
}
fn parse_token(line: &str) -> Option<String> {
let (key, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
let value = value.trim();
(key.trim().eq_ignore_ascii_case("token")
&& !value.is_empty()
&& value.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()))
.then(|| value.to_string())
}
fn release_pf(run: Run<'_>, slot: &Mutex<Option<String>>) {
if let Some(token) = lock(slot).take()
&& let Err(why) = run_ok(run, Tool::Pfctl, &["-X".to_string(), token], None)
{
tracing::debug!(%why, "cannot release the pf reference");
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
fn flush_args(anchor: &str) -> Vec<String> {
owned(&["-q", "-a", anchor, "-F", "all"])
}
fn load_args(anchor: &str) -> Vec<String> {
owned(&["-q", "-a", anchor, "-f", "-"])
}
/// The two halves that out-rank the default route.
const HALVES: [&str; 2] = ["0.0.0.0/1", "128.0.0.0/1"];
/// The IPv6 halves, made unreachable.
const HALVES_V6: [&str; 2] = ["::/1", "8000::/1"];
fn route_add_args(half: &str, interface: &str) -> Vec<String> {
owned(&["-q", "-n", "add", "-net", half, "-interface", interface])
}
fn route_del_args(half: &str, interface: &str) -> Vec<String> {
owned(&["-q", "-n", "delete", "-net", half, "-interface", interface])
}
fn route_add_v6_args(half: &str) -> Vec<String> {
owned(&["-q", "-n", "add", "-inet6", "-net", half, "::1", "-reject"])
}
fn route_del_v6_args(half: &str) -> Vec<String> {
owned(&["-q", "-n", "delete", "-inet6", "-net", half, "::1"])
}
/// Takes away the overlay default routes. Best effort: what is not there is
/// the state wanted.
fn clear_routes(run: Run<'_>, interface: &str) {
for half in HALVES {
let _ = run(Tool::Route, &route_del_args(half, interface), None);
}
for half in HALVES_V6 {
let _ = run(Tool::Route, &route_del_v6_args(half), None);
}
}
fn set_routes(run: Run<'_>, interface: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
clear_routes(run, interface);
for half in HALVES {
if let Err(why) = run_ok(run, Tool::Route, &route_add_args(half, interface), None) {
clear_routes(run, interface);
return Err(why);
}
}
for half in HALVES_V6 {
// A host without IPv6 has nothing to block; not a failure.
if let Err(why) = run_ok(run, Tool::Route, &route_add_v6_args(half), None) {
tracing::debug!(%why, "cannot block IPv6 for the exit node");
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Makes the host match the plan.
pub(super) fn apply_plan(
run: Run<'_>,
token: &Mutex<Option<String>>,
plan: &ExitHostPlan,
) -> ExitHostReport {
let forwarding = if plan.offer.is_empty() {
None
} else {
forwarding_state(run)
};
let outcome = apply_rules(run, token, plan);
let verdict = |ok: bool, why: &str| {
if ok {
RuleOutcome::Applied
} else {
RuleOutcome::Failed(why.to_string())
}
};
match outcome {
Ok(()) => ExitHostReport {
offer: plan
.offer
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, RuleOutcome::Applied))
.collect(),
forwarding,
client: plan.client.then_some(RuleOutcome::Applied),
},
Err(why) => ExitHostReport {
offer: plan
.offer
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, verdict(false, &why)))
.collect(),
forwarding,
client: plan.client.then(|| verdict(false, &why)),
},
}
}
fn apply_rules(
run: Run<'_>,
token: &Mutex<Option<String>>,
plan: &ExitHostPlan,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let interface = plan.interface.as_str();
let anchor = anchor_name(interface)?;
let egress = default_route(run, interface)?;
let uid = if plan.client {
Some(agent_uid(run)?)
} else {
None
};
let client = uid.map(|uid| ClientRules {
uid,
overlay: &plan.overlay,
});
let rules = pf_rules(interface, &egress, &plan.offer, client.as_ref());
acquire_pf(run, token)?;
run_ok(run, Tool::Pfctl, &load_args(&anchor), Some(&rules))
.map_err(|why| format!("cannot load the pf rules: {why}"))?;
// The routes come after the rules that keep the agent's own traffic off
// them: the other order would loop for as long as it takes.
if plan.client {
set_routes(run, interface)?;
} else {
clear_routes(run, interface);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Removes everything this agent put there for the interface.
pub(super) fn clear_all(run: Run<'_>, token: &Mutex<Option<String>>, interface: &str) {
clear_routes(run, interface);
if let Ok(anchor) = anchor_name(interface) {
// Flushing an anchor nothing was ever loaded into is not an error
// worth reporting.
if let Err(why) = run_ok(run, Tool::Pfctl, &flush_args(&anchor), None) {
tracing::debug!(%why, "cannot flush the exit node pf anchor");
}
}
release_pf(run, token);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::cell::RefCell;
use super::*;
fn range() -> Ipv4Range {
"10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()
}
const DEFAULT_ROUTE: &str = " route to: default\n\
destination: default\n\
mask: default\n\
gateway: 192.168.1.1\n\
interface: en0\n\
flags: <UP,GATEWAY,DONE,STATIC,PRCLONING,GLOBAL>\n";
fn egress() -> DefaultRoute {
DefaultRoute {
interface: "en0".into(),
gateway: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 1)),
}
}
/// A scripted host that records every call.
struct Fake {
calls: RefCell<Vec<String>>,
stdins: RefCell<Vec<String>>,
default_route: Option<String>,
forwarding: &'static str,
pf_missing: bool,
pf_load_fails: bool,
route_add_fails: bool,
pf_enable_output: &'static str,
}
impl Fake {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
calls: RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
stdins: RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
default_route: Some(DEFAULT_ROUTE.to_string()),
forwarding: "1\n",
pf_missing: false,
pf_load_fails: false,
route_add_fails: false,
pf_enable_output: "pf enabled\nToken : 4242\n",
}
}
fn run(&self, tool: Tool, args: &[String], stdin: Option<&str>) -> Ran {
let line = format!("{:?} {}", tool, args.join(" "));
self.calls.borrow_mut().push(line);
if let Some(text) = stdin {
self.stdins.borrow_mut().push(text.to_string());
}
let ok = |stdout: &str, stderr: &str| Ran::Exited {
success: true,
stdout: stdout.to_string(),
stderr: stderr.to_string(),
};
let fail = |why: &str| Ran::Exited {
success: false,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: why.to_string(),
};
match tool {
Tool::Id => ok("0\n", ""),
Tool::Sysctl => ok(self.forwarding, ""),
Tool::Route if args.first().map(String::as_str) == Some("-n") => {
match &self.default_route {
Some(text) => ok(text, ""),
None => fail("route: writing to routing socket: not in table"),
}
}
Tool::Route if args.contains(&"add".to_string()) && self.route_add_fails => {
fail("route: writing to routing socket: File exists")
}
Tool::Route => ok("", ""),
Tool::Pfctl if self.pf_missing => Ran::Missing,
Tool::Pfctl if args == ["-E"] => ok("", self.pf_enable_output),
Tool::Pfctl if args.contains(&"-f".to_string()) && self.pf_load_fails => {
fail("pfctl: Syntax error")
}
Tool::Pfctl => ok("", ""),
}
}
fn calls(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.calls.borrow().clone()
}
fn position(&self, needle: &str) -> Option<usize> {
self.calls.borrow().iter().position(|c| c.contains(needle))
}
fn count(&self, needle: &str) -> usize {
self.calls
.borrow()
.iter()
.filter(|c| c.contains(needle))
.count()
}
}
fn plan(offer: bool, client: bool) -> ExitHostPlan {
ExitHostPlan {
interface: "utun5".into(),
offer: if offer { vec![range()] } else { Vec::new() },
client,
overlay: vec![range()],
..Default::default()
}
}
#[test]
fn the_default_route_is_read_from_route_output() {
assert_eq!(parse_default_route(DEFAULT_ROUTE), Some(egress()));
// A point-to-point default has no gateway line to use.
let ppp = "destination: default\n interface: ppp0\n";
assert_eq!(
parse_default_route(ppp),
Some(DefaultRoute {
interface: "ppp0".into(),
gateway: None
})
);
assert_eq!(parse_default_route("route: not in table"), None);
// An interface name that is not plain letters and digits never ends
// up in a rule.
assert_eq!(parse_default_route("interface: en0; pass all\n"), None);
}
#[test]
fn the_anchor_is_under_com_apple_and_only_for_plain_names() {
assert_eq!(
anchor_name("utun5").unwrap(),
"com.apple/tsunagi-exit-utun5"
);
assert!(anchor_name("").is_err());
assert!(anchor_name("utun5 pass all").is_err());
assert!(anchor_name("../x").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn offering_translates_the_range_and_admits_it_in() {
let text = pf_rules("utun5", &egress(), &[range()], None);
assert_eq!(
text,
"nat on en0 inet from 10.13.37.0/24 to any -> (en0)\n\
pass in quick on utun5 inet from 10.13.37.0/24 to ! 10.13.37.0/24\n"
);
// Translation precedes filtering, as pf requires.
assert!(text.find("nat on").unwrap() < text.find("pass in").unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn using_sends_the_agents_own_traffic_back_out_the_physical_interface() {
let other: Ipv4Range = "10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap();
let overlay = [range(), other];
let client = ClientRules {
uid: 0,
overlay: &overlay,
};
let text = pf_rules("utun5", &egress(), &[], Some(&client));
assert!(
text.starts_with(
"table <tsunagi_overlay_utun5> const { 10.13.37.0/24, 10.99.0.0/16 }\n"
),
"{text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains("nat on en0 inet from (utun5) to any -> (en0)\n"),
"{text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains(
"pass out quick on utun5 route-to (en0 192.168.1.1) inet proto { tcp udp } \
from any to ! <tsunagi_overlay_utun5> user 0\n"
),
"{text}"
);
// Only the agent's user, and only what is not the overlay.
assert!(!text.contains("from any to any"));
let direct = DefaultRoute {
interface: "ppp0".into(),
gateway: None,
};
let text = pf_rules(
"utun5",
&direct,
&[],
Some(&ClientRules {
uid: 501,
overlay: &[],
}),
);
assert!(text.contains("route-to ppp0 inet"), "{text}");
assert!(text.contains("to any user 501"), "{text}");
assert!(!text.contains("table"), "{text}");
}
#[test]
fn the_overlay_default_routes_are_halves_and_ipv6_is_rejected() {
assert_eq!(
route_add_args("0.0.0.0/1", "utun5").join(" "),
"-q -n add -net 0.0.0.0/1 -interface utun5"
);
assert_eq!(
route_del_args("128.0.0.0/1", "utun5").join(" "),
"-q -n delete -net 128.0.0.0/1 -interface utun5"
);
assert_eq!(
route_add_v6_args("8000::/1").join(" "),
"-q -n add -inet6 -net 8000::/1 ::1 -reject"
);
assert_eq!(
route_del_v6_args("::/1").join(" "),
"-q -n delete -inet6 -net ::/1 ::1"
);
}
#[test]
fn the_pf_token_is_found_in_either_stream() {
assert_eq!(parse_token("Token : 1234"), Some("1234".into()));
assert_eq!(parse_token("token: 9"), Some("9".into()));
assert_eq!(parse_token("pf enabled"), None);
assert_eq!(parse_token("Token : x; rm"), None);
}
#[test]
fn offering_loads_the_anchor_and_reads_but_never_writes_forwarding() {
let fake = Fake::new();
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, false));
assert_eq!(report.offer, vec![(range(), RuleOutcome::Applied)]);
assert_eq!(report.forwarding, Some(true));
assert_eq!(report.client, None);
let calls = fake.calls();
assert!(
calls
.iter()
.any(|c| c == "Pfctl -q -a com.apple/tsunagi-exit-utun5 -f -"),
"{calls:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
fake.stdins.borrow()[0],
"nat on en0 inet from 10.13.37.0/24 to any -> (en0)\n\
pass in quick on utun5 inet from 10.13.37.0/24 to ! 10.13.37.0/24\n"
);
// sysctl is only ever asked, never told.
assert!(
calls
.iter()
.filter(|c| c.starts_with("Sysctl"))
.all(|c| c == "Sysctl -n net.inet.ip.forwarding"),
"{calls:?}"
);
// No client routes were added for an offer alone.
assert_eq!(fake.count(" add "), 0);
assert_eq!(token.lock().unwrap().as_deref(), Some("4242"));
}
#[test]
fn forwarding_off_is_reported_and_unreadable_is_none() {
let mut fake = Fake::new();
fake.forwarding = "0\n";
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, false));
assert_eq!(report.forwarding, Some(false));
fake.forwarding = "junk";
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, false));
assert_eq!(report.forwarding, None);
}
#[test]
fn the_client_rules_are_loaded_before_the_routes_that_need_them() {
let fake = Fake::new();
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(false, true));
assert_eq!(report.client, Some(RuleOutcome::Applied));
assert!(report.offer.is_empty());
let load = fake.position("-f -").unwrap();
let add = fake.position(" add -net 0.0.0.0/1").unwrap();
assert!(load < add, "{:?}", fake.calls());
assert!(fake.position("add -net 128.0.0.0/1").is_some());
assert!(fake.position("-inet6 -net ::/1 ::1 -reject").is_some());
assert!(fake.stdins.borrow()[0].contains("user 0"));
// The default route was read before any overlay route existed.
assert!(fake.position("-n get default").unwrap() < add);
}
#[test]
fn no_routes_are_added_when_the_rules_did_not_load() {
let mut fake = Fake::new();
fake.pf_load_fails = true;
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, true));
let Some(RuleOutcome::Failed(why)) = report.client else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("cannot load the pf rules"), "{why}");
assert!(why.contains("Syntax error"), "{why}");
assert!(matches!(report.offer[0].1, RuleOutcome::Failed(_)));
// Nothing sent the host's traffic into a tunnel it could not exempt
// the agent from.
assert_eq!(fake.count(" add "), 0);
}
#[test]
fn a_failing_route_is_a_failure_and_leaves_nothing_behind() {
let mut fake = Fake::new();
fake.route_add_fails = true;
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(false, true));
let Some(RuleOutcome::Failed(why)) = report.client else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("File exists"), "{why}");
// The cleanup after the failed add removed whatever did land.
let last_add = fake
.calls()
.iter()
.rposition(|c| c.contains(" add "))
.unwrap();
assert!(
fake.calls()[last_add..]
.iter()
.any(|c| c.contains("delete"))
);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_pfctl_or_default_route_says_what_is_wrong() {
let mut fake = Fake::new();
fake.pf_missing = true;
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, false));
let RuleOutcome::Failed(why) = &report.offer[0].1 else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("/sbin/pfctl not found"), "{why}");
let mut fake = Fake::new();
fake.default_route = None;
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, false));
let RuleOutcome::Failed(why) = &report.offer[0].1 else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("default route"), "{why}");
assert_eq!(fake.count("-f -"), 0);
}
#[test]
fn a_default_route_through_the_overlay_is_refused() {
let mut fake = Fake::new();
fake.default_route = Some("gateway: 10.13.37.1\ninterface: utun5\n".into());
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let report = apply_plan(&|t, a, s| fake.run(t, a, s), &token, &plan(true, false));
let RuleOutcome::Failed(why) = &report.offer[0].1 else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("already goes through"), "{why}");
}
#[test]
fn pf_is_enabled_once_and_released_once_on_clear() {
let fake = Fake::new();
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let run = |t, a: &[String], s: Option<&str>| fake.run(t, a, s);
apply_plan(&run, &token, &plan(true, false));
apply_plan(&run, &token, &plan(true, true));
assert_eq!(fake.count("Pfctl -E"), 1, "{:?}", fake.calls());
clear_all(&run, &token, "utun5");
assert_eq!(fake.count("Pfctl -X 4242"), 1);
assert!(
fake.position("-a com.apple/tsunagi-exit-utun5 -F all")
.is_some()
);
assert!(
fake.position("delete -net 0.0.0.0/1 -interface utun5")
.is_some()
);
assert_eq!(*token.lock().unwrap(), None);
// A second clear has nothing to release and still succeeds.
clear_all(&run, &token, "utun5");
assert_eq!(fake.count("Pfctl -X"), 1);
}
#[test]
fn dropping_the_client_removes_its_routes() {
let fake = Fake::new();
let token = Mutex::new(None);
let run = |t, a: &[String], s: Option<&str>| fake.run(t, a, s);
apply_plan(&run, &token, &plan(true, false));
assert!(fake.position("delete -net 0.0.0.0/1").is_some());
assert_eq!(fake.count(" add "), 0);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
//! Host rules that let a game's LAN discovery reach the overlay interface.
//!
//! Broadcast fanout happens at local TUN ingress (see [`super::broadcast`]),
//! so a limited broadcast only reaches Tsunagi if the operating system routes
//! it through the overlay interface, and a discovery *reply* only reaches the
//! game if the host firewall lets it in. Left to the user that is two manual
//! steps per host that nobody remembers, so when a network's broadcast is on
//! the agent installs exactly these two things for the interface it owns:
//!
//! * a `255.255.255.255/32` route through the overlay interface, with the
//! overlay address as its preferred source, so the game's discovery packet
//! leaves with a source address the router recognises;
//! * an inbound firewall allowance for **UDP only**, from the overlay range
//! only, on that interface only. Replies to a broadcast come from a
//! different address than the one the request was sent to, so a stateful
//! firewall never matches them to the request. Opening every protocol
//! would expose services such as SSH to every member of the network, which
//! is not what a game needs.
//!
//! # Why this is allowed here
//!
//! The architecture says plugins never touch routing or firewall settings,
//! and nothing a peer announces becomes an OS setting. This is neither: it is
//! the system level, which owns the interface, configuring that interface from
//! values it computed itself (the interface name is derived locally, the
//! address and range come from signed state it already verified). Every object
//! is tagged `tsunagi:<interface>`, reversible, and removed when broadcast is
//! turned off, the network leaves, or the agent stops. A crash can leave a
//! firewall rule behind; the next apply for the same interface removes it.
//!
//! # Failure is contained
//!
//! Neither step can stop the agent. Each reports its own outcome, so a missing
//! firewall tool still leaves the route in place and says what is missing.
//!
//! # Why a trait
//!
//! Linux, Windows and the tests do this very differently, while *what* to
//! install is the same everywhere and lives in [`BroadcastRulesPlan`] and
//! [`rules_summary`], tested on every platform.
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
mod exit;
pub use exit::{
ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport, ExitHostRules, MockExitRules, exit_tag, exit_tag_prefix,
offer_detail,
};
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
mod linux;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
mod linux_exit;
#[cfg(all(test, feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
mod linux_exit_kernel;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub(in crate::overlay) mod linux_exit_mark;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use linux::LinuxHostRules;
// Compiled everywhere so the scripts it builds are tested everywhere; only
// the type that runs them is exported on Windows.
mod windows;
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "windows"), allow(dead_code))]
mod windows_exit;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows::WindowsHostRules;
// Compiled everywhere so its rule text and parsers are tested everywhere.
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos;
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "macos"), allow(dead_code))]
mod macos_exit;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos::MacosHostRules;
/// What the host should be told for one interface.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BroadcastRulesPlan {
/// The overlay interface. Derived locally from the network id, never from
/// anything a peer said.
pub interface: String,
/// This agent's overlay address, the route's preferred source.
pub source: Ipv4Addr,
/// The overlay range inbound UDP is admitted from.
pub range: Ipv4Range,
}
impl BroadcastRulesPlan {
/// The tag every object carries, so it can be found again and nothing
/// else is ever touched.
pub fn tag(&self) -> String {
tag_for(&self.interface)
}
}
/// The tag for an interface's objects.
pub fn tag_for(interface: &str) -> String {
format!("tsunagi:{interface}")
}
/// What happened to one of the two host objects.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RuleOutcome {
/// It is in place.
Applied,
/// It is not, with a reason a person can act on.
Failed(String),
}
impl RuleOutcome {
/// Whether the object is in place.
pub fn is_applied(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::Applied)
}
}
/// What applying a plan achieved.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BroadcastRulesReport {
/// What was asked for.
pub plan: BroadcastRulesPlan,
/// The `255.255.255.255` route.
pub route: RuleOutcome,
/// The inbound firewall allowance.
pub firewall: RuleOutcome,
}
impl BroadcastRulesReport {
/// Whether both objects are in place.
pub fn is_ok(&self) -> bool {
self.route.is_applied() && self.firewall.is_applied()
}
/// One line for `status`.
pub fn summary(&self) -> String {
rules_summary(&self.route, &self.firewall)
}
}
/// The status line for a pair of outcomes.
pub fn rules_summary(route: &RuleOutcome, firewall: &RuleOutcome) -> String {
match (route, firewall) {
(RuleOutcome::Applied, RuleOutcome::Applied) => "ok (route + firewall)".to_string(),
(route, firewall) => {
let part = |what: &str, outcome: &RuleOutcome| match outcome {
RuleOutcome::Applied => format!("{what} ok"),
RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) => format!("{what} failed: {reason}"),
};
format!(
"incomplete; {}; {}",
part("route", route),
part("firewall", firewall)
)
}
}
}
/// Installs and removes the host rules for an overlay interface.
///
/// Both calls are idempotent. Neither can fail as a whole: a step that cannot
/// be done is reported in the [`BroadcastRulesReport`], because the caller's
/// only useful response is to say so.
pub trait BroadcastHostRules: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
/// A short name used in diagnostics.
fn name(&self) -> &str;
/// Makes the host match the plan, replacing whatever this agent put there
/// for the same interface before.
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport>;
/// Removes what this agent put there for the interface. Succeeds when
/// nothing is there: it runs on the shutdown path.
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()>;
/// The exit-node rules that go with these, when the platform has them.
///
/// One object per host, because both halves need the same privileged
/// helpers; the default is that this platform has none, which is said
/// where it matters rather than pretended.
fn exit_rules(&self) -> Option<&dyn ExitHostRules> {
None
}
}
/// The platform has no implementation, which is said rather than pretended.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct UnsupportedHostRules;
impl BroadcastHostRules for UnsupportedHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"unsupported"
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let reason = "host rules are not implemented on this platform; route \
255.255.255.255 through the overlay interface and allow inbound \
UDP from the overlay range yourself"
.to_string();
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route: RuleOutcome::Failed(reason.clone()),
firewall: RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, _interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {})
}
}
/// What a [`MockHostRules`] currently holds, per interface.
pub type MockRulesState = std::collections::BTreeMap<String, BroadcastRulesPlan>;
/// An in-memory host, for tests: nothing is touched.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct MockHostRules {
exit: MockExitRules,
state: Arc<Mutex<MockRulesState>>,
calls: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
firewall_failure: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
}
impl MockHostRules {
/// An empty host.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
exit: MockExitRules::new(),
..Self::default()
}
}
/// The exit-node half of this host, for inspecting and steering tests.
pub fn exit(&self) -> &MockExitRules {
&self.exit
}
/// Makes the firewall step fail with this reason from now on.
pub fn fail_firewall(&self, reason: impl Into<String>) {
*lock(&self.firewall_failure) = Some(reason.into());
}
/// What is installed now.
pub fn installed(&self) -> MockRulesState {
lock(&self.state).clone()
}
/// Every `apply:<interface>` / `clear:<interface>` call, in order.
pub fn calls(&self) -> Vec<String> {
lock(&self.calls).clone()
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for MockHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"mock"
}
fn exit_rules(&self) -> Option<&dyn ExitHostRules> {
Some(&self.exit)
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
lock(&self.calls).push(format!("apply:{}", plan.interface));
lock(&self.state).insert(plan.interface.clone(), plan.clone());
let firewall = match lock(&self.firewall_failure).clone() {
Some(reason) => RuleOutcome::Failed(reason),
None => RuleOutcome::Applied,
};
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route: RuleOutcome::Applied,
firewall,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
lock(&self.calls).push(format!("clear:{interface}"));
lock(&self.state).remove(interface);
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
#[test]
fn every_object_is_tagged_with_its_interface() {
assert_eq!(plan().tag(), "tsunagi:tsun0");
assert_eq!(tag_for("tsun7"), "tsunagi:tsun7");
}
#[test]
fn the_summary_says_which_half_is_missing() {
assert_eq!(
rules_summary(&RuleOutcome::Applied, &RuleOutcome::Applied),
"ok (route + firewall)"
);
let line = rules_summary(
&RuleOutcome::Applied,
&RuleOutcome::Failed("iptables not found".into()),
);
assert!(line.contains("route ok"), "{line}");
assert!(
line.contains("firewall failed: iptables not found"),
"{line}"
);
let report = BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan(),
route: RuleOutcome::Failed("denied".into()),
firewall: RuleOutcome::Applied,
};
assert!(!report.is_ok());
assert!(report.summary().contains("route failed: denied"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_mock_applies_replaces_and_clears_idempotently() {
let rules = MockHostRules::new();
let first = rules.apply(&plan()).await;
assert!(first.is_ok());
assert_eq!(rules.installed().len(), 1);
let mut moved = plan();
moved.source = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 7);
rules.apply(&moved).await;
assert_eq!(rules.installed()["tsun0"].source, moved.source);
rules.clear("tsun0").await;
rules.clear("tsun0").await;
assert!(rules.installed().is_empty());
assert_eq!(rules.calls().len(), 4);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_unsupported_platform_reports_both_steps_failed() {
let report = UnsupportedHostRules.apply(&plan()).await;
assert!(!report.route.is_applied());
assert!(!report.firewall.is_applied());
UnsupportedHostRules.clear("tsun0").await;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
//! Broadcast host rules on Windows: a route and a Defender Firewall rule.
//!
//! Both are written with the `NetTCPIP` and `NetSecurity` PowerShell modules,
//! run by absolute path from `%SystemRoot%` like the DNS publisher does: the
//! in-process alternatives are `unsafe` IP Helper calls this crate forbids.
//!
//! * The route is `255.255.255.255/32` on the overlay interface, on-link, with
//! metric 1, written to the active store only so it cannot outlive a reboot.
//! Windows picks the interface's own address as the source of a packet sent
//! along it; with several networks on one interface that is whichever
//! address Windows treats as primary, which this cannot choose.
//! * The firewall rule allows inbound UDP on that interface alias from the
//! overlay range only, in every profile. Wintun adapters are usually
//! classified as a public network, where inbound UDP is otherwise dropped.
//! Its display name is the tag `tsunagi:<interface>`, which is how it is
//! found again, replaced and removed.
//!
//! Every value in a script is one this agent produced: the interface name is
//! derived from the network id and the range comes from signed state. They are
//! still single-quoted and escaped, so nothing could be read as PowerShell
//! rather than as data. Changing routes and firewall rules needs an elevated
//! process, which is reported as its own cause.
//!
//! This module is compiled everywhere so its script building is tested
//! everywhere. It could not be run against a real Windows host while it was
//! written.
#![cfg_attr(not(target_os = "windows"), allow(dead_code))]
use crate::BoxFuture;
use super::exit::{ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport, ExitHostRules};
use super::windows_exit;
use super::{BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, RuleOutcome, tag_for};
/// A PowerShell single-quoted literal, with any embedded quote doubled.
fn ps_literal(value: &str) -> String {
format!("'{}'", value.replace('\'', "''"))
}
/// The step that makes the route match the plan.
///
/// A leftover route (from a crashed run, or for an old interface index) is
/// removed first so the result is exactly one route.
fn route_script(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(&plan.interface);
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '255.255.255.255/32' -InterfaceAlias $alias \
-PolicyStore ActiveStore -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | \
Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '255.255.255.255/32' -InterfaceAlias $alias \
-NextHop '0.0.0.0' -RouteMetric 1 -PolicyStore ActiveStore | Out-Null\n"
)
}
/// The step that makes the firewall hold exactly one rule for the interface.
fn firewall_script(plan: &BroadcastRulesPlan) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(&plan.interface);
let tag = ps_literal(&plan.tag());
let range = ps_literal(&plan.range.to_string());
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
$tag = {tag}\n\
Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName $tag -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | \
Remove-NetFirewallRule -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName $tag -Direction Inbound -Action Allow -Protocol UDP \
-InterfaceAlias $alias -RemoteAddress {range} -Profile Any | Out-Null\n"
)
}
/// The script that removes both, ignoring what is not there.
fn clear_script(interface: &str) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(interface);
let tag = ps_literal(&tag_for(interface));
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '255.255.255.255/32' -InterfaceAlias {alias} \
-PolicyStore ActiveStore | Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false\n\
Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName {tag} | Remove-NetFirewallRule\n\
exit 0\n"
)
}
/// Turns what PowerShell said into a cause a person can act on.
fn classify(what: &str, text: &str) -> String {
let lower = text.to_ascii_lowercase();
if lower.contains("access is denied")
|| lower.contains("requires elevation")
|| lower.contains("run as administrator")
|| lower.contains("permissiondenied")
{
format!("{what}: Windows refused; run tsng from an elevated (administrator) process")
} else if lower.contains("is not recognized") || lower.contains("commandnotfound") {
format!("{what}: the NetTCPIP/NetSecurity PowerShell modules are not available: {text}")
} else if text.is_empty() {
format!("{what}: failed without saying why")
} else {
format!("{what}: {text}")
}
}
/// The absolute path to Windows PowerShell, so nothing on `PATH` can stand in
/// for it.
fn powershell_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
let root = std::env::var_os("SystemRoot").unwrap_or_else(|| r"C:\Windows".into());
std::path::Path::new(&root)
.join("System32")
.join("WindowsPowerShell")
.join("v1.0")
.join("powershell.exe")
}
/// Runs a script and returns what it said on failure.
fn run_powershell(script: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
run_powershell_output(script).map(|_| ())
}
/// Runs a script and returns what it printed, or what it said on failure.
fn run_powershell_output(script: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
let output = std::process::Command::new(powershell_path())
.args([
"-NoProfile",
"-NonInteractive",
"-ExecutionPolicy",
"Bypass",
"-Command",
script,
])
.output()
.map_err(|err| format!("could not run PowerShell: {err}"))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).into_owned());
}
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let text = if stderr.trim().is_empty() {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string()
} else {
stderr.trim().to_string()
};
Err(text)
}
async fn step(what: &'static str, script: String) -> RuleOutcome {
match tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || run_powershell(&script)).await {
Ok(Ok(())) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Ok(Err(text)) => RuleOutcome::Failed(classify(what, &text)),
Err(err) => RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("{what}: the task failed: {err}")),
}
}
/// The Windows implementation, through PowerShell.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct WindowsHostRules;
impl WindowsHostRules {
/// Creates it. Nothing is run until [`BroadcastHostRules::apply`].
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self
}
}
/// The IPv4 addresses a host name resolves to; empty when it does not.
fn resolve_host(host: &str) -> Vec<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
use std::net::{IpAddr, ToSocketAddrs};
(host, 443)
.to_socket_addrs()
.map(|addrs| {
addrs
.filter_map(|addr| match addr.ip() {
IpAddr::V4(ip) => Some(ip),
IpAddr::V6(_) => None,
})
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default()
}
impl ExitHostRules for WindowsHostRules {
fn needs_bypass(&self) -> bool {
true
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a ExitHostPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, ExitHostReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let job = plan.clone();
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
windows_exit::apply_plan(
&|script| run_powershell_output(script),
&resolve_host,
&job,
)
})
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| {
let failed = RuleOutcome::Failed(format!("the task failed: {err}"));
ExitHostReport {
offer: plan
.offer
.iter()
.map(|range| (*range, failed.clone()))
.collect(),
forwarding: None,
client: plan.client.then_some(failed),
}
})
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
let name = interface.to_string();
let _ = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
windows_exit::clear_all(&|script| run_powershell_output(script), &name)
})
.await;
})
}
}
impl BroadcastHostRules for WindowsHostRules {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"windows-netsecurity"
}
fn exit_rules(&self) -> Option<&dyn ExitHostRules> {
Some(self)
}
fn apply<'a>(&'a self, plan: &'a BroadcastRulesPlan) -> BoxFuture<'a, BroadcastRulesReport> {
Box::pin(async move {
let route = step("route", route_script(plan)).await;
let firewall = step("firewall", firewall_script(plan)).await;
BroadcastRulesReport {
plan: plan.clone(),
route,
firewall,
}
})
}
fn clear<'a>(&'a self, interface: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, ()> {
Box::pin(async move {
if let RuleOutcome::Failed(reason) = step("clear", clear_script(interface)).await {
tracing::warn!(
interface,
"cannot remove the broadcast host rules: {reason}"
);
}
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
fn plan() -> BroadcastRulesPlan {
BroadcastRulesPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
source: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 142),
range: "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap(),
}
}
#[test]
fn a_quote_in_a_value_cannot_escape_the_literal() {
assert_eq!(ps_literal("a'b"), "'a''b'");
let mut hostile = plan();
hostile.interface = "x'; Remove-Item C:\\ #".into();
let script = route_script(&hostile);
assert!(
script.contains("$alias = 'x''; Remove-Item C:\\ #'"),
"{script}"
);
assert!(firewall_script(&hostile).contains("'x''; Remove-Item C:\\ #'"));
}
#[test]
fn the_route_is_on_link_metric_one_in_the_active_store_and_replaces_its_own() {
let script = route_script(&plan());
assert!(script.contains("'255.255.255.255/32'"));
assert!(script.contains("-NextHop '0.0.0.0'"));
assert!(script.contains("-RouteMetric 1"));
assert!(script.contains("-PolicyStore ActiveStore"));
assert!(
script.find("Remove-NetRoute").unwrap() < script.find("New-NetRoute").unwrap(),
"a stale route goes before the new one:\n{script}"
);
}
#[test]
fn the_firewall_rule_is_udp_only_from_the_overlay_range_on_this_interface() {
let script = firewall_script(&plan());
assert!(script.contains("-Protocol UDP"));
assert!(script.contains("-Direction Inbound -Action Allow"));
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceAlias $alias"));
assert!(script.contains("-RemoteAddress '10.13.37.0/24'"));
assert!(script.contains("$tag = 'tsunagi:tsun0'"));
assert!(!script.contains("-Protocol Any") && !script.contains("-Protocol TCP"));
assert!(
script.find("Remove-NetFirewallRule").unwrap()
< script.find("New-NetFirewallRule").unwrap(),
"{script}"
);
}
#[test]
fn clearing_touches_only_our_route_and_our_tagged_rule() {
let script = clear_script("tsun0");
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceAlias 'tsun0'"));
assert!(script.contains("Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'tsunagi:tsun0'"));
assert!(script.contains("exit 0"));
}
#[test]
fn a_refusal_names_elevation_and_a_missing_module_names_the_module() {
assert!(classify("route", "Access is denied").contains("elevated"));
assert!(
classify(
"firewall",
"The term 'New-NetFirewallRule' is not recognized"
)
.contains("modules are not available")
);
assert_eq!(classify("route", "boom"), "route: boom");
assert!(classify("route", "").contains("without saying why"));
}
#[test]
fn powershell_is_found_by_absolute_path() {
let path = powershell_path();
assert!(path.ends_with("powershell.exe"));
assert!(path.to_string_lossy().contains("System32"), "{path:?}");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
//! Exit-node host rules on Windows: WinNAT through PowerShell.
//!
//! Compiled on every platform so the scripts and the plan logic are tested
//! everywhere; only `WindowsHostRules` runs them, and only on Windows. It
//! could not be run against a real Windows host while it was written.
//!
//! # Offering
//!
//! One NAT object per offered range, named with the usual tag
//! `tsunagi-exit:<if>:<range>`:
//!
//! ```text
//! New-NetNat -Name <tag> -InternalIPInterfaceAddressPrefix <range>
//! ```
//!
//! WinNAT translates that range out of whichever interface the traffic leaves
//! by, which is the Windows counterpart of the Linux masquerade. Windows
//! forwards per interface, and the egress is not known here, so forwarding is
//! only *read* for the overlay interface; turning it on for the interfaces
//! involved is the owner's decision (`Set-NetIPInterface -Forwarding Enabled`).
//! Some Windows versions allow a single NAT per host: a second offered range
//! then reports its own failure.
//!
//! # Using
//!
//! Windows has no per-user or per-process routing, so the Linux scheme (an
//! exemption for the agent's user) does not carry over. Instead the agent's
//! own underlay traffic is exempted by *destination*:
//!
//! ```text
//! New-NetRoute 0.0.0.0/1 on the overlay interface, metric 1
//! New-NetRoute 128.0.0.0/1 on the overlay interface, metric 1
//! New-NetRoute <ip>/32 via the physical default gateway, metric 7373
//! ```
//!
//! The halves out-rank the default route without replacing it, so every more
//! specific route (LAN, another VPN) keeps working. A `/32` per address the
//! agent talks to directly (the verified direct paths of its connections, and
//! the relays it uses, resolved when the rules are applied) keeps that traffic
//! on the physical network instead of looping into the tunnel it carries. The
//! metric 7373 marks those routes as ours, which is how stale ones are found
//! and removed. Everything is written to the active store, so a reboot clears
//! it. IPv6 is blackholed with `::/1` and `8000::/1` on the overlay interface,
//! which has no IPv6: applications fall back to IPv4 after a delay, where
//! Linux and macOS answer at once. The bypass follows the agent's paths as
//! they change; a path that appears after the last apply is reached through
//! the tunnel until the next one.
//!
//! The bypass routes are written before the halves, and removed after them.
use super::RuleOutcome;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use super::exit::{ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport, exit_tag, exit_tag_prefix};
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
/// The route metric that marks a bypass route as this agent's.
const BYPASS_METRIC: u32 = 7373;
/// Runs a PowerShell script and returns what it printed.
pub(super) type RunScript<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&str) -> Result<String, String>;
/// Resolves a host name to its IPv4 addresses.
pub(super) type Resolve<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&str) -> Vec<Ipv4Addr>;
/// A PowerShell single-quoted literal, with any embedded quote doubled.
fn ps_literal(value: &str) -> String {
format!("'{}'", value.replace('\'', "''"))
}
/// Creates the NAT of one range, replacing one this agent made before.
fn nat_script(interface: &str, range: &Ipv4Range) -> String {
let name = ps_literal(&exit_tag(interface, range));
let prefix = ps_literal(&range.to_string());
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$name = {name}\n\
Get-NetNat -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | \
Remove-NetNat -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetNat -Name $name -InternalIPInterfaceAddressPrefix {prefix} | Out-Null\n"
)
}
/// Removes this interface's NAT objects except those named in `keep`.
fn prune_script(interface: &str, keep: &[Ipv4Range]) -> String {
let prefix = ps_literal(&exit_tag_prefix(interface));
let keep: Vec<String> = keep
.iter()
.map(|range| ps_literal(&exit_tag(interface, range)))
.collect();
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'\n\
$prefix = {prefix}\n\
$keep = @({})\n\
Get-NetNat | Where-Object {{ $_.Name.StartsWith($prefix) -and \
($keep -notcontains $_.Name) }} | Remove-NetNat -Confirm:$false\n\
exit 0\n",
keep.join(", ")
)
}
/// Prints `Enabled` or `Disabled` for the interface's IPv4 forwarding.
fn forwarding_script(interface: &str) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(interface);
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
(Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceAlias {alias} -AddressFamily IPv4).Forwarding\n"
)
}
/// Prints `<interface index> <next hop>` of the best default route that is
/// not through the overlay interface.
fn gateway_script(interface: &str) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(interface);
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
$best = Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '0.0.0.0/0' -AddressFamily IPv4 \
-PolicyStore ActiveStore | Where-Object {{ $_.InterfaceAlias -ne $alias -and \
$_.NextHop -ne '0.0.0.0' }} | Sort-Object {{ $_.RouteMetric + \
(Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceIndex $_.InterfaceIndex -AddressFamily IPv4).InterfaceMetric }} | \
Select-Object -First 1\n\
if (-not $best) {{ throw 'the host has no default gateway outside the overlay' }}\n\
\"$($best.InterfaceIndex) $($best.NextHop)\"\n"
)
}
/// The default gateway as the script above printed it.
fn parse_gateway(text: &str) -> Option<(u32, Ipv4Addr)> {
let mut words = text.split_whitespace();
let index = words.next()?.parse().ok()?;
let hop = words.next()?.parse().ok()?;
words.next().is_none().then_some((index, hop))
}
/// Replaces the bypass routes with one per address, through the gateway.
fn bypass_script(index: u32, gateway: Ipv4Addr, addresses: &[Ipv4Addr]) -> String {
let list: Vec<String> = addresses
.iter()
.map(|address| ps_literal(&address.to_string()))
.collect();
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 -PolicyStore ActiveStore -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | \
Where-Object {{ $_.RouteMetric -eq {BYPASS_METRIC} -and $_.DestinationPrefix.EndsWith('/32') }} | \
Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
foreach ($ip in @({})) {{\n\
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix \"$ip/32\" -InterfaceIndex {index} -NextHop '{gateway}' \
-RouteMetric {BYPASS_METRIC} -PolicyStore ActiveStore -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null\n\
}}\n",
list.join(", ")
)
}
/// Sends everything else through the overlay interface.
fn halves_script(interface: &str) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(interface);
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
foreach ($p in '0.0.0.0/1', '128.0.0.0/1') {{\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix $p -InterfaceAlias $alias -PolicyStore ActiveStore \
-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix $p -InterfaceAlias $alias -NextHop '0.0.0.0' \
-RouteMetric 1 -PolicyStore ActiveStore | Out-Null\n\
}}\n\
foreach ($p in '::/1', '8000::/1') {{\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix $p -InterfaceAlias $alias -PolicyStore ActiveStore \
-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix $p -InterfaceAlias $alias -NextHop '::' \
-RouteMetric 1 -PolicyStore ActiveStore -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null\n\
}}\n"
)
}
/// Removes the halves and every bypass route. What is not there is the state
/// wanted.
fn remove_client_script(interface: &str) -> String {
let alias = ps_literal(interface);
format!(
"$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'\n\
$alias = {alias}\n\
foreach ($p in '0.0.0.0/1', '128.0.0.0/1', '::/1', '8000::/1') {{\n\
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix $p -InterfaceAlias $alias -PolicyStore ActiveStore | \
Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false\n\
}}\n\
Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 -PolicyStore ActiveStore | \
Where-Object {{ $_.RouteMetric -eq {BYPASS_METRIC} -and $_.DestinationPrefix.EndsWith('/32') }} | \
Remove-NetRoute -Confirm:$false\n\
exit 0\n"
)
}
/// Every address to keep direct: the ones given and what the names resolve
/// to, sorted and without duplicates.
fn bypass_addresses(
resolve: Resolve<'_>,
addresses: &[Ipv4Addr],
hosts: &[String],
) -> Vec<Ipv4Addr> {
let mut all: std::collections::BTreeSet<Ipv4Addr> = addresses.iter().copied().collect();
for host in hosts {
all.extend(resolve(host));
}
all.into_iter()
.filter(|a| !a.is_loopback() && !a.is_unspecified() && !a.is_multicast())
.collect()
}
fn apply_client(
run: RunScript<'_>,
resolve: Resolve<'_>,
plan: &ExitHostPlan,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let interface = plan.interface.as_str();
let gateway = run(&gateway_script(interface))?;
let (index, hop) = parse_gateway(&gateway)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("cannot read the default gateway from `{}`", gateway.trim()))?;
let addresses = bypass_addresses(resolve, &plan.bypass, &plan.bypass_hosts);
run(&bypass_script(index, hop, &addresses))?;
if let Err(why) = run(&halves_script(interface)) {
// Do not leave a half-installed set: bypass routes alone are harmless
// but the next apply starts clean.
let _ = run(&remove_client_script(interface));
return Err(why);
}
Ok(())
}
fn parse_forwarding(text: &str) -> Option<bool> {
match text.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"enabled" | "1" => Some(true),
"disabled" | "0" => Some(false),
_ => None,
}
}
/// Makes the host match the plan.
pub(super) fn apply_plan(
run: RunScript<'_>,
resolve: Resolve<'_>,
plan: &ExitHostPlan,
) -> ExitHostReport {
let interface = plan.interface.as_str();
// What an earlier plan left and this one no longer wants.
let pruned = run(&prune_script(interface, &plan.offer));
let offer = plan
.offer
.iter()
.map(|range| {
let outcome = match &pruned {
Err(why) => RuleOutcome::Failed(why.clone()),
Ok(_) => match run(&nat_script(interface, range)) {
Ok(_) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Err(why) => RuleOutcome::Failed(why),
},
};
(*range, outcome)
})
.collect();
let client = if plan.client {
Some(match apply_client(run, resolve, plan) {
Ok(()) => RuleOutcome::Applied,
Err(why) => RuleOutcome::Failed(why),
})
} else {
// Whatever an earlier plan left must not stay in force.
let _ = run(&remove_client_script(interface));
None
};
let forwarding = if plan.offer.is_empty() {
None
} else {
run(&forwarding_script(interface))
.ok()
.and_then(|text| parse_forwarding(&text))
};
ExitHostReport {
offer,
forwarding,
client,
}
}
/// Removes every NAT object of this agent's for the interface.
pub(super) fn clear_all(run: RunScript<'_>, interface: &str) {
if let Err(why) = run(&prune_script(interface, &[])) {
tracing::warn!(interface, "cannot remove the exit node NAT: {why}");
}
if let Err(why) = run(&remove_client_script(interface)) {
tracing::warn!(interface, "cannot remove the exit node routes: {why}");
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use std::cell::RefCell;
use super::*;
fn range() -> Ipv4Range {
"10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()
}
fn plan(client: bool) -> ExitHostPlan {
ExitHostPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
offer: vec![range()],
client,
overlay: vec![range()],
..Default::default()
}
}
#[test]
fn the_nat_is_named_with_the_tag_and_replaces_its_own() {
let script = nat_script("tsun0", &range());
assert!(
script.contains("$name = 'tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24'"),
"{script}"
);
assert!(script.contains("-InternalIPInterfaceAddressPrefix '10.13.37.0/24'"));
assert!(
script.find("Remove-NetNat").unwrap() < script.find("New-NetNat").unwrap(),
"{script}"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_quote_in_a_value_cannot_escape_the_literal() {
let script = nat_script("x'; Remove-Item C:\\ #", &range());
assert!(script.contains("'tsunagi-exit:x''; Remove-Item C:\\ #:10.13.37.0/24'"));
assert!(prune_script("x'y", &[]).contains("'tsunagi-exit:x''y:'"));
assert!(forwarding_script("x'y").contains("'x''y'"));
}
#[test]
fn pruning_keeps_wanted_ranges_and_only_selects_this_interfaces_nats() {
let script = prune_script("tsun0", &[range()]);
assert!(script.contains("$prefix = 'tsunagi-exit:tsun0:'"));
assert!(script.contains("$keep = @('tsunagi-exit:tsun0:10.13.37.0/24')"));
assert!(script.contains("StartsWith($prefix)"));
assert!(script.contains("exit 0"));
assert!(prune_script("tsun0", &[]).contains("$keep = @()"));
}
#[test]
fn forwarding_text_is_read_never_written() {
assert_eq!(parse_forwarding("Enabled\r\n"), Some(true));
assert_eq!(parse_forwarding("Disabled"), Some(false));
assert_eq!(parse_forwarding("what"), None);
let script = forwarding_script("tsun0");
assert!(script.contains("Get-NetIPInterface"));
assert!(!script.contains("Set-NetIPInterface"));
}
#[test]
fn offering_prunes_then_creates_and_reads_forwarding() {
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
calls.borrow_mut().push(script.to_string());
Ok(if script.contains("Get-NetIPInterface") {
"Disabled\n".to_string()
} else {
String::new()
})
};
let report = apply_plan(&run, &no_names, &plan(false));
assert_eq!(report.offer, vec![(range(), RuleOutcome::Applied)]);
assert_eq!(report.forwarding, Some(false));
assert_eq!(report.client, None);
let calls = calls.borrow();
assert!(calls[0].contains("StartsWith"), "{calls:?}");
assert!(calls[1].contains("New-NetNat"), "{calls:?}");
// Without a client, the routes of an earlier plan are taken away.
assert!(calls[2].contains("RouteMetric -eq 7373"), "{calls:?}");
assert!(calls[3].contains("Get-NetIPInterface"), "{calls:?}");
}
#[test]
fn a_failing_nat_is_that_ranges_failure() {
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
if script.contains("New-NetNat") {
Err("A NAT with this prefix already exists".into())
} else {
Ok(String::new())
}
};
let report = apply_plan(&run, &no_names, &plan(false));
let RuleOutcome::Failed(why) = &report.offer[0].1 else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("already exists"), "{why}");
}
fn no_names(_: &str) -> Vec<Ipv4Addr> {
Vec::new()
}
fn client_plan() -> ExitHostPlan {
ExitHostPlan {
interface: "tsun0".into(),
offer: Vec::new(),
client: true,
overlay: vec![range()],
bypass: vec![Ipv4Addr::new(138, 201, 61, 182)],
bypass_hosts: vec!["relay.example".into()],
}
}
#[test]
fn the_gateway_is_read_from_the_script_output() {
assert_eq!(
parse_gateway("12 192.168.1.1\r\n"),
Some((12, Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 1)))
);
assert_eq!(parse_gateway(""), None);
assert_eq!(parse_gateway("12"), None);
assert_eq!(parse_gateway("12 gw"), None);
assert_eq!(parse_gateway("12 1.1.1.1 extra"), None);
let script = gateway_script("tsun0");
assert!(script.contains("-ne $alias"));
assert!(script.contains("-ne '0.0.0.0'"));
}
#[test]
fn bypass_routes_are_marked_host_routes_through_the_physical_gateway() {
let script = bypass_script(
12,
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 1),
&[Ipv4Addr::new(1, 2, 3, 4), Ipv4Addr::new(5, 6, 7, 8)],
);
assert!(script.contains("@('1.2.3.4', '5.6.7.8')"), "{script}");
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceIndex 12 -NextHop '192.168.1.1'"));
assert!(script.contains("-RouteMetric 7373"));
assert!(script.contains("-PolicyStore ActiveStore"));
// Stale marked routes go first, and only /32 ones with our metric.
assert!(script.find("Remove-NetRoute").unwrap() < script.find("New-NetRoute").unwrap());
assert!(script.contains("RouteMetric -eq 7373"));
assert!(script.contains("EndsWith('/32')"));
}
#[test]
fn the_halves_go_through_the_overlay_and_ipv6_is_blackholed() {
let script = halves_script("tsun0");
assert!(script.contains("'0.0.0.0/1', '128.0.0.0/1'"));
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceAlias $alias -NextHop '0.0.0.0'"));
assert!(script.contains("'::/1', '8000::/1'"));
assert!(script.contains("-PolicyStore ActiveStore"));
assert!(
!script.contains("0.0.0.0/0"),
"the default route is left alone"
);
assert!(halves_script("x'y").contains("'x''y'"));
}
#[test]
fn addresses_are_resolved_merged_and_cleaned() {
let resolve = |host: &str| -> Vec<Ipv4Addr> {
match host {
"relay.example" => vec![Ipv4Addr::new(9, 9, 9, 9), Ipv4Addr::new(1, 2, 3, 4)],
_ => Vec::new(),
}
};
let all = bypass_addresses(
&resolve,
&[
Ipv4Addr::new(1, 2, 3, 4),
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
],
&["relay.example".into(), "gone.example".into()],
);
assert_eq!(
all,
vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 2, 3, 4), Ipv4Addr::new(9, 9, 9, 9)]
);
}
#[test]
fn the_bypass_is_written_before_the_halves_that_need_it() {
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
calls.borrow_mut().push(script.to_string());
Ok(if script.contains("Select-Object -First 1") {
"12 192.168.1.1\n".to_string()
} else {
String::new()
})
};
let resolve = |_: &str| vec![Ipv4Addr::new(9, 9, 9, 9)];
let report = apply_plan(&run, &resolve, &client_plan());
assert_eq!(report.client, Some(RuleOutcome::Applied));
let calls = calls.borrow();
let at = |needle: &str| calls.iter().position(|c| c.contains(needle)).unwrap();
assert!(at("Select-Object -First 1") < at("-RouteMetric 7373"));
assert!(at("-RouteMetric 7373") < at("'0.0.0.0/1', '128.0.0.0/1'"));
let bypass = &calls[at("-RouteMetric 7373")];
assert!(
bypass.contains("'9.9.9.9'") && bypass.contains("'138.201.61.182'"),
"{bypass}"
);
}
#[test]
fn nothing_goes_through_the_overlay_when_the_bypass_cannot_be_written() {
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
if script.contains("Select-Object -First 1") {
Ok("12 192.168.1.1".to_string())
} else if script.contains("-RouteMetric 7373") && script.contains("foreach ($ip") {
Err("Access is denied".to_string())
} else {
assert!(!script.contains("-NextHop '0.0.0.0'"), "{script}");
Ok(String::new())
}
};
let report = apply_plan(&run, &no_names, &client_plan());
assert_eq!(
report.client,
Some(RuleOutcome::Failed("Access is denied".into()))
);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_gateway_is_a_failure_that_installs_no_route() {
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
assert!(!script.contains("New-NetRoute"), "{script}");
if script.contains("Select-Object -First 1") {
Err("the host has no default gateway outside the overlay".into())
} else {
Ok(String::new())
}
};
let report = apply_plan(&run, &no_names, &client_plan());
let Some(RuleOutcome::Failed(why)) = report.client else {
panic!("{report:?}");
};
assert!(why.contains("no default gateway"), "{why}");
}
#[test]
fn a_failed_halves_step_removes_what_was_written() {
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
calls.borrow_mut().push(script.to_string());
if script.contains("Select-Object -First 1") {
Ok("12 192.168.1.1".to_string())
} else if script.contains("'128.0.0.0/1'") && script.contains("New-NetRoute") {
Err("boom".to_string())
} else {
Ok(String::new())
}
};
let report = apply_plan(&run, &no_names, &client_plan());
assert!(matches!(report.client, Some(RuleOutcome::Failed(_))));
assert!(calls.borrow().last().unwrap().contains("Remove-NetRoute"));
}
#[test]
fn dropping_the_client_removes_its_routes_and_clearing_does_too() {
let calls = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
calls.borrow_mut().push(script.to_string());
Ok(String::new())
};
let report = apply_plan(&run, &no_names, &plan(false));
assert_eq!(report.client, None);
assert!(
calls
.borrow()
.iter()
.any(|c| c.contains("RouteMetric -eq 7373"))
);
let script = remove_client_script("tsun0");
assert!(script.contains("'0.0.0.0/1', '128.0.0.0/1', '::/1', '8000::/1'"));
assert!(script.contains("exit 0"));
// Only routes on our interface, or marked ours, are touched.
assert!(script.contains("-InterfaceAlias $alias"));
calls.borrow_mut().clear();
clear_all(&run, "tsun0");
assert!(
calls
.borrow()
.iter()
.any(|c| c.contains("RouteMetric -eq 7373"))
);
}
#[test]
fn clearing_prunes_everything_for_the_interface() {
let seen = RefCell::new(Vec::<String>::new());
let run = |script: &str| -> Result<String, String> {
seen.borrow_mut().push(script.to_string());
Ok(String::new())
};
clear_all(&run, "tsun0");
let seen = seen.borrow();
assert!(seen[0].contains("$keep = @()"));
assert!(seen[0].contains("'tsunagi-exit:tsun0:'"));
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
//!
//! * [`provision`] creates the interface and configures it, and removes it
//! again. Platform mechanics behind one decision function.
//! * [`hostrules`] installs the route and firewall allowance that let a
//! game's LAN discovery reach the interface, while broadcast is on.
//! * [`tun`] is the packet interface itself, real or in memory.
//! * [`packet`] reads just enough of an IP header to route by it.
//! * [`config`] names interfaces and describes addresses.
@@ -36,7 +38,10 @@ pub enum OverlayError {
Other(String),
}
pub mod broadcast;
pub mod config;
pub mod exit;
pub mod hostrules;
pub mod interface;
pub mod packet;
pub mod provision;
@@ -44,6 +49,11 @@ pub mod router;
pub mod tun;
pub use config::{Cidr, DEFAULT_INTERFACE_PREFIX, MAX_INTERFACE_NAME_LEN, interface_name};
pub use exit::{ExitRulesReport, RuleSetReport};
pub use hostrules::{
BroadcastHostRules, BroadcastRulesPlan, BroadcastRulesReport, ExitHostPlan, ExitHostReport,
ExitHostRules, MockExitRules, MockHostRules, RuleOutcome, UnsupportedHostRules,
};
pub use interface::{Counters, Interface, PacketCarrier, Rejected};
pub use packet::IpHeader;
pub use provision::{
@@ -51,11 +61,20 @@ pub use provision::{
MockHost, MockProvisioner, Privilege, Provisioned, UnsupportedProvisioner, plan_changes,
probe_net_admin,
};
pub use router::{NetworkRoutes, Route, RouteError, RoutingTable};
pub use router::{ExitPolicy, NetworkRoutes, Route, RouteError, RoutingTable};
pub use tun::{MemoryTun, MemoryTunFactory, TunDevice, TunFactory, TunRequest, address_is_local};
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use hostrules::LinuxHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use hostrules::MacosHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use hostrules::WindowsHostRules;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use provision::NetlinkProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use provision::UtunProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use provision::WintunProvisioner;
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::OverlayError;
use super::super::hostrules::BroadcastHostRules;
use super::super::tun::{TunDevice, TunFactory, TunRequest};
use super::{InterfacePlan, InterfaceProvisioner};
@@ -30,12 +31,23 @@ fn plan_for(request: &TunRequest) -> Result<InterfacePlan, OverlayError> {
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ManagedTunFactory {
provisioner: Arc<dyn InterfaceProvisioner>,
host_rules: Option<Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>>,
}
impl ManagedTunFactory {
/// Wraps a provisioner.
pub fn new(provisioner: Arc<dyn InterfaceProvisioner>) -> Self {
Self { provisioner }
Self {
provisioner,
host_rules: None,
}
}
/// Lets the agent install the broadcast route and firewall allowance for
/// the interface this factory manages.
pub fn with_host_rules(mut self, rules: Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>) -> Self {
self.host_rules = Some(rules);
self
}
/// The provisioner underneath.
@@ -54,6 +66,10 @@ impl TunFactory for ManagedTunFactory {
true
}
fn host_rules(&self) -> Option<Arc<dyn BroadcastHostRules>> {
self.host_rules.clone()
}
fn create<'a>(
&'a self,
request: TunRequest,
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
//! Managing the overlay interface on macOS, through utun and `ifconfig`/`route`.
//!
//! The shape is the same as the Linux and Windows provisioners: observe what
//! is there, [`plan_changes`](super::plan_changes) to decide what to do, apply
//! the difference. Only the mechanisms differ.
//!
//! # Creating the interface
//!
//! The interface is a `utun` device, created through the `tun` dependency's
//! safe wrapper — [`open_tun`](super::super::tun) — over the in-kernel
//! `com.apple.net.utun_control` control socket. No kernel extension and no
//! Network Extension entitlement is involved; what it needs is root. The
//! device is not made persistent, so closing the last file descriptor removes
//! the interface — it goes away when the agent does, however the agent ends.
//!
//! # The kernel names the interface, not us
//!
//! Unlike Linux and Windows, a utun interface cannot be given an arbitrary
//! name: it is always `utunN`, and the unit number is assigned by the kernel.
//! So the name derived from the network id (`tsun…`) is only ever a *request*;
//! the real name is read back off the device after it is opened, and
//! everything downstream — the host rules, the resolver publication — uses the
//! real one. The agent adopts it as soon as the device is created (see
//! [`Interface`](crate::overlay::Interface)).
//!
//! # Configuring it
//!
//! Addresses, MTU and routes are applied with `ifconfig` and `route`. On Linux
//! the same work is done in process over a netlink socket; here there is no
//! equivalent this crate may call, because the in-process route is raw `ioctl`
//! and `PF_ROUTE` and that is `unsafe`. The tools are invoked by absolute path
//! from `/sbin`, so nothing on `PATH` can stand in for them, and every value
//! handed to them is one this agent derived — an interface name chosen by the
//! kernel, an address it allocated — never anything a peer said.
//!
//! # Observing it
//!
//! The interface table is read through `netdev`, a safe wrapper over
//! `getifaddrs`. An interface is matched by its real `utunN` name, which only
//! matters on reconfiguration: the first create always makes a fresh device.
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::BoxFuture;
use crate::overlay::OverlayError;
use super::super::config::Cidr;
use super::super::tun::{TunDevice, TunRequest, open_tun};
use super::privilege::{Privilege, probe_net_admin};
use super::{
InterfacePlan, InterfaceProvisioner, InterfaceState, LinkKind, Provisioned, plan_changes,
};
/// Manages the overlay interface with utun and `ifconfig`/`route`.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct UtunProvisioner {
/// Interfaces this process created, by their real `utunN` name, so a
/// reconfiguration adjusts them rather than trying to create them again.
ours: Mutex<Vec<String>>,
/// Devices kept alive for as long as the interface should exist. Dropping
/// one closes the last descriptor, which removes the utin interface.
held: Mutex<Vec<(String, Arc<dyn TunDevice>)>>,
}
impl UtunProvisioner {
/// Creates the provisioner, after checking the platform supports one.
///
/// Whether the process is actually root is not checked here — reading the
/// effective uid needs a libc call this crate forbids — so a missing
/// privilege surfaces at utun creation with a precise message, the same
/// way the Linux and Windows paths treat the open itself as the honest
/// answer.
pub fn new() -> Result<Self, OverlayError> {
match probe_net_admin() {
Privilege::Available => {}
Privilege::Missing(reason) => return Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(reason)),
Privilege::Unsupported => {
return Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(
"interface management is not compiled in".to_string(),
));
}
}
Ok(Self {
ours: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
held: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
})
}
fn is_ours(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
lock(&self.ours).iter().any(|owned| owned == name)
}
/// Opens the utun device, which is what creates it. The kernel assigns the
/// name, so the returned device reports a `utunN` that is not `plan.name`.
fn create_device(&self, plan: &InterfacePlan) -> Result<Arc<dyn TunDevice>, OverlayError> {
let request = TunRequest::bare(plan.name.clone(), plan.mtu);
open_tun(&request)
}
}
impl InterfaceProvisioner for UtunProvisioner {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"utun"
}
fn reconcile<'a>(
&'a self,
plan: &'a InterfacePlan,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<Provisioned, OverlayError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
// A reconfiguration: the plan carries the real `utunN` name the
// agent adopted after the first create, so the interface is there
// and only the addresses and MTU need bringing into line.
if self.is_ours(&plan.name) {
let current = observe(&plan.name).await;
let changes = plan_changes(&current, plan, true)?;
configure(&plan.name, &changes).await?;
return Ok(Provisioned {
changes,
device: None,
});
}
// The first create. The kernel assigns the unit, so the device is
// opened first and its real name used for everything after.
let device = self.create_device(plan)?;
let real = device.name().to_string();
// A fresh interface starts with nothing on it, so the whole plan is
// applied. `plan_changes` against an absent interface is exactly
// that decision; its `create_link` flag is already satisfied by the
// open above, so `configure` ignores it and only applies the rest.
let changes = plan_changes(&InterfaceState::absent(), plan, false)?;
// A failure here leaves an interface that exists but cannot carry
// traffic. Drop the device so the utun closes, and report, rather
// than leave a trap behind.
if let Err(err) = configure(&real, &changes).await {
drop(device);
return Err(err);
}
lock(&self.ours).push(real.clone());
lock(&self.held).push((real, Arc::clone(&device)));
Ok(Provisioned {
changes,
device: Some(device),
})
})
}
fn remove<'a>(&'a self, name: &'a str) -> BoxFuture<'a, Result<(), OverlayError>> {
Box::pin(async move {
// Dropping the device closes the last descriptor, which removes the
// utun interface and the routes that were bound to it. There is
// nothing to flush: a utun never outlives the process that holds it.
lock(&self.held).retain(|(held, _)| held != name);
lock(&self.ours).retain(|owned| owned != name);
Ok(())
})
}
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
/// `fe80::/10` and `169.254.0.0/16`, which macOS assigns on its own.
fn is_link_local(addr: IpAddr) -> bool {
match addr {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => addr.is_link_local(),
IpAddr::V6(addr) => (addr.segments()[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80,
}
}
/// What the interface named `name` currently looks like.
///
/// Never fails: a name nothing is using reads as [`InterfaceState::absent`],
/// which is what the plan then acts on.
async fn observe(name: &str) -> InterfaceState {
let name = name.to_string();
let found = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
netdev::get_interfaces()
.into_iter()
.find(|iface| iface.name == name)
})
.await
.ok()
.flatten();
let Some(iface) = found else {
return InterfaceState::absent();
};
let mut addresses: Vec<Cidr> = Vec::new();
for net in &iface.ipv4 {
if let Ok(cidr) = Cidr::new(IpAddr::V4(net.addr()), net.prefix_len())
&& !is_link_local(cidr.addr)
{
addresses.push(cidr);
}
}
for net in &iface.ipv6 {
if let Ok(cidr) = Cidr::new(IpAddr::V6(net.addr()), net.prefix_len())
&& !is_link_local(cidr.addr)
{
addresses.push(cidr);
}
}
addresses.sort();
InterfaceState {
// Only ever reached for an interface this agent created (see
// `reconcile`), so it is ours and a TUN by construction.
kind: LinkKind::Tun,
attached: iface.is_up(),
up: iface.is_up(),
mtu: iface.mtu.unwrap_or(0),
addresses,
}
}
/// Applies MTU, link state, addresses and the on-link routes they imply.
async fn configure(name: &str, changes: &super::Changes) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
if let Some(mtu) = changes.set_mtu {
set_mtu(name, mtu).await?;
}
for cidr in &changes.remove {
// Best effort: an address that is already gone is the outcome wanted.
if let Err(err) = address_del(name, *cidr).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %cidr, %err, "could not remove address");
}
if let Err(err) = route_del(name, *cidr).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %cidr, %err, "could not remove route");
}
}
for cidr in &changes.add {
address_add(name, *cidr).await?;
// The subnet route makes the whole overlay range reach the interface;
// a point-to-point utun does not install one from the address alone. A
// host address (/32 or /128) needs none. Best effort: a route that is
// already there is the outcome wanted.
if let Err(err) = route_add(name, *cidr).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %cidr, %err, "could not add route");
}
}
if changes.bring_up {
// Best effort: a utun with a descriptor open is up already, and a
// failure to nudge it is not a reason to fail the whole reconcile.
if let Err(err) = set_up(name).await {
tracing::debug!(interface = %name, %err, "could not enable the interface");
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// The network address of a CIDR, with the host bits cleared.
fn network_of(cidr: Cidr) -> IpAddr {
match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => {
let bits = u32::from(addr);
let mask = if cidr.prefix_len == 0 {
0
} else {
u32::MAX << (32 - u32::from(cidr.prefix_len))
};
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(bits & mask))
}
IpAddr::V6(addr) => {
let bits = u128::from(addr);
let mask = if cidr.prefix_len == 0 {
0
} else {
u128::MAX << (128 - u32::from(cidr.prefix_len))
};
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(bits & mask))
}
}
}
/// Whether a CIDR is a single host address, which needs no subnet route.
fn is_host_route(cidr: Cidr) -> bool {
match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => cidr.prefix_len >= 32,
IpAddr::V6(_) => cidr.prefix_len >= 128,
}
}
/// The `ifconfig` arguments that add an address to a utun interface.
///
/// A utun is point-to-point, so the IPv4 form names the address as its own
/// peer; `alias` lets several coexist on the one interface.
fn address_add_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(addr) => vec![
name.into(),
"inet".into(),
format!("{addr}/{}", cidr.prefix_len),
addr.to_string(),
"alias".into(),
],
IpAddr::V6(addr) => vec![
name.into(),
"inet6".into(),
format!("{addr}/{}", cidr.prefix_len),
"alias".into(),
],
}
}
/// The `ifconfig` arguments that remove an address from a utun interface.
fn address_del_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
let family = match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => "inet",
IpAddr::V6(_) => "inet6",
};
vec![
name.into(),
family.into(),
cidr.addr.to_string(),
"-alias".into(),
]
}
/// The `route` arguments that point a CIDR's subnet at the interface.
fn route_add_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
let family = match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => "-inet",
IpAddr::V6(_) => "-inet6",
};
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"add".into(),
family.into(),
"-net".into(),
format!("{}/{}", network_of(cidr), cidr.prefix_len),
"-interface".into(),
name.into(),
]
}
/// The `route` arguments that remove that subnet route.
fn route_del_args(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Vec<String> {
let family = match cidr.addr {
IpAddr::V4(_) => "-inet",
IpAddr::V6(_) => "-inet6",
};
vec![
"-q".into(),
"-n".into(),
"delete".into(),
family.into(),
"-net".into(),
format!("{}/{}", network_of(cidr), cidr.prefix_len),
"-interface".into(),
name.into(),
]
}
async fn address_add(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(address_add_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn address_del(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(address_del_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn route_add(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
if is_host_route(cidr) {
return Ok(());
}
route(route_add_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn route_del(name: &str, cidr: Cidr) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
if is_host_route(cidr) {
return Ok(());
}
route(route_del_args(name, cidr)).await
}
async fn set_mtu(name: &str, mtu: u32) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(vec![name.into(), "mtu".into(), mtu.to_string()]).await
}
async fn set_up(name: &str) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
ifconfig(vec![name.into(), "up".into()]).await
}
/// Runs `/sbin/ifconfig`, turning a non-zero exit into an error with its text.
async fn ifconfig(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
run("/sbin/ifconfig", args).await
}
/// Runs `/sbin/route`, turning a non-zero exit into an error with its text.
async fn route(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
run("/sbin/route", args).await
}
/// Runs a system tool by absolute path, so nothing on `PATH` can stand in for
/// it, and turns a non-zero exit into an error carrying what it said.
async fn run(program: &'static str, args: Vec<String>) -> Result<(), OverlayError> {
let display = format!("{program} {}", args.join(" "));
let output = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
std::process::Command::new(program).args(&args).output()
})
.await
.map_err(|err| OverlayError::Other(format!("could not run {display}: {err}")))?
.map_err(|err| OverlayError::Unavailable(format!("could not run {display}: {err}")))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(());
}
let message = {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let text = if stderr.trim().is_empty() {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string()
} else {
stderr.trim().to_string()
};
if text.is_empty() {
format!("exit code {}", output.status)
} else {
text
}
};
Err(OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"{display} failed: {message}"
)))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
fn v4(last: u8, prefix: u8) -> Cidr {
Cidr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, last)), prefix).unwrap()
}
fn v6(last: u16, prefix: u8) -> Cidr {
Cidr::new(
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfd00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, last)),
prefix,
)
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn a_v4_address_is_added_point_to_point_with_an_alias() {
let args = address_add_args("utun5", v4(69, 24));
assert_eq!(
args,
vec!["utun5", "inet", "10.13.37.69/24", "10.13.37.69", "alias"]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_v6_address_is_added_with_a_prefix_and_an_alias() {
let args = address_add_args("utun5", v6(1, 128));
assert_eq!(args, vec!["utun5", "inet6", "fd00::1/128", "alias"]);
}
#[test]
fn deleting_an_address_names_the_family_and_removes_the_alias() {
let args = address_del_args("utun5", v4(69, 24));
assert_eq!(args, vec!["utun5", "inet", "10.13.37.69", "-alias"]);
let args = address_del_args("utun5", v6(1, 128));
assert_eq!(args, vec!["utun5", "inet6", "fd00::1", "-alias"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_subnet_route_points_the_masked_network_at_the_interface() {
let args = route_add_args("utun5", v4(69, 24));
assert_eq!(
args,
vec![
"-q",
"-n",
"add",
"-inet",
"-net",
"10.13.37.0/24",
"-interface",
"utun5"
]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_host_address_installs_no_subnet_route() {
assert!(is_host_route(v4(69, 32)));
assert!(is_host_route(v6(1, 128)));
assert!(!is_host_route(v4(69, 24)));
assert!(!is_host_route(v6(1, 64)));
}
#[test]
fn the_network_address_clears_the_host_bits() {
assert_eq!(
network_of(v4(69, 24)),
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 0))
);
assert_eq!(
network_of(Cidr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 69)), 16).unwrap()),
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 0, 0))
);
assert_eq!(
network_of(v6(0x1234, 64)),
IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfd00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0))
);
}
#[test]
fn link_local_addresses_are_not_ours_to_manage() {
assert!(is_link_local(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(
0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
))));
assert!(is_link_local(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 1, 1))));
assert!(!is_link_local(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 1))));
assert!(!is_link_local(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(
0xfd00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
))));
}
}
@@ -20,11 +20,13 @@
//! pure and tested on every platform, and only the execution is behind
//! [`InterfaceProvisioner`].
//!
//! Four implementations:
//! Five implementations:
//!
//! * `NetlinkProvisioner` on Linux, which needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`.
//! * `WintunProvisioner` on Windows, a Wintun adapter configured with `netsh`,
//! which needs an elevated process.
//! * `UtunProvisioner` on macOS, a utun interface configured with `ifconfig`
//! and `route`, which needs root.
//! * [`MockProvisioner`], an in-memory host used by the tests.
//! * [`UnsupportedProvisioner`] elsewhere, which fails with an explanation
//! and a pointer at the manual route rather than pretending to work.
@@ -52,12 +54,19 @@ pub use mock::{MockHost, MockProvisioner};
mod linux;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub use linux::NetlinkProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
pub(crate) use linux::RouteHandle;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
mod windows;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows::WintunProvisioner;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos::UtunProvisioner;
mod privilege;
pub use privilege::{Privilege, probe_net_admin};
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
//! Grant it with:
//!
//! ```text
//! sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi
//! sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /usr/local/bin/tsng
//! ```
//!
//! `+p` rather than `+ep`: with `+p` the capability is permitted but not
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ impl Privilege {
/// How to obtain it, for a diagnostic.
pub fn how_to_grant(program: &str) -> String {
format!(
"Grant it once with `sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p {program}` \
"Grant it once with `sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p {program}` \
and the agent manages its own interface. Without it, run with \
`--no-tun`: the tunnels still form, they just do not reach the \
operating system."
@@ -63,15 +63,20 @@ pub use linux_impl::{NetAdmin, probe_net_admin};
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
pub use windows_impl::probe_net_admin;
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
pub use macos_impl::probe_net_admin;
#[cfg(not(any(
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows")
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos")
)))]
pub use other_impl::probe_net_admin;
#[cfg(not(any(
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows")
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"),
all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos")
)))]
mod other_impl {
use super::Privilege;
@@ -101,6 +106,25 @@ mod windows_impl {
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "macos"))]
mod macos_impl {
use super::Privilege;
/// Whether this process can configure interfaces.
///
/// macOS has no capability to hold and lower the way Linux does: creating
/// a utun interface simply needs the process to be root. Reading the
/// effective uid means a libc call this crate forbids, so the probe is
/// deliberately optimistic — it reports that the platform can manage
/// interfaces — and the real check is left to the utun open, which fails
/// with a precise "run with sudo" message when the process is not root.
/// This matches how the Linux path treats the open itself as the honest
/// answer.
pub fn probe_net_admin() -> Privilege {
Privilege::Available
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "linux"))]
mod linux_impl {
use caps::{CapSet, Capability};
@@ -147,7 +171,7 @@ mod linux_impl {
caps::raise(None, CapSet::Effective, Capability::CAP_NET_ADMIN).map_err(|err| {
OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"cannot raise CAP_NET_ADMIN: {err}. {}",
Privilege::how_to_grant("tsunagi")
Privilege::how_to_grant("tsng")
))
})?;
Ok(Self { raised: true })
@@ -180,8 +204,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn the_grant_instructions_name_the_program() {
let text = Privilege::how_to_grant("/usr/local/bin/tsunagi");
assert!(text.contains("setcap cap_net_admin+p /usr/local/bin/tsunagi"));
let text = Privilege::how_to_grant("/usr/local/bin/tsng");
assert!(text.contains("setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /usr/local/bin/tsng"));
assert!(text.contains("--no-tun"), "the fallback is offered too");
}
@@ -262,7 +262,12 @@ async fn configure(plan: &InterfacePlan, changes: &super::Changes) -> Result<(),
set_mtu(&plan.name, mtu).await?;
}
for cidr in &changes.add {
address_add(&plan.name, *cidr).await?;
if let Err(err) = address_add(&plan.name, *cidr).await {
let err_str = err.to_string();
if !err_str.contains("already exists") && !err_str.contains("0x80071392") {
return Err(err);
}
}
}
if changes.bring_up {
// Best effort: a Wintun adapter with a session is up already, and a
+974
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,974 @@
//! Which peer a packet is for, and whether a peer may have sent it.
//!
//! One agent has one interface, so a packet coming off it could belong to any
//! network the agent is in and to any protocol currently carrying traffic.
//! Deciding which is this table's job, and it is the reason the interface
//! belongs to the system level: the answer comes from signed state, which no
//! protocol owns.
//!
//! Two questions, and they are not the same one:
//!
//! * **Outbound**: this destination address — whose is it? A packet for
//! nobody is dropped rather than broadcast.
//! * **Inbound**: this peer decrypted a packet with this source address —
//! is that address actually its? A peer may not speak for anybody else,
//! and the check consults the signed claim rather than anything the peer
//! said.
//!
//! Nothing here is derived from a protocol's key. An address is allocated at
//! the system level and signed by the member that holds it, so every protocol
//! carries traffic for the same addresses and the table is the same whichever
//! one is in use.
use super::broadcast::{BroadcastPolicy, BroadcastTable};
use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use iroh::EndpointId;
use crate::identity::NetworkId;
use crate::state::Ipv4Range;
/// Where an outbound packet is going.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Route {
/// The network the destination belongs to.
pub network: NetworkId,
/// The member that holds the destination address.
pub peer: EndpointId,
}
/// A network's exit-node settings, as far as packets are concerned.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ExitPolicy {
/// This agent offers itself as an exit node here: packets from members
/// for addresses outside every overlay range are handed to the host.
pub offer: bool,
/// The member all other traffic is sent to, if this device uses one.
pub via: Option<EndpointId>,
}
/// What one network contributes to the table.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NetworkRoutes {
/// Exit-node settings of this network.
pub exit: ExitPolicy,
/// Local broadcast policy and authenticated willing recipients.
pub broadcast: BroadcastPolicy,
/// The range this network allocates from, once it has agreed one.
pub range: Option<Ipv4Range>,
/// This agent's own address in the network.
pub local: Option<Ipv4Addr>,
/// Every other member's address, as the signed state has it.
pub peers: Vec<(Ipv4Addr, EndpointId)>,
}
/// Why a network cannot be added to the table.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RouteError {
/// Two networks would answer for the same addresses.
#[error(
"network {network} uses {range}, which overlaps {other_range} already in use by \
{other}. One agent has one interface, so an address can belong to only one of \
them: stop the other network before starting this one."
)]
Overlap {
/// The network being added.
network: NetworkId,
/// The range it wants.
range: Ipv4Range,
/// The network already using an overlapping range.
other: NetworkId,
/// That network's range.
other_range: Ipv4Range,
},
}
/// Address ownership across every network this agent is in.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct RoutingTable {
broadcast: ArcSwap<BroadcastTable>,
networks: RwLock<HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>>,
}
impl RoutingTable {
/// An empty table.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
fn read(&self) -> std::sync::RwLockReadGuard<'_, HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>> {
match self.networks.read() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
fn write(&self) -> std::sync::RwLockWriteGuard<'_, HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>> {
match self.networks.write() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
/// Replaces what one network contributes.
///
/// Rejected when its range overlaps another network's. With one
/// interface an address can belong to only one network, and guessing
/// which would send somebody's traffic to a stranger.
pub fn set_network(&self, network: NetworkId, routes: NetworkRoutes) -> Result<(), RouteError> {
let mut networks = self.write();
if let Some(range) = routes.range {
for (other, existing) in networks.iter() {
if *other == network {
continue;
}
let Some(other_range) = existing.range else {
continue;
};
if ranges_overlap(range, other_range) {
return Err(RouteError::Overlap {
network,
range,
other: *other,
other_range,
});
}
}
}
networks.insert(network, routes);
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
Ok(())
}
/// Forgets a network.
pub fn remove_network(&self, network: NetworkId) {
let mut networks = self.write();
networks.remove(&network);
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
}
/// Replaces only a network's broadcast participation, without changing addresses.
pub fn set_broadcast(&self, network: NetworkId, policy: BroadcastPolicy) {
let mut networks = self.write();
if let Some(routes) = networks.get_mut(&network) {
if routes.broadcast == policy {
return;
}
routes.broadcast = policy;
self.broadcast
.store(Arc::new(BroadcastTable::build(&networks)));
}
}
/// Replaces only a network's exit-node settings, without changing addresses.
///
/// A network that has no entry yet (its range is not agreed) takes them
/// from [`NetworkRoutes::exit`] when it is added.
pub fn set_exit(&self, network: NetworkId, policy: ExitPolicy) {
if let Some(routes) = self.write().get_mut(&network) {
routes.exit = policy;
}
}
/// Recognizes limited and configured subnet broadcasts before unicast lookup.
pub fn is_broadcast(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.broadcast.load().is_destination(destination)
}
/// A precomputed domain-scoped recipient list; no per-packet graph search.
pub fn broadcast_recipients(
&self,
source: Ipv4Addr,
destination: Ipv4Addr,
) -> Option<Arc<[Route]>> {
self.broadcast.load().outgoing(source, destination)
}
/// Local admission after the plugin authenticated and decrypted the sender.
pub fn accepts_broadcast(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
destination: Ipv4Addr,
) -> bool {
self.broadcast.load().accepts(network, peer, destination)
}
/// The peer that holds a destination address, if anybody does.
///
/// This agent's own address returns `None`: a packet for ourselves does
/// not go over a tunnel, and answering with a peer would send it to one.
///
/// An address nobody holds, outside every overlay range and an ordinary
/// unicast destination, goes to this device's exit node when it has one:
/// that is what sending *all* traffic through a member means.
pub fn route(&self, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> Option<Route> {
let networks = self.read();
for (network, routes) in networks.iter() {
if routes.local == Some(destination) {
return None;
}
if let Some((_, peer)) = routes
.peers
.iter()
.find(|(address, _)| *address == destination)
{
return Some(Route {
network: *network,
peer: *peer,
});
}
}
// Inside an overlay range, an unowned address is nobody's, not the
// internet's.
if !is_internet_destination(destination) || in_any_range(&networks, destination) {
return None;
}
exit_via(&networks).map(|(network, peer)| Route { network, peer })
}
/// Whether a peer may send from a source address.
///
/// A peer speaks only for the address the network agreed it holds. The
/// one exception is this device's exit node: what comes back from the
/// internet carries the internet's addresses, so from *that* peer any
/// source outside the overlay ranges is accepted.
pub fn may_send_from(&self, network: NetworkId, peer: EndpointId, source: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
let networks = self.read();
let Some(routes) = networks.get(&network) else {
return false;
};
if routes
.peers
.iter()
.any(|(address, holder)| *address == source && *holder == peer)
{
return true;
}
routes.exit.via == Some(peer)
&& is_internet_destination(source)
&& !in_any_range(&networks, source)
}
/// Whether this agent, as an exit node of `network`, takes a member's
/// packet for `destination` to the host.
///
/// Only an ordinary unicast address outside every overlay range, so a
/// packet for another member, for this agent or for the local network
/// segment never leaves by this door. The sender's own source address is
/// checked separately, by [`Self::may_send_from`].
pub fn accepts_exit_traffic(&self, network: NetworkId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
let networks = self.read();
networks
.get(&network)
.is_some_and(|routes| routes.exit.offer)
&& is_internet_destination(destination)
&& !in_any_range(&networks, destination)
}
/// The network and member this device sends its internet traffic through.
///
/// One default route, so one answer; if several networks claim one (they
/// should not) the lowest network id decides, so two runs agree.
pub fn exit_via(&self) -> Option<(NetworkId, EndpointId)> {
exit_via(&self.read())
}
/// Networks that offer this agent as an exit node, with the range each
/// agreed. A network that has not agreed one yet has nothing to
/// masquerade and is left out.
pub fn exit_offers(&self) -> Vec<(NetworkId, Ipv4Range)> {
let mut offers: Vec<(NetworkId, Ipv4Range)> = self
.read()
.iter()
.filter(|(_, routes)| routes.exit.offer)
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.range?)))
.collect();
offers.sort_by_key(|(network, _)| *network);
offers
}
/// The range of every network in the table that has agreed one, sorted.
pub fn overlay_ranges(&self) -> Vec<Ipv4Range> {
let mut ranges: Vec<Ipv4Range> = self
.read()
.values()
.filter_map(|routes| routes.range)
.collect();
ranges.sort_by_key(|range| (range.base, range.prefix_len));
ranges.dedup();
ranges
}
/// One network's exit-node settings and its range, if it is in the table.
pub fn exit_settings(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Option<(ExitPolicy, Option<Ipv4Range>)> {
self.read()
.get(&network)
.map(|routes| (routes.exit, routes.range))
}
/// Whether an ordinary packet terminates on this host in this network.
/// Exported LAN subnets must extend this admission policy explicitly later.
pub fn is_local_destination(&self, network: NetworkId, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
self.read()
.get(&network)
.is_some_and(|routes| routes.local == Some(destination))
}
/// Every address this agent should answer to, with its prefix length.
pub fn local_addresses(&self) -> Vec<(Ipv4Addr, u8)> {
let mut addresses: Vec<(Ipv4Addr, u8)> = self
.read()
.values()
.filter_map(|routes| Some((routes.local?, routes.range?.prefix_len)))
.collect();
addresses.sort();
addresses
}
/// The one network whose address the limited broadcast route is bound to.
///
/// The host has a single `255.255.255.255` route per interface, and one
/// interface carries every network, so only one overlay address can be its
/// source. The choice is the lowest [`NetworkId`] among networks that have
/// broadcast enabled, a range and a local address: deterministic, so two
/// runs with the same networks pick the same one.
pub fn broadcast_host_target(&self) -> Option<(Ipv4Addr, Ipv4Range)> {
let networks = self.read();
networks
.iter()
.filter(|(_, routes)| routes.broadcast.enabled)
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.local?, routes.range?)))
.min_by_key(|(network, _, _)| *network)
.map(|(_, local, range)| (local, range))
}
/// Whether a range would collide with one another network already uses.
///
/// Asked before proposing a range rather than after: with one interface
/// an agent that claimed an address it could not route would also be
/// telling everybody else to use that range, and "the range of the
/// lowest author wins" would spread the collision instead of containing
/// it.
pub fn would_overlap(&self, network: NetworkId, range: Ipv4Range) -> Option<Ipv4Range> {
self.read().iter().find_map(|(other, existing)| {
if *other == network {
return None;
}
let other_range = existing.range?;
ranges_overlap(range, other_range).then_some(other_range)
})
}
/// All active networks whose reserved ranges intersect this range.
pub fn overlapping_networks(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
range: Ipv4Range,
) -> Vec<(NetworkId, Ipv4Range)> {
let mut conflicts: Vec<_> = self
.read()
.iter()
.filter_map(|(other, routes)| {
let other_range = routes.range?;
(*other != network && ranges_overlap(range, other_range))
.then_some((*other, other_range))
})
.collect();
conflicts.sort_by_key(|(id, _)| *id);
conflicts
}
/// Current signed allocations used for encrypted data delivery checks.
pub(crate) fn probe_addresses(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
peer: EndpointId,
) -> Option<(Ipv4Addr, Ipv4Addr)> {
let table = self.read();
let routes = table.get(&network)?;
Some((
routes.local?,
routes
.peers
.iter()
.find(|(_, holder)| *holder == peer)
.map(|(address, _)| *address)?,
))
}
/// How many networks the table covers.
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.read().len()
}
/// Whether it covers none.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.read().is_empty()
}
}
/// Whether an address is an ordinary unicast one: not this host, not a
/// multicast or broadcast group, not link-local, not unspecified.
fn is_internet_destination(address: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
!(address.is_unspecified()
|| address.is_loopback()
|| address.is_multicast()
|| address.is_broadcast()
|| address.is_link_local())
}
/// Whether an address lies in any network's range.
fn in_any_range(networks: &HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>, address: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
networks
.values()
.any(|routes| routes.range.is_some_and(|range| range.contains(address)))
}
/// The exit node in use, if any, from the lowest network that names one.
fn exit_via(networks: &HashMap<NetworkId, NetworkRoutes>) -> Option<(NetworkId, EndpointId)> {
networks
.iter()
.filter_map(|(network, routes)| Some((*network, routes.exit.via?)))
.min_by_key(|(network, _)| *network)
}
/// Whether two ranges share any address.
fn ranges_overlap(one: Ipv4Range, other: Ipv4Range) -> bool {
// A range contains the other's base, or the other way round. With
// prefix-aligned ranges that is the whole of it: two blocks either nest
// or are disjoint.
one.contains(other.base) || other.contains(one.base)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::identity::{NetworkKeys, NetworkName, NetworkSecret};
fn network(name: &str) -> NetworkId {
NetworkKeys::derive(
&NetworkName::new(name).unwrap(),
&NetworkSecret::from_bytes(vec![4u8; 32]).unwrap(),
)
.network_id()
}
fn peer(seed: u8) -> EndpointId {
iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32]).public()
}
fn addr(last: u8) -> Ipv4Addr {
Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, last)
}
fn routes() -> NetworkRoutes {
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(addr(1)),
peers: vec![(addr(2), peer(2)), (addr(3), peer(3))],
}
}
#[test]
fn a_packet_goes_to_the_member_that_holds_its_destination() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("routing");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.route(addr(2)),
Some(Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(2)
})
);
assert_eq!(
table.route(addr(3)),
Some(Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(3)
})
);
}
#[test]
fn a_packet_for_nobody_has_nowhere_to_go() {
// Dropped rather than sent to everybody: a tunnel is not a broadcast
// domain, and flooding would hand one member another's traffic.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("routing"), routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(200)), None);
assert_eq!(table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 0, 2, 1)), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_packet_for_ourselves_is_not_sent_to_a_peer() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("routing"), routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(1)), None, "that address is ours");
}
#[test]
fn a_peer_may_only_send_from_the_address_it_holds() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("ownership");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
assert!(table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(2)));
// Somebody else's address, and its own network's.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(3)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(1)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(99)));
// A peer that holds nothing here.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(9), addr(2)));
// And the question is per network, not global.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(network("elsewhere"), peer(2), addr(2)));
}
#[test]
fn two_networks_with_overlapping_ranges_are_refused() {
// One interface means an address belongs to one network. Accepting
// both and guessing would send somebody's traffic to a stranger.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let first = network("first");
let second = network("second");
table.set_network(first, routes()).unwrap();
let err = table.set_network(second, routes()).unwrap_err();
let RouteError::Overlap { other, .. } = err;
assert_eq!(other, first);
assert!(err.to_string().contains("stop the other network"), "{err}");
assert_eq!(table.len(), 1, "the overlapping network is not added");
// A range of its own is fine.
table
.set_network(
second,
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
peers: vec![(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 2), peer(4))],
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(
table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 2)),
Some(Route {
network: second,
peer: peer(4)
})
);
// And the first network still answers for its own.
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)).map(|route| route.network), Some(first));
}
#[test]
fn the_host_broadcast_target_is_the_lowest_enabled_network_with_an_address() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
assert_eq!(table.broadcast_host_target(), None);
let (low, high) = {
let (a, b) = (network("first"), network("second"));
if a < b { (a, b) } else { (b, a) }
};
let mk = |enabled: bool, base: [u8; 4], local: Option<Ipv4Addr>| NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: BroadcastPolicy {
enabled,
..Default::default()
},
range: Some(
format!("{}.{}.{}.0/24", base[0], base[1], base[2])
.parse()
.unwrap(),
),
local,
peers: Vec::new(),
};
let a = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 1, 0, 1);
let b = Ipv4Addr::new(10, 2, 0, 1);
// The lower id has broadcast off, so the higher one is chosen.
table
.set_network(low, mk(false, [10, 1, 0, 0], Some(a)))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(high, mk(true, [10, 2, 0, 0], Some(b)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((b, "10.2.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
// Both enabled: the lowest id wins, whatever the insertion order.
table
.set_network(low, mk(true, [10, 1, 0, 0], Some(a)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((a, "10.1.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
// No local address yet: it cannot be the route's source.
table
.set_network(low, mk(true, [10, 1, 0, 0], None))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.broadcast_host_target(),
Some((b, "10.2.0.0/24".parse().unwrap()))
);
table.remove_network(high);
assert_eq!(table.broadcast_host_target(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_range_can_be_asked_about_before_it_is_proposed() {
// The point of asking first: an agent that claims an address it
// cannot route also tells everybody else to use that range.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let first = network("first");
let second = network("second");
table.set_network(first, routes()).unwrap();
let mine: Ipv4Range = "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.would_overlap(second, mine), Some(mine));
// Its own range is not a collision with itself.
assert_eq!(table.would_overlap(first, mine), None);
assert_eq!(
table.would_overlap(second, "10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn a_nested_range_counts_as_overlapping() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table
.set_network(
network("wide"),
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.0.0.0/8".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
// Inside the /8, in either direction.
assert!(
table
.set_network(
network("narrow"),
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
}
)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn replacing_a_network_does_not_count_as_overlapping_itself() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("refresh");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
let mut updated = routes();
updated.peers.push((addr(4), peer(4)));
table.set_network(id, updated).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.len(), 1);
assert!(table.route(addr(4)).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn forgetting_a_network_takes_its_addresses_with_it() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("leaving");
table.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
table.remove_network(id);
assert!(table.is_empty());
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)), None);
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(2)));
}
#[test]
fn the_local_addresses_are_what_the_interface_should_carry() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("one"), routes()).unwrap();
table
.set_network(
network("two"),
NetworkRoutes {
exit: Default::default(),
broadcast: Default::default(),
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
peers: Vec::new(),
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.local_addresses(),
vec![(addr(1), 24), (Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1), 16)]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_network_with_no_address_yet_contributes_nothing() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("waiting");
table.set_network(id, NetworkRoutes::default()).unwrap();
assert!(table.local_addresses().is_empty());
assert_eq!(table.route(addr(2)), None);
assert_eq!(table.len(), 1, "the network is known, it just has nothing");
}
fn with_exit(offer: bool, via: Option<EndpointId>) -> NetworkRoutes {
NetworkRoutes {
exit: ExitPolicy { offer, via },
..routes()
}
}
const INTERNET: Ipv4Addr = Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34);
#[test]
fn without_an_exit_node_the_internet_has_nowhere_to_go() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_network(network("plain"), routes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(INTERNET), None);
assert_eq!(table.exit_via(), None);
}
#[test]
fn with_an_exit_node_every_ordinary_destination_goes_to_it() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("client");
table
.set_network(id, with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
let exit = Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(2),
};
assert_eq!(table.route(INTERNET), Some(exit));
assert_eq!(table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 10)), Some(exit));
assert_eq!(table.exit_via(), Some((id, peer(2))));
// A member's own address still goes to that member.
assert_eq!(
table.route(addr(3)),
Some(Route {
network: id,
peer: peer(3)
})
);
}
#[test]
fn the_exit_node_is_never_the_answer_for_what_is_not_the_internet() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table
.set_network(network("client"), with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
// Ourselves, a free address inside the overlay range, and everything
// that is not an ordinary unicast destination.
for destination in [
addr(1),
addr(200),
Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1),
Ipv4Addr::new(224, 0, 0, 251),
Ipv4Addr::new(239, 255, 255, 250),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 1, 1),
] {
assert_eq!(table.route(destination), None, "{destination}");
}
}
#[test]
fn another_networks_range_is_not_the_internet_either() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table
.set_network(network("client"), with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(
network("other"),
NetworkRoutes {
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
local: Some(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 0, 1)),
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(table.route(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 7, 7)), None);
}
#[test]
fn two_exit_choices_resolve_to_the_lowest_network_id() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let (a, b) = (network("one"), network("two"));
table
.set_network(a, with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
table
.set_network(
b,
NetworkRoutes {
exit: ExitPolicy {
offer: false,
via: Some(peer(9)),
},
range: Some("10.99.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
let (chosen, _) = table.exit_via().unwrap();
assert_eq!(chosen, a.min(b));
assert_eq!(table.route(INTERNET).unwrap().network, a.min(b));
}
#[test]
fn the_exit_peer_may_send_from_any_internet_address_but_nobody_else_may() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("client");
table
.set_network(id, with_exit(false, Some(peer(2))))
.unwrap();
// What comes back from the internet carries the internet's addresses.
assert!(table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), INTERNET));
// Another member still speaks only for its own address.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(3), INTERNET));
assert!(table.may_send_from(id, peer(3), addr(3)));
// The exit peer cannot pass itself off as somebody else in the
// overlay, nor as this agent, nor as something that is not a source.
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(3)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(1)));
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), addr(200)));
for source in [
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
Ipv4Addr::new(224, 0, 0, 1),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
] {
assert!(!table.may_send_from(id, peer(2), source), "{source}");
}
// Without choosing an exit node nobody gets the exception.
let plain = RoutingTable::new();
plain.set_network(id, routes()).unwrap();
assert!(!plain.may_send_from(id, peer(2), INTERNET));
}
#[test]
fn an_exit_node_takes_a_members_internet_packets_only_while_it_offers() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let id = network("server");
table.set_network(id, with_exit(false, None)).unwrap();
assert!(!table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, INTERNET));
table.set_exit(
id,
ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None,
},
);
assert!(table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, INTERNET));
assert!(table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 10)));
// Never for another member, for this agent, a free overlay address,
// or anything that is not an ordinary unicast destination.
for destination in [
addr(1),
addr(2),
addr(200),
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST,
Ipv4Addr::new(224, 0, 0, 251),
Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST,
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
] {
assert!(
!table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, destination),
"{destination}"
);
}
// An unknown network offers nothing.
assert!(!table.accepts_exit_traffic(network("elsewhere"), INTERNET));
table.set_exit(id, ExitPolicy::default());
assert!(!table.accepts_exit_traffic(id, INTERNET));
}
#[test]
fn offers_are_listed_by_network_with_the_range_each_agreed() {
let table = RoutingTable::new();
let (a, b) = (network("a"), network("b"));
table.set_network(a, with_exit(true, None)).unwrap();
table
.set_network(
b,
NetworkRoutes {
exit: ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None,
},
// No range agreed yet: nothing to masquerade.
..Default::default()
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
table.exit_offers(),
vec![(a, "10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap())]
);
assert_eq!(
table.exit_settings(a),
Some((
ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None
},
Some("10.13.37.0/24".parse().unwrap())
))
);
assert_eq!(table.exit_settings(network("none")), None);
}
#[test]
fn setting_exit_for_a_network_with_no_entry_is_remembered_by_the_caller() {
// The runtime keeps the policy and passes it with the network when
// its range is agreed; a setter for a network the table does not know
// yet changes nothing.
let table = RoutingTable::new();
table.set_exit(
network("later"),
ExitPolicy {
offer: true,
via: None,
},
);
assert!(table.is_empty());
}
}
@@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ pub trait TunFactory: Send + Sync + std::fmt::Debug + 'static {
Box::pin(async move { Ok(()) })
}
/// The host rules for this factory's interface, when it manages the host.
///
/// `None` for an in-memory device or an interface somebody else prepared:
/// there is nothing of ours to route or to open in a firewall.
fn host_rules(&self) -> Option<Arc<dyn super::hostrules::BroadcastHostRules>> {
None
}
/// Removes an interface this factory created.
///
/// Runs on the teardown path, so it reports rather than fails: there is
@@ -221,7 +229,31 @@ impl TunDevice for MemoryTun {
/// enough here: the agent chose the address, so anything else holding it is a
/// problem in its own right.
pub fn address_is_local(address: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
std::net::UdpSocket::bind((address, 0)).is_ok()
if std::net::UdpSocket::bind((address, 0)).is_ok() {
return true;
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "tun-device", target_os = "windows"))]
{
if let Ok(interfaces) = std::panic::catch_unwind(netdev::get_interfaces) {
for iface in interfaces {
if iface.is_up() {
match address {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
if iface.ipv4.iter().any(|ip| ip.addr() == v4) {
return true;
}
}
std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
if iface.ipv6.iter().any(|ip| ip.addr() == v6) {
return true;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
false
}
/// Creates [`MemoryTun`] devices.
@@ -385,7 +417,15 @@ mod system {
/// across this call, and such a guard must not span an `await` because
/// Linux capabilities are per thread.
pub(crate) fn open_tun(request: &TunRequest) -> Result<Arc<dyn TunDevice>, OverlayError> {
// macOS mutates neither field below (it neither names the interface nor
// sets a platform config), so `mut` is unused only there.
#[cfg_attr(target_os = "macos", allow(unused_mut))]
let mut config = tun::Configuration::default();
// macOS names its tunnels `utunN` and assigns the unit number itself.
// A name derived from the network id (`tsun…`) is not a legal utun
// name, so there the kernel is left to choose and the real name is read
// back below. Linux and Windows take the requested name verbatim.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
config.tun_name(&request.name);
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
config.platform_config(|platform| {
@@ -403,9 +443,20 @@ mod system {
let device = tun::create_as_async(&config).map_err(|err| open_error(&request.name, err))?;
// The interface name the operating system actually gave us: the
// requested one everywhere except macOS, where the kernel chose the
// utun unit and so the real name has to be read back off the device.
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
let name = {
use tun::AbstractDevice;
device.tun_name().unwrap_or_else(|_| request.name.clone())
};
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
let name = request.name.clone();
let (reader, writer) = tokio::io::split(device);
Ok(Arc::new(SystemTun {
name: request.name.clone(),
name,
mtu: request.mtu,
reader: Mutex::new(reader),
writer: Mutex::new(writer),
@@ -432,12 +483,15 @@ mod system {
if denied {
let hint = if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
"Open PowerShell or Command Prompt with 'Run as administrator' and \
start `tsunagi up` there."
start `tsng up` there."
} else if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
"Start `tsunagi up` as root or grant CAP_NET_ADMIN with \
`sudo setcap cap_net_admin+p /path/to/tsunagi`."
"Start `tsng up` as root or grant CAP_NET_ADMIN with \
`sudo setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p /path/to/tsunagi`."
} else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
"Creating a utun interface needs root on macOS; start `tsng up` \
with `sudo`, or install it as a root LaunchDaemon."
} else {
"Start `tsunagi up` with the privileges required to create a TUN interface."
"Start `tsng up` with the privileges required to create a TUN interface."
};
return OverlayError::Unavailable(format!(
"permission denied while creating the TUN interface `{name}`. \
@@ -455,7 +509,7 @@ mod system {
fn open_hint() -> &'static str {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
"Creating one needs CAP_NET_ADMIN; grant it with `setcap cap_net_admin+p`, \
"Creating one needs CAP_NET_ADMIN; grant it with `setcap cap_net_admin,cap_net_bind_service+p`, \
or run with `--no-tun` to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@@ -464,7 +518,12 @@ mod system {
run as Administrator with the DLL beside the executable, or run with `--no-tun` \
to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "windows")))]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
"Creating a utun interface needs root; start the agent with `sudo` or as a root \
LaunchDaemon, or run with `--no-tun` to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "windows", target_os = "macos")))]
{
"Run with `--no-tun` to keep the tunnels off the operating system."
}
@@ -480,7 +539,7 @@ mod system {
let message = open_error("tsun0", error).to_string();
assert!(message.contains("permission denied"), "{message}");
assert!(message.contains("tsun0"), "{message}");
assert!(message.contains("tsunagi up"), "{message}");
assert!(message.contains("tsng up"), "{message}");
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
assert!(message.contains("Run as administrator"), "{message}");
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
File renamed without changes.
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use crate::error::ProtocolError;
/// The version in the ALPN is the wire-compatibility version of the control
/// protocol. It is independent of the network identity scheme version, so
/// bumping it must not change any existing [`crate::NetworkId`].
pub const ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/ctrl/1";
pub const ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/ctrl/7";
/// ALPN of the tsunagi data plane.
///
@@ -29,11 +29,12 @@ pub const ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/ctrl/1";
/// saturated or broken data plane cannot disturb control traffic, and the
/// transport underneath can be replaced without touching the control protocol.
///
/// Version 3 fragments logical datagrams below the peer-relay envelope, so
/// the overlay's MTU is independent of the current QUIC path MTU. Older data
/// versions cannot form a data link; control and persistent identities remain
/// compatible. Both ends, including any intermediate peer, must be upgraded.
pub const DATA_ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/data/3";
/// Version 4 adds source, destination, hop limit and stable flow id above
/// transport fragmentation. Version 5 adds the end-to-end protocol to that
/// envelope, so a tunnel no longer depends on the kind of link under it, and
/// a first-claimed time to a signed hostname claim. All members must upgrade
/// together. Persistent identities and network configuration do not change.
pub const DATA_ALPN: &[u8] = b"tsunagi/data/5";
/// Largest plugin protocol identifier accepted when opening a data channel.
pub const MAX_DATA_PROTOCOL_LEN: usize = 32;
@@ -42,7 +43,9 @@ pub const MAX_DATA_PROTOCOL_LEN: usize = 32;
pub const MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN: usize = 64;
/// Control protocol version carried inside the handshake.
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u16 = 1;
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u16 = 7;
pub use crate::dataplane::transport::{MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD, TransportPayload};
/// First message of the handshake, sent by the initiator.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -74,6 +77,13 @@ pub struct AuthProof {
/// What this agent tells a peer about itself.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Announcement {
/// Local opt-in to receive LAN broadcasts in this network.
pub broadcast: bool,
/// This agent offers itself as an exit node in this network: members may
/// send all their internet traffic through it. Off unless its owner
/// turned it on, and only said once the rules that make it work are in
/// place.
pub exit_node: bool,
/// Human-readable hostname. A mutable binding, not an identity.
pub hostname: String,
/// Announced IP plugin capabilities. Opaque to the core.
@@ -106,6 +116,13 @@ pub struct DataOpenAck {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum ControlMessage {
/// Private transport negotiation; never persisted or rebroadcast.
Transport {
/// Transport protocol id; the payload stays opaque to the core.
protocol: String,
/// Secret negotiation data, redacted in diagnostics.
payload: TransportPayload,
},
/// Hostname and capability announcement.
Announce(Announcement),
/// A small request used to verify that the exchange works.
@@ -154,8 +171,8 @@ pub enum ControlMessage {
/// and repairs itself; and volatile, so it lives here and not in
/// signed state, which is for what has to survive a member being away.
Reachable {
/// The peers, as raw endpoint keys.
peers: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
/// Direct links, scoped to the plugin protocol they actually carry.
links: Vec<ReachableLink>,
},
/// Graceful goodbye.
///
@@ -164,6 +181,11 @@ pub enum ControlMessage {
/// Short free-text reason.
reason: String,
},
/// Signed cleanup markers, each proving the retired claim version.
Retirements {
/// Bounded by the per-message signed-state limit.
markers: Vec<crate::state::SignedRetirement>,
},
}
/// Somewhere a member has been seen.
@@ -183,6 +205,15 @@ pub struct PeerHint {
pub addrs: Vec<String>,
}
/// One directly observed edge, advertised only by its authenticated source.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ReachableLink {
/// The other end of this transport link.
pub peer: [u8; 32],
/// Protocol carried by the link.
pub protocol: String,
}
/// Longest address text accepted in a hint.
pub const MAX_HINT_ADDR_LEN: usize = 128;
@@ -247,6 +278,39 @@ pub fn validate_capability(
/// network, the other networks or the agent.
pub fn validate(message: &ControlMessage, limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
match message {
ControlMessage::Retirements { markers } => {
check_len("retirements", markers.len(), limits.max_state_records)?;
for marker in markers {
check_len(
"retirement.signature",
marker.signature.len(),
MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN,
)?;
check_len(
"retirement.target.signature",
marker.target.signature.len(),
MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN,
)?;
if let Some(name) = marker.target.body.hostname() {
check_len(
"retirement.target.hostname",
name.len(),
limits.max_hostname_len,
)?;
}
}
}
ControlMessage::Transport { protocol, payload } => {
if protocol.is_empty() {
return Err(ProtocolError::Malformed("empty transport protocol"));
}
check_len("transport.protocol", protocol.len(), MAX_PROTOCOL_ID_LEN)?;
check_len(
"transport.payload",
payload.as_bytes().len(),
limits.max_transport_payload_len.min(MAX_TRANSPORT_PAYLOAD),
)?;
}
ControlMessage::Peers { peers } => {
check_len("peers", peers.len(), limits.max_state_records)?;
for hint in peers {
@@ -256,10 +320,18 @@ pub fn validate(message: &ControlMessage, limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), Protoco
}
}
}
ControlMessage::Reachable { peers } => {
// One entry per member at most; a sender claiming more than a
// network can hold is not describing this network.
check_len("reachable.peers", peers.len(), limits.max_state_records)?;
ControlMessage::Reachable { links } => {
check_len("reachable.links", links.len(), limits.max_state_records)?;
for link in links {
if link.protocol.is_empty() {
return Err(ProtocolError::Malformed("empty routing protocol"));
}
check_len(
"reachable.protocol",
link.protocol.len(),
MAX_PROTOCOL_ID_LEN,
)?;
}
}
ControlMessage::Announce(announcement) => {
check_len(
@@ -295,10 +367,12 @@ pub fn validate(message: &ControlMessage, limits: &Limits) -> Result<(), Protoco
/// A short, stable label for a message kind, for metrics and diagnostics.
pub fn kind(message: &ControlMessage) -> &'static str {
match message {
ControlMessage::Transport { .. } => "transport",
ControlMessage::Announce(_) => "announce",
ControlMessage::Ping { .. } => "ping",
ControlMessage::Pong { .. } => "pong",
ControlMessage::State { .. } => "state",
ControlMessage::Retirements { .. } => "retirements",
ControlMessage::Reachable { .. } => "reachable",
ControlMessage::Peers { .. } => "peers",
ControlMessage::Bye { .. } => "bye",
File renamed without changes.
@@ -28,16 +28,23 @@
//! replica that has the record needs nothing else to interpret it, and
//! recovery never depends on replaying a chain from the beginning.
//!
//! Any member may also sign a separate retirement of another author's proved
//! claim version. It suppresses stale reservations without changing that
//! author's record, and a newer claim remains valid.
//!
//! # What this slice does not do yet
//!
//! Compaction, revocation of a whole author, and snapshots covering more than
//! one record type. See `docs/sync-model.md` for the shape those take.
//! Compaction and permanent revocation of a whole author. See
//! `docs/sync-model.md` for the implemented cleanup semantics.
pub mod allocator;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
mod retirement;
pub use retirement::{MAX_RETIREMENT_LEN, SignedRetirement};
use iroh::{EndpointId, SecretKey, Signature};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
@@ -109,12 +116,8 @@ impl std::str::FromStr for Ipv4Range {
}
}
/// The IPv4 overlay range used unless something else is configured or agreed.
///
/// A small, specific `/24`: memorable, and far less likely to overlap a
/// network the machine is already on than taking a whole `/8` or `/10` would
/// be. Because addresses are allocated rather than derived, 254 of them is
/// plenty for the size of network this is for.
/// The legacy default range, retained for existing networks and explicit use.
/// New networks use [`derived_ipv4_range`] by default.
pub const DEFAULT_IPV4_RANGE: Ipv4Range = Ipv4Range {
base: Ipv4Addr::new(10, 13, 37, 0),
prefix_len: 24,
@@ -122,15 +125,10 @@ pub const DEFAULT_IPV4_RANGE: Ipv4Range = Ipv4Range {
/// A range derived from a network's own identity.
///
/// One agent has one interface, so two of its networks cannot both use the
/// configured range. The second needs another one — and it cannot be picked
/// locally, because every member has to arrive at the same answer without
/// being told. So it comes from the network id, which every member already
/// has and nobody can choose: the same network derives the same range on
/// every device.
///
/// Inside 10/8 like the default, and never equal to it, so the first
/// network keeps what it has always had.
/// Every member independently derives the same pseudorandom `/24` in 10/8,
/// including isolated first members. Stored signed ranges take precedence.
/// The derivation is kept stable for networks already using it; the legacy
/// default is excluded. Distinct network ids can still produce collisions.
pub fn derived_ipv4_range(network: NetworkId) -> Ipv4Range {
let bytes = network.as_bytes();
let second = bytes[0];
@@ -150,7 +148,7 @@ pub fn derived_ipv4_range(network: NetworkId) -> Ipv4Range {
}
/// Frozen domain separator for the bytes a record signature covers.
pub const RECORD_DOMAIN: &str = "tsunagi-signed-record-v2";
pub const RECORD_DOMAIN: &str = "tsunagi-signed-record-v3";
/// Longest hostname a record may carry.
///
@@ -207,6 +205,18 @@ pub enum RecordBody {
range: Option<Ipv4Range>,
/// The name this author answers to.
hostname: Option<String>,
/// When this author first claimed that name, in milliseconds since
/// the Unix epoch, kept across every later version that keeps the
/// name. It is what makes a name belong to whoever claimed it first
/// rather than to whoever happens to sort lowest, so a member that
/// arrives later with the same name cannot take it over.
///
/// The author's own word: a member with a wrong clock can claim an
/// earlier time. That costs it nothing it could not do by other
/// means, since anybody who knows the network secret is a member,
/// and it cannot take an address or reach anything it was not
/// already entitled to.
hostname_since: Option<u64>,
},
/// This author gives up everything it claimed.
///
@@ -243,6 +253,14 @@ impl RecordBody {
}
}
/// When the author first claimed the hostname, if it has one.
pub fn hostname_since(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
RecordBody::Claim { hostname_since, .. } => *hostname_since,
RecordBody::Release => None,
}
}
fn canonical(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(96);
match self {
@@ -250,6 +268,7 @@ impl RecordBody {
address,
range,
hostname,
hostname_since,
} => {
push_lp(&mut out, b"claim");
push_opt(
@@ -270,6 +289,13 @@ impl RecordBody {
.as_deref(),
);
push_opt(&mut out, hostname.as_deref().map(str::as_bytes));
push_opt(
&mut out,
hostname_since
.map(|since| since.to_be_bytes())
.as_ref()
.map(|bytes| &bytes[..]),
);
}
RecordBody::Release => {
push_lp(&mut out, b"release");
@@ -391,8 +417,12 @@ impl SignedRecord {
address,
range,
hostname,
hostname_since,
} = &self.body
{
if hostname.is_none() && hostname_since.is_some() {
return Err(StateError::Malformed("a time was claimed for no hostname"));
}
// Bounds before anything is believed, because all of this came
// off the network.
if let Some(range) = range {
@@ -465,6 +495,7 @@ pub enum Merged {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct StateSet {
records: HashMap<EndpointId, SignedRecord>,
retirements: HashMap<EndpointId, SignedRetirement>,
}
impl StateSet {
@@ -477,6 +508,7 @@ impl StateSet {
pub fn from_verified(records: impl IntoIterator<Item = (EndpointId, SignedRecord)>) -> Self {
Self {
records: records.into_iter().collect(),
retirements: HashMap::new(),
}
}
@@ -505,6 +537,52 @@ impl StateSet {
.collect()
}
/// Visible records, excluding versions retired by authenticated members.
pub fn active_records(&self) -> Vec<SignedRecord> {
self.records()
.into_iter()
.filter(|r| r.author_id().is_ok_and(|id| !self.is_retired(&id)))
.collect()
}
/// Whether the current known version is at or below a proved retirement.
pub fn is_retired(&self, author: &EndpointId) -> bool {
self.retirements
.get(author)
.is_some_and(|m| self.version_of(author) <= m.target.version)
}
/// Strongest retained cleanup proof for an identity.
pub fn retirement_of(&self, target: &EndpointId) -> Option<&SignedRetirement> {
self.retirements.get(target)
}
/// Durable markers in target-id order, including markers surpassed by a fresh claim.
pub fn retirements(&self) -> Vec<SignedRetirement> {
let mut markers: Vec<_> = self.retirements.values().cloned().collect();
markers.sort_by_key(|m| m.target.author);
markers
}
/// Accepts any member's signed cleanup after checking both signatures.
pub fn merge_retirement(
&mut self,
network: NetworkId,
marker: SignedRetirement,
max: usize,
) -> Result<bool, StateError> {
let target = marker.verify(network)?;
if let Some(old) = self.retirements.get(&target) {
if !marker.supersedes(old) {
return Ok(false);
}
} else if self.retirements.len() >= max {
return Err(StateError::Malformed("retirement capacity reached"));
}
self.retirements.insert(target, marker);
Ok(true)
}
/// Merges one record, verifying it first.
///
/// Merging is into the existing set, never a wholesale replacement, and an
@@ -568,6 +646,9 @@ impl StateSet {
pub fn address_holders(&self) -> HashMap<Ipv4Addr, EndpointId> {
let mut holders: HashMap<Ipv4Addr, EndpointId> = HashMap::new();
for (author, record) in &self.records {
if self.is_retired(author) {
continue;
}
let Some(address) = record.body.claimed_address() else {
continue;
};
@@ -585,25 +666,36 @@ impl StateSet {
/// Who currently holds each claimed hostname.
///
/// The same rule as addresses, for the same reason: a name is owned, two
/// members may claim one, and every replica has to reach the same answer
/// about who has it without asking anybody.
/// A name belongs to the member that claimed it first, and the others
/// that claim it keep working by address but are not found by that name.
/// "First" is the time each author signed into its own claim, with the
/// lower id deciding a tie and a claim with no time counting as last, so
/// every replica reaches the same answer about who has it without
/// asking anybody. It is a pure function of the records: nothing depends
/// on the order they arrived in, so there is no race to lose.
pub fn hostname_holders(&self) -> HashMap<String, EndpointId> {
let mut holders: HashMap<String, EndpointId> = HashMap::new();
let mut holders: HashMap<String, (u64, EndpointId)> = HashMap::new();
for (author, record) in &self.records {
if self.is_retired(author) {
continue;
}
let Some(hostname) = record.body.hostname() else {
continue;
};
let claim = (record.body.hostname_since().unwrap_or(u64::MAX), *author);
holders
.entry(hostname.to_string())
.and_modify(|held| {
if author.as_bytes() < held.as_bytes() {
*held = *author;
if (claim.0, claim.1.as_bytes()) < (held.0, held.1.as_bytes()) {
*held = claim;
}
})
.or_insert(*author);
.or_insert(claim);
}
holders
.into_iter()
.map(|(hostname, (_, author))| (hostname, author))
.collect()
}
/// The hostname an author holds, if it holds one uncontested.
@@ -612,6 +704,22 @@ impl StateSet {
(self.hostname_holders().get(hostname) == Some(author)).then_some(hostname)
}
/// The name an author claimed and the member that holds it instead, when
/// somebody who claimed it earlier does.
pub fn hostname_taken(&self, author: &EndpointId) -> Option<(&str, EndpointId)> {
if self.is_retired(author) {
return None;
}
let hostname = self.records.get(author)?.body.hostname()?;
let holder = *self.hostname_holders().get(hostname)?;
(holder != *author).then_some((hostname, holder))
}
/// When an author first claimed the name it holds now, if it has one.
pub fn hostname_since_of(&self, author: &EndpointId) -> Option<u64> {
self.records.get(author)?.body.hostname_since()
}
/// The address an author holds, if it holds one uncontested.
pub fn address_of(&self, author: &EndpointId) -> Option<Ipv4Addr> {
let address = self.records.get(author)?.body.claimed_address()?;
@@ -620,21 +728,44 @@ impl StateSet {
/// The range the network settled on, if anybody has said.
///
/// When claims disagree, the one from the lowest author id wins, so every
/// replica reaches the same answer. A participant joining later therefore
/// adopts the range already in use instead of imposing its own.
/// A legacy or explicit range takes precedence over the derived default,
/// so a fresh member's default cannot renumber an established network.
/// Other disagreements use the lowest author id, independently of arrival
/// order. The signed record format and network identity remain unchanged.
pub fn agreed_range(&self) -> Option<Ipv4Range> {
let mut authors: Vec<&EndpointId> = self.records.keys().collect();
authors.sort_by_key(|author| *author.as_bytes());
authors
.into_iter()
.find_map(|author| self.records.get(author)?.body.range())
self.records
.iter()
.chain(
self.retirements
.iter()
.filter(|(author, _)| !self.records.contains_key(*author))
.map(|(author, marker)| (author, &marker.target)),
)
.filter_map(|(author, record)| {
let range = record.body.range()?;
let derived = derived_ipv4_range(NetworkId::from_bytes(record.network));
Some(((range == derived, *author.as_bytes()), range))
})
.min_by_key(|(priority, _)| *priority)
.map(|(_, range)| range)
}
/// The highest version this author has published, as far as is known.
pub fn version_of(&self, author: &EndpointId) -> u64 {
self.records.get(author).map_or(0, |record| record.version)
}
/// Highest witnessed author counter across claims and authored cleanup.
/// This differs from the claim version used to decide retirement.
pub fn authored_version(&self, author: &EndpointId) -> u64 {
self.retirements
.values()
.filter(|m| m.author == *author.as_bytes())
.map(|m| m.version)
.chain(std::iter::once(self.version_of(author)))
.max()
.unwrap_or(0)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -661,6 +792,7 @@ mod tests {
address: Some(address.parse().unwrap()),
range: Some(range()),
hostname: None,
hostname_since: None,
}
}
@@ -720,6 +852,7 @@ mod tests {
address: Some("10.99.0.1".parse().unwrap()),
range: Some(range()),
hostname: None,
hostname_since: None,
},
);
assert!(matches!(outside.verify(id), Err(StateError::Malformed(_))));
@@ -735,6 +868,7 @@ mod tests {
prefix_len: 31,
}),
hostname: None,
hostname_since: None,
},
);
assert!(matches!(no_hosts.verify(id), Err(StateError::Malformed(_))));
@@ -776,6 +910,7 @@ mod tests {
address: None,
range: None,
hostname: Some(bad.to_string()),
hostname_since: None,
},
);
assert!(
@@ -797,6 +932,7 @@ mod tests {
address: Some("10.13.37.5".parse().unwrap()),
range: None,
hostname: None,
hostname_since: None,
},
);
assert!(matches!(record.verify(id), Err(StateError::Malformed(_))));
@@ -818,6 +954,7 @@ mod tests {
address: None,
range: None,
hostname: Some("music".into()),
hostname_since: None,
},
)
};
@@ -860,6 +997,7 @@ mod tests {
address: None,
range: None,
hostname: Some(name.to_string()),
hostname_since: None,
},
)
};
@@ -879,6 +1017,109 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&secret.public()), Some("new"));
}
fn named_at(
secret: &SecretKey,
id: NetworkId,
version: u64,
name: &str,
since: u64,
) -> SignedRecord {
SignedRecord::sign(
secret,
id,
version,
RecordBody::Claim {
address: None,
range: None,
hostname: Some(name.into()),
hostname_since: Some(since),
},
)
}
#[test]
fn a_name_belongs_to_whoever_claimed_it_first_whatever_their_ids_or_arrival_order() {
let id = network("naming");
let mut keys = [SecretKey::generate(), SecretKey::generate()];
keys.sort_by_key(|key| *key.public().as_bytes());
let [low, high] = keys;
// The member with the higher id claimed first, so it holds the name,
// and the lower id does not take it back by sorting first.
let early = named_at(&high, id, 1, "music", 1_000);
let late = named_at(&low, id, 1, "music", 2_000);
for order in [[&early, &late], [&late, &early]] {
let mut set = StateSet::new();
for record in order {
set.merge(id, (*record).clone()).unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&high.public()), Some("music"));
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&low.public()), None);
assert_eq!(
set.hostname_taken(&low.public()),
Some(("music", high.public()))
);
assert_eq!(set.hostname_taken(&high.public()), None);
}
// At the same instant the lower id decides, the same way everywhere.
let mut set = StateSet::new();
set.merge(id, named_at(&high, id, 1, "music", 5)).unwrap();
set.merge(id, named_at(&low, id, 1, "music", 5)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&low.public()), Some("music"));
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&high.public()), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_name_that_loses_is_found_again_once_the_holder_lets_it_go() {
let id = network("naming");
let first = SecretKey::generate();
let second = SecretKey::generate();
let mut set = StateSet::new();
set.merge(id, named_at(&first, id, 1, "music", 1)).unwrap();
set.merge(id, named_at(&second, id, 1, "music", 2)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&second.public()), None);
// Renaming starts the clock afresh, so it cannot be used to jump the
// queue for a name somebody else already holds.
set.merge(id, named_at(&first, id, 2, "other", 3)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&second.public()), Some("music"));
set.merge(id, named_at(&first, id, 3, "music", 4)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&second.public()), Some("music"));
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&first.public()), None);
// And a release hands it on.
set.merge(id, SignedRecord::sign(&second, id, 2, RecordBody::Release))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(set.hostname_of(&first.public()), Some("music"));
}
#[test]
fn a_time_with_no_name_is_not_a_valid_claim() {
let id = network("naming");
let secret = SecretKey::generate();
let record = SignedRecord::sign(
&secret,
id,
1,
RecordBody::Claim {
address: None,
range: None,
hostname: None,
hostname_since: Some(1),
},
);
assert!(matches!(record.verify(id), Err(StateError::Malformed(_))));
// The time is signed: moving it breaks the signature, so nobody can
// improve another member's place in the queue.
let mut forged = named_at(&secret, id, 1, "music", 9_000);
if let RecordBody::Claim { hostname_since, .. } = &mut forged.body {
*hostname_since = Some(1);
}
assert_eq!(forged.verify(id).unwrap_err(), StateError::BadSignature);
}
#[test]
fn a_release_gives_up_the_name_as_well_as_the_address() {
let secret = SecretKey::generate();
@@ -894,6 +1135,7 @@ mod tests {
address: Some("10.13.37.5".parse().unwrap()),
range: Some(range()),
hostname: Some("music".into()),
hostname_since: None,
},
),
)
@@ -1057,6 +1299,7 @@ mod tests {
address: Some("10.99.0.7".parse().unwrap()),
range: Some(custom),
hostname: None,
hostname_since: None,
},
),
)
@@ -1098,7 +1341,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(once.base.octets()[0], 10, "inside 10/8 like the default");
assert_ne!(
once, DEFAULT_IPV4_RANGE,
"the default belongs to whichever network asked first"
"the legacy default remains excluded"
);
// A different network derives a different range, which is the
@@ -1110,4 +1353,34 @@ mod tests {
.network_id();
assert_ne!(once, derived_ipv4_range(other));
}
#[test]
fn a_derived_default_cannot_displace_a_legacy_or_explicit_range() {
let id = network("range-migration");
let a = SecretKey::generate();
let b = SecretKey::generate();
let (low, high) = if a.public().as_bytes() < b.public().as_bytes() {
(a, b)
} else {
(b, a)
};
for established in [DEFAULT_IPV4_RANGE, "10.90.0.0/16".parse().unwrap()] {
let body = |range: Ipv4Range| RecordBody::Claim {
address: Some(Ipv4Addr::from(u32::from(range.base) + 1)),
range: Some(range),
hostname: None,
hostname_since: None,
};
let fresh = SignedRecord::sign(&low, id, 1, body(derived_ipv4_range(id)));
let existing = SignedRecord::sign(&high, id, 1, body(established));
for records in [
vec![fresh.clone(), existing.clone()],
vec![existing.clone(), fresh.clone()],
] {
let mut state = StateSet::new();
state.merge_all(id, records);
assert_eq!(state.agreed_range(), Some(established));
}
}
}
}
+219
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
//! A member may retire an observed claim, never another identity's future.
use iroh::{EndpointId, SecretKey, Signature};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::{RecordBody, SignedRecord, StateError, push_lp};
use crate::NetworkId;
/// Maximum encoded retirement size, including its bounded claim proof.
pub const MAX_RETIREMENT_LEN: usize = 1024;
/// A network member's signed retirement of a proved claim version.
///
/// The original author's signed claim proves the cutoff really existed.
/// Newer claims remain valid. This is neither a forged Release nor a ban.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SignedRetirement {
/// Device identity of the member requesting cleanup.
pub author: [u8; 32],
/// Network in which cleanup applies.
pub network: [u8; 32],
/// Requester's durable author counter, committed with this marker.
pub version: u64,
/// The target's original signed claim; bounds the retired version.
pub target: SignedRecord,
/// Requester's Ed25519 signature over this marker and its proof.
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
impl SignedRetirement {
fn canonical_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(768);
push_lp(&mut out, b"tsunagi-node-retirement/v1");
push_lp(&mut out, &self.network);
push_lp(&mut out, &self.author);
push_lp(&mut out, &self.version.to_be_bytes());
// Bind every field of the original signed claim, including its signature.
push_lp(&mut out, &self.target.network);
push_lp(&mut out, &self.target.author);
push_lp(&mut out, &self.target.version.to_be_bytes());
push_lp(&mut out, &self.target.body.canonical());
push_lp(&mut out, &self.target.signature);
out
}
/// Signs a marker with the requesting member's persistent device key.
pub fn sign(
secret: &SecretKey,
network: NetworkId,
version: u64,
target: SignedRecord,
) -> Self {
let mut marker = Self {
author: *secret.public().as_bytes(),
network: *network.as_bytes(),
version,
target,
signature: Vec::new(),
};
marker.signature = secret.sign(&marker.canonical_bytes()).to_bytes().to_vec();
marker
}
/// Verifies both authors, scope and a finite, genuinely signed cutoff.
pub fn verify(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Result<EndpointId, StateError> {
if self.network != *network.as_bytes() {
return Err(StateError::WrongNetwork);
}
if self.version == 0 || self.version > i64::MAX as u64 {
return Err(StateError::Malformed("retirement version is out of range"));
}
if !matches!(self.target.body, RecordBody::Claim { .. }) {
return Err(StateError::Malformed("only a claim can be retired"));
}
let target = self.target.verify(network)?;
let author = EndpointId::from_bytes(&self.author).map_err(|_| StateError::BadAuthor)?;
if author == target {
return Err(StateError::Malformed(
"use Release to retire your own claim",
));
}
let raw: [u8; Signature::LENGTH] =
self.signature
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| StateError::BadSignatureLength {
expected: Signature::LENGTH,
})?;
author
.verify(&self.canonical_bytes(), &Signature::from_bytes(&raw))
.map_err(|_| StateError::BadSignature)?;
Ok(target)
}
/// A deterministic strongest marker per target, independent of arrival order.
pub(crate) fn supersedes(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.target.version > other.target.version
|| (self.target.version == other.target.version
&& (self.canonical_bytes(), &self.signature)
< (other.canonical_bytes(), &other.signature))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::panic)]
use super::*;
use crate::state::{Ipv4Range, StateSet};
fn claim(key: &SecretKey, id: NetworkId, version: u64) -> SignedRecord {
SignedRecord::sign(
key,
id,
version,
RecordBody::Claim {
address: Some("10.23.0.2".parse().unwrap()),
range: Some("10.23.0.0/24".parse::<Ipv4Range>().unwrap()),
hostname: Some("retired".into()),
hostname_since: Some(123),
},
)
}
#[test]
fn markers_release_claims_in_any_merge_order_and_older_snapshots_cannot_restore_them() {
let id = NetworkId::from_bytes([7; 32]);
let target = SecretKey::generate();
let cleaner = SecretKey::generate();
let record = claim(&target, id, 5);
let marker = SignedRetirement::sign(&cleaner, id, 8, record.clone());
for first in [true, false] {
let mut state = StateSet::new();
if first {
state.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 16).unwrap();
}
state.merge(id, record.clone()).unwrap();
if !first {
state.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 16).unwrap();
}
assert!(state.address_holders().is_empty());
assert!(state.hostname_holders().is_empty());
state.merge(id, claim(&target, id, 4)).unwrap();
assert!(state.is_retired(&target.public()));
assert!(
state.agreed_range().is_some(),
"cleanup does not renumber the network"
);
state.merge(id, claim(&target, id, 6)).unwrap();
assert!(!state.is_retired(&target.public()));
assert_eq!(state.hostname_of(&target.public()), Some("retired"));
}
}
#[test]
fn proof_signature_scope_tampering_future_cutoffs_and_capacity_are_checked() {
let id = NetworkId::from_bytes([7; 32]);
let target = SecretKey::generate();
let cleaner = SecretKey::generate();
let marker = SignedRetirement::sign(&cleaner, id, 8, claim(&target, id, 5));
assert!(marker.verify(NetworkId::from_bytes([8; 32])).is_err());
let mut forged = marker.clone();
forged.target.version = 99;
assert!(forged.verify(id).is_err());
let mut forged = marker.clone();
forged.signature[0] ^= 1;
assert!(forged.verify(id).is_err());
let mut proof = marker.target.clone();
proof.version = 99;
assert!(
SignedRetirement::sign(&cleaner, id, 8, proof)
.verify(id)
.is_err()
);
let mut state = StateSet::new();
assert!(state.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 0).is_err());
assert!(state.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 1).unwrap());
assert!(!state.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 1).unwrap());
assert!(postcard::to_stdvec(&marker).unwrap().len() <= MAX_RETIREMENT_LEN);
let another = SecretKey::generate();
assert!(
state
.merge_retirement(
id,
SignedRetirement::sign(&cleaner, id, 9, claim(&another, id, 1)),
1
)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn competing_cleanup_markers_converge_and_keep_the_highest_observed_cutoff() {
let id = NetworkId::from_bytes([7; 32]);
let target = SecretKey::generate();
let a = SecretKey::generate();
let b = SecretKey::generate();
let markers = [
SignedRetirement::sign(&a, id, 1, claim(&target, id, 4)),
SignedRetirement::sign(&a, id, 2, claim(&target, id, 5)),
SignedRetirement::sign(&b, id, 3, claim(&target, id, 5)),
];
let mut forward = StateSet::new();
let mut reverse = StateSet::new();
for marker in &markers {
forward.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 16).unwrap();
}
for marker in markers.iter().rev() {
reverse.merge_retirement(id, marker.clone(), 16).unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(forward.retirements(), reverse.retirements());
assert_eq!(
forward
.retirement_of(&target.public())
.unwrap()
.target
.version,
5
);
}
}
File renamed without changes.
File renamed without changes.
@@ -248,17 +248,70 @@ impl Storage {
.await
}
/// Persists local broadcast participation for one configured network.
pub async fn set_broadcast(&self, network_id: NetworkId, enabled: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_broadcast(network_id, enabled))
.await
}
/// Persists the ordered protocol selection off the async executor.
pub async fn set_protocols(&self, network_id: NetworkId, protocols: Vec<String>) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_protocols(network_id, &protocols))
.await
}
/// Persists whether this agent offers itself as an exit node in a network.
pub async fn set_exit_node(&self, network_id: NetworkId, enabled: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_exit_node(network_id, enabled))
.await
}
/// Persists the member this device sends its internet traffic through.
pub async fn set_exit_via(&self, network_id: NetworkId, via: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_exit_via(network_id, via.as_ref()))
.await
}
/// Updates the auto-start flag of a network.
pub async fn set_auto_start(&self, network_id: NetworkId, auto_start: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.set_auto_start(network_id, auto_start))
.await
}
/// Configured networks in the user's most recently selected order.
pub async fn network_start_order(&self) -> Result<Vec<NetworkId>> {
self.with_state(|state| {
let configured = state.list_networks()?;
let text = state
.get_setting("network_start_order")?
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut order = Vec::new();
for word in text.split(',') {
if let Ok(id) = word.parse::<NetworkId>()
&& configured.iter().any(|n| n.network_id == id)
&& !order.contains(&id)
{
order.push(id);
}
}
Ok(order)
})
.await
}
/// Prefers this network at startup without disabling suspended networks.
pub async fn prefer_network(&self, network: NetworkId) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.prefer_network(network))
.await
}
/// Removes a network configuration and its cached hints.
pub async fn remove_network(&self, network_id: NetworkId) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| {
state.remove_network(network_id)?;
state.forget_signed_records(network_id)
state.forget_signed_records(network_id)?;
state.forget_retirements(network_id)?;
state.forget_peer_hostnames(network_id)
})
.await?;
self.with_cache((), move |cache| cache.forget_network(network_id))
@@ -277,6 +330,26 @@ impl Storage {
.await
}
/// Remembers the hostname a member announced, so it can still be named
/// once it is away.
pub async fn remember_peer_hostname(
&self,
network_id: NetworkId,
endpoint_id: [u8; 32],
hostname: String,
) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| {
state.remember_peer_hostname(network_id, &endpoint_id, &hostname)
})
.await
}
/// The hostnames members of a network last announced.
pub async fn peer_hostnames(&self, network_id: NetworkId) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], String)>> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.peer_hostnames(network_id))
.await
}
/// Records an address hint. Failures are non-fatal.
pub async fn record_hint(
&self,
@@ -297,6 +370,31 @@ impl Storage {
.await
}
/// Loads verified durable cleanup proofs off the executor.
pub async fn retirements(
&self,
network: NetworkId,
max: usize,
) -> Result<Vec<crate::state::SignedRetirement>> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.retirements(network, max))
.await
}
/// Persists a received cleanup proof before applying it.
pub async fn put_retirement(&self, marker: crate::state::SignedRetirement) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.put_retirement(&marker))
.await
}
/// Commits our cleanup and author counter together before announcement.
pub async fn publish_own_retirement(
&self,
marker: crate::state::SignedRetirement,
) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.publish_own_retirement(&marker))
.await
}
/// Stores a record received from another replica.
pub async fn put_signed_record(&self, record: SignedRecord) -> Result<()> {
self.with_state(move |state| state.put_signed_record(&record))
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